From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/2] arm64: optional paranoid __{get,put}_user checks
Date: Wed, 1 Nov 2017 12:05:55 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171101120555.yvb65g3wgtxskfh3@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <77c80381-cf68-aa1a-9112-e057c068eeb6@redhat.com>
On Tue, Oct 31, 2017 at 04:56:39PM -0700, Laura Abbott wrote:
> On 10/26/2017 02:09 AM, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > In Prague, Kees mentioned that it would be nice to have a mechanism to
> > catch bad __{get,put}_user uses, such as the recent CVE-2017-5123 [1,2]
> > issue with unsafe_put_user() in waitid().
> >
> > These patches allow an optional access_ok() check to be dropped in
> > arm64's __{get,put}_user() primitives. These will then BUG() if a bad
> > user pointer is passed (which should only happen in the absence of an
> > earlier access_ok() check).
> Turning on the option fails as soon as we hit userspace. On my buildroot
> based environment I get the help text for ld.so (????) and then a message
> about attempting to kill init.
Ouch. Thanks for the report, and sorry about this.
The problem is that I evaluate the ptr argument twice in
__{get,put}_user(), and this may have side effects.
e.g. when the ELF loader does things like:
__put_user((elf_addr_t)p, sp++)
... we increment sp twice, and write to the wrong user address, leaving
sp corrupt.
I have an additional patch [1] to fix this, which is in my
arm64/access-ok branch [2].
Thanks,
Mark.
[1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mark/linux.git/commit/?h=arm64/access-ok&id=ebb7ff83eb53b8810395d5cf48712a4ae6d678543
[2] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mark/linux.git/log/?h=arm64/access-ok
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-11-01 12:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-10-26 9:09 [RFC PATCH 0/2] arm64: optional paranoid __{get,put}_user checks Mark Rutland
2017-10-26 9:09 ` [RFC PATCH 1/2] arm64: write __range_ok() in C Mark Rutland
2017-11-16 15:28 ` Will Deacon
2017-11-20 12:22 ` Mark Rutland
2017-10-26 9:09 ` [RFC PATCH 2/2] arm64: allow paranoid __{get,put}user Mark Rutland
2017-10-27 15:41 ` [RFC PATCH 0/2] arm64: optional paranoid __{get,put}_user checks Will Deacon
2017-10-27 20:44 ` Mark Rutland
2017-10-28 8:47 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-10-31 23:56 ` Laura Abbott
2017-11-01 12:05 ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2017-11-01 21:13 ` Laura Abbott
2017-11-01 22:28 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-01 23:05 ` Laura Abbott
2017-11-01 23:29 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-02 1:25 ` Laura Abbott
2017-11-03 23:04 ` [RFC PATCH 1/2] x86: Avoid multiple evaluations in __{get,put}_user_size Laura Abbott
2017-11-03 23:04 ` [RFC PATCH 2/2] x86: Allow paranoid __{get,put}_user Laura Abbott
2017-11-04 0:14 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-04 0:24 ` Al Viro
2017-11-04 0:44 ` Al Viro
2017-11-04 1:39 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-04 1:41 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-04 1:58 ` Mark Rutland
2017-11-06 20:38 ` Laura Abbott
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