From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Subject: [GIT PULL] usercopy protection for v4.8
Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2016 14:55:07 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160726215507.GA13730@www.outflux.net> (raw)
Hi,
This is my next pull request for v4.8, which introduces a kernel self
protection of copy_to_user/copy_from_user that has been under review and
test on the kernel-hardening list for a while. It has lived for a bit
in -next, and appears to be ready IMO. There will be more improvements
in the future, but this is a solid start.
Again, if I can improve these pull request emails in any way, please
let me know. :)
Thanks!
-Kees
The following changes since commit 523d939ef98fd712632d93a5a2b588e477a7565e:
Linux 4.7 (2016-07-24 12:23:50 -0700)
are available in the git repository at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git tags/usercopy-v4.8
for you to fetch changes up to ed18adc1cdd00a5c55a20fbdaed4804660772281:
mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support (2016-07-26 14:43:54 -0700)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Implements HARDENED_USERCOPY verification of copy_to_user/copy_from_user
bounds checking for most architectures on SLAB and SLUB.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Kees Cook (11):
mm: Implement stack frame object validation
mm: Hardened usercopy
x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
ARM: uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
arm64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
ia64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
powerpc/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
sparc/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
s390/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support
mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support
Laura Abbott (1):
mm: Add is_migrate_cma_page
arch/Kconfig | 9 ++
arch/arm/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h | 11 +-
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 29 +++-
arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c | 4 +-
arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S | 4 +-
arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S | 4 +-
arch/ia64/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 18 ++-
arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h | 21 ++-
arch/s390/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/s390/lib/uaccess.c | 2 +
arch/sparc/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/sparc/include/asm/uaccess_32.h | 14 +-
arch/sparc/include/asm/uaccess_64.h | 11 +-
arch/x86/Kconfig | 2 +
arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h | 44 ++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 10 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h | 2 +
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h | 2 +
include/linux/mmzone.h | 2 +
include/linux/slab.h | 12 ++
include/linux/thread_info.h | 24 ++++
init/Kconfig | 2 +
mm/Makefile | 4 +
mm/slab.c | 30 ++++
mm/slub.c | 40 ++++++
mm/usercopy.c | 268 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/Kconfig | 28 ++++
31 files changed, 573 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 mm/usercopy.c
--
Kees Cook
Brillo & Chrome OS Security
next reply other threads:[~2016-07-26 21:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-07-26 21:55 Kees Cook [this message]
2016-07-27 3:53 ` [GIT PULL] usercopy protection for v4.8 Kees Cook
2016-07-30 4:36 ` Kees Cook
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