From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 14:47:27 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <7199.1479826047@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20161122104401.GC1552@wunner.de>
Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> wrote:
> > +int efi_get_secureboot(void)
>
> It looks like you didn't compile-test this on ARM.
Yes. What arm config would you suggest?
> > +#define f_getvar(...) efi_call_runtime(get_variable, __VA_ARGS__)
> > +
> > + status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sb_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid,
> > + NULL, &size, &val);
>
> Just replace the f_getvar yourself instead of having cpp do it:
>
> status = efi_call_runtime(get_variable, (efi_char16_t *)sb_var_name,
> (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid, NULL, &size, &val);
That makes it less clear. I think something like this makes it much more
obvious:
static efi_status_t get_efi_var(const efi_char16_t *name,
const efi_guid_t *vendor,
u32 *attr,
unsigned long *data_size, void *data)
{
return efi_call_runtime(get_variable,
(efi_char16_t *)name, (efi_guid_t *)vendor,
attr, data_size, data);
}
And then doing:
status = get_efi_var(efi_SecureBoot_name, &efi_variable_guid,
NULL, &size, &val);
which the compiler will inline.
> The "out_efi_err" portion differs from the previous version of this
> patch. Setting a __u8 to a negative value, is this really what you
> want?
Eh? efi_get_secureboot() returns an int as before. The out_efi_err: portions
are exactly the same:
> -static int efi_get_secureboot(...) > +int efi_get_secureboot(...)
> ... > ...
> -out_efi_err: > +out_efi_err:
> - switch (status) { > + switch (status) {
> - case EFI_NOT_FOUND: > + case EFI_NOT_FOUND:
> - return 0; > + return 0;
> - case EFI_DEVICE_ERROR: > + case EFI_DEVICE_ERROR:
> - return -EIO; > + return -EIO;
> - case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION: > + case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
> - return -EACCES; > + return -EACCES;
> - default: > + default:
> - return -EINVAL; > + return -EINVAL;
> - } > + }
> -}
David
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-11-22 14:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-11-16 21:47 [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 01/16] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells
2016-11-16 22:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-16 22:40 ` David Howells
2016-12-25 21:20 ` Pavel Machek
2016-12-25 21:44 ` David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells
2016-11-17 12:37 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 0:31 ` [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services David Howells
2016-11-22 10:20 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 14:17 ` David Howells
2016-11-22 14:58 ` Joe Perches
2016-11-22 15:52 ` David Howells
2016-11-22 16:25 ` Joe Perches
2016-11-22 16:40 ` David Howells
2016-11-22 16:51 ` Joe Perches
2016-11-22 0:31 ` [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: " David Howells
2016-11-22 0:31 ` [PATCH 3/6] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions David Howells
2016-11-22 0:32 ` [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells
2016-11-22 10:44 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 10:49 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-22 14:47 ` David Howells [this message]
2016-11-22 20:30 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23 0:02 ` David Howells
2016-11-22 14:52 ` David Howells
2016-11-22 20:36 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 14:57 ` David Howells
2016-11-22 0:32 ` [PATCH 5/6] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode David Howells
2016-11-22 13:03 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 0:32 ` [PATCH 6/6] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells
2016-11-22 13:04 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-21 11:42 ` [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells
2016-11-21 11:52 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 12:41 ` David Howells
2016-11-21 13:14 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 15:17 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-21 15:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 11:46 ` David Howells
2016-11-21 19:58 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 03/16] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 04/16] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 05/16] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells
2016-11-17 21:58 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-18 11:58 ` Josh Boyer
2016-11-18 12:10 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-18 17:28 ` David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 06/16] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 07/16] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 08/16] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 09/16] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 10/16] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 11/16] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 12/16] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 13/16] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 14/16] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:49 ` [PATCH 15/16] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:49 ` [PATCH 16/16] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is " David Howells
2016-11-16 22:27 ` [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-21 19:53 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-30 14:27 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-16 22:28 ` Justin Forbes
2016-11-21 23:10 ` [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed David Howells
2016-11-22 6:12 ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-23 12:58 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 19:21 ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-24 17:34 ` David Howells
2016-11-24 20:19 ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-25 14:49 ` David Howells
2016-11-28 22:32 ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-29 0:11 ` David Howells
2016-11-29 0:23 ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-29 14:03 ` David Howells
2016-11-29 14:35 ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-30 14:41 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-30 16:25 ` David Howells
2016-11-29 10:40 ` David Howells
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