From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>,
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
keescook@google.com, hughd@google.com,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>,
aliguori@amazon.com, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Subject: [patch 30/60] x86/mm/kpti: Add infrastructure for page table isolation
Date: Mon, 04 Dec 2017 15:07:36 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171204150607.312035530@linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20171204140706.296109558@linutronix.de
[-- Attachment #1: x86-kpti--Add_infrastructure_for_page_table_isolation.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 7218 bytes --]
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Add the initial files for kernel page table isolation, with a minimal init
function and the boot time detection for this misfeature.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 2
arch/x86/boot/compressed/pagetable.c | 3
arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 7 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/kpti.h | 14 ++++
arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 7 +-
arch/x86/mm/init.c | 2
arch/x86/mm/kpti.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/kpti.h | 11 +++
init/main.c | 2
9 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2711,6 +2711,8 @@
steal time is computed, but won't influence scheduler
behaviour
+ nokpti [X86-64] Disable kernel page table isolation
+
nolapic [X86-32,APIC] Do not enable or use the local APIC.
nolapic_timer [X86-32,APIC] Do not use the local APIC timer.
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/pagetable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/pagetable.c
@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@
*/
#undef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+/* No KERNEL_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION support needed either: */
+#undef CONFIG_KERNEL_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+
#include "misc.h"
/* These actually do the work of building the kernel identity maps. */
--- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
@@ -205,18 +205,23 @@ For 32-bit we have the following convent
.endm
.macro SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg:req
+ ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_BUG_CPU_SECURE_MODE_KPTI
mov %cr3, \scratch_reg
ADJUST_KERNEL_CR3 \scratch_reg
mov \scratch_reg, %cr3
+.Lend_\@:
.endm
.macro SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3 scratch_reg:req
+ ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_BUG_CPU_SECURE_MODE_KPTI
mov %cr3, \scratch_reg
ADJUST_USER_CR3 \scratch_reg
mov \scratch_reg, %cr3
+.Lend_\@:
.endm
.macro SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg:req save_reg:req
+ ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Ldone_\@", "", X86_BUG_CPU_SECURE_MODE_KPTI
movq %cr3, \scratch_reg
movq \scratch_reg, \save_reg
/*
@@ -233,11 +238,13 @@ For 32-bit we have the following convent
.endm
.macro RESTORE_CR3 save_reg:req
+ ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_BUG_CPU_SECURE_MODE_KPTI
/*
* The CR3 write could be avoided when not changing its value,
* but would require a CR3 read *and* a scratch register.
*/
movq \save_reg, %cr3
+.Lend_\@:
.endm
#else /* CONFIG_KERNEL_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=n: */
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kpti.h
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_KPTI_H
+#define _ASM_X86_KPTI_H
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KERNEL_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+extern void kpti_init(void);
+extern void kpti_check_boottime_disable(void);
+#else
+static inline void kpti_check_boottime_disable(void) { }
+#endif
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_KPTI_H */
--- a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
@@ -43,9 +43,10 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_NUMA) += amdtopology.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_NUMA) += srat.o
obj-$(CONFIG_NUMA_EMU) += numa_emulation.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MPX) += mpx.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) += pkeys.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY) += kaslr.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MPX) += mpx.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) += pkeys.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY) += kaslr.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_KERNEL_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION) += kpti.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_boot.o
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <asm/kaslr.h>
#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/kpti.h>
/*
* We need to define the tracepoints somewhere, and tlb.c
@@ -630,6 +631,7 @@ void __init init_mem_mapping(void)
{
unsigned long end;
+ kpti_check_boottime_disable();
probe_page_size_mask();
setup_pcid();
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/kpti.c
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright(c) 2017 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ * General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * This code is based in part on work published here:
+ *
+ * https://github.com/IAIK/KAISER
+ *
+ * The original work was written by and and signed off by for the Linux
+ * kernel by:
+ *
+ * Signed-off-by: Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at>
+ * Signed-off-by: Moritz Lipp <moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at>
+ * Signed-off-by: Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at>
+ * Signed-off-by: Michael Schwarz <michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at>
+ *
+ * Major changes to the original code by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
+ * Mostly rewritten by Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> and
+ * Andy Lutomirsky <luto@amacapital.net>
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
+#include <asm/cmdline.h>
+#include <asm/kpti.h>
+#include <asm/pgtable.h>
+#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
+#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+#include <asm/desc.h>
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Kernel/User page tables isolation: " fmt
+
+void __init kpti_check_boottime_disable(void)
+{
+ bool enable = true;
+
+ if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nokpti")) {
+ pr_info("disabled on command line.\n");
+ enable = false;
+ }
+ if (hypervisor_is_type(X86_HYPER_XEN_PV)) {
+ pr_info("disabled on XEN_PV.\n");
+ enable = false;
+ }
+ if (enable)
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_SECURE_MODE_KPTI);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize kernel page table isolation
+ */
+void __init kpti_init(void)
+{
+ if (!static_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_SECURE_MODE_KPTI))
+ return;
+
+ pr_info("enabled\n");
+}
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/kpti.h
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#ifndef _INCLUDE_KPTI_H
+#define _INCLUDE_KPTI_H
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KERNEL_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#include <asm/kpti.h>
+#else
+static inline void kpti_init(void) { }
+#endif
+
+#endif
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/perf_event.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/kpti.h>
#include <linux/blkdev.h>
#include <linux/elevator.h>
#include <linux/sched_clock.h>
@@ -505,6 +506,7 @@ static void __init mm_init(void)
pgtable_init();
vmalloc_init();
ioremap_huge_init();
+ kpti_init();
}
asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-12-04 17:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 118+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-12-04 14:07 [patch 00/60] x86/kpti: Kernel Page Table Isolation (was KAISER) Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 01/60] x86/entry/64/paravirt: Use paravirt-safe macro to access eflags Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 12:17 ` Juergen Gross
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 02/60] x86/unwinder/orc: Dont bail on stack overflow Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 20:31 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 21:31 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 03/60] x86/unwinder: Handle stack overflows more gracefully Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 04/60] x86/irq: Remove an old outdated comment about context tracking races Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 05/60] x86/irq/64: Print the offending IP in the stack overflow warning Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 06/60] x86/entry/64: Allocate and enable the SYSENTER stack Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 07/60] x86/dumpstack: Add get_stack_info() support for " Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 08/60] x86/entry/gdt: Put per-CPU GDT remaps in ascending order Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 09/60] x86/mm/fixmap: Generalize the GDT fixmap mechanism, introduce struct cpu_entry_area Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 10/60] x86/kasan/64: Teach KASAN about the cpu_entry_area Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 11/60] x86/entry: Fix assumptions that the HW TSS is at the beginning of cpu_tss Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 12/60] x86/dumpstack: Handle stack overflow on all stacks Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 13/60] x86/entry: Move SYSENTER_stack to the beginning of struct tss_struct Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 14/60] x86/entry: Remap the TSS into the CPU entry area Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 18:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 15/60] x86/entry/64: Separate cpu_current_top_of_stack from TSS.sp0 Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 16/60] x86/espfix/64: Stop assuming that pt_regs is on the entry stack Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 17/60] x86/entry/64: Use a per-CPU trampoline stack for IDT entries Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 18/60] x86/entry/64: Return to userspace from the trampoline stack Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 19/60] x86/entry/64: Create a per-CPU SYSCALL entry trampoline Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 20/60] x86/entry/64: Move the IST stacks into struct cpu_entry_area Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 21/60] x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSENTER stack canary Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 22/60] x86/entry: Clean up the SYSENTER_stack code Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 19:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 23/60] x86/entry/64: Make cpu_entry_area.tss read-only Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 20:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 24/60] x86/paravirt: Dont patch flush_tlb_single Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 12:18 ` Juergen Gross
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 25/60] x86/paravirt: Provide a way to check for hypervisors Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 12:19 ` Juergen Gross
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 26/60] x86/cpufeature: Make cpu bugs sticky Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 27/60] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 23:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 28/60] x86/mm/kpti: Disable global pages if KERNEL_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 14:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 29/60] x86/mm/kpti: Prepare the x86/entry assembly code for entry/exit CR3 switching Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2017-12-05 15:20 ` [patch 30/60] x86/mm/kpti: Add infrastructure for page table isolation Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 31/60] x86/mm/kpti: Add mapping helper functions Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-05 16:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-07 8:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 32/60] x86/mm/kpti: Allow NX poison to be set in p4d/pgd Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 17:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 33/60] x86/mm/kpti: Allocate a separate user PGD Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 18:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-06 20:56 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 34/60] x86/mm/kpti: Populate " Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 19:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 35/60] x86/espfix: Ensure that ESPFIX is visible in " Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 36/60] x86/mm/kpti: Add functions to clone kernel PMDs Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-06 15:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 37/60] x86mm//kpti: Force entry through trampoline when KPTI active Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-06 16:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 38/60] x86/fixmap: Move cpu entry area into a separate PMD Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-06 18:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 39/60] x86/mm/kpti: Share cpu_entry_area PMDs Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-06 21:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 40/60] x86: PMD align entry text Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-07 8:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 41/60] x86/mm/kpti: Share entry text PMD Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-07 8:24 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 42/60] x86/fixmap: Move IDT fixmap into the cpu_entry_area range Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 43/60] x86/fixmap: Add debugstore entries to cpu_entry_area Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-07 9:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 44/60] x86/events/intel/ds: Map debug buffers in fixmap Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 45/60] x86/fixmap: Add ldt entries to user shared fixmap Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 46/60] x86/ldt: Rename ldt_struct->entries member Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 47/60] x86/ldt: Map LDT entries into fixmap Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 22:51 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 48/60] x86/mm: Move the CR3 construction functions to tlbflush.h Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 49/60] x86/mm: Remove hard-coded ASID limit checks Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 50/60] x86/mm: Put MMU to hardware ASID translation in one place Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 51/60] x86/mm: Allow flushing for future ASID switches Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 22:34 ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-04 22:36 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 22:47 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-04 22:54 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 23:06 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 52/60] x86/mm: Abstract switching CR3 Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 53/60] x86/mm: Use/Fix PCID to optimize user/kernel switches Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 21:46 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-05 22:05 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-05 22:08 ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 54/60] x86/mm: Optimize RESTORE_CR3 Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 55/60] x86/mm: Use INVPCID for __native_flush_tlb_single() Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 22:51 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-05 13:51 ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-05 14:08 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 56/60] x86/mm/kpti: Disable native VSYSCALL Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 57/60] x86/mm/kpti: Add Kconfig Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 16:54 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 16:57 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 9:34 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 58/60] x86/mm/debug_pagetables: Add page table directory Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 59/60] x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Check user space page table for WX pages Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 60/60] x86/mm/debug_pagetables: Allow dumping current pagetables Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 18:02 ` [patch 00/60] x86/kpti: Kernel Page Table Isolation (was KAISER) Linus Torvalds
2017-12-04 18:18 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 18:21 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-12-04 18:28 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-05 21:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-05 21:57 ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-05 23:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-19 20:56 ` Andrew Morton
2018-01-19 21:06 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-20 19:59 ` Thomas Gleixner
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