From: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-usb@vger.kernel.org" <linux-usb@vger.kernel.org>,
"dhowells@redhat.com" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"keyrings@vger.kernel.org" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>,
"linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] keys/encrypted: Fix two crypto-on-the-stack bugs
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2016 17:58:56 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161214165856.GD17255@8bytes.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrWsTKq0NOpwiJtB50OU7w99-m82NhPG_Uxs2Fqbpz0LLA@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, Dec 13, 2016 at 08:40:00AM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> But I think this is rather silly. Joerg, Linus, etc: would it be okay
> to change lib/dma-debug.c to allow DMA *from* rodata?
Yeah, this would be fine for DMA_TO_DEVICE mappings. At least I can't
think of a reason right now to not allow it, in the end its also
read-only memory for the CPU, so it can be readable by devices too.
There is no danger of race conditions like on stacks or data leaks, as
there is only compile-time data in rodata.
Joerg
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-12-14 16:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-12-12 20:52 [PATCH] wusbcore: Fix one more crypto-on-the-stack bug Andy Lutomirski
2016-12-12 20:53 ` [PATCH] keys/encrypted: Fix two crypto-on-the-stack bugs Andy Lutomirski
2016-12-13 12:20 ` David Laight
2016-12-13 16:40 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-12-14 16:58 ` Joerg Roedel [this message]
2016-12-13 16:45 ` David Howells
2016-12-13 17:02 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-12-13 20:02 ` David Howells
2016-12-12 20:54 ` [PATCH] cifs: Fix smbencrypt() to stop pointing a scatterlist at the stack Andy Lutomirski
2016-12-13 11:40 ` Sergei Shtylyov
2016-12-13 13:07 ` Jeff Layton
2016-12-14 8:19 ` Steve French
2016-12-12 20:55 ` [PATCH] crypto: Make a few drivers depend on !VMAP_STACK Andy Lutomirski
2016-12-13 3:42 ` Herbert Xu
2016-12-12 20:55 ` [PATCH] orinoco: Use shash instead of ahash for MIC calculations Andy Lutomirski
2016-12-13 7:54 ` Eric Biggers
2016-12-13 11:35 ` Kalle Valo
2016-12-13 16:41 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-12-13 17:03 ` Kalle Valo
2016-12-30 11:34 ` Kalle Valo
2016-12-30 12:02 ` Kalle Valo
2016-12-30 12:15 ` Kalle Valo
2016-12-12 21:44 ` [PATCH] wusbcore: Fix one more crypto-on-the-stack bug Greg KH
2016-12-12 23:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-12-12 22:28 ` [PATCH] keys/encrypted: Fix two crypto-on-the-stack bugs David Howells
2016-12-13 0:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
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