linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 11:44:01 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161122104401.GC1552@wunner.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <147977472115.6360.13015228230799369019.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

On Tue, Nov 22, 2016 at 12:32:01AM +0000, David Howells wrote:
> Get the firmware's secure-boot status in the kernel boot wrapper and stash
> it somewhere that the main kernel image can find.

That's a bit terse.  You could write here that you're moving the
existing ARM function to generic stub code to be able to reuse it
on x86.

Further comments below.


> 
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> ---
> 
>  Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt           |    2 +
>  arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c          |    5 ++
>  arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h     |    3 +
>  drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile     |    2 -
>  drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c   |   46 --------------------
>  drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c |   66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/linux/efi.h                       |    2 +
>  7 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
> index 95a4d34af3fd..b8527c6b7646 100644
> --- a/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt
> @@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ Offset	Proto	Name		Meaning
>  1E9/001	ALL	eddbuf_entries	Number of entries in eddbuf (below)
>  1EA/001	ALL	edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries	Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer
>  				(below)
> +1EB/001	ALL     kbd_status      Numlock is enabled
> +1EC/001	ALL     secure_boot	Secure boot is enabled in the firmware
>  1EF/001	ALL	sentinel	Used to detect broken bootloaders
>  290/040	ALL	edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures
>  2D0/A00	ALL	e820_map	E820 memory map table
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
> index c8c32ebcdfdb..fd6506de480d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
>  #include <asm/efi.h>
>  #include <asm/setup.h>
>  #include <asm/desc.h>
> +#include <asm/bootparam_utils.h>
>  
>  #include "../string.h"
>  #include "eboot.h"
> @@ -1158,6 +1159,10 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(struct efi_config *c,
>  	else
>  		setup_boot_services32(efi_early);
>  
> +	sanitize_boot_params(boot_params);

What is the connection of this change to the rest of the patch?
Needs an explanation in the commit message.


> +
> +	boot_params->secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot();
> +
>  	setup_graphics(boot_params);
>  
>  	setup_efi_pci(boot_params);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
> index b10bf319ed20..5138dacf8bb8 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
> @@ -135,7 +135,8 @@ struct boot_params {
>  	__u8  eddbuf_entries;				/* 0x1e9 */
>  	__u8  edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries;			/* 0x1ea */
>  	__u8  kbd_status;				/* 0x1eb */
> -	__u8  _pad5[3];					/* 0x1ec */
> +	__u8  secure_boot;				/* 0x1ec */
> +	__u8  _pad5[2];					/* 0x1ed */
>  	/*
>  	 * The sentinel is set to a nonzero value (0xff) in header.S.
>  	 *
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
> index 6621b13c370f..9af966863612 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
> @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD	:= y
>  # Prevents link failures: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is not linked in.
>  KCOV_INSTRUMENT			:= n
>  
> -lib-y				:= efi-stub-helper.o gop.o
> +lib-y				:= efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o
>  
>  # include the stub's generic dependencies from lib/ when building for ARM/arm64
>  arm-deps := fdt_rw.c fdt_ro.c fdt_wip.c fdt.c fdt_empty_tree.c fdt_sw.c sort.c
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
> index b4f7d78f9e8b..552ee61ddbed 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
> @@ -20,52 +20,6 @@
>  
>  bool __nokaslr;
>  
> -static int efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
> -{
> -	static efi_char16_t const sb_var_name[] = {
> -		'S', 'e', 'c', 'u', 'r', 'e', 'B', 'o', 'o', 't', 0 };
> -	static efi_char16_t const sm_var_name[] = {
> -		'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0 };
> -
> -	efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
> -	efi_get_variable_t *f_getvar = sys_table_arg->runtime->get_variable;
> -	u8 val;
> -	unsigned long size = sizeof(val);
> -	efi_status_t status;
> -
> -	status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sb_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid,
> -			  NULL, &size, &val);
> -
> -	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
> -		goto out_efi_err;
> -
> -	if (val == 0)
> -		return 0;
> -
> -	status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sm_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid,
> -			  NULL, &size, &val);
> -
> -	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
> -		goto out_efi_err;
> -
> -	if (val == 1)
> -		return 0;
> -
> -	return 1;
> -
> -out_efi_err:
> -	switch (status) {
> -	case EFI_NOT_FOUND:
> -		return 0;
> -	case EFI_DEVICE_ERROR:
> -		return -EIO;
> -	case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
> -		return -EACCES;
> -	default:
> -		return -EINVAL;
> -	}
> -}
> -
>  efi_status_t efi_open_volume(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
>  			     void *__image, void **__fh)
>  {
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..e44d8c9ee150
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
> +/*
> + * Secure boot handling.
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2013,2014 Linaro Limited
> + *     Roy Franz <roy.franz@linaro.org
> + * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc.
> + *     Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
> + *
> + * This file is part of the Linux kernel, and is made available under the
> + * terms of the GNU General Public License version 2.
> + *
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/efi.h>
> +#include <linux/sort.h>

You don't need sort.h.


> +#include <asm/efi.h>
> +
> +#include "efistub.h"

>From a cursory look at efistub.h, you don't seem to need this either.


> +
> +int efi_get_secureboot(void)

It looks like you didn't compile-test this on ARM.

You dropped the efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg argument but this
isn't defined anywhere as a static global.


> +{
> +	static const efi_char16_t const sb_var_name[] = {
> +		'S', 'e', 'c', 'u', 'r', 'e', 'B', 'o', 'o', 't', 0 };
> +	static const efi_char16_t const sm_var_name[] = {
> +		'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0 };
> +
> +	static const efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
> +

Gratuitous newline in-between variable declarations.

> +	u8 val;
> +	unsigned long size = sizeof(val);
> +	efi_status_t status;
> +
> +#define f_getvar(...) efi_call_runtime(get_variable, __VA_ARGS__)
> +
> +	status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sb_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid,
> +			  NULL, &size, &val);

Just replace the f_getvar yourself instead of having cpp do it:

	status = efi_call_runtime(get_variable, (efi_char16_t *)sb_var_name,
				  (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid, NULL, &size, &val);


> +
> +	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
> +		goto out_efi_err;
> +
> +	if (val == 0)
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sm_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid,
> +			  NULL, &size, &val);

Same here.


> +
> +	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
> +		goto out_efi_err;
> +
> +	if (val == 1)
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	return 1;
> +
> +out_efi_err:
> +	switch (status) {
> +	case EFI_NOT_FOUND:
> +		return 0;
> +	case EFI_DEVICE_ERROR:
> +		return -EIO;
> +	case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
> +		return -EACCES;
> +	default:
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	}

The "out_efi_err" portion differs from the previous version of this
patch.  Setting a __u8 to a negative value, is this really what you
want?

Thanks,

Lukas

> +}
> diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
> index 24db4e5ec817..615d8704f048 100644
> --- a/include/linux/efi.h
> +++ b/include/linux/efi.h
> @@ -1477,6 +1477,8 @@ efi_status_t efi_setup_gop(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
>  bool efi_runtime_disabled(void);
>  extern void efi_call_virt_check_flags(unsigned long flags, const char *call);
>  
> +int efi_get_secureboot(void);
> +
>  /*
>   * Arch code can implement the following three template macros, avoiding
>   * reptition for the void/non-void return cases of {__,}efi_call_virt():
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2016-11-22 10:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-11-16 21:47 [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 01/16] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells
2016-11-16 22:20   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-16 22:40   ` David Howells
2016-12-25 21:20   ` Pavel Machek
2016-12-25 21:44   ` David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells
2016-11-17 12:37   ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22  0:31     ` [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services David Howells
2016-11-22 10:20       ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 14:17       ` David Howells
2016-11-22 14:58         ` Joe Perches
2016-11-22 15:52         ` David Howells
2016-11-22 16:25           ` Joe Perches
2016-11-22 16:40           ` David Howells
2016-11-22 16:51             ` Joe Perches
2016-11-22  0:31     ` [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: " David Howells
2016-11-22  0:31     ` [PATCH 3/6] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions David Howells
2016-11-22  0:32     ` [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells
2016-11-22 10:44       ` Lukas Wunner [this message]
2016-11-22 10:49         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-22 14:47       ` David Howells
2016-11-22 20:30         ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23  0:02         ` David Howells
2016-11-22 14:52       ` David Howells
2016-11-22 20:36         ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 14:57       ` David Howells
2016-11-22  0:32     ` [PATCH 5/6] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode David Howells
2016-11-22 13:03       ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22  0:32     ` [PATCH 6/6] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells
2016-11-22 13:04       ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-21 11:42   ` [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells
2016-11-21 11:52     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 12:41     ` David Howells
2016-11-21 13:14       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 15:17         ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-21 15:25           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 11:46   ` David Howells
2016-11-21 19:58     ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 03/16] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 04/16] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 05/16] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells
2016-11-17 21:58   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-18 11:58     ` Josh Boyer
2016-11-18 12:10       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-18 17:28   ` David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 06/16] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 07/16] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 08/16] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 09/16] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 10/16] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 11/16] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 12/16] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 13/16] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 14/16] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:49 ` [PATCH 15/16] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:49 ` [PATCH 16/16] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is " David Howells
2016-11-16 22:27 ` [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-21 19:53   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-30 14:27     ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-16 22:28 ` Justin Forbes
2016-11-21 23:10 ` [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed David Howells
2016-11-22  6:12   ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-23 12:58   ` David Howells
2016-11-23 19:21     ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-24 17:34     ` David Howells
2016-11-24 20:19       ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-25 14:49       ` David Howells
2016-11-28 22:32   ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-29  0:11   ` David Howells
2016-11-29  0:23     ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-29 14:03     ` David Howells
2016-11-29 14:35       ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-30 14:41       ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-30 16:25       ` David Howells
2016-11-29 10:40   ` David Howells

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20161122104401.GC1552@wunner.de \
    --to=lukas@wunner.de \
    --cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=keyrings@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=matthew.garrett@nebula.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).