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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>,
	Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Subject: [PATCH 3.18 02/12] ipsec: Fix aborted xfrm policy dump crash
Date: Mon,  4 Dec 2017 16:59:16 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171204155916.580778933@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171204155916.489136969@linuxfoundation.org>

3.18-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

commit 1137b5e2529a8f5ca8ee709288ecba3e68044df2 upstream.

An independent security researcher, Mohamed Ghannam, has reported
this vulnerability to Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure
program.

The xfrm_dump_policy_done function expects xfrm_dump_policy to
have been called at least once or it will crash.  This can be
triggered if a dump fails because the target socket's receive
buffer is full.

This patch fixes it by using the cb->start mechanism to ensure that
the initialisation is always done regardless of the buffer situation.

Fixes: 12a169e7d8f4 ("ipsec: Put dumpers on the dump list")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c |   25 +++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -1625,32 +1625,34 @@ static int dump_one_policy(struct xfrm_p
 
 static int xfrm_dump_policy_done(struct netlink_callback *cb)
 {
-	struct xfrm_policy_walk *walk = (struct xfrm_policy_walk *) &cb->args[1];
+	struct xfrm_policy_walk *walk = (struct xfrm_policy_walk *)cb->args;
 	struct net *net = sock_net(cb->skb->sk);
 
 	xfrm_policy_walk_done(walk, net);
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int xfrm_dump_policy_start(struct netlink_callback *cb)
+{
+	struct xfrm_policy_walk *walk = (struct xfrm_policy_walk *)cb->args;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*walk) > sizeof(cb->args));
+
+	xfrm_policy_walk_init(walk, XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_ANY);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int xfrm_dump_policy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
 {
 	struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
-	struct xfrm_policy_walk *walk = (struct xfrm_policy_walk *) &cb->args[1];
+	struct xfrm_policy_walk *walk = (struct xfrm_policy_walk *)cb->args;
 	struct xfrm_dump_info info;
 
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct xfrm_policy_walk) >
-		     sizeof(cb->args) - sizeof(cb->args[0]));
-
 	info.in_skb = cb->skb;
 	info.out_skb = skb;
 	info.nlmsg_seq = cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq;
 	info.nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_MULTI;
 
-	if (!cb->args[0]) {
-		cb->args[0] = 1;
-		xfrm_policy_walk_init(walk, XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_ANY);
-	}
-
 	(void) xfrm_policy_walk(net, walk, dump_one_policy, &info);
 
 	return skb->len;
@@ -2384,6 +2386,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy xfrma_spd
 
 static const struct xfrm_link {
 	int (*doit)(struct sk_buff *, struct nlmsghdr *, struct nlattr **);
+	int (*start)(struct netlink_callback *);
 	int (*dump)(struct sk_buff *, struct netlink_callback *);
 	int (*done)(struct netlink_callback *);
 	const struct nla_policy *nla_pol;
@@ -2397,6 +2400,7 @@ static const struct xfrm_link {
 	[XFRM_MSG_NEWPOLICY   - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = { .doit = xfrm_add_policy    },
 	[XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY   - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = { .doit = xfrm_get_policy    },
 	[XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY   - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = { .doit = xfrm_get_policy,
+						   .start = xfrm_dump_policy_start,
 						   .dump = xfrm_dump_policy,
 						   .done = xfrm_dump_policy_done },
 	[XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI    - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = { .doit = xfrm_alloc_userspi },
@@ -2443,6 +2447,7 @@ static int xfrm_user_rcv_msg(struct sk_b
 
 		{
 			struct netlink_dump_control c = {
+				.start = link->start,
 				.dump = link->dump,
 				.done = link->done,
 			};

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-12-04 15:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-12-04 15:59 [PATCH 3.18 00/12] 3.18.86-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-12-04 15:59 ` [PATCH 3.18 01/12] netlink: add a start callback for starting a netlink dump Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-12-04 15:59 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2017-12-04 15:59 ` [PATCH 3.18 03/12] mm, thp: Do not make page table dirty unconditionally in touch_p[mu]d() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-12-04 15:59 ` [PATCH 3.18 04/12] mm/madvise.c: fix madvise() infinite loop under special circumstances Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-12-04 15:59 ` [PATCH 3.18 05/12] btrfs: clear space cache inode generation always Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-12-04 15:59 ` [PATCH 3.18 08/12] eeprom: at24: check at24_read/write arguments Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-12-04 15:59 ` [PATCH 3.18 09/12] drm/panel: simple: Add missing panel_simple_unprepare() calls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-12-04 15:59 ` [PATCH 3.18 10/12] NFS: revalidate "." etc correctly on "open" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-12-04 20:14 ` [PATCH 3.18 00/12] 3.18.86-stable review Shuah Khan
2017-12-04 23:45 ` Guenter Roeck

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