* [PATCH 4.9 1/9] timerfd: Protect the might cancel mechanism proper
2017-05-06 20:39 [PATCH 4.9 0/9] 4.9.27-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-05-06 20:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-06 20:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 2/9] Handle mismatched open calls Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (9 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-06 20:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Dmitry Vyukov, Thomas Gleixner,
syzkaller, Al Viro, linux-fsdevel
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
commit 1e38da300e1e395a15048b0af1e5305bd91402f6 upstream.
The handling of the might_cancel queueing is not properly protected, so
parallel operations on the file descriptor can race with each other and
lead to list corruptions or use after free.
Protect the context for these operations with a seperate lock.
The wait queue lock cannot be reused for this because that would create a
lock inversion scenario vs. the cancel lock. Replacing might_cancel with an
atomic (atomic_t or atomic bit) does not help either because it still can
race vs. the actual list operation.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org"
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1701311521430.3457@nanos
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/timerfd.c | 17 ++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/timerfd.c
+++ b/fs/timerfd.c
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ struct timerfd_ctx {
short unsigned settime_flags; /* to show in fdinfo */
struct rcu_head rcu;
struct list_head clist;
+ spinlock_t cancel_lock;
bool might_cancel;
};
@@ -112,7 +113,7 @@ void timerfd_clock_was_set(void)
rcu_read_unlock();
}
-static void timerfd_remove_cancel(struct timerfd_ctx *ctx)
+static void __timerfd_remove_cancel(struct timerfd_ctx *ctx)
{
if (ctx->might_cancel) {
ctx->might_cancel = false;
@@ -122,6 +123,13 @@ static void timerfd_remove_cancel(struct
}
}
+static void timerfd_remove_cancel(struct timerfd_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ spin_lock(&ctx->cancel_lock);
+ __timerfd_remove_cancel(ctx);
+ spin_unlock(&ctx->cancel_lock);
+}
+
static bool timerfd_canceled(struct timerfd_ctx *ctx)
{
if (!ctx->might_cancel || ctx->moffs.tv64 != KTIME_MAX)
@@ -132,6 +140,7 @@ static bool timerfd_canceled(struct time
static void timerfd_setup_cancel(struct timerfd_ctx *ctx, int flags)
{
+ spin_lock(&ctx->cancel_lock);
if ((ctx->clockid == CLOCK_REALTIME ||
ctx->clockid == CLOCK_REALTIME_ALARM) &&
(flags & TFD_TIMER_ABSTIME) && (flags & TFD_TIMER_CANCEL_ON_SET)) {
@@ -141,9 +150,10 @@ static void timerfd_setup_cancel(struct
list_add_rcu(&ctx->clist, &cancel_list);
spin_unlock(&cancel_lock);
}
- } else if (ctx->might_cancel) {
- timerfd_remove_cancel(ctx);
+ } else {
+ __timerfd_remove_cancel(ctx);
}
+ spin_unlock(&ctx->cancel_lock);
}
static ktime_t timerfd_get_remaining(struct timerfd_ctx *ctx)
@@ -400,6 +410,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(timerfd_create, int, clo
return -ENOMEM;
init_waitqueue_head(&ctx->wqh);
+ spin_lock_init(&ctx->cancel_lock);
ctx->clockid = clockid;
if (isalarm(ctx))
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 2/9] Handle mismatched open calls
2017-05-06 20:39 [PATCH 4.9 0/9] 4.9.27-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-06 20:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 1/9] timerfd: Protect the might cancel mechanism proper Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-05-06 20:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-06 20:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 3/9] tpm_tis: use default timeout value if chip reports it as zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (8 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-06 20:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Sachin Prabhu, Pavel Shilovsky
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
commit 38bd49064a1ecb67baad33598e3d824448ab11ec upstream.
A signal can interrupt a SendReceive call which result in incoming
responses to the call being ignored. This is a problem for calls such as
open which results in the successful response being ignored. This
results in an open file resource on the server.
The patch looks into responses which were cancelled after being sent and
in case of successful open closes the open fids.
For this patch, the check is only done in SendReceive2()
RH-bz: 1403319
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/cifs/cifsglob.h | 11 +++++++++
fs/cifs/cifssmb.c | 4 +++
fs/cifs/connect.c | 13 +++++++++-
fs/cifs/smb2misc.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 4 +++
fs/cifs/smb2proto.h | 7 +++++
fs/cifs/smb2transport.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
fs/cifs/transport.c | 2 +
8 files changed, 135 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/cifs/cifsglob.h
+++ b/fs/cifs/cifsglob.h
@@ -241,6 +241,7 @@ struct smb_version_operations {
/* verify the message */
int (*check_message)(char *, unsigned int, struct TCP_Server_Info *);
bool (*is_oplock_break)(char *, struct TCP_Server_Info *);
+ int (*handle_cancelled_mid)(char *, struct TCP_Server_Info *);
void (*downgrade_oplock)(struct TCP_Server_Info *,
struct cifsInodeInfo *, bool);
/* process transaction2 response */
@@ -1314,12 +1315,19 @@ struct mid_q_entry {
void *callback_data; /* general purpose pointer for callback */
void *resp_buf; /* pointer to received SMB header */
int mid_state; /* wish this were enum but can not pass to wait_event */
+ unsigned int mid_flags;
__le16 command; /* smb command code */
bool large_buf:1; /* if valid response, is pointer to large buf */
bool multiRsp:1; /* multiple trans2 responses for one request */
bool multiEnd:1; /* both received */
};
+struct close_cancelled_open {
+ struct cifs_fid fid;
+ struct cifs_tcon *tcon;
+ struct work_struct work;
+};
+
/* Make code in transport.c a little cleaner by moving
update of optional stats into function below */
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_STATS2
@@ -1451,6 +1459,9 @@ static inline void free_dfs_info_array(s
#define MID_RESPONSE_MALFORMED 0x10
#define MID_SHUTDOWN 0x20
+/* Flags */
+#define MID_WAIT_CANCELLED 1 /* Cancelled while waiting for response */
+
/* Types of response buffer returned from SendReceive2 */
#define CIFS_NO_BUFFER 0 /* Response buffer not returned */
#define CIFS_SMALL_BUFFER 1
--- a/fs/cifs/cifssmb.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/cifssmb.c
@@ -1423,6 +1423,8 @@ cifs_readv_discard(struct TCP_Server_Inf
length = discard_remaining_data(server);
dequeue_mid(mid, rdata->result);
+ mid->resp_buf = server->smallbuf;
+ server->smallbuf = NULL;
return length;
}
@@ -1534,6 +1536,8 @@ cifs_readv_receive(struct TCP_Server_Inf
return cifs_readv_discard(server, mid);
dequeue_mid(mid, false);
+ mid->resp_buf = server->smallbuf;
+ server->smallbuf = NULL;
return length;
}
--- a/fs/cifs/connect.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c
@@ -882,10 +882,19 @@ cifs_demultiplex_thread(void *p)
server->lstrp = jiffies;
if (mid_entry != NULL) {
+ if ((mid_entry->mid_flags & MID_WAIT_CANCELLED) &&
+ mid_entry->mid_state == MID_RESPONSE_RECEIVED &&
+ server->ops->handle_cancelled_mid)
+ server->ops->handle_cancelled_mid(
+ mid_entry->resp_buf,
+ server);
+
if (!mid_entry->multiRsp || mid_entry->multiEnd)
mid_entry->callback(mid_entry);
- } else if (!server->ops->is_oplock_break ||
- !server->ops->is_oplock_break(buf, server)) {
+ } else if (server->ops->is_oplock_break &&
+ server->ops->is_oplock_break(buf, server)) {
+ cifs_dbg(FYI, "Received oplock break\n");
+ } else {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "No task to wake, unknown frame received! NumMids %d\n",
atomic_read(&midCount));
cifs_dump_mem("Received Data is: ", buf,
--- a/fs/cifs/smb2misc.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/smb2misc.c
@@ -654,3 +654,47 @@ smb2_is_valid_oplock_break(char *buffer,
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Can not process oplock break for non-existent connection\n");
return false;
}
+
+void
+smb2_cancelled_close_fid(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ struct close_cancelled_open *cancelled = container_of(work,
+ struct close_cancelled_open, work);
+
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "Close unmatched open\n");
+
+ SMB2_close(0, cancelled->tcon, cancelled->fid.persistent_fid,
+ cancelled->fid.volatile_fid);
+ cifs_put_tcon(cancelled->tcon);
+ kfree(cancelled);
+}
+
+int
+smb2_handle_cancelled_mid(char *buffer, struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
+{
+ struct smb2_hdr *hdr = (struct smb2_hdr *)buffer;
+ struct smb2_create_rsp *rsp = (struct smb2_create_rsp *)buffer;
+ struct cifs_tcon *tcon;
+ struct close_cancelled_open *cancelled;
+
+ if (hdr->Command != SMB2_CREATE || hdr->Status != STATUS_SUCCESS)
+ return 0;
+
+ cancelled = kzalloc(sizeof(*cancelled), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!cancelled)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ tcon = smb2_find_smb_tcon(server, hdr->SessionId, hdr->TreeId);
+ if (!tcon) {
+ kfree(cancelled);
+ return -ENOENT;
+ }
+
+ cancelled->fid.persistent_fid = rsp->PersistentFileId;
+ cancelled->fid.volatile_fid = rsp->VolatileFileId;
+ cancelled->tcon = tcon;
+ INIT_WORK(&cancelled->work, smb2_cancelled_close_fid);
+ queue_work(cifsiod_wq, &cancelled->work);
+
+ return 0;
+}
--- a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c
@@ -1565,6 +1565,7 @@ struct smb_version_operations smb20_oper
.clear_stats = smb2_clear_stats,
.print_stats = smb2_print_stats,
.is_oplock_break = smb2_is_valid_oplock_break,
+ .handle_cancelled_mid = smb2_handle_cancelled_mid,
.downgrade_oplock = smb2_downgrade_oplock,
.need_neg = smb2_need_neg,
.negotiate = smb2_negotiate,
@@ -1645,6 +1646,7 @@ struct smb_version_operations smb21_oper
.clear_stats = smb2_clear_stats,
.print_stats = smb2_print_stats,
.is_oplock_break = smb2_is_valid_oplock_break,
+ .handle_cancelled_mid = smb2_handle_cancelled_mid,
.downgrade_oplock = smb2_downgrade_oplock,
.need_neg = smb2_need_neg,
.negotiate = smb2_negotiate,
@@ -1727,6 +1729,7 @@ struct smb_version_operations smb30_oper
.print_stats = smb2_print_stats,
.dump_share_caps = smb2_dump_share_caps,
.is_oplock_break = smb2_is_valid_oplock_break,
+ .handle_cancelled_mid = smb2_handle_cancelled_mid,
.downgrade_oplock = smb2_downgrade_oplock,
.need_neg = smb2_need_neg,
.negotiate = smb2_negotiate,
@@ -1815,6 +1818,7 @@ struct smb_version_operations smb311_ope
.print_stats = smb2_print_stats,
.dump_share_caps = smb2_dump_share_caps,
.is_oplock_break = smb2_is_valid_oplock_break,
+ .handle_cancelled_mid = smb2_handle_cancelled_mid,
.downgrade_oplock = smb2_downgrade_oplock,
.need_neg = smb2_need_neg,
.negotiate = smb2_negotiate,
--- a/fs/cifs/smb2proto.h
+++ b/fs/cifs/smb2proto.h
@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ extern struct mid_q_entry *smb2_setup_re
struct smb_rqst *rqst);
extern struct mid_q_entry *smb2_setup_async_request(
struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct smb_rqst *rqst);
+extern struct cifs_ses *smb2_find_smb_ses(struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
+ __u64 ses_id);
+extern struct cifs_tcon *smb2_find_smb_tcon(struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
+ __u64 ses_id, __u32 tid);
extern int smb2_calc_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst,
struct TCP_Server_Info *server);
extern int smb3_calc_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst,
@@ -158,6 +162,9 @@ extern int SMB2_set_compression(const un
extern int SMB2_oplock_break(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
const u64 persistent_fid, const u64 volatile_fid,
const __u8 oplock_level);
+extern int smb2_handle_cancelled_mid(char *buffer,
+ struct TCP_Server_Info *server);
+void smb2_cancelled_close_fid(struct work_struct *work);
extern int SMB2_QFS_info(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
u64 persistent_file_id, u64 volatile_file_id,
struct kstatfs *FSData);
--- a/fs/cifs/smb2transport.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/smb2transport.c
@@ -115,22 +115,68 @@ smb3_crypto_shash_allocate(struct TCP_Se
}
static struct cifs_ses *
-smb2_find_smb_ses(struct smb2_hdr *smb2hdr, struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
+smb2_find_smb_ses_unlocked(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, __u64 ses_id)
{
struct cifs_ses *ses;
- spin_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
list_for_each_entry(ses, &server->smb_ses_list, smb_ses_list) {
- if (ses->Suid != smb2hdr->SessionId)
+ if (ses->Suid != ses_id)
continue;
- spin_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
return ses;
}
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+struct cifs_ses *
+smb2_find_smb_ses(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, __u64 ses_id)
+{
+ struct cifs_ses *ses;
+
+ spin_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
+ ses = smb2_find_smb_ses_unlocked(server, ses_id);
spin_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
+ return ses;
+}
+
+static struct cifs_tcon *
+smb2_find_smb_sess_tcon_unlocked(struct cifs_ses *ses, __u32 tid)
+{
+ struct cifs_tcon *tcon;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(tcon, &ses->tcon_list, tcon_list) {
+ if (tcon->tid != tid)
+ continue;
+ ++tcon->tc_count;
+ return tcon;
+ }
+
return NULL;
}
+/*
+ * Obtain tcon corresponding to the tid in the given
+ * cifs_ses
+ */
+
+struct cifs_tcon *
+smb2_find_smb_tcon(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, __u64 ses_id, __u32 tid)
+{
+ struct cifs_ses *ses;
+ struct cifs_tcon *tcon;
+
+ spin_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
+ ses = smb2_find_smb_ses_unlocked(server, ses_id);
+ if (!ses) {
+ spin_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ tcon = smb2_find_smb_sess_tcon_unlocked(ses, tid);
+ spin_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
+
+ return tcon;
+}
int
smb2_calc_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst, struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
@@ -142,7 +188,7 @@ smb2_calc_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqs
struct smb2_hdr *smb2_pdu = (struct smb2_hdr *)iov[0].iov_base;
struct cifs_ses *ses;
- ses = smb2_find_smb_ses(smb2_pdu, server);
+ ses = smb2_find_smb_ses(server, smb2_pdu->SessionId);
if (!ses) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not find session\n", __func__);
return 0;
@@ -359,7 +405,7 @@ smb3_calc_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqs
struct smb2_hdr *smb2_pdu = (struct smb2_hdr *)iov[0].iov_base;
struct cifs_ses *ses;
- ses = smb2_find_smb_ses(smb2_pdu, server);
+ ses = smb2_find_smb_ses(server, smb2_pdu->SessionId);
if (!ses) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not find session\n", __func__);
return 0;
--- a/fs/cifs/transport.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/transport.c
@@ -727,9 +727,11 @@ SendReceive2(const unsigned int xid, str
rc = wait_for_response(ses->server, midQ);
if (rc != 0) {
+ cifs_dbg(FYI, "Cancelling wait for mid %llu\n", midQ->mid);
send_cancel(ses->server, buf, midQ);
spin_lock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
if (midQ->mid_state == MID_REQUEST_SUBMITTED) {
+ midQ->mid_flags |= MID_WAIT_CANCELLED;
midQ->callback = DeleteMidQEntry;
spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
cifs_small_buf_release(buf);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 3/9] tpm_tis: use default timeout value if chip reports it as zero
2017-05-06 20:39 [PATCH 4.9 0/9] 4.9.27-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-06 20:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 1/9] timerfd: Protect the might cancel mechanism proper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-06 20:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 2/9] Handle mismatched open calls Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-05-06 20:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-06 20:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 4/9] scsi: storvsc: Workaround for virtual DVD SCSI version Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (7 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-06 20:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Maciej S. Szmigiero, Jarkko Sakkinen
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maciej S. Szmigiero <mail@maciej.szmigiero.name>
commit 1d70fe9d9c3a4c627f9757cbba5d628687b121c1 upstream.
Since commit 1107d065fdf1 ("tpm_tis: Introduce intermediate layer for
TPM access") Atmel 3203 TPM on ThinkPad X61S (TPM firmware version 13.9)
no longer works. The initialization proceeds fine until we get and
start using chip-reported timeouts - and the chip reports C and D
timeouts of zero.
It turns out that until commit 8e54caf407b98e ("tpm: Provide a generic
means to override the chip returned timeouts") we had actually let
default timeout values remain in this case, so let's bring back this
behavior to make chips like Atmel 3203 work again.
Use a common code that was introduced by that commit so a warning is
printed in this case and /sys/class/tpm/tpm*/timeouts correctly says the
timeouts aren't chip-original.
This is a backport for 4.9 kernel version of the original commit, with
renaming of "TPM_TIS_ITPM_POSSIBLE" flag removed since it was only a
cosmetic change and not a part of the real bug fix.
Fixes: 1107d065fdf1 ("tpm_tis: Introduce intermediate layer for TPM access")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Maciej S. Szmigiero <mail@maciej.szmigiero.name>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
@@ -489,8 +489,7 @@ static int tpm_startup(struct tpm_chip *
int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd;
- unsigned long new_timeout[4];
- unsigned long old_timeout[4];
+ unsigned long timeout_old[4], timeout_chip[4], timeout_eff[4];
struct duration_t *duration_cap;
ssize_t rc;
@@ -542,11 +541,15 @@ int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *ch
!= sizeof(tpm_cmd.header.out) + sizeof(u32) + 4 * sizeof(u32))
return -EINVAL;
- old_timeout[0] = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout.a);
- old_timeout[1] = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout.b);
- old_timeout[2] = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout.c);
- old_timeout[3] = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout.d);
- memcpy(new_timeout, old_timeout, sizeof(new_timeout));
+ timeout_old[0] = jiffies_to_usecs(chip->timeout_a);
+ timeout_old[1] = jiffies_to_usecs(chip->timeout_b);
+ timeout_old[2] = jiffies_to_usecs(chip->timeout_c);
+ timeout_old[3] = jiffies_to_usecs(chip->timeout_d);
+ timeout_chip[0] = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout.a);
+ timeout_chip[1] = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout.b);
+ timeout_chip[2] = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout.c);
+ timeout_chip[3] = be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout.d);
+ memcpy(timeout_eff, timeout_chip, sizeof(timeout_eff));
/*
* Provide ability for vendor overrides of timeout values in case
@@ -554,16 +557,24 @@ int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *ch
*/
if (chip->ops->update_timeouts != NULL)
chip->timeout_adjusted =
- chip->ops->update_timeouts(chip, new_timeout);
+ chip->ops->update_timeouts(chip, timeout_eff);
if (!chip->timeout_adjusted) {
- /* Don't overwrite default if value is 0 */
- if (new_timeout[0] != 0 && new_timeout[0] < 1000) {
- int i;
+ /* Restore default if chip reported 0 */
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(timeout_eff); i++) {
+ if (timeout_eff[i])
+ continue;
+
+ timeout_eff[i] = timeout_old[i];
+ chip->timeout_adjusted = true;
+ }
+
+ if (timeout_eff[0] != 0 && timeout_eff[0] < 1000) {
/* timeouts in msec rather usec */
- for (i = 0; i != ARRAY_SIZE(new_timeout); i++)
- new_timeout[i] *= 1000;
+ for (i = 0; i != ARRAY_SIZE(timeout_eff); i++)
+ timeout_eff[i] *= 1000;
chip->timeout_adjusted = true;
}
}
@@ -572,16 +583,16 @@ int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *ch
if (chip->timeout_adjusted) {
dev_info(&chip->dev,
HW_ERR "Adjusting reported timeouts: A %lu->%luus B %lu->%luus C %lu->%luus D %lu->%luus\n",
- old_timeout[0], new_timeout[0],
- old_timeout[1], new_timeout[1],
- old_timeout[2], new_timeout[2],
- old_timeout[3], new_timeout[3]);
+ timeout_chip[0], timeout_eff[0],
+ timeout_chip[1], timeout_eff[1],
+ timeout_chip[2], timeout_eff[2],
+ timeout_chip[3], timeout_eff[3]);
}
- chip->timeout_a = usecs_to_jiffies(new_timeout[0]);
- chip->timeout_b = usecs_to_jiffies(new_timeout[1]);
- chip->timeout_c = usecs_to_jiffies(new_timeout[2]);
- chip->timeout_d = usecs_to_jiffies(new_timeout[3]);
+ chip->timeout_a = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout_eff[0]);
+ chip->timeout_b = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout_eff[1]);
+ chip->timeout_c = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout_eff[2]);
+ chip->timeout_d = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout_eff[3]);
duration:
tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 4/9] scsi: storvsc: Workaround for virtual DVD SCSI version
2017-05-06 20:39 [PATCH 4.9 0/9] 4.9.27-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2017-05-06 20:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 3/9] tpm_tis: use default timeout value if chip reports it as zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-05-06 20:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-06 20:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 5/9] hwmon: (it87) Avoid registering the same chip on both SIO addresses Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (6 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-06 20:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Stephen Hemminger, K. Y. Srinivasan,
Christoph Hellwig, Martin K. Petersen
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
commit f1c635b439a5c01776fe3a25b1e2dc546ea82e6f upstream.
Hyper-V host emulation of SCSI for virtual DVD device reports SCSI
version 0 (UNKNOWN) but is still capable of supporting REPORTLUN.
Without this patch, a GEN2 Linux guest on Hyper-V will not boot 4.11
successfully with virtual DVD ROM device. What happens is that the SCSI
scan process falls back to doing sequential probing by INQUIRY. But the
storvsc driver has a previous workaround that masks/blocks all errors
reports from INQUIRY (or MODE_SENSE) commands. This workaround causes
the scan to then populate a full set of bogus LUN's on the target and
then sends kernel spinning off into a death spiral doing block reads on
the non-existent LUNs.
By setting the correct blacklist flags, the target with the DVD device
is scanned with REPORTLUN and that works correctly.
Patch needs to go in current 4.11, it is safe but not necessary in older
kernels.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/scsi/storvsc_drv.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/scsi/storvsc_drv.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/storvsc_drv.c
@@ -400,8 +400,6 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(storvsc_vcpus_per_sub_c
*/
static int storvsc_timeout = 180;
-static int msft_blist_flags = BLIST_TRY_VPD_PAGES;
-
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SCSI_FC_ATTRS)
static struct scsi_transport_template *fc_transport_template;
#endif
@@ -1283,6 +1281,22 @@ static int storvsc_do_io(struct hv_devic
return ret;
}
+static int storvsc_device_alloc(struct scsi_device *sdevice)
+{
+ /*
+ * Set blist flag to permit the reading of the VPD pages even when
+ * the target may claim SPC-2 compliance. MSFT targets currently
+ * claim SPC-2 compliance while they implement post SPC-2 features.
+ * With this flag we can correctly handle WRITE_SAME_16 issues.
+ *
+ * Hypervisor reports SCSI_UNKNOWN type for DVD ROM device but
+ * still supports REPORT LUN.
+ */
+ sdevice->sdev_bflags = BLIST_REPORTLUN2 | BLIST_TRY_VPD_PAGES;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int storvsc_device_configure(struct scsi_device *sdevice)
{
@@ -1298,14 +1312,6 @@ static int storvsc_device_configure(stru
sdevice->no_write_same = 1;
/*
- * Add blist flags to permit the reading of the VPD pages even when
- * the target may claim SPC-2 compliance. MSFT targets currently
- * claim SPC-2 compliance while they implement post SPC-2 features.
- * With this patch we can correctly handle WRITE_SAME_16 issues.
- */
- sdevice->sdev_bflags |= msft_blist_flags;
-
- /*
* If the host is WIN8 or WIN8 R2, claim conformance to SPC-3
* if the device is a MSFT virtual device. If the host is
* WIN10 or newer, allow write_same.
@@ -1569,6 +1575,7 @@ static struct scsi_host_template scsi_dr
.eh_host_reset_handler = storvsc_host_reset_handler,
.proc_name = "storvsc_host",
.eh_timed_out = storvsc_eh_timed_out,
+ .slave_alloc = storvsc_device_alloc,
.slave_configure = storvsc_device_configure,
.cmd_per_lun = 255,
.this_id = -1,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 5/9] hwmon: (it87) Avoid registering the same chip on both SIO addresses
2017-05-06 20:39 [PATCH 4.9 0/9] 4.9.27-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2017-05-06 20:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 4/9] scsi: storvsc: Workaround for virtual DVD SCSI version Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-05-06 20:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-06 20:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 6/9] 8250_pci: Fix potential use-after-free in error path Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (5 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-06 20:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Russell King, Guenter Roeck, Jean Delvare
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
commit 8358378b22518d92424597503d3c1cd302a490b6 upstream.
IT8705F is known to respond on both SIO addresses. Registering it twice
may result in system lockups.
Reported-by: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Fixes: e84bd9535e2b ("hwmon: (it87) Add support for second Super-IO chip")
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/hwmon/it87.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/hwmon/it87.c
+++ b/drivers/hwmon/it87.c
@@ -3115,7 +3115,7 @@ static int __init sm_it87_init(void)
{
int sioaddr[2] = { REG_2E, REG_4E };
struct it87_sio_data sio_data;
- unsigned short isa_address;
+ unsigned short isa_address[2];
bool found = false;
int i, err;
@@ -3125,15 +3125,29 @@ static int __init sm_it87_init(void)
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sioaddr); i++) {
memset(&sio_data, 0, sizeof(struct it87_sio_data));
- isa_address = 0;
- err = it87_find(sioaddr[i], &isa_address, &sio_data);
- if (err || isa_address == 0)
+ isa_address[i] = 0;
+ err = it87_find(sioaddr[i], &isa_address[i], &sio_data);
+ if (err || isa_address[i] == 0)
continue;
+ /*
+ * Don't register second chip if its ISA address matches
+ * the first chip's ISA address.
+ */
+ if (i && isa_address[i] == isa_address[0])
+ break;
- err = it87_device_add(i, isa_address, &sio_data);
+ err = it87_device_add(i, isa_address[i], &sio_data);
if (err)
goto exit_dev_unregister;
+
found = true;
+
+ /*
+ * IT8705F may respond on both SIO addresses.
+ * Stop probing after finding one.
+ */
+ if (sio_data.type == it87)
+ break;
}
if (!found) {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 6/9] 8250_pci: Fix potential use-after-free in error path
2017-05-06 20:39 [PATCH 4.9 0/9] 4.9.27-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2017-05-06 20:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 5/9] hwmon: (it87) Avoid registering the same chip on both SIO addresses Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-05-06 20:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-06 20:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 7/9] ceph: try getting buffer capability for readahead/fadvise Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (4 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-06 20:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Michal Suchanek,
Gabriel Krisman Bertazi, Guilherme G. Piccoli
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
commit c130b666a9a711f985a0a44b58699ebe14bb7245 upstream.
Commit f209fa03fc9d ("serial: 8250_pci: Detach low-level driver during
PCI error recovery") introduces a potential use-after-free in case the
pciserial_init_ports call in serial8250_io_resume fails, which may
happen if a memory allocation fails or if the .init quirk failed for
whatever reason). If this happen, further pci_get_drvdata will return a
pointer to freed memory.
This patch reworks the PCI recovery resume hook to restore the old priv
structure in this case, which should be ok, since the ports were already
detached. Such error during recovery causes us to give up on the
recovery.
Fixes: f209fa03fc9d ("serial: 8250_pci: Detach low-level driver during PCI error recovery")
Reported-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_pci.c | 12 +++++-------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_pci.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_pci.c
@@ -5621,17 +5621,15 @@ static pci_ers_result_t serial8250_io_sl
static void serial8250_io_resume(struct pci_dev *dev)
{
struct serial_private *priv = pci_get_drvdata(dev);
- const struct pciserial_board *board;
+ struct serial_private *new;
if (!priv)
return;
- board = priv->board;
- kfree(priv);
- priv = pciserial_init_ports(dev, board);
-
- if (!IS_ERR(priv)) {
- pci_set_drvdata(dev, priv);
+ new = pciserial_init_ports(dev, priv->board);
+ if (!IS_ERR(new)) {
+ pci_set_drvdata(dev, new);
+ kfree(priv);
}
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 7/9] ceph: try getting buffer capability for readahead/fadvise
2017-05-06 20:39 [PATCH 4.9 0/9] 4.9.27-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2017-05-06 20:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 6/9] 8250_pci: Fix potential use-after-free in error path Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-05-06 20:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-06 20:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 8/9] cpu/hotplug: Serialize callback invocations proper Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (3 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-06 20:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Yan, Zheng
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
commit 2b1ac852eb67a6e95595e576371d23519105559f upstream.
For readahead/fadvise cases, caller of ceph_readpages does not
hold buffer capability. Pages can be added to page cache while
there is no buffer capability. This can cause data integrity
issue.
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/ceph/addr.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
fs/ceph/caps.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++
fs/ceph/file.c | 3 +-
fs/ceph/super.h | 2 +
4 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/ceph/addr.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/addr.c
@@ -315,7 +315,32 @@ static int start_read(struct inode *inod
struct page **pages;
pgoff_t next_index;
int nr_pages = 0;
- int ret;
+ int got = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (!current->journal_info) {
+ /* caller of readpages does not hold buffer and read caps
+ * (fadvise, madvise and readahead cases) */
+ int want = CEPH_CAP_FILE_CACHE;
+ ret = ceph_try_get_caps(ci, CEPH_CAP_FILE_RD, want, &got);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ dout("start_read %p, error getting cap\n", inode);
+ } else if (!(got & want)) {
+ dout("start_read %p, no cache cap\n", inode);
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ if (got)
+ ceph_put_cap_refs(ci, got);
+ while (!list_empty(page_list)) {
+ page = list_entry(page_list->prev,
+ struct page, lru);
+ list_del(&page->lru);
+ put_page(page);
+ }
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
off = (u64) page_offset(page);
@@ -338,15 +363,18 @@ static int start_read(struct inode *inod
CEPH_OSD_FLAG_READ, NULL,
ci->i_truncate_seq, ci->i_truncate_size,
false);
- if (IS_ERR(req))
- return PTR_ERR(req);
+ if (IS_ERR(req)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(req);
+ goto out;
+ }
/* build page vector */
nr_pages = calc_pages_for(0, len);
pages = kmalloc(sizeof(*pages) * nr_pages, GFP_KERNEL);
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- if (!pages)
- goto out;
+ if (!pages) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_put;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; ++i) {
page = list_entry(page_list->prev, struct page, lru);
BUG_ON(PageLocked(page));
@@ -379,6 +407,12 @@ static int start_read(struct inode *inod
if (ret < 0)
goto out_pages;
ceph_osdc_put_request(req);
+
+ /* After adding locked pages to page cache, the inode holds cache cap.
+ * So we can drop our cap refs. */
+ if (got)
+ ceph_put_cap_refs(ci, got);
+
return nr_pages;
out_pages:
@@ -387,8 +421,11 @@ out_pages:
unlock_page(pages[i]);
}
ceph_put_page_vector(pages, nr_pages, false);
-out:
+out_put:
ceph_osdc_put_request(req);
+out:
+ if (got)
+ ceph_put_cap_refs(ci, got);
return ret;
}
@@ -425,7 +462,6 @@ static int ceph_readpages(struct file *f
rc = start_read(inode, page_list, max);
if (rc < 0)
goto out;
- BUG_ON(rc == 0);
}
out:
ceph_fscache_readpages_cancel(inode, page_list);
@@ -1372,9 +1408,11 @@ static int ceph_filemap_fault(struct vm_
inode, off, (size_t)PAGE_SIZE, ceph_cap_string(got));
if ((got & (CEPH_CAP_FILE_CACHE | CEPH_CAP_FILE_LAZYIO)) ||
- ci->i_inline_version == CEPH_INLINE_NONE)
+ ci->i_inline_version == CEPH_INLINE_NONE) {
+ current->journal_info = vma->vm_file;
ret = filemap_fault(vma, vmf);
- else
+ current->journal_info = NULL;
+ } else
ret = -EAGAIN;
dout("filemap_fault %p %llu~%zd dropping cap refs on %s ret %d\n",
--- a/fs/ceph/caps.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/caps.c
@@ -2479,6 +2479,27 @@ static void check_max_size(struct inode
ceph_check_caps(ci, CHECK_CAPS_AUTHONLY, NULL);
}
+int ceph_try_get_caps(struct ceph_inode_info *ci, int need, int want, int *got)
+{
+ int ret, err = 0;
+
+ BUG_ON(need & ~CEPH_CAP_FILE_RD);
+ BUG_ON(want & ~(CEPH_CAP_FILE_CACHE|CEPH_CAP_FILE_LAZYIO));
+ ret = ceph_pool_perm_check(ci, need);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = try_get_cap_refs(ci, need, want, 0, true, got, &err);
+ if (ret) {
+ if (err == -EAGAIN) {
+ ret = 0;
+ } else if (err < 0) {
+ ret = err;
+ }
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
/*
* Wait for caps, and take cap references. If we can't get a WR cap
* due to a small max_size, make sure we check_max_size (and possibly
--- a/fs/ceph/file.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/file.c
@@ -1249,8 +1249,9 @@ again:
dout("aio_read %p %llx.%llx %llu~%u got cap refs on %s\n",
inode, ceph_vinop(inode), iocb->ki_pos, (unsigned)len,
ceph_cap_string(got));
-
+ current->journal_info = filp;
ret = generic_file_read_iter(iocb, to);
+ current->journal_info = NULL;
}
dout("aio_read %p %llx.%llx dropping cap refs on %s = %d\n",
inode, ceph_vinop(inode), ceph_cap_string(got), (int)ret);
--- a/fs/ceph/super.h
+++ b/fs/ceph/super.h
@@ -905,6 +905,8 @@ extern int ceph_encode_dentry_release(vo
extern int ceph_get_caps(struct ceph_inode_info *ci, int need, int want,
loff_t endoff, int *got, struct page **pinned_page);
+extern int ceph_try_get_caps(struct ceph_inode_info *ci,
+ int need, int want, int *got);
/* for counting open files by mode */
extern void __ceph_get_fmode(struct ceph_inode_info *ci, int mode);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 8/9] cpu/hotplug: Serialize callback invocations proper
2017-05-06 20:39 [PATCH 4.9 0/9] 4.9.27-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2017-05-06 20:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 7/9] ceph: try getting buffer capability for readahead/fadvise Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-05-06 20:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-06 20:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 9/9] dm ioctl: prevent stack leak in dm ioctl call Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (2 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-06 20:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior, hpa,
mingo, akpm, torvalds, Thomas Gleixner
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
commit dc434e056fe1dada20df7ba07f32739d3a701adf upstream.
The setup/remove_state/instance() functions in the hotplug core code are
serialized against concurrent CPU hotplug, but unfortunately not serialized
against themself.
As a consequence a concurrent invocation of these function results in
corruption of the callback machinery because two instances try to invoke
callbacks on remote cpus at the same time. This results in missing callback
invocations and initiator threads waiting forever on the completion.
The obvious solution to replace get_cpu_online() with cpu_hotplug_begin()
is not possible because at least one callsite calls into these functions
from a get_online_cpu() locked region.
Extend the protection scope of the cpuhp_state_mutex from solely protecting
the state arrays to cover the callback invocation machinery as well.
Fixes: 5b7aa87e0482 ("cpu/hotplug: Implement setup/removal interface")
Reported-and-tested-by: Bart Van Assche <Bart.VanAssche@sandisk.com>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: mingo@kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170314150645.g4tdyoszlcbajmna@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/cpu.c | 17 +++++++++--------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/cpu.c
+++ b/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -1441,14 +1441,12 @@ static void cpuhp_store_callbacks(enum c
/* (Un)Install the callbacks for further cpu hotplug operations */
struct cpuhp_step *sp;
- mutex_lock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
sp = cpuhp_get_step(state);
sp->startup.single = startup;
sp->teardown.single = teardown;
sp->name = name;
sp->multi_instance = multi_instance;
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&sp->list);
- mutex_unlock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
}
static void *cpuhp_get_teardown_cb(enum cpuhp_state state)
@@ -1518,16 +1516,13 @@ static int cpuhp_reserve_state(enum cpuh
{
enum cpuhp_state i;
- mutex_lock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
for (i = CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN; i <= CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN_END; i++) {
if (cpuhp_ap_states[i].name)
continue;
cpuhp_ap_states[i].name = "Reserved";
- mutex_unlock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
return i;
}
- mutex_unlock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
WARN(1, "No more dynamic states available for CPU hotplug\n");
return -ENOSPC;
}
@@ -1544,6 +1539,7 @@ int __cpuhp_state_add_instance(enum cpuh
return -EINVAL;
get_online_cpus();
+ mutex_lock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
if (!invoke || !sp->startup.multi)
goto add_node;
@@ -1568,11 +1564,10 @@ int __cpuhp_state_add_instance(enum cpuh
}
add_node:
ret = 0;
- mutex_lock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
hlist_add_head(node, &sp->list);
- mutex_unlock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
err:
+ mutex_unlock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
put_online_cpus();
return ret;
}
@@ -1601,6 +1596,7 @@ int __cpuhp_setup_state(enum cpuhp_state
return -EINVAL;
get_online_cpus();
+ mutex_lock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
/* currently assignments for the ONLINE state are possible */
if (state == CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN) {
@@ -1636,6 +1632,8 @@ int __cpuhp_setup_state(enum cpuhp_state
}
}
out:
+ mutex_unlock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
+
put_online_cpus();
if (!ret && dyn_state)
return state;
@@ -1655,6 +1653,8 @@ int __cpuhp_state_remove_instance(enum c
return -EINVAL;
get_online_cpus();
+ mutex_lock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
+
if (!invoke || !cpuhp_get_teardown_cb(state))
goto remove;
/*
@@ -1671,7 +1671,6 @@ int __cpuhp_state_remove_instance(enum c
}
remove:
- mutex_lock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
hlist_del(node);
mutex_unlock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
put_online_cpus();
@@ -1696,6 +1695,7 @@ void __cpuhp_remove_state(enum cpuhp_sta
BUG_ON(cpuhp_cb_check(state));
get_online_cpus();
+ mutex_lock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
if (sp->multi_instance) {
WARN(!hlist_empty(&sp->list),
@@ -1721,6 +1721,7 @@ void __cpuhp_remove_state(enum cpuhp_sta
}
remove:
cpuhp_store_callbacks(state, NULL, NULL, NULL, false);
+ mutex_unlock(&cpuhp_state_mutex);
put_online_cpus();
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cpuhp_remove_state);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 9/9] dm ioctl: prevent stack leak in dm ioctl call
2017-05-06 20:39 [PATCH 4.9 0/9] 4.9.27-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2017-05-06 20:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 8/9] cpu/hotplug: Serialize callback invocations proper Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-05-06 20:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-05-07 19:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 0/9] 4.9.27-stable review Guenter Roeck
2017-05-08 19:17 ` Shuah Khan
10 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2017-05-06 20:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Adrian Salido, Alasdair G Kergon,
Mike Snitzer
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Adrian Salido <salidoa@google.com>
commit 4617f564c06117c7d1b611be49521a4430042287 upstream.
When calling a dm ioctl that doesn't process any data
(IOCTL_FLAGS_NO_PARAMS), the contents of the data field in struct
dm_ioctl are left initialized. Current code is incorrectly extending
the size of data copied back to user, causing the contents of kernel
stack to be leaked to user. Fix by only copying contents before data
and allow the functions processing the ioctl to override.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Salido <salidoa@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c
@@ -1847,7 +1847,7 @@ static int ctl_ioctl(uint command, struc
if (r)
goto out;
- param->data_size = sizeof(*param);
+ param->data_size = offsetof(struct dm_ioctl, data);
r = fn(param, input_param_size);
if (unlikely(param->flags & DM_BUFFER_FULL_FLAG) &&
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 4.9 0/9] 4.9.27-stable review
2017-05-06 20:39 [PATCH 4.9 0/9] 4.9.27-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2017-05-06 20:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 9/9] dm ioctl: prevent stack leak in dm ioctl call Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2017-05-07 19:38 ` Guenter Roeck
2017-05-08 19:17 ` Shuah Khan
10 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Guenter Roeck @ 2017-05-07 19:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-kernel
Cc: torvalds, akpm, shuahkh, patches, ben.hutchings, stable
On 05/06/2017 01:39 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.27 release.
> There are 9 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Mon May 8 20:38:28 UTC 2017.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
Build results:
total: 145 pass: 145 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
total: 122 pass: 122 fail: 0
Details are available at http://kerneltests.org/builders.
Guenter
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 4.9 0/9] 4.9.27-stable review
2017-05-06 20:39 [PATCH 4.9 0/9] 4.9.27-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2017-05-07 19:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 0/9] 4.9.27-stable review Guenter Roeck
@ 2017-05-08 19:17 ` Shuah Khan
10 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Shuah Khan @ 2017-05-08 19:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-kernel
Cc: torvalds, akpm, linux, patches, ben.hutchings, stable, Shuah Khan
On 05/06/2017 02:39 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.27 release.
> There are 9 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Mon May 8 20:38:28 UTC 2017.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.27-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>
Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
thanks,
-- Shuah
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread