* [PATCH 1/2] ns: Allow ns_entries to have custom symlink content
@ 2017-01-14 14:14 Kirill Tkhai
2017-01-14 14:15 ` [PATCH 2/2] pidns: Expose task pid_ns_for_children to userspace Kirill Tkhai
2017-01-16 8:18 ` [PATCH 1/2] ns: Allow ns_entries to have custom symlink content Cyrill Gorcunov
0 siblings, 2 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Kirill Tkhai @ 2017-01-14 14:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: avagin, linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, ktkhai, ebiederm, gorcunov, viro
Make possible to have link content prefix yyy
different from the link name xxx:
$ readlink /proc/[pid]/ns/xxx
yyy:[4026531838]
This will be used in next patch.
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
---
fs/nsfs.c | 4 +++-
include/linux/proc_ns.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/nsfs.c b/fs/nsfs.c
index 8c9fb29c6673..c2499c59bf51 100644
--- a/fs/nsfs.c
+++ b/fs/nsfs.c
@@ -182,9 +182,11 @@ int ns_get_name(char *buf, size_t size, struct task_struct *task,
{
struct ns_common *ns;
int res = -ENOENT;
+ const char *name;
ns = ns_ops->get(task);
if (ns) {
- res = snprintf(buf, size, "%s:[%u]", ns_ops->name, ns->inum);
+ name = ns_ops->real_ns_name ? : ns_ops->name;
+ res = snprintf(buf, size, "%s:[%u]", name, ns->inum);
ns_ops->put(ns);
}
return res;
diff --git a/include/linux/proc_ns.h b/include/linux/proc_ns.h
index 12cb8bd81d2d..88dba3b53375 100644
--- a/include/linux/proc_ns.h
+++ b/include/linux/proc_ns.h
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ struct inode;
struct proc_ns_operations {
const char *name;
+ const char *real_ns_name;
int type;
struct ns_common *(*get)(struct task_struct *task);
void (*put)(struct ns_common *ns);
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 2/2] pidns: Expose task pid_ns_for_children to userspace
2017-01-14 14:14 [PATCH 1/2] ns: Allow ns_entries to have custom symlink content Kirill Tkhai
@ 2017-01-14 14:15 ` Kirill Tkhai
2017-01-17 20:00 ` Andrei Vagin
` (2 more replies)
2017-01-16 8:18 ` [PATCH 1/2] ns: Allow ns_entries to have custom symlink content Cyrill Gorcunov
1 sibling, 3 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Kirill Tkhai @ 2017-01-14 14:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: avagin, linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, ktkhai, ebiederm, gorcunov, viro
For correct checkpointing/restoring of a task from userspace
it's need to know the task's pid_ns_for_children. Currently,
there is no a sane way to do that (the only possible trick
is to force the task create a new child and to analize the
child's /proc/[pid]/ns/pid link, that is performance-stupid).
The patch exposes pid_ns_for_children to ns directory
in standard way with the name "pid_for_children":
~# ls /proc/5531/ns -l | grep pid
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Jan 14 16:38 pid -> pid:[4026531836]
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Jan 14 16:38 pid_for_children -> pid:[4026532286]
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
---
fs/proc/namespaces.c | 1 +
include/linux/proc_ns.h | 1 +
kernel/pid_namespace.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/proc/namespaces.c b/fs/proc/namespaces.c
index 766f0c637ad1..3803b24ca220 100644
--- a/fs/proc/namespaces.c
+++ b/fs/proc/namespaces.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static const struct proc_ns_operations *ns_entries[] = {
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_PID_NS
&pidns_operations,
+ &pidns_for_children_operations,
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
&userns_operations,
diff --git a/include/linux/proc_ns.h b/include/linux/proc_ns.h
index 88dba3b53375..58ab28d81fc2 100644
--- a/include/linux/proc_ns.h
+++ b/include/linux/proc_ns.h
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ extern const struct proc_ns_operations netns_operations;
extern const struct proc_ns_operations utsns_operations;
extern const struct proc_ns_operations ipcns_operations;
extern const struct proc_ns_operations pidns_operations;
+extern const struct proc_ns_operations pidns_for_children_operations;
extern const struct proc_ns_operations userns_operations;
extern const struct proc_ns_operations mntns_operations;
extern const struct proc_ns_operations cgroupns_operations;
diff --git a/kernel/pid_namespace.c b/kernel/pid_namespace.c
index df9e8e9e0be7..cbe950d4a11e 100644
--- a/kernel/pid_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/pid_namespace.c
@@ -369,6 +369,20 @@ static struct ns_common *pidns_get(struct task_struct *task)
return ns ? &ns->ns : NULL;
}
+static struct ns_common *pidns_for_children_get(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ struct pid_namespace *ns = NULL;
+
+ task_lock(task);
+ if (task->nsproxy) {
+ ns = task->nsproxy->pid_ns_for_children;
+ get_pid_ns(ns);
+ }
+ task_unlock(task);
+
+ return ns ? &ns->ns : NULL;
+}
+
static void pidns_put(struct ns_common *ns)
{
put_pid_ns(to_pid_ns(ns));
@@ -438,6 +452,17 @@ const struct proc_ns_operations pidns_operations = {
.get_parent = pidns_get_parent,
};
+const struct proc_ns_operations pidns_for_children_operations = {
+ .name = "pid_for_children",
+ .real_ns_name = "pid",
+ .type = CLONE_NEWPID,
+ .get = pidns_for_children_get,
+ .put = pidns_put,
+ .install = pidns_install,
+ .owner = pidns_owner,
+ .get_parent = pidns_get_parent,
+};
+
static __init int pid_namespaces_init(void)
{
pid_ns_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(pid_namespace, SLAB_PANIC);
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 1/2] ns: Allow ns_entries to have custom symlink content
2017-01-14 14:14 [PATCH 1/2] ns: Allow ns_entries to have custom symlink content Kirill Tkhai
2017-01-14 14:15 ` [PATCH 2/2] pidns: Expose task pid_ns_for_children to userspace Kirill Tkhai
@ 2017-01-16 8:18 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
1 sibling, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Cyrill Gorcunov @ 2017-01-16 8:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kirill Tkhai; +Cc: avagin, linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, ebiederm, viro
On Sat, Jan 14, 2017 at 05:14:48PM +0300, Kirill Tkhai wrote:
> Make possible to have link content prefix yyy
> different from the link name xxx:
>
> $ readlink /proc/[pid]/ns/xxx
> yyy:[4026531838]
>
> This will be used in next patch.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
I don't like much @real_ns_name variable naming, but it's
just personal opinion. The rest looks good to me (for
both patches). If only I didn't miss something obvious.
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 2/2] pidns: Expose task pid_ns_for_children to userspace
2017-01-14 14:15 ` [PATCH 2/2] pidns: Expose task pid_ns_for_children to userspace Kirill Tkhai
@ 2017-01-17 20:00 ` Andrei Vagin
2017-01-23 21:49 ` Alban Crequy
2017-01-30 15:10 ` Kirill Tkhai
2 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Andrei Vagin @ 2017-01-17 20:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kirill Tkhai
Cc: avagin, linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, ebiederm, gorcunov, viro,
linux-api, Michael Kerrisk
On Sat, Jan 14, 2017 at 05:15:04PM +0300, Kirill Tkhai wrote:
> For correct checkpointing/restoring of a task from userspace
> it's need to know the task's pid_ns_for_children. Currently,
> there is no a sane way to do that (the only possible trick
> is to force the task create a new child and to analize the
> child's /proc/[pid]/ns/pid link, that is performance-stupid).
>
> The patch exposes pid_ns_for_children to ns directory
> in standard way with the name "pid_for_children":
>
> ~# ls /proc/5531/ns -l | grep pid
> lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Jan 14 16:38 pid -> pid:[4026531836]
> lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Jan 14 16:38 pid_for_children -> pid:[4026532286]
>
Cc: linux-api, Michael Kerrisk
Acked-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com>
> Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
> ---
> fs/proc/namespaces.c | 1 +
> include/linux/proc_ns.h | 1 +
> kernel/pid_namespace.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/fs/proc/namespaces.c b/fs/proc/namespaces.c
> index 766f0c637ad1..3803b24ca220 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/namespaces.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/namespaces.c
> @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static const struct proc_ns_operations *ns_entries[] = {
> #endif
> #ifdef CONFIG_PID_NS
> &pidns_operations,
> + &pidns_for_children_operations,
> #endif
> #ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
> &userns_operations,
> diff --git a/include/linux/proc_ns.h b/include/linux/proc_ns.h
> index 88dba3b53375..58ab28d81fc2 100644
> --- a/include/linux/proc_ns.h
> +++ b/include/linux/proc_ns.h
> @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ extern const struct proc_ns_operations netns_operations;
> extern const struct proc_ns_operations utsns_operations;
> extern const struct proc_ns_operations ipcns_operations;
> extern const struct proc_ns_operations pidns_operations;
> +extern const struct proc_ns_operations pidns_for_children_operations;
> extern const struct proc_ns_operations userns_operations;
> extern const struct proc_ns_operations mntns_operations;
> extern const struct proc_ns_operations cgroupns_operations;
> diff --git a/kernel/pid_namespace.c b/kernel/pid_namespace.c
> index df9e8e9e0be7..cbe950d4a11e 100644
> --- a/kernel/pid_namespace.c
> +++ b/kernel/pid_namespace.c
> @@ -369,6 +369,20 @@ static struct ns_common *pidns_get(struct task_struct *task)
> return ns ? &ns->ns : NULL;
> }
>
> +static struct ns_common *pidns_for_children_get(struct task_struct *task)
> +{
> + struct pid_namespace *ns = NULL;
> +
> + task_lock(task);
> + if (task->nsproxy) {
> + ns = task->nsproxy->pid_ns_for_children;
> + get_pid_ns(ns);
> + }
> + task_unlock(task);
> +
> + return ns ? &ns->ns : NULL;
> +}
> +
> static void pidns_put(struct ns_common *ns)
> {
> put_pid_ns(to_pid_ns(ns));
> @@ -438,6 +452,17 @@ const struct proc_ns_operations pidns_operations = {
> .get_parent = pidns_get_parent,
> };
>
> +const struct proc_ns_operations pidns_for_children_operations = {
> + .name = "pid_for_children",
> + .real_ns_name = "pid",
> + .type = CLONE_NEWPID,
> + .get = pidns_for_children_get,
> + .put = pidns_put,
> + .install = pidns_install,
> + .owner = pidns_owner,
> + .get_parent = pidns_get_parent,
> +};
> +
> static __init int pid_namespaces_init(void)
> {
> pid_ns_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(pid_namespace, SLAB_PANIC);
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 2/2] pidns: Expose task pid_ns_for_children to userspace
2017-01-14 14:15 ` [PATCH 2/2] pidns: Expose task pid_ns_for_children to userspace Kirill Tkhai
2017-01-17 20:00 ` Andrei Vagin
@ 2017-01-23 21:49 ` Alban Crequy
2017-01-24 8:35 ` Kirill Tkhai
2017-01-30 15:10 ` Kirill Tkhai
2 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Alban Crequy @ 2017-01-23 21:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kirill Tkhai
Cc: Andrey Vagin, linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, Eric W. Biederman,
Cyrill Gorcunov, Alexander Viro, Michael Kerrisk-manpages,
Linux API
On 14 January 2017 at 15:15, Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> wrote:
> For correct checkpointing/restoring of a task from userspace
> it's need to know the task's pid_ns_for_children. Currently,
> there is no a sane way to do that (the only possible trick
> is to force the task create a new child and to analize the
> child's /proc/[pid]/ns/pid link, that is performance-stupid).
>
> The patch exposes pid_ns_for_children to ns directory
> in standard way with the name "pid_for_children":
>
> ~# ls /proc/5531/ns -l | grep pid
> lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Jan 14 16:38 pid -> pid:[4026531836]
> lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Jan 14 16:38 pid_for_children -> pid:[4026532286]
>
> Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
What's happening if a process, after unsharing CLONE_NEWPID, does not
fork but instead let another process open the new "pid_for_children"
and then setns()+fork()? Is that other process allowed to create the
"pid 1" in the new pid namespaces? Is that also allowed if the other
process lives in a sibling pid namespace? If so, that would break what
pid_namespaces(7) says:
"the parental relationship between processes mirrors the parental
relationship between PID namespaces: the parent of a process is
either in the same namespace or resides in the immediate parent
PID namespace."
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 2/2] pidns: Expose task pid_ns_for_children to userspace
2017-01-23 21:49 ` Alban Crequy
@ 2017-01-24 8:35 ` Kirill Tkhai
0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Kirill Tkhai @ 2017-01-24 8:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alban Crequy
Cc: Andrey Vagin, linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, Eric W. Biederman,
Cyrill Gorcunov, Alexander Viro, Michael Kerrisk-manpages,
Linux API
On 24.01.2017 00:49, Alban Crequy wrote:
> On 14 January 2017 at 15:15, Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> wrote:
>> For correct checkpointing/restoring of a task from userspace
>> it's need to know the task's pid_ns_for_children. Currently,
>> there is no a sane way to do that (the only possible trick
>> is to force the task create a new child and to analize the
>> child's /proc/[pid]/ns/pid link, that is performance-stupid).
>>
>> The patch exposes pid_ns_for_children to ns directory
>> in standard way with the name "pid_for_children":
>>
>> ~# ls /proc/5531/ns -l | grep pid
>> lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Jan 14 16:38 pid -> pid:[4026531836]
>> lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Jan 14 16:38 pid_for_children -> pid:[4026532286]
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
>
> What's happening if a process, after unsharing CLONE_NEWPID, does not
> fork but instead let another process open the new "pid_for_children"
> and then setns()+fork()? Is that other process allowed to create the
> "pid 1" in the new pid namespaces? Is that also allowed if the other
> process lives in a sibling pid namespace? If so, that would break what
> pid_namespaces(7) says:
>
> "the parental relationship between processes mirrors the parental
> relationship between PID namespaces: the parent of a process is
> either in the same namespace or resides in the immediate parent
> PID namespace."
>
You can setns() on a pid_ns only if your active pid_ns is a (grand)parent
for the target pid_ns. So, the situation you described is not possible.
See pidns_install() for the details.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 2/2] pidns: Expose task pid_ns_for_children to userspace
2017-01-14 14:15 ` [PATCH 2/2] pidns: Expose task pid_ns_for_children to userspace Kirill Tkhai
2017-01-17 20:00 ` Andrei Vagin
2017-01-23 21:49 ` Alban Crequy
@ 2017-01-30 15:10 ` Kirill Tkhai
2 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Kirill Tkhai @ 2017-01-30 15:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: avagin, linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, ebiederm, gorcunov, viro
ping
On 14.01.2017 17:15, Kirill Tkhai wrote:
> For correct checkpointing/restoring of a task from userspace
> it's need to know the task's pid_ns_for_children. Currently,
> there is no a sane way to do that (the only possible trick
> is to force the task create a new child and to analize the
> child's /proc/[pid]/ns/pid link, that is performance-stupid).
>
> The patch exposes pid_ns_for_children to ns directory
> in standard way with the name "pid_for_children":
>
> ~# ls /proc/5531/ns -l | grep pid
> lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Jan 14 16:38 pid -> pid:[4026531836]
> lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Jan 14 16:38 pid_for_children -> pid:[4026532286]
>
> Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
> ---
> fs/proc/namespaces.c | 1 +
> include/linux/proc_ns.h | 1 +
> kernel/pid_namespace.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/fs/proc/namespaces.c b/fs/proc/namespaces.c
> index 766f0c637ad1..3803b24ca220 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/namespaces.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/namespaces.c
> @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static const struct proc_ns_operations *ns_entries[] = {
> #endif
> #ifdef CONFIG_PID_NS
> &pidns_operations,
> + &pidns_for_children_operations,
> #endif
> #ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
> &userns_operations,
> diff --git a/include/linux/proc_ns.h b/include/linux/proc_ns.h
> index 88dba3b53375..58ab28d81fc2 100644
> --- a/include/linux/proc_ns.h
> +++ b/include/linux/proc_ns.h
> @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ extern const struct proc_ns_operations netns_operations;
> extern const struct proc_ns_operations utsns_operations;
> extern const struct proc_ns_operations ipcns_operations;
> extern const struct proc_ns_operations pidns_operations;
> +extern const struct proc_ns_operations pidns_for_children_operations;
> extern const struct proc_ns_operations userns_operations;
> extern const struct proc_ns_operations mntns_operations;
> extern const struct proc_ns_operations cgroupns_operations;
> diff --git a/kernel/pid_namespace.c b/kernel/pid_namespace.c
> index df9e8e9e0be7..cbe950d4a11e 100644
> --- a/kernel/pid_namespace.c
> +++ b/kernel/pid_namespace.c
> @@ -369,6 +369,20 @@ static struct ns_common *pidns_get(struct task_struct *task)
> return ns ? &ns->ns : NULL;
> }
>
> +static struct ns_common *pidns_for_children_get(struct task_struct *task)
> +{
> + struct pid_namespace *ns = NULL;
> +
> + task_lock(task);
> + if (task->nsproxy) {
> + ns = task->nsproxy->pid_ns_for_children;
> + get_pid_ns(ns);
> + }
> + task_unlock(task);
> +
> + return ns ? &ns->ns : NULL;
> +}
> +
> static void pidns_put(struct ns_common *ns)
> {
> put_pid_ns(to_pid_ns(ns));
> @@ -438,6 +452,17 @@ const struct proc_ns_operations pidns_operations = {
> .get_parent = pidns_get_parent,
> };
>
> +const struct proc_ns_operations pidns_for_children_operations = {
> + .name = "pid_for_children",
> + .real_ns_name = "pid",
> + .type = CLONE_NEWPID,
> + .get = pidns_for_children_get,
> + .put = pidns_put,
> + .install = pidns_install,
> + .owner = pidns_owner,
> + .get_parent = pidns_get_parent,
> +};
> +
> static __init int pid_namespaces_init(void)
> {
> pid_ns_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(pid_namespace, SLAB_PANIC);
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2017-01-30 15:11 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
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2017-01-14 14:14 [PATCH 1/2] ns: Allow ns_entries to have custom symlink content Kirill Tkhai
2017-01-14 14:15 ` [PATCH 2/2] pidns: Expose task pid_ns_for_children to userspace Kirill Tkhai
2017-01-17 20:00 ` Andrei Vagin
2017-01-23 21:49 ` Alban Crequy
2017-01-24 8:35 ` Kirill Tkhai
2017-01-30 15:10 ` Kirill Tkhai
2017-01-16 8:18 ` [PATCH 1/2] ns: Allow ns_entries to have custom symlink content Cyrill Gorcunov
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