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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] usercopy protection for v4.8
Date: Fri, 29 Jul 2016 21:36:37 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jKDGmVu5+VTKT9tV_USScShqivmaCM8h+EGn22ySoq0JQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jLB1488O9cAxhCv7bjQfac9E_+b9XnWMHTdwW546B3ooQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, Jul 26, 2016 at 8:53 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 26, 2016 at 2:55 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> This is my next pull request for v4.8, which introduces a kernel self
>> protection of copy_to_user/copy_from_user that has been under review and
>> test on the kernel-hardening list for a while. It has lived for a bit
>> in -next, and appears to be ready IMO. There will be more improvements
>> in the future, but this is a solid start.
>>
>> Again, if I can improve these pull request emails in any way, please
>> let me know. :)
>
> Hrm, part of the complexity of the KSPP work: this series depends on
> _etext fixes in the arm and arm64 trees, so this should likely wait
> until those trees are pulled.

Okay, this should be ready to go now. The dependencies in arm and
arm64 have been pulled:

commit 14c4a533e09 ("ARM: 8583/1: mm: fix location of _etext")
commit 9fdc14c55cd6 ("arm64: mm: fix location of _etext")

Thanks!

-Kees

>> The following changes since commit 523d939ef98fd712632d93a5a2b588e477a7565e:
>>
>>   Linux 4.7 (2016-07-24 12:23:50 -0700)
>>
>> are available in the git repository at:
>>
>>   git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git tags/usercopy-v4.8
>>
>> for you to fetch changes up to ed18adc1cdd00a5c55a20fbdaed4804660772281:
>>
>>   mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support (2016-07-26 14:43:54 -0700)
>>
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------
>> Implements HARDENED_USERCOPY verification of copy_to_user/copy_from_user
>> bounds checking for most architectures on SLAB and SLUB.
>>
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------
>> Kees Cook (11):
>>       mm: Implement stack frame object validation
>>       mm: Hardened usercopy
>>       x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
>>       ARM: uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
>>       arm64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
>>       ia64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
>>       powerpc/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
>>       sparc/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
>>       s390/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
>>       mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support
>>       mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support
>>
>> Laura Abbott (1):
>>       mm: Add is_migrate_cma_page
>>
>>  arch/Kconfig                        |   9 ++
>>  arch/arm/Kconfig                    |   1 +
>>  arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h      |  11 +-
>>  arch/arm64/Kconfig                  |   1 +
>>  arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h    |  29 +++-
>>  arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c      |   4 +-
>>  arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S     |   4 +-
>>  arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S       |   4 +-
>>  arch/ia64/Kconfig                   |   1 +
>>  arch/ia64/include/asm/uaccess.h     |  18 ++-
>>  arch/powerpc/Kconfig                |   1 +
>>  arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h  |  21 ++-
>>  arch/s390/Kconfig                   |   1 +
>>  arch/s390/lib/uaccess.c             |   2 +
>>  arch/sparc/Kconfig                  |   1 +
>>  arch/sparc/include/asm/uaccess_32.h |  14 +-
>>  arch/sparc/include/asm/uaccess_64.h |  11 +-
>>  arch/x86/Kconfig                    |   2 +
>>  arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h  |  44 ++++++
>>  arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h      |  10 +-
>>  arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h   |   2 +
>>  arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h   |   2 +
>>  include/linux/mmzone.h              |   2 +
>>  include/linux/slab.h                |  12 ++
>>  include/linux/thread_info.h         |  24 ++++
>>  init/Kconfig                        |   2 +
>>  mm/Makefile                         |   4 +
>>  mm/slab.c                           |  30 ++++
>>  mm/slub.c                           |  40 ++++++
>>  mm/usercopy.c                       | 268 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>  security/Kconfig                    |  28 ++++
>>  31 files changed, 573 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
>>  create mode 100644 mm/usercopy.c
>>
>> --
>> Kees Cook
>> Brillo & Chrome OS Security
>
>
>
> --
> Kees Cook
> Chrome OS & Brillo Security



-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security

      reply	other threads:[~2016-07-30  4:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-07-26 21:55 [GIT PULL] usercopy protection for v4.8 Kees Cook
2016-07-27  3:53 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-30  4:36   ` Kees Cook [this message]

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