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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: "Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v6 18/34] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME
Date: Wed, 07 Jun 2017 14:16:27 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170607191627.28645.4398.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170607191309.28645.15241.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

When SME is active, pagetable entries created for EFI need to have the
encryption mask set as necessary.

When the new pagetable pages are allocated they are mapped encrypted. So,
update the efi_pgt value that will be used in cr3 to include the encryption
mask so that the PGD table can be read successfully. The pagetable mapping
as well as the kernel are also added to the pagetable mapping as encrypted.
All other EFI mappings are mapped decrypted (tables, etc.).

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c |   15 +++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
index eb8dff1..ed37fa3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ void efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(void)
 
 int __init efi_setup_page_tables(unsigned long pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages)
 {
-	unsigned long pfn, text;
+	unsigned long pfn, text, pf;
 	struct page *page;
 	unsigned npages;
 	pgd_t *pgd;
@@ -335,7 +335,12 @@ int __init efi_setup_page_tables(unsigned long pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages)
 	if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP))
 		return 0;
 
-	efi_scratch.efi_pgt = (pgd_t *)__pa(efi_pgd);
+	/*
+	 * Since the PGD is encrypted, set the encryption mask so that when
+	 * this value is loaded into cr3 the PGD will be decrypted during
+	 * the pagetable walk.
+	 */
+	efi_scratch.efi_pgt = (pgd_t *)__sme_pa(efi_pgd);
 	pgd = efi_pgd;
 
 	/*
@@ -345,7 +350,8 @@ int __init efi_setup_page_tables(unsigned long pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages)
 	 * phys_efi_set_virtual_address_map().
 	 */
 	pfn = pa_memmap >> PAGE_SHIFT;
-	if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, pa_memmap, num_pages, _PAGE_NX | _PAGE_RW)) {
+	pf = _PAGE_NX | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_ENC;
+	if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, pa_memmap, num_pages, pf)) {
 		pr_err("Error ident-mapping new memmap (0x%lx)!\n", pa_memmap);
 		return 1;
 	}
@@ -388,7 +394,8 @@ int __init efi_setup_page_tables(unsigned long pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages)
 	text = __pa(_text);
 	pfn = text >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 
-	if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, text, npages, _PAGE_RW)) {
+	pf = _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_ENC;
+	if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, text, npages, pf)) {
 		pr_err("Failed to map kernel text 1:1\n");
 		return 1;
 	}

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-06-07 19:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 94+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-06-07 19:13 [PATCH v6 00/34] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13 ` [PATCH v6 01/34] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13 ` [PATCH v6 02/34] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13 ` [PATCH v6 03/34] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13 ` [PATCH v6 04/34] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 10:55   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:14 ` [PATCH v6 05/34] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 16:30   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:14 ` [PATCH v6 06/34] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 16:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:14 ` [PATCH v6 07/34] x86/mm: Don't use phys_to_virt in ioremap() if SME is active Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14 ` [PATCH v6 08/34] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14 ` [PATCH v6 09/34] x86/mm: Simplify p[gum]d_page() macros Tom Lendacky
2017-06-10 10:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:14 ` [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3 Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 22:06   ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 13:42     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 20:51       ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 21:02         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 21:17           ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 22:01             ` [Xen-devel] " Andrew Cooper
2017-06-09 18:36               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 18:43                 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-09 18:54                   ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-09 18:59                   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 19:42                     ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08  6:05   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-08 22:38     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 18:46       ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-09 21:20         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08  7:39   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-07 19:15 ` [PATCH v6 11/34] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15 ` [PATCH v6 12/34] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15 ` [PATCH v6 13/34] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory Tom Lendacky
2017-06-10 15:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:15 ` [PATCH v6 14/34] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
2017-06-10 16:01   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-12 13:31     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15 ` [PATCH v6 15/34] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16 ` [PATCH v6 16/34] efi: Add an EFI table address match function Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16 ` [PATCH v6 17/34] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0 Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-06-11 19:44   ` [PATCH v6 18/34] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:16 ` [PATCH v6 19/34] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08  4:24   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-07 19:16 ` [PATCH v6 20/34] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 16:07   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 17:06     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 17:27       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:16 ` [PATCH v6 21/34] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17 ` [PATCH v6 22/34] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 16:25   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:17 ` [PATCH v6 23/34] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 16:24   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:38     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17 ` [PATCH v6 24/34] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 16:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 19:38     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17 ` [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08  5:53   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-08 21:09     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08  7:58   ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-06-08 23:04     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 16:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 19:49     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15  9:08       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 13:23         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17 ` [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08  2:38   ` Nick Sarnie
2017-06-08 14:26     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 17:42   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 20:40     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15  9:41       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 14:59         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 15:33           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 16:33             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-19 17:18               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 20:13             ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-06-21 15:37         ` Joerg Roedel
2017-06-21 16:59           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 18:40             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17 ` [PATCH v6 27/34] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18 ` [PATCH v6 28/34] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18 ` [PATCH v6 29/34] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15  9:55   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:18 ` [PATCH v6 30/34] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 10:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 17:43     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18 ` [PATCH v6 31/34] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18 ` [PATCH v6 32/34] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:19 ` [PATCH v6 33/34] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:19 ` [PATCH v6 34/34] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08  2:40 ` [PATCH v6 00/34] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Nick Sarnie
2017-06-08 16:14   ` Tom Lendacky

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