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From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 14:47:27 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7199.1479826047@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20161122104401.GC1552@wunner.de>

Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> wrote:

> > +int efi_get_secureboot(void)
> 
> It looks like you didn't compile-test this on ARM.

Yes.  What arm config would you suggest?

> > +#define f_getvar(...) efi_call_runtime(get_variable, __VA_ARGS__)
> > +
> > +	status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sb_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid,
> > +			  NULL, &size, &val);
>
> Just replace the f_getvar yourself instead of having cpp do it:
>
> 	status = efi_call_runtime(get_variable, (efi_char16_t *)sb_var_name,
> 				  (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid, NULL, &size, &val);

That makes it less clear.  I think something like this makes it much more
obvious:

    static efi_status_t get_efi_var(const efi_char16_t *name,
				const efi_guid_t *vendor,
				u32 *attr,
				unsigned long *data_size, void *data)
    {
	return efi_call_runtime(get_variable,
				(efi_char16_t *)name, (efi_guid_t *)vendor,
				attr, data_size, data);
    }

And then doing:

	status = get_efi_var(efi_SecureBoot_name, &efi_variable_guid,
			     NULL, &size, &val);

which the compiler will inline.

> The "out_efi_err" portion differs from the previous version of this
> patch.  Setting a __u8 to a negative value, is this really what you
> want?

Eh?  efi_get_secureboot() returns an int as before.  The out_efi_err: portions
are exactly the same:

> -static int efi_get_secureboot(...)	> +int efi_get_secureboot(...)
> ...					> ...
> -out_efi_err:				> +out_efi_err:
> -	switch (status) {		> +	switch (status) {
> -	case EFI_NOT_FOUND:		> +	case EFI_NOT_FOUND:
> -		return 0;		> +		return 0;
> -	case EFI_DEVICE_ERROR:		> +	case EFI_DEVICE_ERROR:
> -		return -EIO;		> +		return -EIO;
> -	case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION:	> +	case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
> -		return -EACCES;		> +		return -EACCES;
> -	default:			> +	default:
> -		return -EINVAL;		> +		return -EINVAL;
> -	}				> +	}
> -}

David

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-11-22 14:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-11-16 21:47 [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 01/16] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells
2016-11-16 22:20   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-16 22:40   ` David Howells
2016-12-25 21:20   ` Pavel Machek
2016-12-25 21:44   ` David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells
2016-11-17 12:37   ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22  0:31     ` [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services David Howells
2016-11-22 10:20       ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 14:17       ` David Howells
2016-11-22 14:58         ` Joe Perches
2016-11-22 15:52         ` David Howells
2016-11-22 16:25           ` Joe Perches
2016-11-22 16:40           ` David Howells
2016-11-22 16:51             ` Joe Perches
2016-11-22  0:31     ` [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: " David Howells
2016-11-22  0:31     ` [PATCH 3/6] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions David Howells
2016-11-22  0:32     ` [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells
2016-11-22 10:44       ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 10:49         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-22 14:47       ` David Howells [this message]
2016-11-22 20:30         ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23  0:02         ` David Howells
2016-11-22 14:52       ` David Howells
2016-11-22 20:36         ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 14:57       ` David Howells
2016-11-22  0:32     ` [PATCH 5/6] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode David Howells
2016-11-22 13:03       ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22  0:32     ` [PATCH 6/6] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells
2016-11-22 13:04       ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-21 11:42   ` [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells
2016-11-21 11:52     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 12:41     ` David Howells
2016-11-21 13:14       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 15:17         ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-21 15:25           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 11:46   ` David Howells
2016-11-21 19:58     ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 03/16] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 04/16] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 05/16] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells
2016-11-17 21:58   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-18 11:58     ` Josh Boyer
2016-11-18 12:10       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-18 17:28   ` David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 06/16] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 07/16] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 08/16] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 09/16] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 10/16] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 11/16] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 12/16] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 13/16] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 14/16] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:49 ` [PATCH 15/16] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:49 ` [PATCH 16/16] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is " David Howells
2016-11-16 22:27 ` [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-21 19:53   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-30 14:27     ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-16 22:28 ` Justin Forbes
2016-11-21 23:10 ` [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed David Howells
2016-11-22  6:12   ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-23 12:58   ` David Howells
2016-11-23 19:21     ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-24 17:34     ` David Howells
2016-11-24 20:19       ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-25 14:49       ` David Howells
2016-11-28 22:32   ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-29  0:11   ` David Howells
2016-11-29  0:23     ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-29 14:03     ` David Howells
2016-11-29 14:35       ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-30 14:41       ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-30 16:25       ` David Howells
2016-11-29 10:40   ` David Howells

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