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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
	"Juergen Gross" <jgross@suse.com>,
	xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
Date: Fri, 9 Jun 2017 13:36:35 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <9725c503-2e33-2365-87f5-f017e1cbe9b6@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <d37917b1-8e49-e8a8-b9ac-59491331640f@citrix.com>

On 6/8/2017 5:01 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 08/06/2017 22:17, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
>> On 06/08/2017 05:02 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>>> On 6/8/2017 3:51 PM, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
>>>>>> What may be needed is making sure X86_FEATURE_SME is not set for PV
>>>>>> guests.
>>>>> And that may be something that Xen will need to control through either
>>>>> CPUID or MSR support for the PV guests.
>>>>
>>>> Only on newer versions of Xen. On earlier versions (2-3 years old) leaf
>>>> 0x80000007 is passed to the guest unchanged. And so is MSR_K8_SYSCFG.
>>> The SME feature is in leaf 0x8000001f, is that leaf passed to the guest
>>> unchanged?
>> Oh, I misread the patch where X86_FEATURE_SME is defined. Then all
>> versions, including the current one, pass it unchanged.
>>
>> All that's needed is setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SME) in
>> xen_init_capabilities().
> 
> AMD processors still don't support CPUID Faulting (or at least, I
> couldn't find any reference to it in the latest docs), so we cannot
> actually hide SME from a guest which goes looking at native CPUID.
> Furthermore, I'm not aware of any CPUID masking support covering that leaf.
> 
> However, if Linux is using the paravirtual cpuid hook, things are
> slightly better.
> 
> On Xen 4.9 and later, no guests will see the feature.  On earlier
> versions of Xen (before I fixed the logic), plain domUs will not see the
> feature, while dom0 will.
> 
> For safely, I'd recommend unilaterally clobbering the feature as Boris
> suggested.  There is no way SME will be supportable on a per-PV guest

That may be too late. Early boot support in head_64.S will make calls to
check for the feature (through CPUID and MSR), set the sme_me_mask and
encrypt the kernel in place. Is there another way to approach this?

> basis, although (as far as I am aware) Xen as a whole would be able to
> encompass itself and all of its PV guests inside one single SME instance.

Yes, that is correct.

Thanks,
Tom

> 
> ~Andrew
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2017-06-09 18:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 94+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-06-07 19:13 [PATCH v6 00/34] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13 ` [PATCH v6 01/34] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13 ` [PATCH v6 02/34] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13 ` [PATCH v6 03/34] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13 ` [PATCH v6 04/34] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 10:55   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:14 ` [PATCH v6 05/34] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 16:30   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:14 ` [PATCH v6 06/34] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 16:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:14 ` [PATCH v6 07/34] x86/mm: Don't use phys_to_virt in ioremap() if SME is active Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14 ` [PATCH v6 08/34] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14 ` [PATCH v6 09/34] x86/mm: Simplify p[gum]d_page() macros Tom Lendacky
2017-06-10 10:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:14 ` [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3 Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 22:06   ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 13:42     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 20:51       ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 21:02         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 21:17           ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 22:01             ` [Xen-devel] " Andrew Cooper
2017-06-09 18:36               ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-06-09 18:43                 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-09 18:54                   ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-09 18:59                   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 19:42                     ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08  6:05   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-08 22:38     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 18:46       ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-09 21:20         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08  7:39   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-07 19:15 ` [PATCH v6 11/34] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15 ` [PATCH v6 12/34] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15 ` [PATCH v6 13/34] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory Tom Lendacky
2017-06-10 15:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:15 ` [PATCH v6 14/34] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
2017-06-10 16:01   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-12 13:31     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15 ` [PATCH v6 15/34] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16 ` [PATCH v6 16/34] efi: Add an EFI table address match function Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16 ` [PATCH v6 17/34] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0 Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16 ` [PATCH v6 18/34] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-11 19:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:16 ` [PATCH v6 19/34] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08  4:24   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-07 19:16 ` [PATCH v6 20/34] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 16:07   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 17:06     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 17:27       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:16 ` [PATCH v6 21/34] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17 ` [PATCH v6 22/34] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 16:25   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:17 ` [PATCH v6 23/34] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 16:24   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:38     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17 ` [PATCH v6 24/34] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 16:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 19:38     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17 ` [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08  5:53   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-08 21:09     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08  7:58   ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-06-08 23:04     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 16:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 19:49     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15  9:08       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 13:23         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17 ` [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08  2:38   ` Nick Sarnie
2017-06-08 14:26     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 17:42   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 20:40     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15  9:41       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 14:59         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 15:33           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 16:33             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-19 17:18               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 20:13             ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2017-06-21 15:37         ` Joerg Roedel
2017-06-21 16:59           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 18:40             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17 ` [PATCH v6 27/34] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18 ` [PATCH v6 28/34] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18 ` [PATCH v6 29/34] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15  9:55   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:18 ` [PATCH v6 30/34] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 10:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 17:43     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18 ` [PATCH v6 31/34] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18 ` [PATCH v6 32/34] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:19 ` [PATCH v6 33/34] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:19 ` [PATCH v6 34/34] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08  2:40 ` [PATCH v6 00/34] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Nick Sarnie
2017-06-08 16:14   ` Tom Lendacky

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