* [PATCH 4.4 01/28] netlink: remove mmapped netlink support
2017-03-20 17:48 [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.56-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-03-20 17:48 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-03-20 17:48 ` [PATCH 4.4 02/28] [PATCH 04/41] vxlan: correctly validate VXLAN ID against VXLAN_N_VID Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (25 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-03-20 17:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Daniel Borkmann,
Ken-ichirou MATSUZAWA, Pablo Neira Ayuso, Patrick McHardy,
Thomas Graf, Florian Westphal, David S. Miller, Shi Yuejie
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
commit d1b4c689d4130bcfd3532680b64db562300716b6 upstream.
mmapped netlink has a number of unresolved issues:
- TX zerocopy support had to be disabled more than a year ago via
commit 4682a0358639b29cf ("netlink: Always copy on mmap TX.")
because the content of the mmapped area can change after netlink
attribute validation but before message processing.
- RX support was implemented mainly to speed up nfqueue dumping packet
payload to userspace. However, since commit ae08ce0021087a5d812d2
("netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: zero copy support") we avoid one copy
with the socket-based interface too (via the skb_zerocopy helper).
The other problem is that skbs attached to mmaped netlink socket
behave different from normal skbs:
- they don't have a shinfo area, so all functions that use skb_shinfo()
(e.g. skb_clone) cannot be used.
- reserving headroom prevents userspace from seeing the content as
it expects message to start at skb->head.
See for instance
commit aa3a022094fa ("netlink: not trim skb for mmaped socket when dump").
- skbs handed e.g. to netlink_ack must have non-NULL skb->sk, else we
crash because it needs the sk to check if a tx ring is attached.
Also not obvious, leads to non-intuitive bug fixes such as 7c7bdf359
("netfilter: nfnetlink: use original skbuff when acking batches").
mmaped netlink also didn't play nicely with the skb_zerocopy helper
used by nfqueue and openvswitch. Daniel Borkmann fixed this via
commit 6bb0fef489f6 ("netlink, mmap: fix edge-case leakages in nf queue
zero-copy")' but at the cost of also needing to provide remaining
length to the allocation function.
nfqueue also has problems when used with mmaped rx netlink:
- mmaped netlink doesn't allow use of nfqueue batch verdict messages.
Problem is that in the mmap case, the allocation time also determines
the ordering in which the frame will be seen by userspace (A
allocating before B means that A is located in earlier ring slot,
but this also means that B might get a lower sequence number then A
since seqno is decided later. To fix this we would need to extend the
spinlocked region to also cover the allocation and message setup which
isn't desirable.
- nfqueue can now be configured to queue large (GSO) skbs to userspace.
Queing GSO packets is faster than having to force a software segmentation
in the kernel, so this is a desirable option. However, with a mmap based
ring one has to use 64kb per ring slot element, else mmap has to fall back
to the socket path (NL_MMAP_STATUS_COPY) for all large packets.
To use the mmap interface, userspace not only has to probe for mmap netlink
support, it also has to implement a recv/socket receive path in order to
handle messages that exceed the size of an rx ring element.
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Ken-ichirou MATSUZAWA <chamaken@gmail.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Shi Yuejie <shiyuejie@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
Documentation/networking/netlink_mmap.txt | 332 -------------
include/uapi/linux/netlink.h | 4
include/uapi/linux/netlink_diag.h | 2
net/netlink/Kconfig | 9
net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 751 ------------------------------
net/netlink/af_netlink.h | 15
net/netlink/diag.c | 39 -
7 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1138 deletions(-)
--- a/Documentation/networking/netlink_mmap.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,332 +0,0 @@
-This file documents how to use memory mapped I/O with netlink.
-
-Author: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
-
-Overview
---------
-
-Memory mapped netlink I/O can be used to increase throughput and decrease
-overhead of unicast receive and transmit operations. Some netlink subsystems
-require high throughput, these are mainly the netfilter subsystems
-nfnetlink_queue and nfnetlink_log, but it can also help speed up large
-dump operations of f.i. the routing database.
-
-Memory mapped netlink I/O used two circular ring buffers for RX and TX which
-are mapped into the processes address space.
-
-The RX ring is used by the kernel to directly construct netlink messages into
-user-space memory without copying them as done with regular socket I/O,
-additionally as long as the ring contains messages no recvmsg() or poll()
-syscalls have to be issued by user-space to get more message.
-
-The TX ring is used to process messages directly from user-space memory, the
-kernel processes all messages contained in the ring using a single sendmsg()
-call.
-
-Usage overview
---------------
-
-In order to use memory mapped netlink I/O, user-space needs three main changes:
-
-- ring setup
-- conversion of the RX path to get messages from the ring instead of recvmsg()
-- conversion of the TX path to construct messages into the ring
-
-Ring setup is done using setsockopt() to provide the ring parameters to the
-kernel, then a call to mmap() to map the ring into the processes address space:
-
-- setsockopt(fd, SOL_NETLINK, NETLINK_RX_RING, ¶ms, sizeof(params));
-- setsockopt(fd, SOL_NETLINK, NETLINK_TX_RING, ¶ms, sizeof(params));
-- ring = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0)
-
-Usage of either ring is optional, but even if only the RX ring is used the
-mapping still needs to be writable in order to update the frame status after
-processing.
-
-Conversion of the reception path involves calling poll() on the file
-descriptor, once the socket is readable the frames from the ring are
-processed in order until no more messages are available, as indicated by
-a status word in the frame header.
-
-On kernel side, in order to make use of memory mapped I/O on receive, the
-originating netlink subsystem needs to support memory mapped I/O, otherwise
-it will use an allocated socket buffer as usual and the contents will be
- copied to the ring on transmission, nullifying most of the performance gains.
-Dumps of kernel databases automatically support memory mapped I/O.
-
-Conversion of the transmit path involves changing message construction to
-use memory from the TX ring instead of (usually) a buffer declared on the
-stack and setting up the frame header appropriately. Optionally poll() can
-be used to wait for free frames in the TX ring.
-
-Structured and definitions for using memory mapped I/O are contained in
-<linux/netlink.h>.
-
-RX and TX rings
-----------------
-
-Each ring contains a number of continuous memory blocks, containing frames of
-fixed size dependent on the parameters used for ring setup.
-
-Ring: [ block 0 ]
- [ frame 0 ]
- [ frame 1 ]
- [ block 1 ]
- [ frame 2 ]
- [ frame 3 ]
- ...
- [ block n ]
- [ frame 2 * n ]
- [ frame 2 * n + 1 ]
-
-The blocks are only visible to the kernel, from the point of view of user-space
-the ring just contains the frames in a continuous memory zone.
-
-The ring parameters used for setting up the ring are defined as follows:
-
-struct nl_mmap_req {
- unsigned int nm_block_size;
- unsigned int nm_block_nr;
- unsigned int nm_frame_size;
- unsigned int nm_frame_nr;
-};
-
-Frames are grouped into blocks, where each block is a continuous region of memory
-and holds nm_block_size / nm_frame_size frames. The total number of frames in
-the ring is nm_frame_nr. The following invariants hold:
-
-- frames_per_block = nm_block_size / nm_frame_size
-
-- nm_frame_nr = frames_per_block * nm_block_nr
-
-Some parameters are constrained, specifically:
-
-- nm_block_size must be a multiple of the architectures memory page size.
- The getpagesize() function can be used to get the page size.
-
-- nm_frame_size must be equal or larger to NL_MMAP_HDRLEN, IOW a frame must be
- able to hold at least the frame header
-
-- nm_frame_size must be smaller or equal to nm_block_size
-
-- nm_frame_size must be a multiple of NL_MMAP_MSG_ALIGNMENT
-
-- nm_frame_nr must equal the actual number of frames as specified above.
-
-When the kernel can't allocate physically continuous memory for a ring block,
-it will fall back to use physically discontinuous memory. This might affect
-performance negatively, in order to avoid this the nm_frame_size parameter
-should be chosen to be as small as possible for the required frame size and
-the number of blocks should be increased instead.
-
-Ring frames
-------------
-
-Each frames contain a frame header, consisting of a synchronization word and some
-meta-data, and the message itself.
-
-Frame: [ header message ]
-
-The frame header is defined as follows:
-
-struct nl_mmap_hdr {
- unsigned int nm_status;
- unsigned int nm_len;
- __u32 nm_group;
- /* credentials */
- __u32 nm_pid;
- __u32 nm_uid;
- __u32 nm_gid;
-};
-
-- nm_status is used for synchronizing processing between the kernel and user-
- space and specifies ownership of the frame as well as the operation to perform
-
-- nm_len contains the length of the message contained in the data area
-
-- nm_group specified the destination multicast group of message
-
-- nm_pid, nm_uid and nm_gid contain the netlink pid, UID and GID of the sending
- process. These values correspond to the data available using SOCK_PASSCRED in
- the SCM_CREDENTIALS cmsg.
-
-The possible values in the status word are:
-
-- NL_MMAP_STATUS_UNUSED:
- RX ring: frame belongs to the kernel and contains no message
- for user-space. Approriate action is to invoke poll()
- to wait for new messages.
-
- TX ring: frame belongs to user-space and can be used for
- message construction.
-
-- NL_MMAP_STATUS_RESERVED:
- RX ring only: frame is currently used by the kernel for message
- construction and contains no valid message yet.
- Appropriate action is to invoke poll() to wait for
- new messages.
-
-- NL_MMAP_STATUS_VALID:
- RX ring: frame contains a valid message. Approriate action is
- to process the message and release the frame back to
- the kernel by setting the status to
- NL_MMAP_STATUS_UNUSED or queue the frame by setting the
- status to NL_MMAP_STATUS_SKIP.
-
- TX ring: the frame contains a valid message from user-space to
- be processed by the kernel. After completing processing
- the kernel will release the frame back to user-space by
- setting the status to NL_MMAP_STATUS_UNUSED.
-
-- NL_MMAP_STATUS_COPY:
- RX ring only: a message is ready to be processed but could not be
- stored in the ring, either because it exceeded the
- frame size or because the originating subsystem does
- not support memory mapped I/O. Appropriate action is
- to invoke recvmsg() to receive the message and release
- the frame back to the kernel by setting the status to
- NL_MMAP_STATUS_UNUSED.
-
-- NL_MMAP_STATUS_SKIP:
- RX ring only: user-space queued the message for later processing, but
- processed some messages following it in the ring. The
- kernel should skip this frame when looking for unused
- frames.
-
-The data area of a frame begins at a offset of NL_MMAP_HDRLEN relative to the
-frame header.
-
-TX limitations
---------------
-
-As of Jan 2015 the message is always copied from the ring frame to an
-allocated buffer due to unresolved security concerns.
-See commit 4682a0358639b29cf ("netlink: Always copy on mmap TX.").
-
-Example
--------
-
-Ring setup:
-
- unsigned int block_size = 16 * getpagesize();
- struct nl_mmap_req req = {
- .nm_block_size = block_size,
- .nm_block_nr = 64,
- .nm_frame_size = 16384,
- .nm_frame_nr = 64 * block_size / 16384,
- };
- unsigned int ring_size;
- void *rx_ring, *tx_ring;
-
- /* Configure ring parameters */
- if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_NETLINK, NETLINK_RX_RING, &req, sizeof(req)) < 0)
- exit(1);
- if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_NETLINK, NETLINK_TX_RING, &req, sizeof(req)) < 0)
- exit(1)
-
- /* Calculate size of each individual ring */
- ring_size = req.nm_block_nr * req.nm_block_size;
-
- /* Map RX/TX rings. The TX ring is located after the RX ring */
- rx_ring = mmap(NULL, 2 * ring_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
- MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
- if ((long)rx_ring == -1L)
- exit(1);
- tx_ring = rx_ring + ring_size:
-
-Message reception:
-
-This example assumes some ring parameters of the ring setup are available.
-
- unsigned int frame_offset = 0;
- struct nl_mmap_hdr *hdr;
- struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
- unsigned char buf[16384];
- ssize_t len;
-
- while (1) {
- struct pollfd pfds[1];
-
- pfds[0].fd = fd;
- pfds[0].events = POLLIN | POLLERR;
- pfds[0].revents = 0;
-
- if (poll(pfds, 1, -1) < 0 && errno != -EINTR)
- exit(1);
-
- /* Check for errors. Error handling omitted */
- if (pfds[0].revents & POLLERR)
- <handle error>
-
- /* If no new messages, poll again */
- if (!(pfds[0].revents & POLLIN))
- continue;
-
- /* Process all frames */
- while (1) {
- /* Get next frame header */
- hdr = rx_ring + frame_offset;
-
- if (hdr->nm_status == NL_MMAP_STATUS_VALID) {
- /* Regular memory mapped frame */
- nlh = (void *)hdr + NL_MMAP_HDRLEN;
- len = hdr->nm_len;
-
- /* Release empty message immediately. May happen
- * on error during message construction.
- */
- if (len == 0)
- goto release;
- } else if (hdr->nm_status == NL_MMAP_STATUS_COPY) {
- /* Frame queued to socket receive queue */
- len = recv(fd, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_DONTWAIT);
- if (len <= 0)
- break;
- nlh = buf;
- } else
- /* No more messages to process, continue polling */
- break;
-
- process_msg(nlh);
-release:
- /* Release frame back to the kernel */
- hdr->nm_status = NL_MMAP_STATUS_UNUSED;
-
- /* Advance frame offset to next frame */
- frame_offset = (frame_offset + frame_size) % ring_size;
- }
- }
-
-Message transmission:
-
-This example assumes some ring parameters of the ring setup are available.
-A single message is constructed and transmitted, to send multiple messages
-at once they would be constructed in consecutive frames before a final call
-to sendto().
-
- unsigned int frame_offset = 0;
- struct nl_mmap_hdr *hdr;
- struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
- struct sockaddr_nl addr = {
- .nl_family = AF_NETLINK,
- };
-
- hdr = tx_ring + frame_offset;
- if (hdr->nm_status != NL_MMAP_STATUS_UNUSED)
- /* No frame available. Use poll() to avoid. */
- exit(1);
-
- nlh = (void *)hdr + NL_MMAP_HDRLEN;
-
- /* Build message */
- build_message(nlh);
-
- /* Fill frame header: length and status need to be set */
- hdr->nm_len = nlh->nlmsg_len;
- hdr->nm_status = NL_MMAP_STATUS_VALID;
-
- if (sendto(fd, NULL, 0, 0, &addr, sizeof(addr)) < 0)
- exit(1);
-
- /* Advance frame offset to next frame */
- frame_offset = (frame_offset + frame_size) % ring_size;
--- a/include/uapi/linux/netlink.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/netlink.h
@@ -107,8 +107,10 @@ struct nlmsgerr {
#define NETLINK_PKTINFO 3
#define NETLINK_BROADCAST_ERROR 4
#define NETLINK_NO_ENOBUFS 5
+#ifndef __KERNEL__
#define NETLINK_RX_RING 6
#define NETLINK_TX_RING 7
+#endif
#define NETLINK_LISTEN_ALL_NSID 8
#define NETLINK_LIST_MEMBERSHIPS 9
#define NETLINK_CAP_ACK 10
@@ -134,6 +136,7 @@ struct nl_mmap_hdr {
__u32 nm_gid;
};
+#ifndef __KERNEL__
enum nl_mmap_status {
NL_MMAP_STATUS_UNUSED,
NL_MMAP_STATUS_RESERVED,
@@ -145,6 +148,7 @@ enum nl_mmap_status {
#define NL_MMAP_MSG_ALIGNMENT NLMSG_ALIGNTO
#define NL_MMAP_MSG_ALIGN(sz) __ALIGN_KERNEL(sz, NL_MMAP_MSG_ALIGNMENT)
#define NL_MMAP_HDRLEN NL_MMAP_MSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct nl_mmap_hdr))
+#endif
#define NET_MAJOR 36 /* Major 36 is reserved for networking */
--- a/include/uapi/linux/netlink_diag.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/netlink_diag.h
@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ enum {
#define NDIAG_SHOW_MEMINFO 0x00000001 /* show memory info of a socket */
#define NDIAG_SHOW_GROUPS 0x00000002 /* show groups of a netlink socket */
+#ifndef __KERNEL__
#define NDIAG_SHOW_RING_CFG 0x00000004 /* show ring configuration */
+#endif
#endif
--- a/net/netlink/Kconfig
+++ b/net/netlink/Kconfig
@@ -2,15 +2,6 @@
# Netlink Sockets
#
-config NETLINK_MMAP
- bool "NETLINK: mmaped IO"
- ---help---
- This option enables support for memory mapped netlink IO. This
- reduces overhead by avoiding copying data between kernel- and
- userspace.
-
- If unsure, say N.
-
config NETLINK_DIAG
tristate "NETLINK: socket monitoring interface"
default n
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ static int __netlink_deliver_tap_skb(str
dev_hold(dev);
- if (netlink_skb_is_mmaped(skb) || is_vmalloc_addr(skb->head))
+ if (is_vmalloc_addr(skb->head))
nskb = netlink_to_full_skb(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
else
nskb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
@@ -300,610 +300,8 @@ static void netlink_rcv_wake(struct sock
wake_up_interruptible(&nlk->wait);
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_NETLINK_MMAP
-static bool netlink_rx_is_mmaped(struct sock *sk)
-{
- return nlk_sk(sk)->rx_ring.pg_vec != NULL;
-}
-
-static bool netlink_tx_is_mmaped(struct sock *sk)
-{
- return nlk_sk(sk)->tx_ring.pg_vec != NULL;
-}
-
-static __pure struct page *pgvec_to_page(const void *addr)
-{
- if (is_vmalloc_addr(addr))
- return vmalloc_to_page(addr);
- else
- return virt_to_page(addr);
-}
-
-static void free_pg_vec(void **pg_vec, unsigned int order, unsigned int len)
-{
- unsigned int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
- if (pg_vec[i] != NULL) {
- if (is_vmalloc_addr(pg_vec[i]))
- vfree(pg_vec[i]);
- else
- free_pages((unsigned long)pg_vec[i], order);
- }
- }
- kfree(pg_vec);
-}
-
-static void *alloc_one_pg_vec_page(unsigned long order)
-{
- void *buffer;
- gfp_t gfp_flags = GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_COMP | __GFP_ZERO |
- __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_NORETRY;
-
- buffer = (void *)__get_free_pages(gfp_flags, order);
- if (buffer != NULL)
- return buffer;
-
- buffer = vzalloc((1 << order) * PAGE_SIZE);
- if (buffer != NULL)
- return buffer;
-
- gfp_flags &= ~__GFP_NORETRY;
- return (void *)__get_free_pages(gfp_flags, order);
-}
-
-static void **alloc_pg_vec(struct netlink_sock *nlk,
- struct nl_mmap_req *req, unsigned int order)
-{
- unsigned int block_nr = req->nm_block_nr;
- unsigned int i;
- void **pg_vec;
-
- pg_vec = kcalloc(block_nr, sizeof(void *), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (pg_vec == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
- for (i = 0; i < block_nr; i++) {
- pg_vec[i] = alloc_one_pg_vec_page(order);
- if (pg_vec[i] == NULL)
- goto err1;
- }
-
- return pg_vec;
-err1:
- free_pg_vec(pg_vec, order, block_nr);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-
-static void
-__netlink_set_ring(struct sock *sk, struct nl_mmap_req *req, bool tx_ring, void **pg_vec,
- unsigned int order)
-{
- struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
- struct sk_buff_head *queue;
- struct netlink_ring *ring;
-
- queue = tx_ring ? &sk->sk_write_queue : &sk->sk_receive_queue;
- ring = tx_ring ? &nlk->tx_ring : &nlk->rx_ring;
-
- spin_lock_bh(&queue->lock);
-
- ring->frame_max = req->nm_frame_nr - 1;
- ring->head = 0;
- ring->frame_size = req->nm_frame_size;
- ring->pg_vec_pages = req->nm_block_size / PAGE_SIZE;
-
- swap(ring->pg_vec_len, req->nm_block_nr);
- swap(ring->pg_vec_order, order);
- swap(ring->pg_vec, pg_vec);
-
- __skb_queue_purge(queue);
- spin_unlock_bh(&queue->lock);
-
- WARN_ON(atomic_read(&nlk->mapped));
-
- if (pg_vec)
- free_pg_vec(pg_vec, order, req->nm_block_nr);
-}
-
-static int netlink_set_ring(struct sock *sk, struct nl_mmap_req *req,
- bool tx_ring)
-{
- struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
- struct netlink_ring *ring;
- void **pg_vec = NULL;
- unsigned int order = 0;
-
- ring = tx_ring ? &nlk->tx_ring : &nlk->rx_ring;
-
- if (atomic_read(&nlk->mapped))
- return -EBUSY;
- if (atomic_read(&ring->pending))
- return -EBUSY;
-
- if (req->nm_block_nr) {
- if (ring->pg_vec != NULL)
- return -EBUSY;
-
- if ((int)req->nm_block_size <= 0)
- return -EINVAL;
- if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(req->nm_block_size))
- return -EINVAL;
- if (req->nm_frame_size < NL_MMAP_HDRLEN)
- return -EINVAL;
- if (!IS_ALIGNED(req->nm_frame_size, NL_MMAP_MSG_ALIGNMENT))
- return -EINVAL;
-
- ring->frames_per_block = req->nm_block_size /
- req->nm_frame_size;
- if (ring->frames_per_block == 0)
- return -EINVAL;
- if (ring->frames_per_block * req->nm_block_nr !=
- req->nm_frame_nr)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- order = get_order(req->nm_block_size);
- pg_vec = alloc_pg_vec(nlk, req, order);
- if (pg_vec == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
- } else {
- if (req->nm_frame_nr)
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- mutex_lock(&nlk->pg_vec_lock);
- if (atomic_read(&nlk->mapped) == 0) {
- __netlink_set_ring(sk, req, tx_ring, pg_vec, order);
- mutex_unlock(&nlk->pg_vec_lock);
- return 0;
- }
-
- mutex_unlock(&nlk->pg_vec_lock);
-
- if (pg_vec)
- free_pg_vec(pg_vec, order, req->nm_block_nr);
-
- return -EBUSY;
-}
-
-static void netlink_mm_open(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
-{
- struct file *file = vma->vm_file;
- struct socket *sock = file->private_data;
- struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-
- if (sk)
- atomic_inc(&nlk_sk(sk)->mapped);
-}
-
-static void netlink_mm_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
-{
- struct file *file = vma->vm_file;
- struct socket *sock = file->private_data;
- struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-
- if (sk)
- atomic_dec(&nlk_sk(sk)->mapped);
-}
-
-static const struct vm_operations_struct netlink_mmap_ops = {
- .open = netlink_mm_open,
- .close = netlink_mm_close,
-};
-
-static int netlink_mmap(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
- struct vm_area_struct *vma)
-{
- struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
- struct netlink_ring *ring;
- unsigned long start, size, expected;
- unsigned int i;
- int err = -EINVAL;
-
- if (vma->vm_pgoff)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- mutex_lock(&nlk->pg_vec_lock);
-
- expected = 0;
- for (ring = &nlk->rx_ring; ring <= &nlk->tx_ring; ring++) {
- if (ring->pg_vec == NULL)
- continue;
- expected += ring->pg_vec_len * ring->pg_vec_pages * PAGE_SIZE;
- }
-
- if (expected == 0)
- goto out;
-
- size = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
- if (size != expected)
- goto out;
-
- start = vma->vm_start;
- for (ring = &nlk->rx_ring; ring <= &nlk->tx_ring; ring++) {
- if (ring->pg_vec == NULL)
- continue;
-
- for (i = 0; i < ring->pg_vec_len; i++) {
- struct page *page;
- void *kaddr = ring->pg_vec[i];
- unsigned int pg_num;
-
- for (pg_num = 0; pg_num < ring->pg_vec_pages; pg_num++) {
- page = pgvec_to_page(kaddr);
- err = vm_insert_page(vma, start, page);
- if (err < 0)
- goto out;
- start += PAGE_SIZE;
- kaddr += PAGE_SIZE;
- }
- }
- }
-
- atomic_inc(&nlk->mapped);
- vma->vm_ops = &netlink_mmap_ops;
- err = 0;
-out:
- mutex_unlock(&nlk->pg_vec_lock);
- return err;
-}
-
-static void netlink_frame_flush_dcache(const struct nl_mmap_hdr *hdr, unsigned int nm_len)
-{
-#if ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE == 1
- struct page *p_start, *p_end;
-
- /* First page is flushed through netlink_{get,set}_status */
- p_start = pgvec_to_page(hdr + PAGE_SIZE);
- p_end = pgvec_to_page((void *)hdr + NL_MMAP_HDRLEN + nm_len - 1);
- while (p_start <= p_end) {
- flush_dcache_page(p_start);
- p_start++;
- }
-#endif
-}
-
-static enum nl_mmap_status netlink_get_status(const struct nl_mmap_hdr *hdr)
-{
- smp_rmb();
- flush_dcache_page(pgvec_to_page(hdr));
- return hdr->nm_status;
-}
-
-static void netlink_set_status(struct nl_mmap_hdr *hdr,
- enum nl_mmap_status status)
-{
- smp_mb();
- hdr->nm_status = status;
- flush_dcache_page(pgvec_to_page(hdr));
-}
-
-static struct nl_mmap_hdr *
-__netlink_lookup_frame(const struct netlink_ring *ring, unsigned int pos)
-{
- unsigned int pg_vec_pos, frame_off;
-
- pg_vec_pos = pos / ring->frames_per_block;
- frame_off = pos % ring->frames_per_block;
-
- return ring->pg_vec[pg_vec_pos] + (frame_off * ring->frame_size);
-}
-
-static struct nl_mmap_hdr *
-netlink_lookup_frame(const struct netlink_ring *ring, unsigned int pos,
- enum nl_mmap_status status)
-{
- struct nl_mmap_hdr *hdr;
-
- hdr = __netlink_lookup_frame(ring, pos);
- if (netlink_get_status(hdr) != status)
- return NULL;
-
- return hdr;
-}
-
-static struct nl_mmap_hdr *
-netlink_current_frame(const struct netlink_ring *ring,
- enum nl_mmap_status status)
-{
- return netlink_lookup_frame(ring, ring->head, status);
-}
-
-static void netlink_increment_head(struct netlink_ring *ring)
-{
- ring->head = ring->head != ring->frame_max ? ring->head + 1 : 0;
-}
-
-static void netlink_forward_ring(struct netlink_ring *ring)
-{
- unsigned int head = ring->head;
- const struct nl_mmap_hdr *hdr;
-
- do {
- hdr = __netlink_lookup_frame(ring, ring->head);
- if (hdr->nm_status == NL_MMAP_STATUS_UNUSED)
- break;
- if (hdr->nm_status != NL_MMAP_STATUS_SKIP)
- break;
- netlink_increment_head(ring);
- } while (ring->head != head);
-}
-
-static bool netlink_has_valid_frame(struct netlink_ring *ring)
-{
- unsigned int head = ring->head, pos = head;
- const struct nl_mmap_hdr *hdr;
-
- do {
- hdr = __netlink_lookup_frame(ring, pos);
- if (hdr->nm_status == NL_MMAP_STATUS_VALID)
- return true;
- pos = pos != 0 ? pos - 1 : ring->frame_max;
- } while (pos != head);
-
- return false;
-}
-
-static bool netlink_dump_space(struct netlink_sock *nlk)
-{
- struct netlink_ring *ring = &nlk->rx_ring;
- struct nl_mmap_hdr *hdr;
- unsigned int n;
-
- hdr = netlink_current_frame(ring, NL_MMAP_STATUS_UNUSED);
- if (hdr == NULL)
- return false;
-
- n = ring->head + ring->frame_max / 2;
- if (n > ring->frame_max)
- n -= ring->frame_max;
-
- hdr = __netlink_lookup_frame(ring, n);
-
- return hdr->nm_status == NL_MMAP_STATUS_UNUSED;
-}
-
-static unsigned int netlink_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
- poll_table *wait)
-{
- struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
- unsigned int mask;
- int err;
-
- if (nlk->rx_ring.pg_vec != NULL) {
- /* Memory mapped sockets don't call recvmsg(), so flow control
- * for dumps is performed here. A dump is allowed to continue
- * if at least half the ring is unused.
- */
- while (nlk->cb_running && netlink_dump_space(nlk)) {
- err = netlink_dump(sk);
- if (err < 0) {
- sk->sk_err = -err;
- sk->sk_error_report(sk);
- break;
- }
- }
- netlink_rcv_wake(sk);
- }
-
- mask = datagram_poll(file, sock, wait);
-
- /* We could already have received frames in the normal receive
- * queue, that will show up as NL_MMAP_STATUS_COPY in the ring,
- * so if mask contains pollin/etc already, there's no point
- * walking the ring.
- */
- if ((mask & (POLLIN | POLLRDNORM)) != (POLLIN | POLLRDNORM)) {
- spin_lock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
- if (nlk->rx_ring.pg_vec) {
- if (netlink_has_valid_frame(&nlk->rx_ring))
- mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
- }
- spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
- }
-
- spin_lock_bh(&sk->sk_write_queue.lock);
- if (nlk->tx_ring.pg_vec) {
- if (netlink_current_frame(&nlk->tx_ring, NL_MMAP_STATUS_UNUSED))
- mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
- }
- spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_write_queue.lock);
-
- return mask;
-}
-
-static struct nl_mmap_hdr *netlink_mmap_hdr(struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
- return (struct nl_mmap_hdr *)(skb->head - NL_MMAP_HDRLEN);
-}
-
-static void netlink_ring_setup_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk,
- struct netlink_ring *ring,
- struct nl_mmap_hdr *hdr)
-{
- unsigned int size;
- void *data;
-
- size = ring->frame_size - NL_MMAP_HDRLEN;
- data = (void *)hdr + NL_MMAP_HDRLEN;
-
- skb->head = data;
- skb->data = data;
- skb_reset_tail_pointer(skb);
- skb->end = skb->tail + size;
- skb->len = 0;
-
- skb->destructor = netlink_skb_destructor;
- NETLINK_CB(skb).flags |= NETLINK_SKB_MMAPED;
- NETLINK_CB(skb).sk = sk;
-}
-
-static int netlink_mmap_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
- u32 dst_portid, u32 dst_group,
- struct scm_cookie *scm)
-{
- struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
- struct netlink_ring *ring;
- struct nl_mmap_hdr *hdr;
- struct sk_buff *skb;
- unsigned int maxlen;
- int err = 0, len = 0;
-
- mutex_lock(&nlk->pg_vec_lock);
-
- ring = &nlk->tx_ring;
- maxlen = ring->frame_size - NL_MMAP_HDRLEN;
-
- do {
- unsigned int nm_len;
-
- hdr = netlink_current_frame(ring, NL_MMAP_STATUS_VALID);
- if (hdr == NULL) {
- if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT) &&
- atomic_read(&nlk->tx_ring.pending))
- schedule();
- continue;
- }
-
- nm_len = ACCESS_ONCE(hdr->nm_len);
- if (nm_len > maxlen) {
- err = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
-
- netlink_frame_flush_dcache(hdr, nm_len);
-
- skb = alloc_skb(nm_len, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (skb == NULL) {
- err = -ENOBUFS;
- goto out;
- }
- __skb_put(skb, nm_len);
- memcpy(skb->data, (void *)hdr + NL_MMAP_HDRLEN, nm_len);
- netlink_set_status(hdr, NL_MMAP_STATUS_UNUSED);
-
- netlink_increment_head(ring);
-
- NETLINK_CB(skb).portid = nlk->portid;
- NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_group = dst_group;
- NETLINK_CB(skb).creds = scm->creds;
-
- err = security_netlink_send(sk, skb);
- if (err) {
- kfree_skb(skb);
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (unlikely(dst_group)) {
- atomic_inc(&skb->users);
- netlink_broadcast(sk, skb, dst_portid, dst_group,
- GFP_KERNEL);
- }
- err = netlink_unicast(sk, skb, dst_portid,
- msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
- if (err < 0)
- goto out;
- len += err;
-
- } while (hdr != NULL ||
- (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT) &&
- atomic_read(&nlk->tx_ring.pending)));
-
- if (len > 0)
- err = len;
-out:
- mutex_unlock(&nlk->pg_vec_lock);
- return err;
-}
-
-static void netlink_queue_mmaped_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
- struct nl_mmap_hdr *hdr;
-
- hdr = netlink_mmap_hdr(skb);
- hdr->nm_len = skb->len;
- hdr->nm_group = NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_group;
- hdr->nm_pid = NETLINK_CB(skb).creds.pid;
- hdr->nm_uid = from_kuid(sk_user_ns(sk), NETLINK_CB(skb).creds.uid);
- hdr->nm_gid = from_kgid(sk_user_ns(sk), NETLINK_CB(skb).creds.gid);
- netlink_frame_flush_dcache(hdr, hdr->nm_len);
- netlink_set_status(hdr, NL_MMAP_STATUS_VALID);
-
- NETLINK_CB(skb).flags |= NETLINK_SKB_DELIVERED;
- kfree_skb(skb);
-}
-
-static void netlink_ring_set_copied(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
- struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
- struct netlink_ring *ring = &nlk->rx_ring;
- struct nl_mmap_hdr *hdr;
-
- spin_lock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
- hdr = netlink_current_frame(ring, NL_MMAP_STATUS_UNUSED);
- if (hdr == NULL) {
- spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
- kfree_skb(skb);
- netlink_overrun(sk);
- return;
- }
- netlink_increment_head(ring);
- __skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
- spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
-
- hdr->nm_len = skb->len;
- hdr->nm_group = NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_group;
- hdr->nm_pid = NETLINK_CB(skb).creds.pid;
- hdr->nm_uid = from_kuid(sk_user_ns(sk), NETLINK_CB(skb).creds.uid);
- hdr->nm_gid = from_kgid(sk_user_ns(sk), NETLINK_CB(skb).creds.gid);
- netlink_set_status(hdr, NL_MMAP_STATUS_COPY);
-}
-
-#else /* CONFIG_NETLINK_MMAP */
-#define netlink_rx_is_mmaped(sk) false
-#define netlink_tx_is_mmaped(sk) false
-#define netlink_mmap sock_no_mmap
-#define netlink_poll datagram_poll
-#define netlink_mmap_sendmsg(sk, msg, dst_portid, dst_group, scm) 0
-#endif /* CONFIG_NETLINK_MMAP */
-
static void netlink_skb_destructor(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_NETLINK_MMAP
- struct nl_mmap_hdr *hdr;
- struct netlink_ring *ring;
- struct sock *sk;
-
- /* If a packet from the kernel to userspace was freed because of an
- * error without being delivered to userspace, the kernel must reset
- * the status. In the direction userspace to kernel, the status is
- * always reset here after the packet was processed and freed.
- */
- if (netlink_skb_is_mmaped(skb)) {
- hdr = netlink_mmap_hdr(skb);
- sk = NETLINK_CB(skb).sk;
-
- if (NETLINK_CB(skb).flags & NETLINK_SKB_TX) {
- netlink_set_status(hdr, NL_MMAP_STATUS_UNUSED);
- ring = &nlk_sk(sk)->tx_ring;
- } else {
- if (!(NETLINK_CB(skb).flags & NETLINK_SKB_DELIVERED)) {
- hdr->nm_len = 0;
- netlink_set_status(hdr, NL_MMAP_STATUS_VALID);
- }
- ring = &nlk_sk(sk)->rx_ring;
- }
-
- WARN_ON(atomic_read(&ring->pending) == 0);
- atomic_dec(&ring->pending);
- sock_put(sk);
-
- skb->head = NULL;
- }
-#endif
if (is_vmalloc_addr(skb->head)) {
if (!skb->cloned ||
!atomic_dec_return(&(skb_shinfo(skb)->dataref)))
@@ -936,18 +334,6 @@ static void netlink_sock_destruct(struct
}
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
-#ifdef CONFIG_NETLINK_MMAP
- if (1) {
- struct nl_mmap_req req;
-
- memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
- if (nlk->rx_ring.pg_vec)
- __netlink_set_ring(sk, &req, false, NULL, 0);
- memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
- if (nlk->tx_ring.pg_vec)
- __netlink_set_ring(sk, &req, true, NULL, 0);
- }
-#endif /* CONFIG_NETLINK_MMAP */
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Freeing alive netlink socket %p\n", sk);
@@ -1201,9 +587,6 @@ static int __netlink_create(struct net *
mutex_init(nlk->cb_mutex);
}
init_waitqueue_head(&nlk->wait);
-#ifdef CONFIG_NETLINK_MMAP
- mutex_init(&nlk->pg_vec_lock);
-#endif
sk->sk_destruct = netlink_sock_destruct;
sk->sk_protocol = protocol;
@@ -1745,8 +1128,7 @@ int netlink_attachskb(struct sock *sk, s
nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
if ((atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) > sk->sk_rcvbuf ||
- test_bit(NETLINK_S_CONGESTED, &nlk->state)) &&
- !netlink_skb_is_mmaped(skb)) {
+ test_bit(NETLINK_S_CONGESTED, &nlk->state))) {
DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
if (!*timeo) {
if (!ssk || netlink_is_kernel(ssk))
@@ -1784,14 +1166,7 @@ static int __netlink_sendskb(struct sock
netlink_deliver_tap(skb);
-#ifdef CONFIG_NETLINK_MMAP
- if (netlink_skb_is_mmaped(skb))
- netlink_queue_mmaped_skb(sk, skb);
- else if (netlink_rx_is_mmaped(sk))
- netlink_ring_set_copied(sk, skb);
- else
-#endif /* CONFIG_NETLINK_MMAP */
- skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
+ skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
return len;
}
@@ -1815,9 +1190,6 @@ static struct sk_buff *netlink_trim(stru
int delta;
WARN_ON(skb->sk != NULL);
- if (netlink_skb_is_mmaped(skb))
- return skb;
-
delta = skb->end - skb->tail;
if (is_vmalloc_addr(skb->head) || delta * 2 < skb->truesize)
return skb;
@@ -1897,71 +1269,6 @@ struct sk_buff *__netlink_alloc_skb(stru
unsigned int ldiff, u32 dst_portid,
gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_NETLINK_MMAP
- unsigned int maxlen, linear_size;
- struct sock *sk = NULL;
- struct sk_buff *skb;
- struct netlink_ring *ring;
- struct nl_mmap_hdr *hdr;
-
- sk = netlink_getsockbyportid(ssk, dst_portid);
- if (IS_ERR(sk))
- goto out;
-
- ring = &nlk_sk(sk)->rx_ring;
- /* fast-path without atomic ops for common case: non-mmaped receiver */
- if (ring->pg_vec == NULL)
- goto out_put;
-
- /* We need to account the full linear size needed as a ring
- * slot cannot have non-linear parts.
- */
- linear_size = size + ldiff;
- if (ring->frame_size - NL_MMAP_HDRLEN < linear_size)
- goto out_put;
-
- skb = alloc_skb_head(gfp_mask);
- if (skb == NULL)
- goto err1;
-
- spin_lock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
- /* check again under lock */
- if (ring->pg_vec == NULL)
- goto out_free;
-
- /* check again under lock */
- maxlen = ring->frame_size - NL_MMAP_HDRLEN;
- if (maxlen < linear_size)
- goto out_free;
-
- netlink_forward_ring(ring);
- hdr = netlink_current_frame(ring, NL_MMAP_STATUS_UNUSED);
- if (hdr == NULL)
- goto err2;
-
- netlink_ring_setup_skb(skb, sk, ring, hdr);
- netlink_set_status(hdr, NL_MMAP_STATUS_RESERVED);
- atomic_inc(&ring->pending);
- netlink_increment_head(ring);
-
- spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
- return skb;
-
-err2:
- kfree_skb(skb);
- spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
- netlink_overrun(sk);
-err1:
- sock_put(sk);
- return NULL;
-
-out_free:
- kfree_skb(skb);
- spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
-out_put:
- sock_put(sk);
-out:
-#endif
return alloc_skb(size, gfp_mask);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__netlink_alloc_skb);
@@ -2242,8 +1549,7 @@ static int netlink_setsockopt(struct soc
if (level != SOL_NETLINK)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
- if (optname != NETLINK_RX_RING && optname != NETLINK_TX_RING &&
- optlen >= sizeof(int) &&
+ if (optlen >= sizeof(int) &&
get_user(val, (unsigned int __user *)optval))
return -EFAULT;
@@ -2296,25 +1602,6 @@ static int netlink_setsockopt(struct soc
}
err = 0;
break;
-#ifdef CONFIG_NETLINK_MMAP
- case NETLINK_RX_RING:
- case NETLINK_TX_RING: {
- struct nl_mmap_req req;
-
- /* Rings might consume more memory than queue limits, require
- * CAP_NET_ADMIN.
- */
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
- return -EPERM;
- if (optlen < sizeof(req))
- return -EINVAL;
- if (copy_from_user(&req, optval, sizeof(req)))
- return -EFAULT;
- err = netlink_set_ring(sk, &req,
- optname == NETLINK_TX_RING);
- break;
- }
-#endif /* CONFIG_NETLINK_MMAP */
case NETLINK_LISTEN_ALL_NSID:
if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_BROADCAST))
return -EPERM;
@@ -2484,18 +1771,6 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct socket
smp_rmb();
}
- /* It's a really convoluted way for userland to ask for mmaped
- * sendmsg(), but that's what we've got...
- */
- if (netlink_tx_is_mmaped(sk) &&
- iter_is_iovec(&msg->msg_iter) &&
- msg->msg_iter.nr_segs == 1 &&
- msg->msg_iter.iov->iov_base == NULL) {
- err = netlink_mmap_sendmsg(sk, msg, dst_portid, dst_group,
- &scm);
- goto out;
- }
-
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (len > sk->sk_sndbuf - 32)
goto out;
@@ -2812,8 +2087,7 @@ static int netlink_dump(struct sock *sk)
goto errout_skb;
}
- if (!netlink_rx_is_mmaped(sk) &&
- atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) >= sk->sk_rcvbuf)
+ if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) >= sk->sk_rcvbuf)
goto errout_skb;
/* NLMSG_GOODSIZE is small to avoid high order allocations being
@@ -2902,16 +2176,7 @@ int __netlink_dump_start(struct sock *ss
struct netlink_sock *nlk;
int ret;
- /* Memory mapped dump requests need to be copied to avoid looping
- * on the pending state in netlink_mmap_sendmsg() while the CB hold
- * a reference to the skb.
- */
- if (netlink_skb_is_mmaped(skb)) {
- skb = skb_copy(skb, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (skb == NULL)
- return -ENOBUFS;
- } else
- atomic_inc(&skb->users);
+ atomic_inc(&skb->users);
sk = netlink_lookup(sock_net(ssk), ssk->sk_protocol, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid);
if (sk == NULL) {
@@ -3255,7 +2520,7 @@ static const struct proto_ops netlink_op
.socketpair = sock_no_socketpair,
.accept = sock_no_accept,
.getname = netlink_getname,
- .poll = netlink_poll,
+ .poll = datagram_poll,
.ioctl = sock_no_ioctl,
.listen = sock_no_listen,
.shutdown = sock_no_shutdown,
@@ -3263,7 +2528,7 @@ static const struct proto_ops netlink_op
.getsockopt = netlink_getsockopt,
.sendmsg = netlink_sendmsg,
.recvmsg = netlink_recvmsg,
- .mmap = netlink_mmap,
+ .mmap = sock_no_mmap,
.sendpage = sock_no_sendpage,
};
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.h
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.h
@@ -45,12 +45,6 @@ struct netlink_sock {
int (*netlink_bind)(struct net *net, int group);
void (*netlink_unbind)(struct net *net, int group);
struct module *module;
-#ifdef CONFIG_NETLINK_MMAP
- struct mutex pg_vec_lock;
- struct netlink_ring rx_ring;
- struct netlink_ring tx_ring;
- atomic_t mapped;
-#endif /* CONFIG_NETLINK_MMAP */
struct rhash_head node;
struct rcu_head rcu;
@@ -62,15 +56,6 @@ static inline struct netlink_sock *nlk_s
return container_of(sk, struct netlink_sock, sk);
}
-static inline bool netlink_skb_is_mmaped(const struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_NETLINK_MMAP
- return NETLINK_CB(skb).flags & NETLINK_SKB_MMAPED;
-#else
- return false;
-#endif /* CONFIG_NETLINK_MMAP */
-}
-
struct netlink_table {
struct rhashtable hash;
struct hlist_head mc_list;
--- a/net/netlink/diag.c
+++ b/net/netlink/diag.c
@@ -8,41 +8,6 @@
#include "af_netlink.h"
-#ifdef CONFIG_NETLINK_MMAP
-static int sk_diag_put_ring(struct netlink_ring *ring, int nl_type,
- struct sk_buff *nlskb)
-{
- struct netlink_diag_ring ndr;
-
- ndr.ndr_block_size = ring->pg_vec_pages << PAGE_SHIFT;
- ndr.ndr_block_nr = ring->pg_vec_len;
- ndr.ndr_frame_size = ring->frame_size;
- ndr.ndr_frame_nr = ring->frame_max + 1;
-
- return nla_put(nlskb, nl_type, sizeof(ndr), &ndr);
-}
-
-static int sk_diag_put_rings_cfg(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *nlskb)
-{
- struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
- int ret;
-
- mutex_lock(&nlk->pg_vec_lock);
- ret = sk_diag_put_ring(&nlk->rx_ring, NETLINK_DIAG_RX_RING, nlskb);
- if (!ret)
- ret = sk_diag_put_ring(&nlk->tx_ring, NETLINK_DIAG_TX_RING,
- nlskb);
- mutex_unlock(&nlk->pg_vec_lock);
-
- return ret;
-}
-#else
-static int sk_diag_put_rings_cfg(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *nlskb)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-#endif
-
static int sk_diag_dump_groups(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *nlskb)
{
struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
@@ -87,10 +52,6 @@ static int sk_diag_fill(struct sock *sk,
sock_diag_put_meminfo(sk, skb, NETLINK_DIAG_MEMINFO))
goto out_nlmsg_trim;
- if ((req->ndiag_show & NDIAG_SHOW_RING_CFG) &&
- sk_diag_put_rings_cfg(sk, skb))
- goto out_nlmsg_trim;
-
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
return 0;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 02/28] [PATCH 04/41] vxlan: correctly validate VXLAN ID against VXLAN_N_VID
2017-03-20 17:48 [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.56-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-03-20 17:48 ` [PATCH 4.4 01/28] netlink: remove mmapped netlink support Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-03-20 17:48 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-03-20 17:48 ` [PATCH 4.4 03/28] [PATCH 05/41] vti6: return GRE_KEY for vti6 Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (24 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-03-20 17:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Matthias Schiffer, Jiri Benc,
David S. Miller
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Matthias Schiffer <mschiffer@universe-factory.net>
[ Upstream commit 4e37d6911f36545b286d15073f6f2222f840e81c ]
The incorrect check caused an off-by-one error: the maximum VID 0xffffff
was unusable.
Fixes: d342894c5d2f ("vxlan: virtual extensible lan")
Signed-off-by: Matthias Schiffer <mschiffer@universe-factory.net>
Acked-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/vxlan.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/net/vxlan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/vxlan.c
@@ -2600,7 +2600,7 @@ static int vxlan_validate(struct nlattr
if (data[IFLA_VXLAN_ID]) {
__u32 id = nla_get_u32(data[IFLA_VXLAN_ID]);
- if (id >= VXLAN_VID_MASK)
+ if (id >= VXLAN_N_VID)
return -ERANGE;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 03/28] [PATCH 05/41] vti6: return GRE_KEY for vti6
2017-03-20 17:48 [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.56-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-03-20 17:48 ` [PATCH 4.4 01/28] netlink: remove mmapped netlink support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-03-20 17:48 ` [PATCH 4.4 02/28] [PATCH 04/41] vxlan: correctly validate VXLAN ID against VXLAN_N_VID Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-03-20 17:48 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-03-20 17:48 ` [PATCH 4.4 04/28] ipv4: mask tos for input route Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (23 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-03-20 17:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, David Forster, David S. Miller
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Forster <dforster@brocade.com>
[ Upstream commit 7dcdf941cdc96692ab99fd790c8cc68945514851 ]
Align vti6 with vti by returning GRE_KEY flag. This enables iproute2
to display tunnel keys on "ip -6 tunnel show"
Signed-off-by: David Forster <dforster@brocade.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c
@@ -680,6 +680,10 @@ vti6_parm_to_user(struct ip6_tnl_parm2 *
u->link = p->link;
u->i_key = p->i_key;
u->o_key = p->o_key;
+ if (u->i_key)
+ u->i_flags |= GRE_KEY;
+ if (u->o_key)
+ u->o_flags |= GRE_KEY;
u->proto = p->proto;
memcpy(u->name, p->name, sizeof(u->name));
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 04/28] ipv4: mask tos for input route
2017-03-20 17:48 [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.56-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2017-03-20 17:48 ` [PATCH 4.4 03/28] [PATCH 05/41] vti6: return GRE_KEY for vti6 Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-03-20 17:48 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 06/28] net: dont call strlen() on the user buffer in packet_bind_spkt() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (22 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-03-20 17:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Julian Anastasov, David S. Miller
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
[ Upstream commit 6e28099d38c0e50d62c1afc054e37e573adf3d21 ]
Restore the lost masking of TOS in input route code to
allow ip rules to match it properly.
Problem [1] noticed by Shmulik Ladkani <shmulik.ladkani@gmail.com>
[1] http://marc.info/?t=137331755300040&r=1&w=2
Fixes: 89aef8921bfb ("ipv4: Delete routing cache.")
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/ipv4/route.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/net/ipv4/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/route.c
@@ -1958,6 +1958,7 @@ int ip_route_input_noref(struct sk_buff
{
int res;
+ tos &= IPTOS_RT_MASK;
rcu_read_lock();
/* Multicast recognition logic is moved from route cache to here.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 06/28] net: dont call strlen() on the user buffer in packet_bind_spkt()
2017-03-20 17:48 [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.56-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2017-03-20 17:48 ` [PATCH 4.4 04/28] ipv4: mask tos for input route Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-03-20 17:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 07/28] net: net_enable_timestamp() can be called from irq contexts Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (21 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-03-20 17:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Eric Dumazet, Alexander Potapenko,
David S. Miller
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
[ Upstream commit 540e2894f7905538740aaf122bd8e0548e1c34a4 ]
KMSAN (KernelMemorySanitizer, a new error detection tool) reports use of
uninitialized memory in packet_bind_spkt():
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
==================================================================
BUG: KMSAN: use of unitialized memory
CPU: 0 PID: 1074 Comm: packet Not tainted 4.8.0-rc6+ #1891
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs
01/01/2011
0000000000000000 ffff88006b6dfc08 ffffffff82559ae8 ffff88006b6dfb48
ffffffff818a7c91 ffffffff85b9c870 0000000000000092 ffffffff85b9c550
0000000000000000 0000000000000092 00000000ec400911 0000000000000002
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff82559ae8>] dump_stack+0x238/0x290 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[<ffffffff818a6626>] kmsan_report+0x276/0x2e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1003
[<ffffffff818a783b>] __msan_warning+0x5b/0xb0
mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:424
[< inline >] strlen lib/string.c:484
[<ffffffff8259b58d>] strlcpy+0x9d/0x200 lib/string.c:144
[<ffffffff84b2eca4>] packet_bind_spkt+0x144/0x230
net/packet/af_packet.c:3132
[<ffffffff84242e4d>] SYSC_bind+0x40d/0x5f0 net/socket.c:1370
[<ffffffff84242a22>] SyS_bind+0x82/0xa0 net/socket.c:1356
[<ffffffff8515991b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x8f
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.o:?
chained origin: 00000000eba00911
[<ffffffff810bb787>] save_stack_trace+0x27/0x50
arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:67
[< inline >] kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:322
[< inline >] kmsan_save_stack mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:334
[<ffffffff818a59f8>] kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0x118/0x1e0
mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:527
[<ffffffff818a7773>] __msan_set_alloca_origin4+0xc3/0x130
mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:380
[<ffffffff84242b69>] SYSC_bind+0x129/0x5f0 net/socket.c:1356
[<ffffffff84242a22>] SyS_bind+0x82/0xa0 net/socket.c:1356
[<ffffffff8515991b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x8f
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.o:?
origin description: ----address@SYSC_bind (origin=00000000eb400911)
==================================================================
(the line numbers are relative to 4.8-rc6, but the bug persists
upstream)
, when I run the following program as root:
=====================================
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netpacket/packet.h>
#include <net/ethernet.h>
int main() {
struct sockaddr addr;
memset(&addr, 0xff, sizeof(addr));
addr.sa_family = AF_PACKET;
int fd = socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_PACKET, htons(ETH_P_ALL));
bind(fd, &addr, sizeof(addr));
return 0;
}
=====================================
This happens because addr.sa_data copied from the userspace is not
zero-terminated, and copying it with strlcpy() in packet_bind_spkt()
results in calling strlen() on the kernel copy of that non-terminated
buffer.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/packet/af_packet.c | 8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -3021,7 +3021,7 @@ static int packet_bind_spkt(struct socke
int addr_len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- char name[15];
+ char name[sizeof(uaddr->sa_data) + 1];
/*
* Check legality
@@ -3029,7 +3029,11 @@ static int packet_bind_spkt(struct socke
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr))
return -EINVAL;
- strlcpy(name, uaddr->sa_data, sizeof(name));
+ /* uaddr->sa_data comes from the userspace, it's not guaranteed to be
+ * zero-terminated.
+ */
+ memcpy(name, uaddr->sa_data, sizeof(uaddr->sa_data));
+ name[sizeof(uaddr->sa_data)] = 0;
return packet_do_bind(sk, name, 0, pkt_sk(sk)->num);
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 07/28] net: net_enable_timestamp() can be called from irq contexts
2017-03-20 17:48 [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.56-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 06/28] net: dont call strlen() on the user buffer in packet_bind_spkt() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-03-20 17:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 08/28] dccp: Unlock sock before calling sk_free() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (20 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-03-20 17:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Eric Dumazet, Dmitry Vyukov, David S. Miller
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
[ Upstream commit 13baa00ad01bb3a9f893e3a08cbc2d072fc0c15d ]
It is now very clear that silly TCP listeners might play with
enabling/disabling timestamping while new children are added
to their accept queue.
Meaning net_enable_timestamp() can be called from BH context
while current state of the static key is not enabled.
Lets play safe and allow all contexts.
The work queue is scheduled only under the problematic cases,
which are the static key enable/disable transition, to not slow down
critical paths.
This extends and improves what we did in commit 5fa8bbda38c6 ("net: use
a work queue to defer net_disable_timestamp() work")
Fixes: b90e5794c5bd ("net: dont call jump_label_dec from irq context")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/core/dev.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/net/core/dev.c
+++ b/net/core/dev.c
@@ -1677,27 +1677,54 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(net_dec_ingress_queue)
static struct static_key netstamp_needed __read_mostly;
#ifdef HAVE_JUMP_LABEL
static atomic_t netstamp_needed_deferred;
+static atomic_t netstamp_wanted;
static void netstamp_clear(struct work_struct *work)
{
int deferred = atomic_xchg(&netstamp_needed_deferred, 0);
+ int wanted;
- while (deferred--)
- static_key_slow_dec(&netstamp_needed);
+ wanted = atomic_add_return(deferred, &netstamp_wanted);
+ if (wanted > 0)
+ static_key_enable(&netstamp_needed);
+ else
+ static_key_disable(&netstamp_needed);
}
static DECLARE_WORK(netstamp_work, netstamp_clear);
#endif
void net_enable_timestamp(void)
{
+#ifdef HAVE_JUMP_LABEL
+ int wanted;
+
+ while (1) {
+ wanted = atomic_read(&netstamp_wanted);
+ if (wanted <= 0)
+ break;
+ if (atomic_cmpxchg(&netstamp_wanted, wanted, wanted + 1) == wanted)
+ return;
+ }
+ atomic_inc(&netstamp_needed_deferred);
+ schedule_work(&netstamp_work);
+#else
static_key_slow_inc(&netstamp_needed);
+#endif
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(net_enable_timestamp);
void net_disable_timestamp(void)
{
#ifdef HAVE_JUMP_LABEL
- /* net_disable_timestamp() can be called from non process context */
- atomic_inc(&netstamp_needed_deferred);
+ int wanted;
+
+ while (1) {
+ wanted = atomic_read(&netstamp_wanted);
+ if (wanted <= 1)
+ break;
+ if (atomic_cmpxchg(&netstamp_wanted, wanted, wanted - 1) == wanted)
+ return;
+ }
+ atomic_dec(&netstamp_needed_deferred);
schedule_work(&netstamp_work);
#else
static_key_slow_dec(&netstamp_needed);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 08/28] dccp: Unlock sock before calling sk_free()
2017-03-20 17:48 [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.56-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 07/28] net: net_enable_timestamp() can be called from irq contexts Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-03-20 17:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 09/28] tcp: fix various issues for sockets morphing to listen state Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (19 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-03-20 17:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Dmitry Vyukov, Cong Wang,
Eric Dumazet, Gerrit Renker, Thomas Gleixner,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo, David S. Miller
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
[ Upstream commit d5afb6f9b6bb2c57bd0c05e76e12489dc0d037d9 ]
The code where sk_clone() came from created a new socket and locked it,
but then, on the error path didn't unlock it.
This problem stayed there for a long while, till b0691c8ee7c2 ("net:
Unlock sock before calling sk_free()") fixed it, but unfortunately the
callers of sk_clone() (now sk_clone_locked()) were not audited and the
one in dccp_create_openreq_child() remained.
Now in the age of the syskaller fuzzer, this was finally uncovered, as
reported by Dmitry:
---- 8< ----
I've got the following report while running syzkaller fuzzer on
86292b33d4b7 ("Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)")
[ BUG: held lock freed! ]
4.10.0+ #234 Not tainted
-------------------------
syz-executor6/6898 is freeing memory
ffff88006286cac0-ffff88006286d3b7, with a lock still held there!
(slock-AF_INET6){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8362c2c9>] spin_lock
include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline]
(slock-AF_INET6){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8362c2c9>]
sk_clone_lock+0x3d9/0x12c0 net/core/sock.c:1504
5 locks held by syz-executor6/6898:
#0: (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff839a34b4>] lock_sock
include/net/sock.h:1460 [inline]
#0: (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff839a34b4>]
inet_stream_connect+0x44/0xa0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:681
#1: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff83bc1c2a>]
inet6_csk_xmit+0x12a/0x5d0 net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:126
#2: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff8369b424>] __skb_unlink
include/linux/skbuff.h:1767 [inline]
#2: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff8369b424>] __skb_dequeue
include/linux/skbuff.h:1783 [inline]
#2: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff8369b424>]
process_backlog+0x264/0x730 net/core/dev.c:4835
#3: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff83aeb5c0>]
ip6_input_finish+0x0/0x1700 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:59
#4: (slock-AF_INET6){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8362c2c9>] spin_lock
include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline]
#4: (slock-AF_INET6){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8362c2c9>]
sk_clone_lock+0x3d9/0x12c0 net/core/sock.c:1504
Fix it just like was done by b0691c8ee7c2 ("net: Unlock sock before calling
sk_free()").
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170301153510.GE15145@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/dccp/minisocks.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/net/dccp/minisocks.c
+++ b/net/dccp/minisocks.c
@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ struct sock *dccp_create_openreq_child(c
/* It is still raw copy of parent, so invalidate
* destructor and make plain sk_free() */
newsk->sk_destruct = NULL;
+ bh_unlock_sock(newsk);
sk_free(newsk);
return NULL;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 09/28] tcp: fix various issues for sockets morphing to listen state
2017-03-20 17:48 [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.56-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 08/28] dccp: Unlock sock before calling sk_free() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-03-20 17:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 10/28] net: fix socket refcounting in skb_complete_wifi_ack() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (18 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-03-20 17:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Eric Dumazet, Dmitry Vyukov, David S. Miller
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
[ Upstream commit 02b2faaf0af1d85585f6d6980e286d53612acfc2 ]
Dmitry Vyukov reported a divide by 0 triggered by syzkaller, exploiting
tcp_disconnect() path that was never really considered and/or used
before syzkaller ;)
I was not able to reproduce the bug, but it seems issues here are the
three possible actions that assumed they would never trigger on a
listener.
1) tcp_write_timer_handler
2) tcp_delack_timer_handler
3) MTU reduction
Only IPv6 MTU reduction was properly testing TCP_CLOSE and TCP_LISTEN
states from tcp_v6_mtu_reduced()
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 7 +++++--
net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c | 6 ++++--
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -271,10 +271,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_v4_connect);
*/
void tcp_v4_mtu_reduced(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct dst_entry *dst;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
- u32 mtu = tcp_sk(sk)->mtu_info;
+ struct dst_entry *dst;
+ u32 mtu;
+ if ((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_LISTEN | TCPF_CLOSE))
+ return;
+ mtu = tcp_sk(sk)->mtu_info;
dst = inet_csk_update_pmtu(sk, mtu);
if (!dst)
return;
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c
@@ -223,7 +223,8 @@ void tcp_delack_timer_handler(struct soc
sk_mem_reclaim_partial(sk);
- if (sk->sk_state == TCP_CLOSE || !(icsk->icsk_ack.pending & ICSK_ACK_TIMER))
+ if (((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_CLOSE | TCPF_LISTEN)) ||
+ !(icsk->icsk_ack.pending & ICSK_ACK_TIMER))
goto out;
if (time_after(icsk->icsk_ack.timeout, jiffies)) {
@@ -504,7 +505,8 @@ void tcp_write_timer_handler(struct sock
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
int event;
- if (sk->sk_state == TCP_CLOSE || !icsk->icsk_pending)
+ if (((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_CLOSE | TCPF_LISTEN)) ||
+ !icsk->icsk_pending)
goto out;
if (time_after(icsk->icsk_timeout, jiffies)) {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 10/28] net: fix socket refcounting in skb_complete_wifi_ack()
2017-03-20 17:48 [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.56-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 09/28] tcp: fix various issues for sockets morphing to listen state Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-03-20 17:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 11/28] net: fix socket refcounting in skb_complete_tx_timestamp() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (17 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-03-20 17:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Eric Dumazet, Alexander Duyck,
Johannes Berg, Soheil Hassas Yeganeh, Willem de Bruijn,
David S. Miller
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
[ Upstream commit dd4f10722aeb10f4f582948839f066bebe44e5fb ]
TX skbs do not necessarily hold a reference on skb->sk->sk_refcnt
By the time TX completion happens, sk_refcnt might be already 0.
sock_hold()/sock_put() would then corrupt critical state, like
sk_wmem_alloc.
Fixes: bf7fa551e0ce ("mac80211: Resolve sk_refcnt/sk_wmem_alloc issue in wifi ack path")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/core/skbuff.c | 15 ++++++++-------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/net/core/skbuff.c
+++ b/net/core/skbuff.c
@@ -3735,7 +3735,7 @@ void skb_complete_wifi_ack(struct sk_buf
{
struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
struct sock_exterr_skb *serr;
- int err;
+ int err = 1;
skb->wifi_acked_valid = 1;
skb->wifi_acked = acked;
@@ -3745,14 +3745,15 @@ void skb_complete_wifi_ack(struct sk_buf
serr->ee.ee_errno = ENOMSG;
serr->ee.ee_origin = SO_EE_ORIGIN_TXSTATUS;
- /* take a reference to prevent skb_orphan() from freeing the socket */
- sock_hold(sk);
-
- err = sock_queue_err_skb(sk, skb);
+ /* Take a reference to prevent skb_orphan() from freeing the socket,
+ * but only if the socket refcount is not zero.
+ */
+ if (likely(atomic_inc_not_zero(&sk->sk_refcnt))) {
+ err = sock_queue_err_skb(sk, skb);
+ sock_put(sk);
+ }
if (err)
kfree_skb(skb);
-
- sock_put(sk);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(skb_complete_wifi_ack);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 11/28] net: fix socket refcounting in skb_complete_tx_timestamp()
2017-03-20 17:48 [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.56-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 10/28] net: fix socket refcounting in skb_complete_wifi_ack() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-03-20 17:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 12/28] dccp: fix use-after-free in dccp_feat_activate_values Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (16 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-03-20 17:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Eric Dumazet, Alexander Duyck,
Johannes Berg, Soheil Hassas Yeganeh, Willem de Bruijn,
David S. Miller
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
[ Upstream commit 9ac25fc063751379cb77434fef9f3b088cd3e2f7 ]
TX skbs do not necessarily hold a reference on skb->sk->sk_refcnt
By the time TX completion happens, sk_refcnt might be already 0.
sock_hold()/sock_put() would then corrupt critical state, like
sk_wmem_alloc and lead to leaks or use after free.
Fixes: 62bccb8cdb69 ("net-timestamp: Make the clone operation stand-alone from phy timestamping")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/core/skbuff.c | 15 ++++++++-------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/net/core/skbuff.c
+++ b/net/core/skbuff.c
@@ -3678,13 +3678,14 @@ void skb_complete_tx_timestamp(struct sk
if (!skb_may_tx_timestamp(sk, false))
return;
- /* take a reference to prevent skb_orphan() from freeing the socket */
- sock_hold(sk);
-
- *skb_hwtstamps(skb) = *hwtstamps;
- __skb_complete_tx_timestamp(skb, sk, SCM_TSTAMP_SND);
-
- sock_put(sk);
+ /* Take a reference to prevent skb_orphan() from freeing the socket,
+ * but only if the socket refcount is not zero.
+ */
+ if (likely(atomic_inc_not_zero(&sk->sk_refcnt))) {
+ *skb_hwtstamps(skb) = *hwtstamps;
+ __skb_complete_tx_timestamp(skb, sk, SCM_TSTAMP_SND);
+ sock_put(sk);
+ }
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(skb_complete_tx_timestamp);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 12/28] dccp: fix use-after-free in dccp_feat_activate_values
2017-03-20 17:48 [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.56-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 11/28] net: fix socket refcounting in skb_complete_tx_timestamp() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-03-20 17:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 13/28] vrf: Fix use-after-free in vrf_xmit Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (15 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-03-20 17:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Eric Dumazet, Dmitry Vyukov, David S. Miller
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
[ Upstream commit 62f8f4d9066c1c6f2474845d1ca7e2891f2ae3fd ]
Dmitry reported crashes in DCCP stack [1]
Problem here is that when I got rid of listener spinlock, I missed the
fact that DCCP stores a complex state in struct dccp_request_sock,
while TCP does not.
Since multiple cpus could access it at the same time, we need to add
protection.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in dccp_feat_activate_values+0x967/0xab0
net/dccp/feat.c:1541 at addr ffff88003713be68
Read of size 8 by task syz-executor2/8457
CPU: 2 PID: 8457 Comm: syz-executor2 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc7+ #127
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline]
dump_stack+0x292/0x398 lib/dump_stack.c:51
kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:162
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:200 [inline]
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:289 [inline]
kasan_report.part.1+0x20e/0x4e0 mm/kasan/report.c:311
kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:332 [inline]
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x29/0x30 mm/kasan/report.c:332
dccp_feat_activate_values+0x967/0xab0 net/dccp/feat.c:1541
dccp_create_openreq_child+0x464/0x610 net/dccp/minisocks.c:121
dccp_v6_request_recv_sock+0x1f6/0x1960 net/dccp/ipv6.c:457
dccp_check_req+0x335/0x5a0 net/dccp/minisocks.c:186
dccp_v6_rcv+0x69e/0x1d00 net/dccp/ipv6.c:711
ip6_input_finish+0x46d/0x17a0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:279
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline]
ip6_input+0xdb/0x590 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:322
dst_input include/net/dst.h:507 [inline]
ip6_rcv_finish+0x289/0x890 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:69
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline]
ipv6_rcv+0x12ec/0x23d0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:203
__netif_receive_skb_core+0x1ae5/0x3400 net/core/dev.c:4190
__netif_receive_skb+0x2a/0x170 net/core/dev.c:4228
process_backlog+0xe5/0x6c0 net/core/dev.c:4839
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5202 [inline]
net_rx_action+0xe70/0x1900 net/core/dev.c:5267
__do_softirq+0x2fb/0xb7d kernel/softirq.c:284
do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:902
</IRQ>
do_softirq.part.17+0x1e8/0x230 kernel/softirq.c:328
do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:176 [inline]
__local_bh_enable_ip+0x1f2/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:181
local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:31 [inline]
rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:971 [inline]
ip6_finish_output2+0xbb0/0x23d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:123
ip6_finish_output+0x302/0x960 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:148
NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:246 [inline]
ip6_output+0x1cb/0x8d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:162
ip6_xmit+0xcdf/0x20d0 include/net/dst.h:501
inet6_csk_xmit+0x320/0x5f0 net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:179
dccp_transmit_skb+0xb09/0x1120 net/dccp/output.c:141
dccp_xmit_packet+0x215/0x760 net/dccp/output.c:280
dccp_write_xmit+0x168/0x1d0 net/dccp/output.c:362
dccp_sendmsg+0x79c/0xb10 net/dccp/proto.c:796
inet_sendmsg+0x164/0x5b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:744
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:635 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:645
SYSC_sendto+0x660/0x810 net/socket.c:1687
SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1655
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
RIP: 0033:0x4458b9
RSP: 002b:00007f8ceb77bb58 EFLAGS: 00000282 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000017 RCX: 00000000004458b9
RDX: 0000000000000023 RSI: 0000000020e60000 RDI: 0000000000000017
RBP: 00000000006e1b90 R08: 00000000200f9fe1 R09: 0000000000000020
R10: 0000000000008010 R11: 0000000000000282 R12: 00000000007080a8
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f8ceb77c9c0 R15: 00007f8ceb77c700
Object at ffff88003713be50, in cache kmalloc-64 size: 64
Allocated:
PID = 8446
save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:57
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:502
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:514 [inline]
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:605
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x82/0x270 mm/slub.c:2738
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:490 [inline]
dccp_feat_entry_new+0x214/0x410 net/dccp/feat.c:467
dccp_feat_push_change+0x38/0x220 net/dccp/feat.c:487
__feat_register_sp+0x223/0x2f0 net/dccp/feat.c:741
dccp_feat_propagate_ccid+0x22b/0x2b0 net/dccp/feat.c:949
dccp_feat_server_ccid_dependencies+0x1b3/0x250 net/dccp/feat.c:1012
dccp_make_response+0x1f1/0xc90 net/dccp/output.c:423
dccp_v6_send_response+0x4ec/0xc20 net/dccp/ipv6.c:217
dccp_v6_conn_request+0xaba/0x11b0 net/dccp/ipv6.c:377
dccp_rcv_state_process+0x51e/0x1650 net/dccp/input.c:606
dccp_v6_do_rcv+0x213/0x350 net/dccp/ipv6.c:632
sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:893 [inline]
__sk_receive_skb+0x36f/0xcc0 net/core/sock.c:479
dccp_v6_rcv+0xba5/0x1d00 net/dccp/ipv6.c:742
ip6_input_finish+0x46d/0x17a0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:279
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline]
ip6_input+0xdb/0x590 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:322
dst_input include/net/dst.h:507 [inline]
ip6_rcv_finish+0x289/0x890 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:69
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline]
ipv6_rcv+0x12ec/0x23d0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:203
__netif_receive_skb_core+0x1ae5/0x3400 net/core/dev.c:4190
__netif_receive_skb+0x2a/0x170 net/core/dev.c:4228
process_backlog+0xe5/0x6c0 net/core/dev.c:4839
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5202 [inline]
net_rx_action+0xe70/0x1900 net/core/dev.c:5267
__do_softirq+0x2fb/0xb7d kernel/softirq.c:284
Freed:
PID = 15
save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:57
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:502
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:514 [inline]
kasan_slab_free+0x73/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:578
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1355 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1377 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:2954 [inline]
kfree+0xe8/0x2b0 mm/slub.c:3874
dccp_feat_entry_destructor.part.4+0x48/0x60 net/dccp/feat.c:418
dccp_feat_entry_destructor net/dccp/feat.c:416 [inline]
dccp_feat_list_pop net/dccp/feat.c:541 [inline]
dccp_feat_activate_values+0x57f/0xab0 net/dccp/feat.c:1543
dccp_create_openreq_child+0x464/0x610 net/dccp/minisocks.c:121
dccp_v6_request_recv_sock+0x1f6/0x1960 net/dccp/ipv6.c:457
dccp_check_req+0x335/0x5a0 net/dccp/minisocks.c:186
dccp_v6_rcv+0x69e/0x1d00 net/dccp/ipv6.c:711
ip6_input_finish+0x46d/0x17a0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:279
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline]
ip6_input+0xdb/0x590 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:322
dst_input include/net/dst.h:507 [inline]
ip6_rcv_finish+0x289/0x890 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:69
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline]
ipv6_rcv+0x12ec/0x23d0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:203
__netif_receive_skb_core+0x1ae5/0x3400 net/core/dev.c:4190
__netif_receive_skb+0x2a/0x170 net/core/dev.c:4228
process_backlog+0xe5/0x6c0 net/core/dev.c:4839
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5202 [inline]
net_rx_action+0xe70/0x1900 net/core/dev.c:5267
__do_softirq+0x2fb/0xb7d kernel/softirq.c:284
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88003713bd00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88003713bd80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff88003713be00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
Fixes: 079096f103fa ("tcp/dccp: install syn_recv requests into ehash table")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
include/linux/dccp.h | 1 +
net/dccp/minisocks.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++--------
2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/dccp.h
+++ b/include/linux/dccp.h
@@ -163,6 +163,7 @@ struct dccp_request_sock {
__u64 dreq_isr;
__u64 dreq_gsr;
__be32 dreq_service;
+ spinlock_t dreq_lock;
struct list_head dreq_featneg;
__u32 dreq_timestamp_echo;
__u32 dreq_timestamp_time;
--- a/net/dccp/minisocks.c
+++ b/net/dccp/minisocks.c
@@ -146,6 +146,13 @@ struct sock *dccp_check_req(struct sock
struct dccp_request_sock *dreq = dccp_rsk(req);
bool own_req;
+ /* TCP/DCCP listeners became lockless.
+ * DCCP stores complex state in its request_sock, so we need
+ * a protection for them, now this code runs without being protected
+ * by the parent (listener) lock.
+ */
+ spin_lock_bh(&dreq->dreq_lock);
+
/* Check for retransmitted REQUEST */
if (dccp_hdr(skb)->dccph_type == DCCP_PKT_REQUEST) {
@@ -160,7 +167,7 @@ struct sock *dccp_check_req(struct sock
inet_rtx_syn_ack(sk, req);
}
/* Network Duplicate, discard packet */
- return NULL;
+ goto out;
}
DCCP_SKB_CB(skb)->dccpd_reset_code = DCCP_RESET_CODE_PACKET_ERROR;
@@ -186,20 +193,20 @@ struct sock *dccp_check_req(struct sock
child = inet_csk(sk)->icsk_af_ops->syn_recv_sock(sk, skb, req, NULL,
req, &own_req);
- if (!child)
- goto listen_overflow;
-
- return inet_csk_complete_hashdance(sk, child, req, own_req);
+ if (child) {
+ child = inet_csk_complete_hashdance(sk, child, req, own_req);
+ goto out;
+ }
-listen_overflow:
- dccp_pr_debug("listen_overflow!\n");
DCCP_SKB_CB(skb)->dccpd_reset_code = DCCP_RESET_CODE_TOO_BUSY;
drop:
if (dccp_hdr(skb)->dccph_type != DCCP_PKT_RESET)
req->rsk_ops->send_reset(sk, skb);
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop(sk, req);
- return NULL;
+out:
+ spin_unlock_bh(&dreq->dreq_lock);
+ return child;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(dccp_check_req);
@@ -250,6 +257,7 @@ int dccp_reqsk_init(struct request_sock
{
struct dccp_request_sock *dreq = dccp_rsk(req);
+ spin_lock_init(&dreq->dreq_lock);
inet_rsk(req)->ir_rmt_port = dccp_hdr(skb)->dccph_sport;
inet_rsk(req)->ir_num = ntohs(dccp_hdr(skb)->dccph_dport);
inet_rsk(req)->acked = 0;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 13/28] vrf: Fix use-after-free in vrf_xmit
2017-03-20 17:48 [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.56-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 12/28] dccp: fix use-after-free in dccp_feat_activate_values Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-03-20 17:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 14/28] uapi: fix linux/packet_diag.h userspace compilation error Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (14 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-03-20 17:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, David Ahern, David S. Miller
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
[ Upstream commit f7887d40e541f74402df0684a1463c0a0bb68c68 ]
KASAN detected a use-after-free:
[ 269.467067] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vrf_xmit+0x7f1/0x827 [vrf] at addr ffff8800350a21c0
[ 269.467067] Read of size 4 by task ssh/1879
[ 269.467067] CPU: 1 PID: 1879 Comm: ssh Not tainted 4.10.0+ #249
[ 269.467067] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.7.5-20140531_083030-gandalf 04/01/2014
[ 269.467067] Call Trace:
[ 269.467067] dump_stack+0x81/0xb6
[ 269.467067] kasan_object_err+0x21/0x78
[ 269.467067] kasan_report+0x2f7/0x450
[ 269.467067] ? vrf_xmit+0x7f1/0x827 [vrf]
[ 269.467067] ? ip_output+0xa4/0xdb
[ 269.467067] __asan_load4+0x6b/0x6d
[ 269.467067] vrf_xmit+0x7f1/0x827 [vrf]
...
Which corresponds to the skb access after xmit handling. Fix by saving
skb->len and using the saved value to update stats.
Fixes: 193125dbd8eb2 ("net: Introduce VRF device driver")
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/vrf.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/net/vrf.c
+++ b/drivers/net/vrf.c
@@ -345,6 +345,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t is_ip_tx_frame(struct
static netdev_tx_t vrf_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
{
+ int len = skb->len;
netdev_tx_t ret = is_ip_tx_frame(skb, dev);
if (likely(ret == NET_XMIT_SUCCESS || ret == NET_XMIT_CN)) {
@@ -352,7 +353,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t vrf_xmit(struct sk_bu
u64_stats_update_begin(&dstats->syncp);
dstats->tx_pkts++;
- dstats->tx_bytes += skb->len;
+ dstats->tx_bytes += len;
u64_stats_update_end(&dstats->syncp);
} else {
this_cpu_inc(dev->dstats->tx_drps);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 14/28] uapi: fix linux/packet_diag.h userspace compilation error
2017-03-20 17:48 [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.56-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 13/28] vrf: Fix use-after-free in vrf_xmit Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-03-20 17:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 16/28] mpls: Send route delete notifications when router module is unloaded Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (13 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-03-20 17:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Dmitry V. Levin, Pavel Emelyanov,
David S. Miller
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv@altlinux.org>
[ Upstream commit 745cb7f8a5de0805cade3de3991b7a95317c7c73 ]
Replace MAX_ADDR_LEN with its numeric value to fix the following
linux/packet_diag.h userspace compilation error:
/usr/include/linux/packet_diag.h:67:17: error: 'MAX_ADDR_LEN' undeclared here (not in a function)
__u8 pdmc_addr[MAX_ADDR_LEN];
This is not the first case in the UAPI where the numeric value
of MAX_ADDR_LEN is used instead of symbolic one, uapi/linux/if_link.h
already does the same:
$ grep MAX_ADDR_LEN include/uapi/linux/if_link.h
__u8 mac[32]; /* MAX_ADDR_LEN */
There are no UAPI headers besides these two that use MAX_ADDR_LEN.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
include/uapi/linux/packet_diag.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/include/uapi/linux/packet_diag.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/packet_diag.h
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ struct packet_diag_mclist {
__u32 pdmc_count;
__u16 pdmc_type;
__u16 pdmc_alen;
- __u8 pdmc_addr[MAX_ADDR_LEN];
+ __u8 pdmc_addr[32]; /* MAX_ADDR_LEN */
};
struct packet_diag_ring {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 16/28] mpls: Send route delete notifications when router module is unloaded
2017-03-20 17:48 [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.56-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (12 preceding siblings ...)
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 14/28] uapi: fix linux/packet_diag.h userspace compilation error Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-03-20 17:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 17/28] ipv6: make ECMP route replacement less greedy Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (12 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-03-20 17:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, David Ahern, David S. Miller
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
[ Upstream commit e37791ec1ad785b59022ae211f63a16189bacebf ]
When the mpls_router module is unloaded, mpls routes are deleted but
notifications are not sent to userspace leaving userspace caches
out of sync. Add the call to mpls_notify_route in mpls_net_exit as
routes are freed.
Fixes: 0189197f44160 ("mpls: Basic routing support")
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/mpls/af_mpls.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/net/mpls/af_mpls.c
+++ b/net/mpls/af_mpls.c
@@ -1567,6 +1567,7 @@ static void mpls_net_exit(struct net *ne
for (index = 0; index < platform_labels; index++) {
struct mpls_route *rt = rtnl_dereference(platform_label[index]);
RCU_INIT_POINTER(platform_label[index], NULL);
+ mpls_notify_route(net, index, rt, NULL, NULL);
mpls_rt_free(rt);
}
rtnl_unlock();
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 17/28] ipv6: make ECMP route replacement less greedy
2017-03-20 17:48 [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.56-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (13 preceding siblings ...)
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 16/28] mpls: Send route delete notifications when router module is unloaded Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-03-20 17:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 18/28] ipv6: avoid write to a possibly cloned skb Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (11 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-03-20 17:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Sabrina Dubroca, Nicolas Dichtel,
Xin Long, Michal Kubecek, David S. Miller
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
[ Upstream commit 67e194007be08d071294456274dd53e0a04fdf90 ]
Commit 27596472473a ("ipv6: fix ECMP route replacement") introduced a
loop that removes all siblings of an ECMP route that is being
replaced. However, this loop doesn't stop when it has replaced
siblings, and keeps removing other routes with a higher metric.
We also end up triggering the WARN_ON after the loop, because after
this nsiblings < 0.
Instead, stop the loop when we have taken care of all routes with the
same metric as the route being replaced.
Reproducer:
===========
#!/bin/sh
ip netns add ns1
ip netns add ns2
ip -net ns1 link set lo up
for x in 0 1 2 ; do
ip link add veth$x netns ns2 type veth peer name eth$x netns ns1
ip -net ns1 link set eth$x up
ip -net ns2 link set veth$x up
done
ip -net ns1 -6 r a 2000::/64 nexthop via fe80::0 dev eth0 \
nexthop via fe80::1 dev eth1 nexthop via fe80::2 dev eth2
ip -net ns1 -6 r a 2000::/64 via fe80::42 dev eth0 metric 256
ip -net ns1 -6 r a 2000::/64 via fe80::43 dev eth0 metric 2048
echo "before replace, 3 routes"
ip -net ns1 -6 r | grep -v '^fe80\|^ff00'
echo
ip -net ns1 -6 r c 2000::/64 nexthop via fe80::4 dev eth0 \
nexthop via fe80::5 dev eth1 nexthop via fe80::6 dev eth2
echo "after replace, only 2 routes, metric 2048 is gone"
ip -net ns1 -6 r | grep -v '^fe80\|^ff00'
Fixes: 27596472473a ("ipv6: fix ECMP route replacement")
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c
@@ -903,6 +903,8 @@ add:
ins = &rt->dst.rt6_next;
iter = *ins;
while (iter) {
+ if (iter->rt6i_metric > rt->rt6i_metric)
+ break;
if (rt6_qualify_for_ecmp(iter)) {
*ins = iter->dst.rt6_next;
fib6_purge_rt(iter, fn, info->nl_net);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 18/28] ipv6: avoid write to a possibly cloned skb
2017-03-20 17:48 [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.56-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (14 preceding siblings ...)
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 17/28] ipv6: make ECMP route replacement less greedy Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-03-20 17:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 19/28] bridge: drop netfilter fake rtable unconditionally Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (10 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-03-20 17:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Hannes Frederic Sowa, Andreas Karis,
Florian Westphal, David S. Miller
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
[ Upstream commit 79e49503efe53a8c51d8b695bedc8a346c5e4a87 ]
ip6_fragment, in case skb has a fraglist, checks if the
skb is cloned. If it is, it will move to the 'slow path' and allocates
new skbs for each fragment.
However, right before entering the slowpath loop, it updates the
nexthdr value of the last ipv6 extension header to NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT,
to account for the fragment header that will be inserted in the new
ipv6-fragment skbs.
In case original skb is cloned this munges nexthdr value of another
skb. Avoid this by doing the nexthdr update for each of the new fragment
skbs separately.
This was observed with tcpdump on a bridge device where netfilter ipv6
reassembly is active: tcpdump shows malformed fragment headers as
the l4 header (icmpv6, tcp, etc). is decoded as a fragment header.
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Reported-by: Andreas Karis <akaris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
@@ -742,13 +742,14 @@ slow_path:
* Fragment the datagram.
*/
- *prevhdr = NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT;
troom = rt->dst.dev->needed_tailroom;
/*
* Keep copying data until we run out.
*/
while (left > 0) {
+ u8 *fragnexthdr_offset;
+
len = left;
/* IF: it doesn't fit, use 'mtu' - the data space left */
if (len > mtu)
@@ -793,6 +794,10 @@ slow_path:
*/
skb_copy_from_linear_data(skb, skb_network_header(frag), hlen);
+ fragnexthdr_offset = skb_network_header(frag);
+ fragnexthdr_offset += prevhdr - skb_network_header(skb);
+ *fragnexthdr_offset = NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT;
+
/*
* Build fragment header.
*/
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 19/28] bridge: drop netfilter fake rtable unconditionally
2017-03-20 17:48 [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.56-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (15 preceding siblings ...)
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 18/28] ipv6: avoid write to a possibly cloned skb Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-03-20 17:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 21/28] dccp: fix memory leak during tear-down of unsuccessful connection request Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (9 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-03-20 17:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Andreas Karis, Florian Westphal,
Pablo Neira Ayuso, David S. Miller
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
[ Upstream commit a13b2082ece95247779b9995c4e91b4246bed023 ]
Andreas reports kernel oops during rmmod of the br_netfilter module.
Hannes debugged the oops down to a NULL rt6info->rt6i_indev.
Problem is that br_netfilter has the nasty concept of adding a fake
rtable to skb->dst; this happens in a br_netfilter prerouting hook.
A second hook (in bridge LOCAL_IN) is supposed to remove these again
before the skb is handed up the stack.
However, on module unload hooks get unregistered which means an
skb could traverse the prerouting hook that attaches the fake_rtable,
while the 'fake rtable remove' hook gets removed from the hooklist
immediately after.
Fixes: 34666d467cbf1e2e3c7 ("netfilter: bridge: move br_netfilter out of the core")
Reported-by: Andreas Karis <akaris@redhat.com>
Debugged-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/bridge/br_input.c | 1 +
net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c | 21 ---------------------
2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 21 deletions(-)
--- a/net/bridge/br_input.c
+++ b/net/bridge/br_input.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(br_should_route_hook);
static int
br_netif_receive_skb(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ br_drop_fake_rtable(skb);
return netif_receive_skb(skb);
}
--- a/net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c
+++ b/net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c
@@ -516,21 +516,6 @@ static unsigned int br_nf_pre_routing(vo
}
-/* PF_BRIDGE/LOCAL_IN ************************************************/
-/* The packet is locally destined, which requires a real
- * dst_entry, so detach the fake one. On the way up, the
- * packet would pass through PRE_ROUTING again (which already
- * took place when the packet entered the bridge), but we
- * register an IPv4 PRE_ROUTING 'sabotage' hook that will
- * prevent this from happening. */
-static unsigned int br_nf_local_in(void *priv,
- struct sk_buff *skb,
- const struct nf_hook_state *state)
-{
- br_drop_fake_rtable(skb);
- return NF_ACCEPT;
-}
-
/* PF_BRIDGE/FORWARD *************************************************/
static int br_nf_forward_finish(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
@@ -901,12 +886,6 @@ static struct nf_hook_ops br_nf_ops[] __
.priority = NF_BR_PRI_BRNF,
},
{
- .hook = br_nf_local_in,
- .pf = NFPROTO_BRIDGE,
- .hooknum = NF_BR_LOCAL_IN,
- .priority = NF_BR_PRI_BRNF,
- },
- {
.hook = br_nf_forward_ip,
.pf = NFPROTO_BRIDGE,
.hooknum = NF_BR_FORWARD,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 21/28] dccp: fix memory leak during tear-down of unsuccessful connection request
2017-03-20 17:48 [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.56-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (16 preceding siblings ...)
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 19/28] bridge: drop netfilter fake rtable unconditionally Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-03-20 17:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 22/28] net sched actions: decrement module reference count after table flush Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (8 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-03-20 17:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jianwen Ji, Hannes Frederic Sowa,
David S. Miller
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
[ Upstream commit 72ef9c4125c7b257e3a714d62d778ab46583d6a3 ]
This patch fixes a memory leak, which happens if the connection request
is not fulfilled between parsing the DCCP options and handling the SYN
(because e.g. the backlog is full), because we forgot to free the
list of ack vectors.
Reported-by: Jianwen Ji <jiji@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/dccp/ccids/ccid2.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/net/dccp/ccids/ccid2.c
+++ b/net/dccp/ccids/ccid2.c
@@ -749,6 +749,7 @@ static void ccid2_hc_tx_exit(struct sock
for (i = 0; i < hc->tx_seqbufc; i++)
kfree(hc->tx_seqbuf[i]);
hc->tx_seqbufc = 0;
+ dccp_ackvec_parsed_cleanup(&hc->tx_av_chunks);
}
static void ccid2_hc_rx_packet_recv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 22/28] net sched actions: decrement module reference count after table flush.
2017-03-20 17:48 [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.56-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (17 preceding siblings ...)
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 21/28] dccp: fix memory leak during tear-down of unsuccessful connection request Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-03-20 17:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 23/28] fscrypt: fix renaming and linking special files Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (7 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-03-20 17:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Roman Mashak, Jamal Hadi Salim,
Cong Wang, David S. Miller
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Roman Mashak <mrv@mojatatu.com>
[ Upstream commit edb9d1bff4bbe19b8ae0e71b1f38732591a9eeb2 ]
When tc actions are loaded as a module and no actions have been installed,
flushing them would result in actions removed from the memory, but modules
reference count not being decremented, so that the modules would not be
unloaded.
Following is example with GACT action:
% sudo modprobe act_gact
% lsmod
Module Size Used by
act_gact 16384 0
%
% sudo tc actions ls action gact
%
% sudo tc actions flush action gact
% lsmod
Module Size Used by
act_gact 16384 1
% sudo tc actions flush action gact
% lsmod
Module Size Used by
act_gact 16384 2
% sudo rmmod act_gact
rmmod: ERROR: Module act_gact is in use
....
After the fix:
% lsmod
Module Size Used by
act_gact 16384 0
%
% sudo tc actions add action pass index 1
% sudo tc actions add action pass index 2
% sudo tc actions add action pass index 3
% lsmod
Module Size Used by
act_gact 16384 3
%
% sudo tc actions flush action gact
% lsmod
Module Size Used by
act_gact 16384 0
%
% sudo tc actions flush action gact
% lsmod
Module Size Used by
act_gact 16384 0
% sudo rmmod act_gact
% lsmod
Module Size Used by
%
Fixes: f97017cdefef ("net-sched: Fix actions flushing")
Signed-off-by: Roman Mashak <mrv@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/sched/act_api.c | 5 +----
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/net/sched/act_api.c
+++ b/net/sched/act_api.c
@@ -820,10 +820,8 @@ static int tca_action_flush(struct net *
goto out_module_put;
err = a.ops->walk(skb, &dcb, RTM_DELACTION, &a);
- if (err < 0)
+ if (err <= 0)
goto out_module_put;
- if (err == 0)
- goto noflush_out;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest);
@@ -840,7 +838,6 @@ static int tca_action_flush(struct net *
out_module_put:
module_put(a.ops->owner);
err_out:
-noflush_out:
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 23/28] fscrypt: fix renaming and linking special files
2017-03-20 17:48 [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.56-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (18 preceding siblings ...)
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 22/28] net sched actions: decrement module reference count after table flush Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-03-20 17:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 24/28] fscrypto: lock inode while setting encryption policy Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (6 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-03-20 17:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Eric Biggers, Richard Weinberger,
Theodore Tso
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
commit 42d97eb0ade31e1bc537d086842f5d6e766d9d51 upstream.
Attempting to link a device node, named pipe, or socket file into an
encrypted directory through rename(2) or link(2) always failed with
EPERM. This happened because fscrypt_has_permitted_context() saw that
the file was unencrypted and forbid creating the link. This behavior
was unexpected because such files are never encrypted; only regular
files, directories, and symlinks can be encrypted.
To fix this, make fscrypt_has_permitted_context() always return true on
special files.
This will be covered by a test in my encryption xfstests patchset.
Fixes: 9bd8212f981e ("ext4 crypto: add encryption policy and password salt support")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/ext4/crypto_policy.c | 6 ++++++
fs/f2fs/crypto_policy.c | 5 +++++
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/ext4/crypto_policy.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/crypto_policy.c
@@ -156,6 +156,12 @@ int ext4_is_child_context_consistent_wit
WARN_ON(1); /* Should never happen */
return 0;
}
+
+ /* No restrictions on file types which are never encrypted */
+ if (!S_ISREG(child->i_mode) && !S_ISDIR(child->i_mode) &&
+ !S_ISLNK(child->i_mode))
+ return 1;
+
/* no restrictions if the parent directory is not encrypted */
if (!ext4_encrypted_inode(parent))
return 1;
--- a/fs/f2fs/crypto_policy.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/crypto_policy.c
@@ -149,6 +149,11 @@ int f2fs_is_child_context_consistent_wit
BUG_ON(1);
}
+ /* No restrictions on file types which are never encrypted */
+ if (!S_ISREG(child->i_mode) && !S_ISDIR(child->i_mode) &&
+ !S_ISLNK(child->i_mode))
+ return 1;
+
/* no restrictions if the parent directory is not encrypted */
if (!f2fs_encrypted_inode(parent))
return 1;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 24/28] fscrypto: lock inode while setting encryption policy
2017-03-20 17:48 [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.56-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (19 preceding siblings ...)
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 23/28] fscrypt: fix renaming and linking special files Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-03-20 17:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 25/28] x86/kasan: Fix boot with KASAN=y and PROFILE_ANNOTATED_BRANCHES=y Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (5 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-03-20 17:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Eric Biggers, Theodore Tso,
Richard Weinberger
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
commit 8906a8223ad4909b391c5628f7991ebceda30e52 upstream.
i_rwsem needs to be acquired while setting an encryption policy so that
concurrent calls to FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY are correctly
serialized (especially the ->get_context() + ->set_context() pair), and
so that new files cannot be created in the directory during or after the
->empty_dir() check.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/ext4/ioctl.c | 4 ++++
fs/f2fs/file.c | 9 ++++++++-
2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/ext4/ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/ioctl.c
@@ -633,8 +633,12 @@ resizefs_out:
if (err)
goto encryption_policy_out;
+ mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
+
err = ext4_process_policy(&policy, inode);
+ mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
+
mnt_drop_write_file(filp);
encryption_policy_out:
return err;
--- a/fs/f2fs/file.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/file.c
@@ -1535,12 +1535,19 @@ static int f2fs_ioc_set_encryption_polic
#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION
struct f2fs_encryption_policy policy;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
+ int err;
if (copy_from_user(&policy, (struct f2fs_encryption_policy __user *)arg,
sizeof(policy)))
return -EFAULT;
- return f2fs_process_policy(&policy, inode);
+ mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
+
+ err = f2fs_process_policy(&policy, inode);
+
+ mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
+
+ return err;
#else
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 25/28] x86/kasan: Fix boot with KASAN=y and PROFILE_ANNOTATED_BRANCHES=y
2017-03-20 17:48 [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.56-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (20 preceding siblings ...)
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 24/28] fscrypto: lock inode while setting encryption policy Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-03-20 17:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 26/28] x86/perf: Fix CR4.PCE propagation to use active_mm instead of mm Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (4 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-03-20 17:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Fengguang Wu, Andrey Ryabinin,
kasan-dev, Alexander Potapenko, Andrew Morton, lkp,
Dmitry Vyukov, Thomas Gleixner
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
commit be3606ff739d1c1be36389f8737c577ad87e1f57 upstream.
The kernel doesn't boot with both PROFILE_ANNOTATED_BRANCHES=y and KASAN=y
options selected. With branch profiling enabled we end up calling
ftrace_likely_update() before kasan_early_init(). ftrace_likely_update() is
built with KASAN instrumentation, so calling it before kasan has been
initialized leads to crash.
Use DISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING define to make sure that we don't call
ftrace_likely_update() from early code before kasan_early_init().
Fixes: ef7f0d6a6ca8 ("x86_64: add KASan support")
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: lkp@01.org
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170313163337.1704-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 1 +
arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c | 1 +
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
* Copyright (C) 2000 Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@suse.de> SuSE
*/
+#define DISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
--- a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+#define DISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "kasan: " fmt
#include <linux/bootmem.h>
#include <linux/kasan.h>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 26/28] x86/perf: Fix CR4.PCE propagation to use active_mm instead of mm
2017-03-20 17:48 [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.56-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (21 preceding siblings ...)
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 25/28] x86/kasan: Fix boot with KASAN=y and PROFILE_ANNOTATED_BRANCHES=y Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-03-20 17:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 27/28] futex: Fix potential use-after-free in FUTEX_REQUEUE_PI Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (3 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-03-20 17:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Andy Lutomirski, Alexander Shishkin,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo, Borislav Petkov, H. Peter Anvin,
Jiri Olsa, Linus Torvalds, Peter Zijlstra, Stephane Eranian,
Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
commit 5dc855d44c2ad960a86f593c60461f1ae1566b6d upstream.
If one thread mmaps a perf event while another thread in the same mm
is in some context where active_mm != mm (which can happen in the
scheduler, for example), refresh_pce() would write the wrong value
to CR4.PCE. This broke some PAPI tests.
Reported-and-tested-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 7911d3f7af14 ("perf/x86: Only allow rdpmc if a perf_event is mapped")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0c5b38a76ea50e405f9abe07a13dfaef87c173a1.1489694270.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c
@@ -1996,8 +1996,8 @@ static int x86_pmu_event_init(struct per
static void refresh_pce(void *ignored)
{
- if (current->mm)
- load_mm_cr4(current->mm);
+ if (current->active_mm)
+ load_mm_cr4(current->active_mm);
}
static void x86_pmu_event_mapped(struct perf_event *event)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 27/28] futex: Fix potential use-after-free in FUTEX_REQUEUE_PI
2017-03-20 17:48 [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.56-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (22 preceding siblings ...)
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 26/28] x86/perf: Fix CR4.PCE propagation to use active_mm instead of mm Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-03-20 17:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 28/28] futex: Add missing error handling to FUTEX_REQUEUE_PI Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (2 subsequent siblings)
26 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-03-20 17:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Dmitry Vyukov, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Darren Hart, juri.lelli, bigeasy, xlpang, rostedt,
mathieu.desnoyers, jdesfossez, dvhart, bristot, Thomas Gleixner
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit c236c8e95a3d395b0494e7108f0d41cf36ec107c upstream.
While working on the futex code, I stumbled over this potential
use-after-free scenario. Dmitry triggered it later with syzkaller.
pi_mutex is a pointer into pi_state, which we drop the reference on in
unqueue_me_pi(). So any access to that pointer after that is bad.
Since other sites already do rt_mutex_unlock() with hb->lock held, see
for example futex_lock_pi(), simply move the unlock before
unqueue_me_pi().
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: juri.lelli@arm.com
Cc: bigeasy@linutronix.de
Cc: xlpang@redhat.com
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
Cc: jdesfossez@efficios.com
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: bristot@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170304093558.801744246@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/futex.c | 20 +++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -2690,7 +2690,6 @@ static int futex_wait_requeue_pi(u32 __u
{
struct hrtimer_sleeper timeout, *to = NULL;
struct rt_mutex_waiter rt_waiter;
- struct rt_mutex *pi_mutex = NULL;
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
union futex_key key2 = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
struct futex_q q = futex_q_init;
@@ -2782,6 +2781,8 @@ static int futex_wait_requeue_pi(u32 __u
spin_unlock(q.lock_ptr);
}
} else {
+ struct rt_mutex *pi_mutex;
+
/*
* We have been woken up by futex_unlock_pi(), a timeout, or a
* signal. futex_unlock_pi() will not destroy the lock_ptr nor
@@ -2805,18 +2806,19 @@ static int futex_wait_requeue_pi(u32 __u
if (res)
ret = (res < 0) ? res : 0;
+ /*
+ * If fixup_pi_state_owner() faulted and was unable to handle
+ * the fault, unlock the rt_mutex and return the fault to
+ * userspace.
+ */
+ if (ret && rt_mutex_owner(pi_mutex) == current)
+ rt_mutex_unlock(pi_mutex);
+
/* Unqueue and drop the lock. */
unqueue_me_pi(&q);
}
- /*
- * If fixup_pi_state_owner() faulted and was unable to handle the
- * fault, unlock the rt_mutex and return the fault to userspace.
- */
- if (ret == -EFAULT) {
- if (pi_mutex && rt_mutex_owner(pi_mutex) == current)
- rt_mutex_unlock(pi_mutex);
- } else if (ret == -EINTR) {
+ if (ret == -EINTR) {
/*
* We've already been requeued, but cannot restart by calling
* futex_lock_pi() directly. We could restart this syscall, but
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 28/28] futex: Add missing error handling to FUTEX_REQUEUE_PI
2017-03-20 17:48 [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.56-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (23 preceding siblings ...)
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 27/28] futex: Fix potential use-after-free in FUTEX_REQUEUE_PI Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-03-20 17:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-03-21 0:11 ` [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.56-stable review Shuah Khan
2017-03-21 2:13 ` Guenter Roeck
26 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-03-20 17:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thomas Gleixner,
Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
Darren Hart, juri.lelli, bigeasy, xlpang, rostedt,
mathieu.desnoyers, jdesfossez, dvhart, bristot
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 9bbb25afeb182502ca4f2c4f3f88af0681b34cae upstream.
Thomas spotted that fixup_pi_state_owner() can return errors and we
fail to unlock the rt_mutex in that case.
Reported-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: juri.lelli@arm.com
Cc: bigeasy@linutronix.de
Cc: xlpang@redhat.com
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
Cc: jdesfossez@efficios.com
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: bristot@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170304093558.867401760@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/futex.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -2773,6 +2773,8 @@ static int futex_wait_requeue_pi(u32 __u
if (q.pi_state && (q.pi_state->owner != current)) {
spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr2, &q, current);
+ if (ret && rt_mutex_owner(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex) == current)
+ rt_mutex_unlock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex);
/*
* Drop the reference to the pi state which
* the requeue_pi() code acquired for us.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.56-stable review
2017-03-20 17:48 [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.56-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (24 preceding siblings ...)
2017-03-20 17:49 ` [PATCH 4.4 28/28] futex: Add missing error handling to FUTEX_REQUEUE_PI Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-03-21 0:11 ` Shuah Khan
2017-03-21 2:13 ` Guenter Roeck
26 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Shuah Khan @ 2017-03-21 0:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-kernel
Cc: torvalds, akpm, linux, patches, ben.hutchings, stable, Shuah Khan
On 03/20/2017 11:48 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.56 release.
> There are 28 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed Mar 22 17:47:06 UTC 2017.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.4.56-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.4.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>
Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
thanks,
-- Shuah
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.56-stable review
2017-03-20 17:48 [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.56-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (25 preceding siblings ...)
2017-03-21 0:11 ` [PATCH 4.4 00/28] 4.4.56-stable review Shuah Khan
@ 2017-03-21 2:13 ` Guenter Roeck
26 siblings, 0 replies; 28+ messages in thread
From: Guenter Roeck @ 2017-03-21 2:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-kernel
Cc: torvalds, akpm, shuahkh, patches, ben.hutchings, stable
On 03/20/2017 10:48 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.56 release.
> There are 28 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed Mar 22 17:47:06 UTC 2017.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
Build results:
total: 149 pass: 149 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
total: 115 pass: 115 fail: 0
Details are available at http://kerneltests.org/builders.
Guenter
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 28+ messages in thread