[PATCH 4.14 000/118] 4.14.14-stable review

[PATCH 4.14 000/118] 4.14.14-stable review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.14 release.
There are 118 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.

Responses should be made by Wed Jan 17 12:33:32 UTC 2018.
Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.14-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
  git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    Linux 4.14.14-rc1

Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    x86/retpoline: Remove compile time warning

Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
    x86,perf: Disable intel_bts when PTI

W. Trevor King <wking@tremily.us>
    security/Kconfig: Correct the Documentation reference for PTI

Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    x86/pti: Fix !PCID and sanitize defines

Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
    selftests/x86: Add test_vsyscall

David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
    x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit

Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
    x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps

David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
    x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler indirect jumps

David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
    x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall indirect jumps

David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
    x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps

David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
    x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace assembler indirect jumps

David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
    x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry assembler indirect jumps

David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
    x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps

David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
    x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation

David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
    x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support

Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
    objtool: Allow alternatives to be ignored

Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
    objtool: Detect jumps to retpoline thunks

Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
    x86/pti: Make unpoison of pgd for trusted boot work for real

Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
    x86/alternatives: Fix optimize_nops() checking

David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
    sysfs/cpu: Fix typos in vulnerability documentation

Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
    x86/cpu/AMD: Use LFENCE_RDTSC in preference to MFENCE_RDTSC

Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
    x86/cpu/AMD: Make LFENCE a serializing instruction

Jike Song <albcamus@gmail.com>
    x86/mm/pti: Remove dead logic in pti_user_pagetable_walk*()

Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
    x86/tboot: Unbreak tboot with PTI enabled

Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    x86/cpu: Implement CPU vulnerabilites sysfs functions

Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder

David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
    x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V[12]

Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
    x86/Documentation: Add PTI description

Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
    x86/pti: Unbreak EFI old_memmap

Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.com>
    e1000e: Fix e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan return value.

John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
    apparmor: fix ptrace label match when matching stacked labels

Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
    kdump: write correct address of mem_section into vmcoreinfo

Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
    mux: core: fix double get_device()

Icenowy Zheng <icenowy@aosc.io>
    uas: ignore UAS for Norelsys NS1068(X) chips

Ben Seri <ben@armis.com>
    Bluetooth: Prevent stack info leak from the EFS element.

Viktor Slavkovic <viktors@google.com>
    staging: android: ashmem: fix a race condition in ASHMEM_SET_SIZE ioctl

Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
    usbip: vudc_tx: fix v_send_ret_submit() vulnerability to null xfer buffer

Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
    usbip: fix vudc_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input

Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
    usbip: remove kernel addresses from usb device and urb debug msgs

Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
    USB: UDC core: fix double-free in usb_add_gadget_udc_release

Pete Zaitcev <zaitcev@redhat.com>
    USB: fix usbmon BUG trigger

Stefan Agner <stefan@agner.ch>
    usb: misc: usb3503: make sure reset is low for at least 100us

Christian Holl <cyborgx1@gmail.com>
    USB: serial: cp210x: add new device ID ELV ALC 8xxx

Diego Elio Pettenò <flameeyes@flameeyes.eu>
    USB: serial: cp210x: add IDs for LifeScan OneTouch Verio IQ

Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
    bpf: arsh is not supported in 32 bit alu thus reject it

Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
    bpf, array: fix overflow in max_entries and undefined behavior in index_mask

Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
    bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation

Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
    drm/i915: Fix init_clock_gating for resume

Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
    drm/i915: Move init_clock_gating() back to where it was

Kenneth Graunke <kenneth@whitecape.org>
    drm/i915: Whitelist SLICE_COMMON_ECO_CHICKEN1 on Geminilake.

Zhi Wang <zhi.a.wang@intel.com>
    drm/i915/gvt: Clear the shadow page table entry after post-sync

Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
    drm/vmwgfx: Potential off by one in vmw_view_add()

Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>
    drm/vmwgfx: Don't cache framebuffer maps

David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
    KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Always flush TLB in kvmppc_alloc_reset_hpt()

Serhii Popovych <spopovyc@redhat.com>
    KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix use after free in case of multiple resize requests

Serhii Popovych <spopovyc@redhat.com>
    KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Drop prepare_done from struct kvm_resize_hpt

Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
    KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Fix WIMG handling under pHyp

Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
    KVM: x86: Add memory barrier on vmcs field lookup

Jia Zhang <qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.com>
    x86/microcode/intel: Extend BDW late-loading with a revision check

Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
    iwlwifi: pcie: fix DMA memory mapping / unmapping

Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
    rbd: set max_segments to USHRT_MAX

Florian Margaine <florian@platform.sh>
    rbd: reacquire lock should update lock owner client id

Masaharu Hayakawa <masaharu.hayakawa.ry@renesas.com>
    mmc: renesas_sdhi: Add MODULE_LICENSE

Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
    crypto: algapi - fix NULL dereference in crypto_remove_spawns()

Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
    membarrier: Disable preemption when calling smp_call_function_many()

David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
    Revert "Revert "xfrm: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in xfrm_state_find.""

Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
    sfp: fix sfp-bus oops when removing socket/upstream

Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
    mlxsw: spectrum: Relax sanity checks during enslavement

Mathieu Xhonneux <m.xhonneux@gmail.com>
    ipv6: sr: fix TLVs not being copied using setsockopt

Roi Dayan <roid@mellanox.com>
    net/sched: Fix update of lastuse in act modules implementing stats_update

Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
    mlxsw: spectrum_router: Fix NULL pointer deref

Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
    ethtool: do not print warning for applications using legacy API

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    ipv6: fix possible mem leaks in ipv6_make_skb()

Sergei Shtylyov <sergei.shtylyov@cogentembedded.com>
    sh_eth: fix SH7757 GEther initialization

Jerome Brunet <jbrunet@baylibre.com>
    net: stmmac: enable EEE in MII, GMII or RGMII only

Sergei Shtylyov <sergei.shtylyov@cogentembedded.com>
    sh_eth: fix TSU resource handling

Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
    sctp: fix the handling of ICMP Frag Needed for too small MTUs

Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
    sctp: do not retransmit upon FragNeeded if PMTU discovery is disabled

Fugang Duan <fugang.duan@nxp.com>
    net: fec: free/restore resource in related probe error pathes

Fugang Duan <fugang.duan@nxp.com>
    net: fec: defer probe if regulator is not ready

Fugang Duan <fugang.duan@nxp.com>
    net: fec: restore dev_id in the cases of probe error

Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam@gmail.com>
    RDS: null pointer dereference in rds_atomic_free_op

Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam@gmail.com>
    RDS: Heap OOB write in rds_message_alloc_sgs()

Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
    phylink: ensure we report link down when LOS asserted

Andrii Vladyka <tulup@mail.ru>
    net: core: fix module type in sock_diag_bind

Eli Cooper <elicooper@gmx.com>
    ip6_tunnel: disable dst caching if tunnel is dual-stack

Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
    8021q: fix a memory leak for VLAN 0 device

Vikas C Sajjan <vikas.cha.sajjan@hpe.com>
    x86/acpi: Reduce code duplication in mp_override_legacy_irq()

Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
    ALSA: aloop: Fix racy hw constraints adjustment

Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
    ALSA: aloop: Fix inconsistent format due to incomplete rule

Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
    ALSA: aloop: Release cable upon open error path

Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
    ALSA: pcm: Allow aborting mutex lock at OSS read/write loops

Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
    ALSA: pcm: Abort properly at pending signal in OSS read/write loops

Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
    ALSA: pcm: Add missing error checks in OSS emulation plugin builder

Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
    ALSA: pcm: Workaround for weird PulseAudio behavior on rewind error

Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
    ALSA: pcm: Remove incorrect snd_BUG_ON() usages

Vikas C Sajjan <vikas.cha.sajjan@hpe.com>
    x86/acpi: Handle SCI interrupts above legacy space gracefully

Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
    iw_cxgb4: when flushing, complete all wrs in a chain

Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
    iw_cxgb4: reflect the original WR opcode in drain cqes

Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
    iw_cxgb4: only clear the ARMED bit if a notification is needed

Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
    iw_cxgb4: atomically flush the qp

Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
    iw_cxgb4: only call the cq comp_handler when the cq is armed

Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
    platform/x86: wmi: Call acpi_wmi_init() later

Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
    kvm: vmx: Scrub hardware GPRs at VM-exit

Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
    cgroup: fix css_task_iter crash on CSS_TASK_ITER_PROC

Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>
    MIPS: Disallow outsized PTRACE_SETREGSET NT_PRFPREG regset accesses

Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>
    MIPS: Also verify sizeof `elf_fpreg_t' with PTRACE_SETREGSET

Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>
    MIPS: Fix an FCSR access API regression with NT_PRFPREG and MSA

Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>
    MIPS: Consistently handle buffer counter with PTRACE_SETREGSET

Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>
    MIPS: Guard against any partial write attempt with PTRACE_SETREGSET

Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>
    MIPS: Factor out NT_PRFPREG regset access helpers

Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>
    MIPS: Validate PR_SET_FP_MODE prctl(2) requests against the ABI of the task

Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
    IB/srpt: Fix ACL lookup during login

Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
    IB/srpt: Disable RDMA access by the initiator

Wolfgang Grandegger <wg@grandegger.com>
    can: gs_usb: fix return value of the "set_bittiming" callback

Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
    can: vxcan: improve handling of missing peer name attribute

Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
    KVM: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in write_mmio

Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
    dm bufio: fix shrinker scans when (nr_to_scan < retain_target)


-------------

Diffstat:

 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu |  16 +
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt    |  49 +-
 Documentation/x86/pti.txt                          | 186 ++++++++
 Makefile                                           |   4 +-
 arch/mips/kernel/process.c                         |  12 +
 arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c                          | 147 ++++--
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu.c                   |   1 +
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c                |  90 ++--
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_pr.c                       |   2 +
 arch/x86/Kconfig                                   |  14 +
 arch/x86/Makefile                                  |   8 +
 arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S                  |   5 +-
 arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.S        |   3 +-
 arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S       |   3 +-
 arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S          |   3 +-
 arch/x86/entry/calling.h                           |  36 +-
 arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S                          |   5 +-
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S                          |  12 +-
 arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c                        |  18 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h              |  25 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h                 |   4 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h                    |  18 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h                   |   3 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h               | 214 +++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h             |   2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h                    |   6 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h               |   5 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c                        |  61 ++-
 arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c                      |   7 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c                          |  28 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                         | 185 ++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                       |   3 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c              |  13 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_32.S                        |   6 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S                        |   8 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c                           |   9 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c                            |  11 +
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c                                 |  23 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c                                 |  30 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                                 |   8 +-
 arch/x86/lib/Makefile                              |   1 +
 arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S                         |   7 +-
 arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S                           |  48 ++
 arch/x86/mm/pti.c                                  |  32 +-
 arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c                     |   2 +
 crypto/algapi.c                                    |  12 +
 drivers/base/Kconfig                               |   3 +
 drivers/base/cpu.c                                 |  48 ++
 drivers/block/rbd.c                                |  18 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c                     |   5 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_drv.c                    |   1 +
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_reg.h                    |   2 +
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_display.c               |  14 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_engine_cs.c             |   5 +
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_pm.c                    |  44 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c            |   2 +
 drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_kms.c                |   6 -
 drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_kms.h                |   2 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_stdu.c               |  41 +-
 drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/cq.c                   |   7 +-
 drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/ev.c                   |   8 +-
 drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/iw_cxgb4.h             |   2 -
 drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/qp.c                   | 119 +++--
 drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/t4.h                   |   6 +
 drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c              |   5 +-
 drivers/md/dm-bufio.c                              |   8 +-
 drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_core.c               |   3 +
 drivers/mux/core.c                                 |   4 +-
 drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c                       |   2 +-
 drivers/net/can/vxcan.c                            |   2 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c          |   7 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c        |  11 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum.c     |  11 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum.h     |   2 +
 .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_router.c  |   2 +-
 .../ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_switchdev.c   |   6 +
 drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/sh_eth.c              |  29 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c  |   6 +
 drivers/net/phy/phylink.c                          |   3 +-
 drivers/net/phy/sfp-bus.c                          |   6 +-
 drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/internal.h |  10 +-
 drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx-gen2.c  |  11 +-
 drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx.c       |   8 +-
 drivers/platform/x86/wmi.c                         |   2 +-
 drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c                   |   2 +
 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c                      |  28 +-
 drivers/usb/misc/usb3503.c                         |   2 +
 drivers/usb/mon/mon_bin.c                          |   8 +-
 drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c                        |   2 +
 drivers/usb/storage/unusual_uas.h                  |   7 +
 drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c                   |  17 +-
 drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_rx.c                        |  19 +
 drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_tx.c                        |  11 +-
 include/linux/bpf.h                                |   2 +
 include/linux/cpu.h                                |   7 +
 include/linux/crash_core.h                         |   2 +
 include/linux/sh_eth.h                             |   1 -
 include/net/sctp/structs.h                         |   2 +-
 include/trace/events/kvm.h                         |   7 +-
 kernel/bpf/arraymap.c                              |  61 ++-
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c                              |  41 ++
 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c                             |  14 +-
 kernel/crash_core.c                                |   2 +-
 kernel/sched/membarrier.c                          |   2 +
 net/8021q/vlan.c                                   |   7 +-
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c                         |  20 +-
 net/core/ethtool.c                                 |  15 +-
 net/core/sock_diag.c                               |   2 +-
 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c                                 |   9 +
 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c                              |   5 +-
 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c                              |   9 +-
 net/rds/rdma.c                                     |   4 +
 net/sched/act_gact.c                               |   2 +-
 net/sched/act_mirred.c                             |   2 +-
 net/sctp/input.c                                   |  28 +-
 net/sctp/transport.c                               |  29 +-
 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c                             |  29 +-
 security/Kconfig                                   |   2 +-
 security/apparmor/include/perms.h                  |   3 +
 security/apparmor/ipc.c                            |  53 ++-
 sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c                           |  41 +-
 sound/core/oss/pcm_plugin.c                        |  14 +-
 sound/core/pcm_lib.c                               |   4 +-
 sound/core/pcm_native.c                            |   9 +-
 sound/drivers/aloop.c                              |  98 ++--
 tools/objtool/check.c                              |  69 ++-
 tools/objtool/check.h                              |   2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c        |  40 ++
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile               |   2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_vsyscall.c        | 500 +++++++++++++++++++++
 virt/kvm/arm/mmio.c                                |   6 +-
 131 files changed, 2536 insertions(+), 561 deletions(-)

[PATCH 4.14 001/118] dm bufio: fix shrinker scans when (nr_to_scan < retain_target)

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>

commit fbc7c07ec23c040179384a1f16b62b6030eb6bdd upstream.

When system is under memory pressure it is observed that dm bufio
shrinker often reclaims only one buffer per scan. This change fixes
the following two issues in dm bufio shrinker that cause this behavior:

1. ((nr_to_scan - freed) <= retain_target) condition is used to
terminate slab scan process. This assumes that nr_to_scan is equal
to the LRU size, which might not be correct because do_shrink_slab()
in vmscan.c calculates nr_to_scan using multiple inputs.
As a result when nr_to_scan is less than retain_target (64) the scan
will terminate after the first iteration, effectively reclaiming one
buffer per scan and making scans very inefficient. This hurts vmscan
performance especially because mutex is acquired/released every time
dm_bufio_shrink_scan() is called.
New implementation uses ((LRU size - freed) <= retain_target)
condition for scan termination. LRU size can be safely determined
inside __scan() because this function is called after dm_bufio_lock().

2. do_shrink_slab() uses value returned by dm_bufio_shrink_count() to
determine number of freeable objects in the slab. However dm_bufio
always retains retain_target buffers in its LRU and will terminate
a scan when this mark is reached. Therefore returning the entire LRU size
from dm_bufio_shrink_count() is misleading because that does not
represent the number of freeable objects that slab will reclaim during
a scan. Returning (LRU size - retain_target) better represents the
number of freeable objects in the slab. This way do_shrink_slab()
returns 0 when (LRU size < retain_target) and vmscan will not try to
scan this shrinker avoiding scans that will not reclaim any memory.

Test: tested using Android device running
<AOSP>/system/extras/alloc-stress that generates memory pressure
and causes intensive shrinker scans

Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>


---
 drivers/md/dm-bufio.c |    8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/md/dm-bufio.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-bufio.c
@@ -1611,7 +1611,8 @@ static unsigned long __scan(struct dm_bu
 	int l;
 	struct dm_buffer *b, *tmp;
 	unsigned long freed = 0;
-	unsigned long count = nr_to_scan;
+	unsigned long count = c->n_buffers[LIST_CLEAN] +
+			      c->n_buffers[LIST_DIRTY];
 	unsigned long retain_target = get_retain_buffers(c);
 
 	for (l = 0; l < LIST_SIZE; l++) {
@@ -1647,8 +1648,11 @@ static unsigned long
 dm_bufio_shrink_count(struct shrinker *shrink, struct shrink_control *sc)
 {
 	struct dm_bufio_client *c = container_of(shrink, struct dm_bufio_client, shrinker);
+	unsigned long count = ACCESS_ONCE(c->n_buffers[LIST_CLEAN]) +
+			      ACCESS_ONCE(c->n_buffers[LIST_DIRTY]);
+	unsigned long retain_target = get_retain_buffers(c);
 
-	return ACCESS_ONCE(c->n_buffers[LIST_CLEAN]) + ACCESS_ONCE(c->n_buffers[LIST_DIRTY]);
+	return (count < retain_target) ? 0 : (count - retain_target);
 }
 
 /*

[PATCH 4.14 002/118] KVM: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in write_mmio

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>

commit e39d200fa5bf5b94a0948db0dae44c1b73b84a56 upstream.

Reported by syzkaller:

  BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in write_mmio+0x11e/0x270 [kvm]
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff8803259df7f8 by task syz-executor/32298

  CPU: 6 PID: 32298 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G           OE    4.15.0-rc2+ #18
  Hardware name: LENOVO ThinkCentre M8500t-N000/SHARKBAY, BIOS FBKTC1AUS 02/16/2016
  Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0xab/0xe1
   print_address_description+0x6b/0x290
   kasan_report+0x28a/0x370
   write_mmio+0x11e/0x270 [kvm]
   emulator_read_write_onepage+0x311/0x600 [kvm]
   emulator_read_write+0xef/0x240 [kvm]
   emulator_fix_hypercall+0x105/0x150 [kvm]
   em_hypercall+0x2b/0x80 [kvm]
   x86_emulate_insn+0x2b1/0x1640 [kvm]
   x86_emulate_instruction+0x39a/0xb90 [kvm]
   handle_exception+0x1b4/0x4d0 [kvm_intel]
   vcpu_enter_guest+0x15a0/0x2640 [kvm]
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x549/0x7d0 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x479/0x880 [kvm]
   do_vfs_ioctl+0x142/0x9a0
   SyS_ioctl+0x74/0x80
   entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0x9a

The path of patched vmmcall will patch 3 bytes opcode 0F 01 C1(vmcall)
to the guest memory, however, write_mmio tracepoint always prints 8 bytes
through *(u64 *)val since kvm splits the mmio access into 8 bytes. This
leaks 5 bytes from the kernel stack (CVE-2017-17741).  This patch fixes
it by just accessing the bytes which we operate on.

Before patch:

syz-executor-5567  [007] .... 51370.561696: kvm_mmio: mmio write len 3 gpa 0x10 val 0x1ffff10077c1010f

After patch:

syz-executor-13416 [002] .... 51302.299573: kvm_mmio: mmio write len 3 gpa 0x10 val 0xc1010f

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Tested-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c         |    8 ++++----
 include/trace/events/kvm.h |    7 +++++--
 virt/kvm/arm/mmio.c        |    6 +++---
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -4362,7 +4362,7 @@ static int vcpu_mmio_read(struct kvm_vcp
 					 addr, n, v))
 		    && kvm_io_bus_read(vcpu, KVM_MMIO_BUS, addr, n, v))
 			break;
-		trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ, n, addr, *(u64 *)v);
+		trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ, n, addr, v);
 		handled += n;
 		addr += n;
 		len -= n;
@@ -4621,7 +4621,7 @@ static int read_prepare(struct kvm_vcpu
 {
 	if (vcpu->mmio_read_completed) {
 		trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ, bytes,
-			       vcpu->mmio_fragments[0].gpa, *(u64 *)val);
+			       vcpu->mmio_fragments[0].gpa, val);
 		vcpu->mmio_read_completed = 0;
 		return 1;
 	}
@@ -4643,14 +4643,14 @@ static int write_emulate(struct kvm_vcpu
 
 static int write_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, int bytes, void *val)
 {
-	trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_WRITE, bytes, gpa, *(u64 *)val);
+	trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_WRITE, bytes, gpa, val);
 	return vcpu_mmio_write(vcpu, gpa, bytes, val);
 }
 
 static int read_exit_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
 			  void *val, int bytes)
 {
-	trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ_UNSATISFIED, bytes, gpa, 0);
+	trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ_UNSATISFIED, bytes, gpa, NULL);
 	return X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED;
 }
 
--- a/include/trace/events/kvm.h
+++ b/include/trace/events/kvm.h
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(kvm_ack_irq,
 	{ KVM_TRACE_MMIO_WRITE, "write" }
 
 TRACE_EVENT(kvm_mmio,
-	TP_PROTO(int type, int len, u64 gpa, u64 val),
+	TP_PROTO(int type, int len, u64 gpa, void *val),
 	TP_ARGS(type, len, gpa, val),
 
 	TP_STRUCT__entry(
@@ -225,7 +225,10 @@ TRACE_EVENT(kvm_mmio,
 		__entry->type		= type;
 		__entry->len		= len;
 		__entry->gpa		= gpa;
-		__entry->val		= val;
+		__entry->val		= 0;
+		if (val)
+			memcpy(&__entry->val, val,
+			       min_t(u32, sizeof(__entry->val), len));
 	),
 
 	TP_printk("mmio %s len %u gpa 0x%llx val 0x%llx",
--- a/virt/kvm/arm/mmio.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/arm/mmio.c
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ int kvm_handle_mmio_return(struct kvm_vc
 		}
 
 		trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ, len, run->mmio.phys_addr,
-			       data);
+			       &data);
 		data = vcpu_data_host_to_guest(vcpu, data, len);
 		vcpu_set_reg(vcpu, vcpu->arch.mmio_decode.rt, data);
 	}
@@ -182,14 +182,14 @@ int io_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		data = vcpu_data_guest_to_host(vcpu, vcpu_get_reg(vcpu, rt),
 					       len);
 
-		trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_WRITE, len, fault_ipa, data);
+		trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_WRITE, len, fault_ipa, &data);
 		kvm_mmio_write_buf(data_buf, len, data);
 
 		ret = kvm_io_bus_write(vcpu, KVM_MMIO_BUS, fault_ipa, len,
 				       data_buf);
 	} else {
 		trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ_UNSATISFIED, len,
-			       fault_ipa, 0);
+			       fault_ipa, NULL);
 
 		ret = kvm_io_bus_read(vcpu, KVM_MMIO_BUS, fault_ipa, len,
 				      data_buf);

[PATCH 4.14 003/118] can: vxcan: improve handling of missing peer name attribute

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>

commit b4c2951a4833e66f1bbfe65ddcd4fdcdfafe5e8f upstream.

Picking up the patch from Serhey Popovych (commit 191cdb3822e5df6b3c8,
"veth: Be more robust on network device creation when no attributes").

When the peer name attribute is not provided the former implementation tries
to register the given device name twice ... which leads to -EEXIST.
If only one device name is given apply an automatic generated and valid name
for the peer.

Cc: Serhey Popovych <serhe.popovych@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/net/can/vxcan.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/can/vxcan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/can/vxcan.c
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ static int vxcan_newlink(struct net *net
 		tbp = peer_tb;
 	}
 
-	if (tbp[IFLA_IFNAME]) {
+	if (ifmp && tbp[IFLA_IFNAME]) {
 		nla_strlcpy(ifname, tbp[IFLA_IFNAME], IFNAMSIZ);
 		name_assign_type = NET_NAME_USER;
 	} else {

[PATCH 4.14 004/118] can: gs_usb: fix return value of the "set_bittiming" callback

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wolfgang Grandegger <wg@grandegger.com>

commit d5b42e6607661b198d8b26a0c30969605b1bf5c7 upstream.

The "set_bittiming" callback treats a positive return value as error!
For that reason "can_changelink()" will quit silently after setting
the bittiming values without processing ctrlmode, restart-ms, etc.

Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Grandegger <wg@grandegger.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c
+++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c
@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ static int gs_usb_set_bittiming(struct n
 		dev_err(netdev->dev.parent, "Couldn't set bittimings (err=%d)",
 			rc);
 
-	return rc;
+	return (rc > 0) ? 0 : rc;
 }
 
 static void gs_usb_xmit_callback(struct urb *urb)

[PATCH 4.14 005/118] IB/srpt: Disable RDMA access by the initiator

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>

commit bec40c26041de61162f7be9d2ce548c756ce0f65 upstream.

With the SRP protocol all RDMA operations are initiated by the target.
Since no RDMA operations are initiated by the initiator, do not grant
the initiator permission to submit RDMA reads or writes to the target.

Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c
@@ -1000,8 +1000,7 @@ static int srpt_init_ch_qp(struct srpt_r
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	attr->qp_state = IB_QPS_INIT;
-	attr->qp_access_flags = IB_ACCESS_LOCAL_WRITE | IB_ACCESS_REMOTE_READ |
-	    IB_ACCESS_REMOTE_WRITE;
+	attr->qp_access_flags = IB_ACCESS_LOCAL_WRITE;
 	attr->port_num = ch->sport->port;
 	attr->pkey_index = 0;
 

[PATCH 4.14 006/118] IB/srpt: Fix ACL lookup during login

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>

commit a1ffa4670cb97ae3a4b3e8535d88be5f643f7c3b upstream.

Make sure that the initiator port GUID is stored in ch->ini_guid.
Note: when initiating a connection sgid and dgid members in struct
sa_path_rec represent the source and destination GIDs. When accepting
a connection however sgid represents the destination GID and dgid the
source GID.

Fixes: commit 2bce1a6d2209 ("IB/srpt: Accept GUIDs as port names")
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c
@@ -1991,7 +1991,7 @@ static int srpt_cm_req_recv(struct ib_cm
 		goto destroy_ib;
 	}
 
-	guid = (__be16 *)&param->primary_path->sgid.global.interface_id;
+	guid = (__be16 *)&param->primary_path->dgid.global.interface_id;
 	snprintf(ch->ini_guid, sizeof(ch->ini_guid), "%04x:%04x:%04x:%04x",
 		 be16_to_cpu(guid[0]), be16_to_cpu(guid[1]),
 		 be16_to_cpu(guid[2]), be16_to_cpu(guid[3]));

[PATCH 4.14 007/118] MIPS: Validate PR_SET_FP_MODE prctl(2) requests against the ABI of the task

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>

commit b67336eee3fcb8ecedc6c13e2bf88aacfa3151e2 upstream.

Fix an API loophole introduced with commit 9791554b45a2 ("MIPS,prctl:
add PR_[GS]ET_FP_MODE prctl options for MIPS"), where the caller of
prctl(2) is incorrectly allowed to make a change to CP0.Status.FR or
CP0.Config5.FRE register bits even if CONFIG_MIPS_O32_FP64_SUPPORT has
not been enabled, despite that an executable requesting the mode
requested via ELF file annotation would not be allowed to run in the
first place, or for n64 and n64 ABI tasks which do not have non-default
modes defined at all.  Add suitable checks to `mips_set_process_fp_mode'
and bail out if an invalid mode change has been requested for the ABI in
effect, even if the FPU hardware or emulation would otherwise allow it.

Always succeed however without taking any further action if the mode
requested is the same as one already in effect, regardless of whether
any mode change, should it be requested, would actually be allowed for
the task concerned.

Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>
Fixes: 9791554b45a2 ("MIPS,prctl: add PR_[GS]ET_FP_MODE prctl options for MIPS")
Reviewed-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@mips.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/17800/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/mips/kernel/process.c |   12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/mips/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/process.c
@@ -705,6 +705,18 @@ int mips_set_process_fp_mode(struct task
 	struct task_struct *t;
 	int max_users;
 
+	/* If nothing to change, return right away, successfully.  */
+	if (value == mips_get_process_fp_mode(task))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Only accept a mode change if 64-bit FP enabled for o32.  */
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MIPS_O32_FP64_SUPPORT))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	/* And only for o32 tasks.  */
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT) && !test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT_REGS))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
 	/* Check the value is valid */
 	if (value & ~known_bits)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;

[PATCH 4.14 008/118] MIPS: Factor out NT_PRFPREG regset access helpers

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>

commit a03fe72572c12e98f4173f8a535f32468e48b6ec upstream.

In preparation to fix a commit 72b22bbad1e7 ("MIPS: Don't assume 64-bit
FP registers for FP regset") FCSR access regression factor out
NT_PRFPREG regset access helpers for the non-MSA and the MSA variants
respectively, to avoid having to deal with excessive indentation in the
actual fix.

No functional change, however use `target->thread.fpu.fpr[0]' rather
than `target->thread.fpu.fpr[i]' for FGR holding type size determination
as there's no `i' variable to refer to anymore, and for the factored out
`i' variable declaration use `unsigned int' rather than `unsigned' as
its type, following the common style.

Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>
Fixes: 72b22bbad1e7 ("MIPS: Don't assume 64-bit FP registers for FP regset")
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@mips.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <Paul.Burton@mips.com>
Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk>
Cc: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/17925/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c |  108 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 83 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -410,25 +410,36 @@ static int gpr64_set(struct task_struct
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_64BIT */
 
-static int fpr_get(struct task_struct *target,
-		   const struct user_regset *regset,
-		   unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
-		   void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf)
+/*
+ * Copy the floating-point context to the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer,
+ * !CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant.  FP context's general register slots
+ * correspond 1:1 to buffer slots.
+ */
+static int fpr_get_fpa(struct task_struct *target,
+		       unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
+		       void **kbuf, void __user **ubuf)
 {
-	unsigned i;
-	int err;
-	u64 fpr_val;
-
-	/* XXX fcr31  */
+	return user_regset_copyout(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,
+				   &target->thread.fpu,
+				   0, sizeof(elf_fpregset_t));
+}
 
-	if (sizeof(target->thread.fpu.fpr[i]) == sizeof(elf_fpreg_t))
-		return user_regset_copyout(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
-					   &target->thread.fpu,
-					   0, sizeof(elf_fpregset_t));
+/*
+ * Copy the floating-point context to the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer,
+ * CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant.  Only lower 64 bits of FP context's
+ * general register slots are copied to buffer slots.
+ */
+static int fpr_get_msa(struct task_struct *target,
+		       unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
+		       void **kbuf, void __user **ubuf)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+	u64 fpr_val;
+	int err;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < NUM_FPU_REGS; i++) {
 		fpr_val = get_fpr64(&target->thread.fpu.fpr[i], 0);
-		err = user_regset_copyout(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
+		err = user_regset_copyout(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,
 					  &fpr_val, i * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t),
 					  (i + 1) * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
 		if (err)
@@ -438,27 +449,54 @@ static int fpr_get(struct task_struct *t
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int fpr_set(struct task_struct *target,
+/* Copy the floating-point context to the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer.  */
+static int fpr_get(struct task_struct *target,
 		   const struct user_regset *regset,
 		   unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
-		   const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
+		   void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf)
 {
-	unsigned i;
 	int err;
-	u64 fpr_val;
 
 	/* XXX fcr31  */
 
-	init_fp_ctx(target);
+	if (sizeof(target->thread.fpu.fpr[0]) == sizeof(elf_fpreg_t))
+		err = fpr_get_fpa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
+	else
+		err = fpr_get_msa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
+
+	return err;
+}
 
-	if (sizeof(target->thread.fpu.fpr[i]) == sizeof(elf_fpreg_t))
-		return user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
-					  &target->thread.fpu,
-					  0, sizeof(elf_fpregset_t));
+/*
+ * Copy the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer to the floating-point context,
+ * !CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant.   Buffer slots correspond 1:1 to FP
+ * context's general register slots.
+ */
+static int fpr_set_fpa(struct task_struct *target,
+		       unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
+		       const void **kbuf, const void __user **ubuf)
+{
+	return user_regset_copyin(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,
+				  &target->thread.fpu,
+				  0, sizeof(elf_fpregset_t));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer to the floating-point context,
+ * CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant.  Buffer slots are copied to lower 64
+ * bits only of FP context's general register slots.
+ */
+static int fpr_set_msa(struct task_struct *target,
+		       unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
+		       const void **kbuf, const void __user **ubuf)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+	u64 fpr_val;
+	int err;
 
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(fpr_val) != sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
-	for (i = 0; i < NUM_FPU_REGS && count >= sizeof(elf_fpreg_t); i++) {
-		err = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
+	for (i = 0; i < NUM_FPU_REGS && *count >= sizeof(elf_fpreg_t); i++) {
+		err = user_regset_copyin(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,
 					 &fpr_val, i * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t),
 					 (i + 1) * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
 		if (err)
@@ -469,6 +507,26 @@ static int fpr_set(struct task_struct *t
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/* Copy the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer to the floating-point context.  */
+static int fpr_set(struct task_struct *target,
+		   const struct user_regset *regset,
+		   unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
+		   const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	/* XXX fcr31  */
+
+	init_fp_ctx(target);
+
+	if (sizeof(target->thread.fpu.fpr[0]) == sizeof(elf_fpreg_t))
+		err = fpr_set_fpa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
+	else
+		err = fpr_set_msa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
 enum mips_regset {
 	REGSET_GPR,
 	REGSET_FPR,

[PATCH 4.14 009/118] MIPS: Guard against any partial write attempt with PTRACE_SETREGSET

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>

commit dc24d0edf33c3e15099688b6bbdf7bdc24bf6e91 upstream.

Complement commit d614fd58a283 ("mips/ptrace: Preserve previous
registers for short regset write") and ensure that no partial register
write attempt is made with PTRACE_SETREGSET, as we do not preinitialize
any temporaries used to hold incoming register data and consequently
random data could be written.

It is the responsibility of the caller, such as `ptrace_regset', to
arrange for writes to span whole registers only, so here we only assert
that it has indeed happened.

Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>
Fixes: 72b22bbad1e7 ("MIPS: Don't assume 64-bit FP registers for FP regset")
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@mips.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <Paul.Burton@mips.com>
Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk>
Cc: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/17926/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c |   12 +++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -507,7 +507,15 @@ static int fpr_set_msa(struct task_struc
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/* Copy the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer to the floating-point context.  */
+/*
+ * Copy the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer to the floating-point context.
+ *
+ * We optimize for the case where `count % sizeof(elf_fpreg_t) == 0',
+ * which is supposed to have been guaranteed by the kernel before
+ * calling us, e.g. in `ptrace_regset'.  We enforce that requirement,
+ * so that we can safely avoid preinitializing temporaries for
+ * partial register writes.
+ */
 static int fpr_set(struct task_struct *target,
 		   const struct user_regset *regset,
 		   unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
@@ -515,6 +523,8 @@ static int fpr_set(struct task_struct *t
 {
 	int err;
 
+	BUG_ON(count % sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
+
 	/* XXX fcr31  */
 
 	init_fp_ctx(target);

[PATCH 4.14 010/118] MIPS: Consistently handle buffer counter with PTRACE_SETREGSET

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>

commit 80b3ffce0196ea50068885d085ff981e4b8396f4 upstream.

Update commit d614fd58a283 ("mips/ptrace: Preserve previous registers
for short regset write") bug and consistently consume all data supplied
to `fpr_set_msa' with the ptrace(2) PTRACE_SETREGSET request, such that
a zero data buffer counter is returned where insufficient data has been
given to fill a whole number of FP general registers.

In reality this is not going to happen, as the caller is supposed to
only supply data covering a whole number of registers and it is verified
in `ptrace_regset' and again asserted in `fpr_set', however structuring
code such that the presence of trailing partial FP general register data
causes `fpr_set_msa' to return with a non-zero data buffer counter makes
it appear that this trailing data will be used if there are subsequent
writes made to FP registers, which is going to be the case with the FCSR
once the missing write to that register has been fixed.

Fixes: d614fd58a283 ("mips/ptrace: Preserve previous registers for short regset write")
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@mips.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <Paul.Burton@mips.com>
Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk>
Cc: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/17927/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ static int fpr_set_msa(struct task_struc
 	int err;
 
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(fpr_val) != sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
-	for (i = 0; i < NUM_FPU_REGS && *count >= sizeof(elf_fpreg_t); i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < NUM_FPU_REGS && *count > 0; i++) {
 		err = user_regset_copyin(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,
 					 &fpr_val, i * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t),
 					 (i + 1) * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));

[PATCH 4.14 011/118] MIPS: Fix an FCSR access API regression with NT_PRFPREG and MSA

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>

commit be07a6a1188372b6d19a3307ec33211fc9c9439d upstream.

Fix a commit 72b22bbad1e7 ("MIPS: Don't assume 64-bit FP registers for
FP regset") public API regression, then activated by commit 1db1af84d6df
("MIPS: Basic MSA context switching support"), that caused the FCSR
register not to be read or written for CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA kernel
configurations (regardless of actual presence or absence of the MSA
feature in a given processor) with ptrace(2) PTRACE_GETREGSET and
PTRACE_SETREGSET requests nor recorded in core dumps.

This is because with !CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA configurations the whole of
`elf_fpregset_t' array is bulk-copied as it is, which includes the FCSR
in one half of the last, 33rd slot, whereas with CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA
configurations array elements are copied individually, and then only the
leading 32 FGR slots while the remaining slot is ignored.

Correct the code then such that only FGR slots are copied in the
respective !MSA and MSA helpers an then the FCSR slot is handled
separately in common code.  Use `ptrace_setfcr31' to update the FCSR
too, so that the read-only mask is respected.

Retrieving a correct value of FCSR is important in debugging not only
for the human to be able to get the right interpretation of the
situation, but for correct operation of GDB as well.  This is because
the condition code bits in FSCR are used by GDB to determine the
location to place a breakpoint at when single-stepping through an FPU
branch instruction.  If such a breakpoint is placed incorrectly (i.e.
with the condition reversed), then it will be missed, likely causing the
debuggee to run away from the control of GDB and consequently breaking
the process of investigation.

Fortunately GDB continues using the older PTRACE_GETFPREGS ptrace(2)
request which is unaffected, so the regression only really hits with
post-mortem debug sessions using a core dump file, in which case
execution, and consequently single-stepping through branches is not
possible.  Of course core files created by buggy kernels out there will
have the value of FCSR recorded clobbered, but such core files cannot be
corrected and the person using them simply will have to be aware that
the value of FCSR retrieved is not reliable.

Which also means we can likely get away without defining a replacement
API which would ensure a correct value of FSCR to be retrieved, or none
at all.

This is based on previous work by Alex Smith, extensively rewritten.

Signed-off-by: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@mips.com>
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>
Fixes: 72b22bbad1e7 ("MIPS: Don't assume 64-bit FP registers for FP regset")
Cc: Paul Burton <Paul.Burton@mips.com>
Cc: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/17928/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c |   47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ static int gpr64_set(struct task_struct
 /*
  * Copy the floating-point context to the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer,
  * !CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant.  FP context's general register slots
- * correspond 1:1 to buffer slots.
+ * correspond 1:1 to buffer slots.  Only general registers are copied.
  */
 static int fpr_get_fpa(struct task_struct *target,
 		       unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
@@ -421,13 +421,14 @@ static int fpr_get_fpa(struct task_struc
 {
 	return user_regset_copyout(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,
 				   &target->thread.fpu,
-				   0, sizeof(elf_fpregset_t));
+				   0, NUM_FPU_REGS * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
 }
 
 /*
  * Copy the floating-point context to the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer,
  * CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant.  Only lower 64 bits of FP context's
- * general register slots are copied to buffer slots.
+ * general register slots are copied to buffer slots.  Only general
+ * registers are copied.
  */
 static int fpr_get_msa(struct task_struct *target,
 		       unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
@@ -449,20 +450,29 @@ static int fpr_get_msa(struct task_struc
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/* Copy the floating-point context to the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer.  */
+/*
+ * Copy the floating-point context to the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer.
+ * Choose the appropriate helper for general registers, and then copy
+ * the FCSR register separately.
+ */
 static int fpr_get(struct task_struct *target,
 		   const struct user_regset *regset,
 		   unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
 		   void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf)
 {
+	const int fcr31_pos = NUM_FPU_REGS * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t);
 	int err;
 
-	/* XXX fcr31  */
-
 	if (sizeof(target->thread.fpu.fpr[0]) == sizeof(elf_fpreg_t))
 		err = fpr_get_fpa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
 	else
 		err = fpr_get_msa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	err = user_regset_copyout(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
+				  &target->thread.fpu.fcr31,
+				  fcr31_pos, fcr31_pos + sizeof(u32));
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -470,7 +480,7 @@ static int fpr_get(struct task_struct *t
 /*
  * Copy the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer to the floating-point context,
  * !CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant.   Buffer slots correspond 1:1 to FP
- * context's general register slots.
+ * context's general register slots.  Only general registers are copied.
  */
 static int fpr_set_fpa(struct task_struct *target,
 		       unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
@@ -478,13 +488,14 @@ static int fpr_set_fpa(struct task_struc
 {
 	return user_regset_copyin(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,
 				  &target->thread.fpu,
-				  0, sizeof(elf_fpregset_t));
+				  0, NUM_FPU_REGS * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
 }
 
 /*
  * Copy the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer to the floating-point context,
  * CONFIG_CPU_HAS_MSA variant.  Buffer slots are copied to lower 64
- * bits only of FP context's general register slots.
+ * bits only of FP context's general register slots.  Only general
+ * registers are copied.
  */
 static int fpr_set_msa(struct task_struct *target,
 		       unsigned int *pos, unsigned int *count,
@@ -509,6 +520,8 @@ static int fpr_set_msa(struct task_struc
 
 /*
  * Copy the supplied NT_PRFPREG buffer to the floating-point context.
+ * Choose the appropriate helper for general registers, and then copy
+ * the FCSR register separately.
  *
  * We optimize for the case where `count % sizeof(elf_fpreg_t) == 0',
  * which is supposed to have been guaranteed by the kernel before
@@ -521,18 +534,30 @@ static int fpr_set(struct task_struct *t
 		   unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
 		   const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
 {
+	const int fcr31_pos = NUM_FPU_REGS * sizeof(elf_fpreg_t);
+	u32 fcr31;
 	int err;
 
 	BUG_ON(count % sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
 
-	/* XXX fcr31  */
-
 	init_fp_ctx(target);
 
 	if (sizeof(target->thread.fpu.fpr[0]) == sizeof(elf_fpreg_t))
 		err = fpr_set_fpa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
 	else
 		err = fpr_set_msa(target, &pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (count > 0) {
+		err = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
+					 &fcr31,
+					 fcr31_pos, fcr31_pos + sizeof(u32));
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+
+		ptrace_setfcr31(target, fcr31);
+	}
 
 	return err;
 }

[PATCH 4.14 012/118] MIPS: Also verify sizeof `elf_fpreg_t with PTRACE_SETREGSET

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>

commit 006501e039eec411842bb3150c41358867d320c2 upstream.

Complement commit d614fd58a283 ("mips/ptrace: Preserve previous
registers for short regset write") and like with the PTRACE_GETREGSET
ptrace(2) request also apply a BUILD_BUG_ON check for the size of the
`elf_fpreg_t' type in the PTRACE_SETREGSET request handler.

Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>
Fixes: d614fd58a283 ("mips/ptrace: Preserve previous registers for short regset write")
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@mips.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <Paul.Burton@mips.com>
Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk>
Cc: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/17929/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -438,6 +438,7 @@ static int fpr_get_msa(struct task_struc
 	u64 fpr_val;
 	int err;
 
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(fpr_val) != sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
 	for (i = 0; i < NUM_FPU_REGS; i++) {
 		fpr_val = get_fpr64(&target->thread.fpu.fpr[i], 0);
 		err = user_regset_copyout(pos, count, kbuf, ubuf,

[PATCH 4.14 013/118] MIPS: Disallow outsized PTRACE_SETREGSET NT_PRFPREG regset accesses

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>

commit c8c5a3a24d395b14447a9a89d61586a913840a3b upstream.

Complement commit c23b3d1a5311 ("MIPS: ptrace: Change GP regset to use
correct core dump register layout") and also reject outsized
PTRACE_SETREGSET requests to the NT_PRFPREG regset, like with the
NT_PRSTATUS regset.

Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@mips.com>
Fixes: c23b3d1a5311 ("MIPS: ptrace: Change GP regset to use correct core dump register layout")
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@mips.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <Paul.Burton@mips.com>
Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk>
Cc: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/17930/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -541,6 +541,9 @@ static int fpr_set(struct task_struct *t
 
 	BUG_ON(count % sizeof(elf_fpreg_t));
 
+	if (pos + count > sizeof(elf_fpregset_t))
+		return -EIO;
+
 	init_fp_ctx(target);
 
 	if (sizeof(target->thread.fpu.fpr[0]) == sizeof(elf_fpreg_t))

[PATCH 4.14 014/118] cgroup: fix css_task_iter crash on CSS_TASK_ITER_PROC

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

commit 74d0833c659a8a54735e5efdd44f4b225af68586 upstream.

While teaching css_task_iter to handle skipping over tasks which
aren't group leaders, bc2fb7ed089f ("cgroup: add @flags to
css_task_iter_start() and implement CSS_TASK_ITER_PROCS") introduced a
silly bug.

CSS_TASK_ITER_PROCS is implemented by repeating
css_task_iter_advance() while the advanced cursor is pointing to a
non-leader thread.  However, the cursor variable, @l, wasn't updated
when the iteration has to advance to the next css_set and the
following repetition would operate on the terminal @l from the
previous iteration which isn't pointing to a valid task leading to
oopses like the following or infinite looping.

  BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000254
  IP: __task_pid_nr_ns+0xc7/0xf0
  PGD 0 P4D 0
  Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
  ...
  CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 4.14.4-200.fc26.x86_64 #1
  Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/PRIME B350M-A, BIOS 3203 11/09/2017
  task: ffff88c4baee8000 task.stack: ffff96d5c3158000
  RIP: 0010:__task_pid_nr_ns+0xc7/0xf0
  RSP: 0018:ffff96d5c315bd50 EFLAGS: 00010206
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88c4b68c6000 RCX: 0000000000000250
  RDX: ffffffffa5e47960 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88c490f6ab00
  RBP: ffff96d5c315bd50 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: 0000000000000005
  R10: ffff88c4be006b80 R11: ffff88c42f1b8004 R12: ffff96d5c315bf18
  R13: ffff88c42d7dd200 R14: ffff88c490f6a510 R15: ffff88c4b68c6000
  FS:  00007f9446f8ea00(0000) GS:ffff88c4be680000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 0000000000000254 CR3: 00000007f956f000 CR4: 00000000003406e0
  Call Trace:
   cgroup_procs_show+0x19/0x30
   cgroup_seqfile_show+0x4c/0xb0
   kernfs_seq_show+0x21/0x30
   seq_read+0x2ec/0x3f0
   kernfs_fop_read+0x134/0x180
   __vfs_read+0x37/0x160
   ? security_file_permission+0x9b/0xc0
   vfs_read+0x8e/0x130
   SyS_read+0x55/0xc0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa5
  RIP: 0033:0x7f94455f942d
  RSP: 002b:00007ffe81ba2d00 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005574e2233f00 RCX: 00007f94455f942d
  RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00005574e2321a90 RDI: 000000000000002b
  RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00005574e2321a90 R09: 00005574e231de60
  R10: 00007f94458c8b38 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007f94458c8ae0
  R13: 00007ffe81ba3800 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00005574e2116560
  Code: 04 74 0e 89 f6 48 8d 04 76 48 8d 04 c5 f0 05 00 00 48 8b bf b8 05 00 00 48 01 c7 31 c0 48 8b 0f 48 85 c9 74 18 8b b2 30 08 00 00 <3b> 71 04 77 0d 48 c1 e6 05 48 01 f1 48 3b 51 38 74 09 5d c3 8b
  RIP: __task_pid_nr_ns+0xc7/0xf0 RSP: ffff96d5c315bd50

Fix it by moving the initialization of the cursor below the repeat
label.  While at it, rename it to @next for readability.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Fixes: bc2fb7ed089f ("cgroup: add @flags to css_task_iter_start() and implement CSS_TASK_ITER_PROCS")
Reported-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Bronek Kozicki <brok@incorrekt.com>
Reported-by: George Amanakis <gamanakis@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c |   14 ++++++--------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c
+++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c
@@ -4059,26 +4059,24 @@ static void css_task_iter_advance_css_se
 
 static void css_task_iter_advance(struct css_task_iter *it)
 {
-	struct list_head *l = it->task_pos;
+	struct list_head *next;
 
 	lockdep_assert_held(&css_set_lock);
-	WARN_ON_ONCE(!l);
-
 repeat:
 	/*
 	 * Advance iterator to find next entry.  cset->tasks is consumed
 	 * first and then ->mg_tasks.  After ->mg_tasks, we move onto the
 	 * next cset.
 	 */
-	l = l->next;
+	next = it->task_pos->next;
 
-	if (l == it->tasks_head)
-		l = it->mg_tasks_head->next;
+	if (next == it->tasks_head)
+		next = it->mg_tasks_head->next;
 
-	if (l == it->mg_tasks_head)
+	if (next == it->mg_tasks_head)
 		css_task_iter_advance_css_set(it);
 	else
-		it->task_pos = l;
+		it->task_pos = next;
 
 	/* if PROCS, skip over tasks which aren't group leaders */
 	if ((it->flags & CSS_TASK_ITER_PROCS) && it->task_pos &&

[PATCH 4.14 015/118] kvm: vmx: Scrub hardware GPRs at VM-exit

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>

commit 0cb5b30698fdc8f6b4646012e3acb4ddce430788 upstream.

Guest GPR values are live in the hardware GPRs at VM-exit.  Do not
leave any guest values in hardware GPRs after the guest GPR values are
saved to the vcpu_vmx structure.

This is a partial mitigation for CVE 2017-5715 and CVE 2017-5753.
Specifically, it defeats the Project Zero PoC for CVE 2017-5715.

Suggested-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Serebrin <serebrin@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
[Paolo: Add AMD bits, Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c |   19 +++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c |   14 +++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -4965,6 +4965,25 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu
 		"mov %%r14, %c[r14](%[svm]) \n\t"
 		"mov %%r15, %c[r15](%[svm]) \n\t"
 #endif
+		/*
+		* Clear host registers marked as clobbered to prevent
+		* speculative use.
+		*/
+		"xor %%" _ASM_BX ", %%" _ASM_BX " \n\t"
+		"xor %%" _ASM_CX ", %%" _ASM_CX " \n\t"
+		"xor %%" _ASM_DX ", %%" _ASM_DX " \n\t"
+		"xor %%" _ASM_SI ", %%" _ASM_SI " \n\t"
+		"xor %%" _ASM_DI ", %%" _ASM_DI " \n\t"
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+		"xor %%r8, %%r8 \n\t"
+		"xor %%r9, %%r9 \n\t"
+		"xor %%r10, %%r10 \n\t"
+		"xor %%r11, %%r11 \n\t"
+		"xor %%r12, %%r12 \n\t"
+		"xor %%r13, %%r13 \n\t"
+		"xor %%r14, %%r14 \n\t"
+		"xor %%r15, %%r15 \n\t"
+#endif
 		"pop %%" _ASM_BP
 		:
 		: [svm]"a"(svm),
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -9405,6 +9405,7 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struc
 		/* Save guest registers, load host registers, keep flags */
 		"mov %0, %c[wordsize](%%" _ASM_SP ") \n\t"
 		"pop %0 \n\t"
+		"setbe %c[fail](%0)\n\t"
 		"mov %%" _ASM_AX ", %c[rax](%0) \n\t"
 		"mov %%" _ASM_BX ", %c[rbx](%0) \n\t"
 		__ASM_SIZE(pop) " %c[rcx](%0) \n\t"
@@ -9421,12 +9422,23 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struc
 		"mov %%r13, %c[r13](%0) \n\t"
 		"mov %%r14, %c[r14](%0) \n\t"
 		"mov %%r15, %c[r15](%0) \n\t"
+		"xor %%r8d,  %%r8d \n\t"
+		"xor %%r9d,  %%r9d \n\t"
+		"xor %%r10d, %%r10d \n\t"
+		"xor %%r11d, %%r11d \n\t"
+		"xor %%r12d, %%r12d \n\t"
+		"xor %%r13d, %%r13d \n\t"
+		"xor %%r14d, %%r14d \n\t"
+		"xor %%r15d, %%r15d \n\t"
 #endif
 		"mov %%cr2, %%" _ASM_AX "   \n\t"
 		"mov %%" _ASM_AX ", %c[cr2](%0) \n\t"
 
+		"xor %%eax, %%eax \n\t"
+		"xor %%ebx, %%ebx \n\t"
+		"xor %%esi, %%esi \n\t"
+		"xor %%edi, %%edi \n\t"
 		"pop  %%" _ASM_BP "; pop  %%" _ASM_DX " \n\t"
-		"setbe %c[fail](%0) \n\t"
 		".pushsection .rodata \n\t"
 		".global vmx_return \n\t"
 		"vmx_return: " _ASM_PTR " 2b \n\t"

[PATCH 4.14 016/118] platform/x86: wmi: Call acpi_wmi_init() later

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>

commit 98b8e4e5c17bf87c1b18ed929472051dab39878c upstream.

Calling acpi_wmi_init() at the subsys_initcall() level causes ordering
issues to appear on some systems and they are difficult to reproduce,
because there is no guaranteed ordering between subsys_initcall()
calls, so they may occur in different orders on different systems.

In particular, commit 86d9f48534e8 (mm/slab: fix kmemcg cache
creation delayed issue) exposed one of these issues where genl_init()
and acpi_wmi_init() are both called at the same initcall level, but
the former must run before the latter so as to avoid a NULL pointer
dereference.

For this reason, move the acpi_wmi_init() invocation to the
initcall_sync level which should still be early enough for things
to work correctly in the WMI land.

Link: https://marc.info/?t=151274596700002&r=1&w=2
Reported-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@earth.li>
Reported-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Tested-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@earth.li>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart (VMware) <dvhart@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/platform/x86/wmi.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/platform/x86/wmi.c
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/wmi.c
@@ -1268,5 +1268,5 @@ static void __exit acpi_wmi_exit(void)
 	bus_unregister(&wmi_bus_type);
 }
 
-subsys_initcall(acpi_wmi_init);
+subsys_initcall_sync(acpi_wmi_init);
 module_exit(acpi_wmi_exit);

[PATCH 4.14 017/118] iw_cxgb4: only call the cq comp_handler when the cq is armed

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>

commit cbb40fadd31c6bbc59104e58ac95c6ef492d038b upstream.

The ULPs completion handler should only be called if the CQ is
armed for notification.

Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/ev.c |    8 +++++---
 drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/qp.c |   20 ++++++++++++--------
 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/ev.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/ev.c
@@ -109,9 +109,11 @@ static void post_qp_event(struct c4iw_de
 	if (qhp->ibqp.event_handler)
 		(*qhp->ibqp.event_handler)(&event, qhp->ibqp.qp_context);
 
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&chp->comp_handler_lock, flag);
-	(*chp->ibcq.comp_handler)(&chp->ibcq, chp->ibcq.cq_context);
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&chp->comp_handler_lock, flag);
+	if (t4_clear_cq_armed(&chp->cq)) {
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&chp->comp_handler_lock, flag);
+		(*chp->ibcq.comp_handler)(&chp->ibcq, chp->ibcq.cq_context);
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&chp->comp_handler_lock, flag);
+	}
 }
 
 void c4iw_ev_dispatch(struct c4iw_dev *dev, struct t4_cqe *err_cqe)
--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/qp.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/qp.c
@@ -817,10 +817,12 @@ static void complete_sq_drain_wr(struct
 	t4_swcq_produce(cq);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&schp->lock, flag);
 
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&schp->comp_handler_lock, flag);
-	(*schp->ibcq.comp_handler)(&schp->ibcq,
-				   schp->ibcq.cq_context);
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&schp->comp_handler_lock, flag);
+	if (t4_clear_cq_armed(&schp->cq)) {
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&schp->comp_handler_lock, flag);
+		(*schp->ibcq.comp_handler)(&schp->ibcq,
+					   schp->ibcq.cq_context);
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&schp->comp_handler_lock, flag);
+	}
 }
 
 static void complete_rq_drain_wr(struct c4iw_qp *qhp, struct ib_recv_wr *wr)
@@ -846,10 +848,12 @@ static void complete_rq_drain_wr(struct
 	t4_swcq_produce(cq);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rchp->lock, flag);
 
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&rchp->comp_handler_lock, flag);
-	(*rchp->ibcq.comp_handler)(&rchp->ibcq,
-				   rchp->ibcq.cq_context);
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rchp->comp_handler_lock, flag);
+	if (t4_clear_cq_armed(&rchp->cq)) {
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&rchp->comp_handler_lock, flag);
+		(*rchp->ibcq.comp_handler)(&rchp->ibcq,
+					   rchp->ibcq.cq_context);
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rchp->comp_handler_lock, flag);
+	}
 }
 
 int c4iw_post_send(struct ib_qp *ibqp, struct ib_send_wr *wr,

[PATCH 4.14 018/118] iw_cxgb4: atomically flush the qp

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>

commit bc52e9ca74b9a395897bb640c6671b2cbf716032 upstream.

__flush_qp() has a race condition where during the flush operation,
the qp lock is released allowing another thread to possibly post a WR,
which corrupts the queue state, possibly causing crashes.  The lock was
released to preserve the cq/qp locking hierarchy of cq first, then qp.
However releasing the qp lock is not necessary; both RQ and SQ CQ locks
can be acquired first, followed by the qp lock, and then the RQ and SQ
flushing can be done w/o unlocking.

Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/qp.c |   19 +++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/qp.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/qp.c
@@ -1271,31 +1271,34 @@ static void __flush_qp(struct c4iw_qp *q
 
 	pr_debug("%s qhp %p rchp %p schp %p\n", __func__, qhp, rchp, schp);
 
-	/* locking hierarchy: cq lock first, then qp lock. */
+	/* locking hierarchy: cqs lock first, then qp lock. */
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&rchp->lock, flag);
+	if (schp != rchp)
+		spin_lock(&schp->lock);
 	spin_lock(&qhp->lock);
 
 	if (qhp->wq.flushed) {
 		spin_unlock(&qhp->lock);
+		if (schp != rchp)
+			spin_unlock(&schp->lock);
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rchp->lock, flag);
 		return;
 	}
 	qhp->wq.flushed = 1;
+	t4_set_wq_in_error(&qhp->wq);
 
 	c4iw_flush_hw_cq(rchp);
 	c4iw_count_rcqes(&rchp->cq, &qhp->wq, &count);
 	rq_flushed = c4iw_flush_rq(&qhp->wq, &rchp->cq, count);
-	spin_unlock(&qhp->lock);
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rchp->lock, flag);
 
-	/* locking hierarchy: cq lock first, then qp lock. */
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&schp->lock, flag);
-	spin_lock(&qhp->lock);
 	if (schp != rchp)
 		c4iw_flush_hw_cq(schp);
 	sq_flushed = c4iw_flush_sq(qhp);
+
 	spin_unlock(&qhp->lock);
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&schp->lock, flag);
+	if (schp != rchp)
+		spin_unlock(&schp->lock);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rchp->lock, flag);
 
 	if (schp == rchp) {
 		if (t4_clear_cq_armed(&rchp->cq) &&
@@ -1329,8 +1332,8 @@ static void flush_qp(struct c4iw_qp *qhp
 	rchp = to_c4iw_cq(qhp->ibqp.recv_cq);
 	schp = to_c4iw_cq(qhp->ibqp.send_cq);
 
-	t4_set_wq_in_error(&qhp->wq);
 	if (qhp->ibqp.uobject) {
+		t4_set_wq_in_error(&qhp->wq);
 		t4_set_cq_in_error(&rchp->cq);
 		spin_lock_irqsave(&rchp->comp_handler_lock, flag);
 		(*rchp->ibcq.comp_handler)(&rchp->ibcq, rchp->ibcq.cq_context);

[PATCH 4.14 019/118] iw_cxgb4: only clear the ARMED bit if a notification is needed

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>

commit 335ebf6fa35ca1c59b73f76fad19b249d3550e86 upstream.

In __flush_qp(), the CQ ARMED bit was being cleared regardless of
whether any notification is actually needed.  This resulted in the iser
termination logic getting stuck in ib_drain_sq() because the CQ was not
marked ARMED and thus the drain CQE notification wasn't triggered.

This new bug was exposed when this commit was merged:

commit cbb40fadd31c ("iw_cxgb4: only call the cq comp_handler when the
cq is armed")

Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/qp.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/qp.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/qp.c
@@ -1301,21 +1301,21 @@ static void __flush_qp(struct c4iw_qp *q
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rchp->lock, flag);
 
 	if (schp == rchp) {
-		if (t4_clear_cq_armed(&rchp->cq) &&
-		    (rq_flushed || sq_flushed)) {
+		if ((rq_flushed || sq_flushed) &&
+		    t4_clear_cq_armed(&rchp->cq)) {
 			spin_lock_irqsave(&rchp->comp_handler_lock, flag);
 			(*rchp->ibcq.comp_handler)(&rchp->ibcq,
 						   rchp->ibcq.cq_context);
 			spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rchp->comp_handler_lock, flag);
 		}
 	} else {
-		if (t4_clear_cq_armed(&rchp->cq) && rq_flushed) {
+		if (rq_flushed && t4_clear_cq_armed(&rchp->cq)) {
 			spin_lock_irqsave(&rchp->comp_handler_lock, flag);
 			(*rchp->ibcq.comp_handler)(&rchp->ibcq,
 						   rchp->ibcq.cq_context);
 			spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rchp->comp_handler_lock, flag);
 		}
-		if (t4_clear_cq_armed(&schp->cq) && sq_flushed) {
+		if (sq_flushed && t4_clear_cq_armed(&schp->cq)) {
 			spin_lock_irqsave(&schp->comp_handler_lock, flag);
 			(*schp->ibcq.comp_handler)(&schp->ibcq,
 						   schp->ibcq.cq_context);

[PATCH 4.14 020/118] iw_cxgb4: reflect the original WR opcode in drain cqes

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>

commit 96a236ed286776554fbd227c6d2876fd3b5dc65d upstream.

The flush/drain logic was not retaining the original wr opcode in
its completion.  This can cause problems if the application uses
the completion opcode to make decisions.

Use bit 10 of the CQE header word to indicate the CQE is a special
drain completion, and save the original WR opcode in the cqe header
opcode field.

Fixes: 4fe7c2962e11 ("iw_cxgb4: refactor sq/rq drain logic")
Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/cq.c       |    7 +----
 drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/iw_cxgb4.h |    2 -
 drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/qp.c       |   46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/t4.h       |    6 ++++
 4 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/cq.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/cq.c
@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ next_cqe:
 
 static int cqe_completes_wr(struct t4_cqe *cqe, struct t4_wq *wq)
 {
-	if (CQE_OPCODE(cqe) == C4IW_DRAIN_OPCODE) {
+	if (DRAIN_CQE(cqe)) {
 		WARN_ONCE(1, "Unexpected DRAIN CQE qp id %u!\n", wq->sq.qid);
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -509,7 +509,7 @@ static int poll_cq(struct t4_wq *wq, str
 	/*
 	 * Special cqe for drain WR completions...
 	 */
-	if (CQE_OPCODE(hw_cqe) == C4IW_DRAIN_OPCODE) {
+	if (DRAIN_CQE(hw_cqe)) {
 		*cookie = CQE_DRAIN_COOKIE(hw_cqe);
 		*cqe = *hw_cqe;
 		goto skip_cqe;
@@ -766,9 +766,6 @@ static int c4iw_poll_cq_one(struct c4iw_
 				c4iw_invalidate_mr(qhp->rhp,
 						   CQE_WRID_FR_STAG(&cqe));
 			break;
-		case C4IW_DRAIN_OPCODE:
-			wc->opcode = IB_WC_SEND;
-			break;
 		default:
 			pr_err("Unexpected opcode %d in the CQE received for QPID=0x%0x\n",
 			       CQE_OPCODE(&cqe), CQE_QPID(&cqe));
--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/iw_cxgb4.h
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/iw_cxgb4.h
@@ -631,8 +631,6 @@ static inline int to_ib_qp_state(int c4i
 	return IB_QPS_ERR;
 }
 
-#define C4IW_DRAIN_OPCODE FW_RI_SGE_EC_CR_RETURN
-
 static inline u32 c4iw_ib_to_tpt_access(int a)
 {
 	return (a & IB_ACCESS_REMOTE_WRITE ? FW_RI_MEM_ACCESS_REM_WRITE : 0) |
--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/qp.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/qp.c
@@ -794,21 +794,57 @@ static int ring_kernel_rq_db(struct c4iw
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void complete_sq_drain_wr(struct c4iw_qp *qhp, struct ib_send_wr *wr)
+static int ib_to_fw_opcode(int ib_opcode)
+{
+	int opcode;
+
+	switch (ib_opcode) {
+	case IB_WR_SEND_WITH_INV:
+		opcode = FW_RI_SEND_WITH_INV;
+		break;
+	case IB_WR_SEND:
+		opcode = FW_RI_SEND;
+		break;
+	case IB_WR_RDMA_WRITE:
+		opcode = FW_RI_RDMA_WRITE;
+		break;
+	case IB_WR_RDMA_READ:
+	case IB_WR_RDMA_READ_WITH_INV:
+		opcode = FW_RI_READ_REQ;
+		break;
+	case IB_WR_REG_MR:
+		opcode = FW_RI_FAST_REGISTER;
+		break;
+	case IB_WR_LOCAL_INV:
+		opcode = FW_RI_LOCAL_INV;
+		break;
+	default:
+		opcode = -EINVAL;
+	}
+	return opcode;
+}
+
+static int complete_sq_drain_wr(struct c4iw_qp *qhp, struct ib_send_wr *wr)
 {
 	struct t4_cqe cqe = {};
 	struct c4iw_cq *schp;
 	unsigned long flag;
 	struct t4_cq *cq;
+	int opcode;
 
 	schp = to_c4iw_cq(qhp->ibqp.send_cq);
 	cq = &schp->cq;
 
+	opcode = ib_to_fw_opcode(wr->opcode);
+	if (opcode < 0)
+		return opcode;
+
 	cqe.u.drain_cookie = wr->wr_id;
 	cqe.header = cpu_to_be32(CQE_STATUS_V(T4_ERR_SWFLUSH) |
-				 CQE_OPCODE_V(C4IW_DRAIN_OPCODE) |
+				 CQE_OPCODE_V(opcode) |
 				 CQE_TYPE_V(1) |
 				 CQE_SWCQE_V(1) |
+				 CQE_DRAIN_V(1) |
 				 CQE_QPID_V(qhp->wq.sq.qid));
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&schp->lock, flag);
@@ -823,6 +859,7 @@ static void complete_sq_drain_wr(struct
 					   schp->ibcq.cq_context);
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&schp->comp_handler_lock, flag);
 	}
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static void complete_rq_drain_wr(struct c4iw_qp *qhp, struct ib_recv_wr *wr)
@@ -837,9 +874,10 @@ static void complete_rq_drain_wr(struct
 
 	cqe.u.drain_cookie = wr->wr_id;
 	cqe.header = cpu_to_be32(CQE_STATUS_V(T4_ERR_SWFLUSH) |
-				 CQE_OPCODE_V(C4IW_DRAIN_OPCODE) |
+				 CQE_OPCODE_V(FW_RI_SEND) |
 				 CQE_TYPE_V(0) |
 				 CQE_SWCQE_V(1) |
+				 CQE_DRAIN_V(1) |
 				 CQE_QPID_V(qhp->wq.sq.qid));
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&rchp->lock, flag);
@@ -879,7 +917,7 @@ int c4iw_post_send(struct ib_qp *ibqp, s
 	 */
 	if (qhp->wq.flushed) {
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&qhp->lock, flag);
-		complete_sq_drain_wr(qhp, wr);
+		err = complete_sq_drain_wr(qhp, wr);
 		return err;
 	}
 	num_wrs = t4_sq_avail(&qhp->wq);
--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/t4.h
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/t4.h
@@ -197,6 +197,11 @@ struct t4_cqe {
 #define CQE_SWCQE_G(x)    ((((x) >> CQE_SWCQE_S)) & CQE_SWCQE_M)
 #define CQE_SWCQE_V(x)	  ((x)<<CQE_SWCQE_S)
 
+#define CQE_DRAIN_S       10
+#define CQE_DRAIN_M       0x1
+#define CQE_DRAIN_G(x)    ((((x) >> CQE_DRAIN_S)) & CQE_DRAIN_M)
+#define CQE_DRAIN_V(x)	  ((x)<<CQE_DRAIN_S)
+
 #define CQE_STATUS_S      5
 #define CQE_STATUS_M      0x1F
 #define CQE_STATUS_G(x)   ((((x) >> CQE_STATUS_S)) & CQE_STATUS_M)
@@ -213,6 +218,7 @@ struct t4_cqe {
 #define CQE_OPCODE_V(x)   ((x)<<CQE_OPCODE_S)
 
 #define SW_CQE(x)         (CQE_SWCQE_G(be32_to_cpu((x)->header)))
+#define DRAIN_CQE(x)      (CQE_DRAIN_G(be32_to_cpu((x)->header)))
 #define CQE_QPID(x)       (CQE_QPID_G(be32_to_cpu((x)->header)))
 #define CQE_TYPE(x)       (CQE_TYPE_G(be32_to_cpu((x)->header)))
 #define SQ_TYPE(x)	  (CQE_TYPE((x)))

[PATCH 4.14 021/118] iw_cxgb4: when flushing, complete all wrs in a chain

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>

commit d14587334580bc94d3ee11e8320e0c157f91ae8f upstream.

If a wr chain was posted and needed to be flushed, only the first
wr in the chain was completed with FLUSHED status.  The rest were
never completed.  This caused isert to hang on shutdown due to the
missing completions which left iscsi IO commands referenced, stalling
the shutdown.

Fixes: 4fe7c2962e11 ("iw_cxgb4: refactor sq/rq drain logic")
Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/qp.c |   28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/qp.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/qp.c
@@ -862,6 +862,22 @@ static int complete_sq_drain_wr(struct c
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int complete_sq_drain_wrs(struct c4iw_qp *qhp, struct ib_send_wr *wr,
+				struct ib_send_wr **bad_wr)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	while (wr) {
+		ret = complete_sq_drain_wr(qhp, wr);
+		if (ret) {
+			*bad_wr = wr;
+			break;
+		}
+		wr = wr->next;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static void complete_rq_drain_wr(struct c4iw_qp *qhp, struct ib_recv_wr *wr)
 {
 	struct t4_cqe cqe = {};
@@ -894,6 +910,14 @@ static void complete_rq_drain_wr(struct
 	}
 }
 
+static void complete_rq_drain_wrs(struct c4iw_qp *qhp, struct ib_recv_wr *wr)
+{
+	while (wr) {
+		complete_rq_drain_wr(qhp, wr);
+		wr = wr->next;
+	}
+}
+
 int c4iw_post_send(struct ib_qp *ibqp, struct ib_send_wr *wr,
 		   struct ib_send_wr **bad_wr)
 {
@@ -917,7 +941,7 @@ int c4iw_post_send(struct ib_qp *ibqp, s
 	 */
 	if (qhp->wq.flushed) {
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&qhp->lock, flag);
-		err = complete_sq_drain_wr(qhp, wr);
+		err = complete_sq_drain_wrs(qhp, wr, bad_wr);
 		return err;
 	}
 	num_wrs = t4_sq_avail(&qhp->wq);
@@ -1066,7 +1090,7 @@ int c4iw_post_receive(struct ib_qp *ibqp
 	 */
 	if (qhp->wq.flushed) {
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&qhp->lock, flag);
-		complete_rq_drain_wr(qhp, wr);
+		complete_rq_drain_wrs(qhp, wr);
 		return err;
 	}
 	num_wrs = t4_rq_avail(&qhp->wq);

[PATCH 4.14 022/118] x86/acpi: Handle SCI interrupts above legacy space gracefully

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vikas C Sajjan <vikas.cha.sajjan@hpe.com>

commit 252714155f04c5d16989cb3aadb85fd1b5772f99 upstream.

Platforms which support only IOAPIC mode, pass the SCI information above
the legacy space (0-15) via the FADT mechanism and not via MADT.

In such cases mp_override_legacy_irq() which is invoked from
acpi_sci_ioapic_setup() to register SCI interrupts fails for interrupts
greater equal 16, since it is meant to handle only the legacy space and
emits error "Invalid bus_irq %u for legacy override".

Add a new function to handle SCI interrupts >= 16 and invoke it
conditionally in acpi_sci_ioapic_setup().

The code duplication due to this new function will be cleaned up in a
separate patch.

Co-developed-by: Sunil V L <sunil.vl@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Vikas C Sajjan <vikas.cha.sajjan@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Sunil V L <sunil.vl@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Abdul Lateef Attar <abdul-lateef.attar@hpe.com>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kkamagui@gmail.com
Cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1510848825-21965-2-git-send-email-vikas.cha.sajjan@hpe.com
Cc: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c |   34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
@@ -429,6 +429,34 @@ static int mp_config_acpi_gsi(struct dev
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int __init mp_register_ioapic_irq(u8 bus_irq, u8 polarity,
+						u8 trigger, u32 gsi)
+{
+	struct mpc_intsrc mp_irq;
+	int ioapic, pin;
+
+	/* Convert 'gsi' to 'ioapic.pin'(INTIN#) */
+	ioapic = mp_find_ioapic(gsi);
+	if (ioapic < 0) {
+		pr_warn("Failed to find ioapic for gsi : %u\n", gsi);
+		return ioapic;
+	}
+
+	pin = mp_find_ioapic_pin(ioapic, gsi);
+
+	mp_irq.type = MP_INTSRC;
+	mp_irq.irqtype = mp_INT;
+	mp_irq.irqflag = (trigger << 2) | polarity;
+	mp_irq.srcbus = MP_ISA_BUS;
+	mp_irq.srcbusirq = bus_irq;
+	mp_irq.dstapic = mpc_ioapic_id(ioapic);
+	mp_irq.dstirq = pin;
+
+	mp_save_irq(&mp_irq);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int __init
 acpi_parse_ioapic(struct acpi_subtable_header * header, const unsigned long end)
 {
@@ -473,7 +501,11 @@ static void __init acpi_sci_ioapic_setup
 	if (acpi_sci_flags & ACPI_MADT_POLARITY_MASK)
 		polarity = acpi_sci_flags & ACPI_MADT_POLARITY_MASK;
 
-	mp_override_legacy_irq(bus_irq, polarity, trigger, gsi);
+	if (bus_irq < NR_IRQS_LEGACY)
+		mp_override_legacy_irq(bus_irq, polarity, trigger, gsi);
+	else
+		mp_register_ioapic_irq(bus_irq, polarity, trigger, gsi);
+
 	acpi_penalize_sci_irq(bus_irq, trigger, polarity);
 
 	/*

[PATCH 4.14 023/118] ALSA: pcm: Remove incorrect snd_BUG_ON() usages

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

commit fe08f34d066f4404934a509b6806db1a4f700c86 upstream.

syzkaller triggered kernel warnings through PCM OSS emulation at
closing a stream:
  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3502 at sound/core/pcm_lib.c:1635
  snd_pcm_hw_param_first+0x289/0x690 sound/core/pcm_lib.c:1635
  Call Trace:
  ....
   snd_pcm_hw_param_near.constprop.27+0x78d/0x9a0 sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c:457
   snd_pcm_oss_change_params+0x17d3/0x3720 sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c:969
   snd_pcm_oss_make_ready+0xaa/0x130 sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c:1128
   snd_pcm_oss_sync+0x257/0x830 sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c:1638
   snd_pcm_oss_release+0x20b/0x280 sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c:2431
   __fput+0x327/0x7e0 fs/file_table.c:210
   ....

This happens while it tries to open and set up the aloop device
concurrently.  The warning above (invoked from snd_BUG_ON() macro) is
to detect the unexpected logical error where snd_pcm_hw_refine() call
shouldn't fail.  The theory is true for the case where the hw_params
config rules are static.  But for an aloop device, the hw_params rule
condition does vary dynamically depending on the connected target;
when another device is opened and changes the parameters, the device
connected in another side is also affected, and it caused the error
from snd_pcm_hw_refine().

That is, the simplest "solution" for this is to remove the incorrect
assumption of static rules, and treat such an error as a normal error
path.  As there are a couple of other places using snd_BUG_ON()
incorrectly, this patch removes these spurious snd_BUG_ON() calls.

Reported-by: syzbot+6f11c7e2a1b91d466432@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c |    1 -
 sound/core/pcm_lib.c     |    4 ++--
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c
+++ b/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c
@@ -455,7 +455,6 @@ static int snd_pcm_hw_param_near(struct
 		v = snd_pcm_hw_param_last(pcm, params, var, dir);
 	else
 		v = snd_pcm_hw_param_first(pcm, params, var, dir);
-	snd_BUG_ON(v < 0);
 	return v;
 }
 
--- a/sound/core/pcm_lib.c
+++ b/sound/core/pcm_lib.c
@@ -1632,7 +1632,7 @@ int snd_pcm_hw_param_first(struct snd_pc
 		return changed;
 	if (params->rmask) {
 		int err = snd_pcm_hw_refine(pcm, params);
-		if (snd_BUG_ON(err < 0))
+		if (err < 0)
 			return err;
 	}
 	return snd_pcm_hw_param_value(params, var, dir);
@@ -1678,7 +1678,7 @@ int snd_pcm_hw_param_last(struct snd_pcm
 		return changed;
 	if (params->rmask) {
 		int err = snd_pcm_hw_refine(pcm, params);
-		if (snd_BUG_ON(err < 0))
+		if (err < 0)
 			return err;
 	}
 	return snd_pcm_hw_param_value(params, var, dir);

[PATCH 4.14 024/118] ALSA: pcm: Workaround for weird PulseAudio behavior on rewind error

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

commit fb51f1cd06f9ced7b7085a2a4636375d520431ca upstream.

The commit 9027c4639ef1 ("ALSA: pcm: Call ack() whenever appl_ptr is
updated") introduced the possible error code returned from the PCM
rewind ioctl.  Basically the change was for handling the indirect PCM
more correctly, but ironically, it caused rather a side-effect:
PulseAudio gets pissed off when receiving an error from rewind, throws
everything away and stops processing further, resulting in the
silence.

It's clearly a failure in the application side, so the best would be
to fix that bug in PA.  OTOH, PA is mostly the only user of the rewind
feature, so it's not good to slap the sole customer.

This patch tries to mitigate the situation: instead of returning an
error, now the rewind ioctl returns zero when the driver can't rewind.
It indicates that no rewind was performed, so the behavior is
consistent, at least.

Fixes: 9027c4639ef1 ("ALSA: pcm: Call ack() whenever appl_ptr is updated")
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 sound/core/pcm_native.c |    9 +++++++--
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/sound/core/pcm_native.c
+++ b/sound/core/pcm_native.c
@@ -2582,7 +2582,7 @@ static snd_pcm_sframes_t forward_appl_pt
 	return ret < 0 ? ret : frames;
 }
 
-/* decrease the appl_ptr; returns the processed frames or a negative error */
+/* decrease the appl_ptr; returns the processed frames or zero for error */
 static snd_pcm_sframes_t rewind_appl_ptr(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream,
 					 snd_pcm_uframes_t frames,
 					 snd_pcm_sframes_t avail)
@@ -2599,7 +2599,12 @@ static snd_pcm_sframes_t rewind_appl_ptr
 	if (appl_ptr < 0)
 		appl_ptr += runtime->boundary;
 	ret = pcm_lib_apply_appl_ptr(substream, appl_ptr);
-	return ret < 0 ? ret : frames;
+	/* NOTE: we return zero for errors because PulseAudio gets depressed
+	 * upon receiving an error from rewind ioctl and stops processing
+	 * any longer.  Returning zero means that no rewind is done, so
+	 * it's not absolutely wrong to answer like that.
+	 */
+	return ret < 0 ? 0 : frames;
 }
 
 static snd_pcm_sframes_t snd_pcm_playback_rewind(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream,

[PATCH 4.14 025/118] ALSA: pcm: Add missing error checks in OSS emulation plugin builder

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

commit 6708913750344a900f2e73bfe4a4d6dbbce4fe8d upstream.

In the OSS emulation plugin builder where the frame size is parsed in
the plugin chain, some places miss the possible errors returned from
the plugin src_ or dst_frames callback.

This patch papers over such places.

Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 sound/core/oss/pcm_plugin.c |   14 +++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/sound/core/oss/pcm_plugin.c
+++ b/sound/core/oss/pcm_plugin.c
@@ -592,18 +592,26 @@ snd_pcm_sframes_t snd_pcm_plug_write_tra
 	snd_pcm_sframes_t frames = size;
 
 	plugin = snd_pcm_plug_first(plug);
-	while (plugin && frames > 0) {
+	while (plugin) {
+		if (frames <= 0)
+			return frames;
 		if ((next = plugin->next) != NULL) {
 			snd_pcm_sframes_t frames1 = frames;
-			if (plugin->dst_frames)
+			if (plugin->dst_frames) {
 				frames1 = plugin->dst_frames(plugin, frames);
+				if (frames1 <= 0)
+					return frames1;
+			}
 			if ((err = next->client_channels(next, frames1, &dst_channels)) < 0) {
 				return err;
 			}
 			if (err != frames1) {
 				frames = err;
-				if (plugin->src_frames)
+				if (plugin->src_frames) {
 					frames = plugin->src_frames(plugin, frames1);
+					if (frames <= 0)
+						return frames;
+				}
 			}
 		} else
 			dst_channels = NULL;

[PATCH 4.14 026/118] ALSA: pcm: Abort properly at pending signal in OSS read/write loops

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

commit 29159a4ed7044c52e3e2cf1a9fb55cec4745c60b upstream.

The loops for read and write in PCM OSS emulation have no proper check
of pending signals, and they keep processing even after user tries to
break.  This results in a very long delay, often seen as RCU stall
when a huge unprocessed bytes remain queued.  The bug could be easily
triggered by syzkaller.

As a simple workaround, this patch adds the proper check of pending
signals and aborts the loop appropriately.

Reported-by: syzbot+993cb4cfcbbff3947c21@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

--- a/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c
+++ b/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c
@@ -1381,6 +1381,10 @@ static ssize_t snd_pcm_oss_write1(struct
 			    tmp != runtime->oss.period_bytes)
 				break;
 		}
+		if (signal_pending(current)) {
+			tmp = -ERESTARTSYS;
+			goto err;
+		}
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
 	return xfer;
@@ -1466,6 +1470,10 @@ static ssize_t snd_pcm_oss_read1(struct
 			bytes -= tmp;
 			xfer += tmp;
 		}
+		if (signal_pending(current)) {
+			tmp = -ERESTARTSYS;
+			goto err;
+		}
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
 	return xfer;

[PATCH 4.14 027/118] ALSA: pcm: Allow aborting mutex lock at OSS read/write loops

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

commit 900498a34a3ac9c611e9b425094c8106bdd7dc1c upstream.

PCM OSS read/write loops keep taking the mutex lock for the whole
read/write, and this might take very long when the exceptionally high
amount of data is given.  Also, since it invokes with mutex_lock(),
the concurrent read/write becomes unbreakable.

This patch tries to address these issues by replacing mutex_lock()
with mutex_lock_interruptible(), and also splits / re-takes the lock
at each read/write period chunk, so that it can switch the context
more finely if requested.

Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c |   36 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

--- a/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c
+++ b/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c
@@ -1334,8 +1334,11 @@ static ssize_t snd_pcm_oss_write1(struct
 
 	if ((tmp = snd_pcm_oss_make_ready(substream)) < 0)
 		return tmp;
-	mutex_lock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
 	while (bytes > 0) {
+		if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) {
+			tmp = -ERESTARTSYS;
+			break;
+		}
 		if (bytes < runtime->oss.period_bytes || runtime->oss.buffer_used > 0) {
 			tmp = bytes;
 			if (tmp + runtime->oss.buffer_used > runtime->oss.period_bytes)
@@ -1379,18 +1382,18 @@ static ssize_t snd_pcm_oss_write1(struct
 			xfer += tmp;
 			if ((substream->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) != 0 &&
 			    tmp != runtime->oss.period_bytes)
-				break;
+				tmp = -EAGAIN;
 		}
+ err:
+		mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
+		if (tmp < 0)
+			break;
 		if (signal_pending(current)) {
 			tmp = -ERESTARTSYS;
-			goto err;
+			break;
 		}
+		tmp = 0;
 	}
-	mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
-	return xfer;
-
- err:
-	mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
 	return xfer > 0 ? (snd_pcm_sframes_t)xfer : tmp;
 }
 
@@ -1438,8 +1441,11 @@ static ssize_t snd_pcm_oss_read1(struct
 
 	if ((tmp = snd_pcm_oss_make_ready(substream)) < 0)
 		return tmp;
-	mutex_lock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
 	while (bytes > 0) {
+		if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) {
+			tmp = -ERESTARTSYS;
+			break;
+		}
 		if (bytes < runtime->oss.period_bytes || runtime->oss.buffer_used > 0) {
 			if (runtime->oss.buffer_used == 0) {
 				tmp = snd_pcm_oss_read2(substream, runtime->oss.buffer, runtime->oss.period_bytes, 1);
@@ -1470,16 +1476,16 @@ static ssize_t snd_pcm_oss_read1(struct
 			bytes -= tmp;
 			xfer += tmp;
 		}
+ err:
+		mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
+		if (tmp < 0)
+			break;
 		if (signal_pending(current)) {
 			tmp = -ERESTARTSYS;
-			goto err;
+			break;
 		}
+		tmp = 0;
 	}
-	mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
-	return xfer;
-
- err:
-	mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
 	return xfer > 0 ? (snd_pcm_sframes_t)xfer : tmp;
 }
 

[PATCH 4.14 028/118] ALSA: aloop: Release cable upon open error path

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

commit 9685347aa0a5c2869058ca6ab79fd8e93084a67f upstream.

The aloop runtime object and its assignment in the cable are left even
when opening a substream fails.  This doesn't mean any memory leak,
but it still keeps the invalid pointer that may be referred by the
another side of the cable spontaneously, which is a potential Oops
cause.

Clean up the cable assignment and the empty cable upon the error path
properly.

Fixes: 597603d615d2 ("ALSA: introduce the snd-aloop module for the PCM loopback")
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 sound/drivers/aloop.c |   38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

--- a/sound/drivers/aloop.c
+++ b/sound/drivers/aloop.c
@@ -658,12 +658,31 @@ static int rule_channels(struct snd_pcm_
 	return snd_interval_refine(hw_param_interval(params, rule->var), &t);
 }
 
+static void free_cable(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
+{
+	struct loopback *loopback = substream->private_data;
+	int dev = get_cable_index(substream);
+	struct loopback_cable *cable;
+
+	cable = loopback->cables[substream->number][dev];
+	if (!cable)
+		return;
+	if (cable->streams[!substream->stream]) {
+		/* other stream is still alive */
+		cable->streams[substream->stream] = NULL;
+	} else {
+		/* free the cable */
+		loopback->cables[substream->number][dev] = NULL;
+		kfree(cable);
+	}
+}
+
 static int loopback_open(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
 {
 	struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime = substream->runtime;
 	struct loopback *loopback = substream->private_data;
 	struct loopback_pcm *dpcm;
-	struct loopback_cable *cable;
+	struct loopback_cable *cable = NULL;
 	int err = 0;
 	int dev = get_cable_index(substream);
 
@@ -682,7 +701,6 @@ static int loopback_open(struct snd_pcm_
 	if (!cable) {
 		cable = kzalloc(sizeof(*cable), GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!cable) {
-			kfree(dpcm);
 			err = -ENOMEM;
 			goto unlock;
 		}
@@ -724,6 +742,10 @@ static int loopback_open(struct snd_pcm_
 	else
 		runtime->hw = cable->hw;
  unlock:
+	if (err < 0) {
+		free_cable(substream);
+		kfree(dpcm);
+	}
 	mutex_unlock(&loopback->cable_lock);
 	return err;
 }
@@ -732,20 +754,10 @@ static int loopback_close(struct snd_pcm
 {
 	struct loopback *loopback = substream->private_data;
 	struct loopback_pcm *dpcm = substream->runtime->private_data;
-	struct loopback_cable *cable;
-	int dev = get_cable_index(substream);
 
 	loopback_timer_stop(dpcm);
 	mutex_lock(&loopback->cable_lock);
-	cable = loopback->cables[substream->number][dev];
-	if (cable->streams[!substream->stream]) {
-		/* other stream is still alive */
-		cable->streams[substream->stream] = NULL;
-	} else {
-		/* free the cable */
-		loopback->cables[substream->number][dev] = NULL;
-		kfree(cable);
-	}
+	free_cable(substream);
 	mutex_unlock(&loopback->cable_lock);
 	return 0;
 }

[PATCH 4.14 029/118] ALSA: aloop: Fix inconsistent format due to incomplete rule

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

commit b088b53e20c7d09b5ab84c5688e609f478e5c417 upstream.

The extra hw constraint rule for the formats the aloop driver
introduced has a slight flaw, where it doesn't return a positive value
when the mask got changed.  It came from the fact that it's basically
a copy&paste from snd_hw_constraint_mask64().  The original code is
supposed to be a single-shot and it modifies the mask bits only once
and never after, while what we need for aloop is the dynamic hw rule
that limits the mask bits.

This difference results in the inconsistent state, as the hw_refine
doesn't apply the dependencies fully.  The worse and surprisingly
result is that it causes a crash in OSS emulation when multiple
full-duplex reads/writes are performed concurrently (I leave why it
triggers Oops to readers as a homework).

For fixing this, replace a few open-codes with the standard
snd_mask_*() macros.

Reported-by: syzbot+3902b5220e8ca27889ca@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: b1c73fc8e697 ("ALSA: snd-aloop: Fix hw_params restrictions and checking")
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 sound/drivers/aloop.c |   13 ++++++-------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/sound/drivers/aloop.c
+++ b/sound/drivers/aloop.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 #include <sound/core.h>
 #include <sound/control.h>
 #include <sound/pcm.h>
+#include <sound/pcm_params.h>
 #include <sound/info.h>
 #include <sound/initval.h>
 
@@ -622,14 +623,12 @@ static int rule_format(struct snd_pcm_hw
 {
 
 	struct snd_pcm_hardware *hw = rule->private;
-	struct snd_mask *maskp = hw_param_mask(params, rule->var);
+	struct snd_mask m;
 
-	maskp->bits[0] &= (u_int32_t)hw->formats;
-	maskp->bits[1] &= (u_int32_t)(hw->formats >> 32);
-	memset(maskp->bits + 2, 0, (SNDRV_MASK_MAX-64) / 8); /* clear rest */
-	if (! maskp->bits[0] && ! maskp->bits[1])
-		return -EINVAL;
-	return 0;
+	snd_mask_none(&m);
+	m.bits[0] = (u_int32_t)hw->formats;
+	m.bits[1] = (u_int32_t)(hw->formats >> 32);
+	return snd_mask_refine(hw_param_mask(params, rule->var), &m);
 }
 
 static int rule_rate(struct snd_pcm_hw_params *params,

[PATCH 4.14 030/118] ALSA: aloop: Fix racy hw constraints adjustment

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

commit 898dfe4687f460ba337a01c11549f87269a13fa2 upstream.

The aloop driver tries to update the hw constraints of the connected
target on the cable of the opened PCM substream.  This is done by
adding the extra hw constraints rules referring to the substream
runtime->hw fields, while the other substream may update the runtime
hw of another side on the fly.

This is, however, racy and may result in the inconsistent values when
both PCM streams perform the prepare concurrently.  One of the reason
is that it overwrites the other's runtime->hw field; which is not only
racy but also broken when it's called before the open of another side
finishes.  And, since the reference to runtime->hw isn't protected,
the concurrent write may give the partial value update and become
inconsistent.

This patch is an attempt to fix and clean up:
- The prepare doesn't change the runtime->hw of other side any longer,
  but only update the cable->hw that is referred commonly.
- The extra rules refer to the loopback_pcm object instead of the
  runtime->hw.  The actual hw is deduced from cable->hw.
- The extra rules take the cable_lock to protect against the race.

Fixes: b1c73fc8e697 ("ALSA: snd-aloop: Fix hw_params restrictions and checking")
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 sound/drivers/aloop.c |   51 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)

--- a/sound/drivers/aloop.c
+++ b/sound/drivers/aloop.c
@@ -306,19 +306,6 @@ static int loopback_trigger(struct snd_p
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void params_change_substream(struct loopback_pcm *dpcm,
-				    struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime)
-{
-	struct snd_pcm_runtime *dst_runtime;
-
-	if (dpcm == NULL || dpcm->substream == NULL)
-		return;
-	dst_runtime = dpcm->substream->runtime;
-	if (dst_runtime == NULL)
-		return;
-	dst_runtime->hw = dpcm->cable->hw;
-}
-
 static void params_change(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
 {
 	struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime = substream->runtime;
@@ -330,10 +317,6 @@ static void params_change(struct snd_pcm
 	cable->hw.rate_max = runtime->rate;
 	cable->hw.channels_min = runtime->channels;
 	cable->hw.channels_max = runtime->channels;
-	params_change_substream(cable->streams[SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_PLAYBACK],
-				runtime);
-	params_change_substream(cable->streams[SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_CAPTURE],
-				runtime);
 }
 
 static int loopback_prepare(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
@@ -621,24 +604,29 @@ static unsigned int get_cable_index(stru
 static int rule_format(struct snd_pcm_hw_params *params,
 		       struct snd_pcm_hw_rule *rule)
 {
-
-	struct snd_pcm_hardware *hw = rule->private;
+	struct loopback_pcm *dpcm = rule->private;
+	struct loopback_cable *cable = dpcm->cable;
 	struct snd_mask m;
 
 	snd_mask_none(&m);
-	m.bits[0] = (u_int32_t)hw->formats;
-	m.bits[1] = (u_int32_t)(hw->formats >> 32);
+	mutex_lock(&dpcm->loopback->cable_lock);
+	m.bits[0] = (u_int32_t)cable->hw.formats;
+	m.bits[1] = (u_int32_t)(cable->hw.formats >> 32);
+	mutex_unlock(&dpcm->loopback->cable_lock);
 	return snd_mask_refine(hw_param_mask(params, rule->var), &m);
 }
 
 static int rule_rate(struct snd_pcm_hw_params *params,
 		     struct snd_pcm_hw_rule *rule)
 {
-	struct snd_pcm_hardware *hw = rule->private;
+	struct loopback_pcm *dpcm = rule->private;
+	struct loopback_cable *cable = dpcm->cable;
 	struct snd_interval t;
 
-        t.min = hw->rate_min;
-        t.max = hw->rate_max;
+	mutex_lock(&dpcm->loopback->cable_lock);
+	t.min = cable->hw.rate_min;
+	t.max = cable->hw.rate_max;
+	mutex_unlock(&dpcm->loopback->cable_lock);
         t.openmin = t.openmax = 0;
         t.integer = 0;
 	return snd_interval_refine(hw_param_interval(params, rule->var), &t);
@@ -647,11 +635,14 @@ static int rule_rate(struct snd_pcm_hw_p
 static int rule_channels(struct snd_pcm_hw_params *params,
 			 struct snd_pcm_hw_rule *rule)
 {
-	struct snd_pcm_hardware *hw = rule->private;
+	struct loopback_pcm *dpcm = rule->private;
+	struct loopback_cable *cable = dpcm->cable;
 	struct snd_interval t;
 
-        t.min = hw->channels_min;
-        t.max = hw->channels_max;
+	mutex_lock(&dpcm->loopback->cable_lock);
+	t.min = cable->hw.channels_min;
+	t.max = cable->hw.channels_max;
+	mutex_unlock(&dpcm->loopback->cable_lock);
         t.openmin = t.openmax = 0;
         t.integer = 0;
 	return snd_interval_refine(hw_param_interval(params, rule->var), &t);
@@ -717,19 +708,19 @@ static int loopback_open(struct snd_pcm_
 	/* are cached -> they do not reflect the actual state */
 	err = snd_pcm_hw_rule_add(runtime, 0,
 				  SNDRV_PCM_HW_PARAM_FORMAT,
-				  rule_format, &runtime->hw,
+				  rule_format, dpcm,
 				  SNDRV_PCM_HW_PARAM_FORMAT, -1);
 	if (err < 0)
 		goto unlock;
 	err = snd_pcm_hw_rule_add(runtime, 0,
 				  SNDRV_PCM_HW_PARAM_RATE,
-				  rule_rate, &runtime->hw,
+				  rule_rate, dpcm,
 				  SNDRV_PCM_HW_PARAM_RATE, -1);
 	if (err < 0)
 		goto unlock;
 	err = snd_pcm_hw_rule_add(runtime, 0,
 				  SNDRV_PCM_HW_PARAM_CHANNELS,
-				  rule_channels, &runtime->hw,
+				  rule_channels, dpcm,
 				  SNDRV_PCM_HW_PARAM_CHANNELS, -1);
 	if (err < 0)
 		goto unlock;

[PATCH 4.14 031/118] x86/acpi: Reduce code duplication in mp_override_legacy_irq()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vikas C Sajjan <vikas.cha.sajjan@hpe.com>

commit 4ee2ec1b122599f7b10c849fa7915cebb37b7edb upstream.

The new function mp_register_ioapic_irq() is a subset of the code in
mp_override_legacy_irq().

Replace the code duplication by invoking mp_register_ioapic_irq() from
mp_override_legacy_irq().

Signed-off-by: Vikas C Sajjan <vikas.cha.sajjan@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kkamagui@gmail.com
Cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1510848825-21965-3-git-send-email-vikas.cha.sajjan@hpe.com
Cc: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c |   27 +++++----------------------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
@@ -342,13 +342,12 @@ acpi_parse_lapic_nmi(struct acpi_subtabl
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_IO_APIC
 #define MP_ISA_BUS		0
 
+static int __init mp_register_ioapic_irq(u8 bus_irq, u8 polarity,
+						u8 trigger, u32 gsi);
+
 static void __init mp_override_legacy_irq(u8 bus_irq, u8 polarity, u8 trigger,
 					  u32 gsi)
 {
-	int ioapic;
-	int pin;
-	struct mpc_intsrc mp_irq;
-
 	/*
 	 * Check bus_irq boundary.
 	 */
@@ -358,14 +357,6 @@ static void __init mp_override_legacy_ir
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * Convert 'gsi' to 'ioapic.pin'.
-	 */
-	ioapic = mp_find_ioapic(gsi);
-	if (ioapic < 0)
-		return;
-	pin = mp_find_ioapic_pin(ioapic, gsi);
-
-	/*
 	 * TBD: This check is for faulty timer entries, where the override
 	 *      erroneously sets the trigger to level, resulting in a HUGE
 	 *      increase of timer interrupts!
@@ -373,16 +364,8 @@ static void __init mp_override_legacy_ir
 	if ((bus_irq == 0) && (trigger == 3))
 		trigger = 1;
 
-	mp_irq.type = MP_INTSRC;
-	mp_irq.irqtype = mp_INT;
-	mp_irq.irqflag = (trigger << 2) | polarity;
-	mp_irq.srcbus = MP_ISA_BUS;
-	mp_irq.srcbusirq = bus_irq;	/* IRQ */
-	mp_irq.dstapic = mpc_ioapic_id(ioapic); /* APIC ID */
-	mp_irq.dstirq = pin;	/* INTIN# */
-
-	mp_save_irq(&mp_irq);
-
+	if (mp_register_ioapic_irq(bus_irq, polarity, trigger, gsi) < 0)
+		return;
 	/*
 	 * Reset default identity mapping if gsi is also an legacy IRQ,
 	 * otherwise there will be more than one entry with the same GSI

[PATCH 4.14 032/118] 8021q: fix a memory leak for VLAN 0 device

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>


[ Upstream commit 78bbb15f2239bc8e663aa20bbe1987c91a0b75f6 ]

A vlan device with vid 0 is allow to creat by not able to be fully
cleaned up by unregister_vlan_dev() which checks for vlan_id!=0.

Also, VLAN 0 is probably not a valid number and it is kinda
"reserved" for HW accelerating devices, but it is probably too
late to reject it from creation even if makes sense. Instead,
just remove the check in unregister_vlan_dev().

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Fixes: ad1afb003939 ("vlan_dev: VLAN 0 should be treated as "no vlan tag" (802.1p packet)")
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/8021q/vlan.c |    7 +------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/net/8021q/vlan.c
+++ b/net/8021q/vlan.c
@@ -111,12 +111,7 @@ void unregister_vlan_dev(struct net_devi
 		vlan_gvrp_uninit_applicant(real_dev);
 	}
 
-	/* Take it out of our own structures, but be sure to interlock with
-	 * HW accelerating devices or SW vlan input packet processing if
-	 * VLAN is not 0 (leave it there for 802.1p).
-	 */
-	if (vlan_id)
-		vlan_vid_del(real_dev, vlan->vlan_proto, vlan_id);
+	vlan_vid_del(real_dev, vlan->vlan_proto, vlan_id);
 
 	/* Get rid of the vlan's reference to real_dev */
 	dev_put(real_dev);

[PATCH 4.14 033/118] ip6_tunnel: disable dst caching if tunnel is dual-stack

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eli Cooper <elicooper@gmx.com>


[ Upstream commit 23263ec86a5f44312d2899323872468752324107 ]

When an ip6_tunnel is in mode 'any', where the transport layer
protocol can be either 4 or 41, dst_cache must be disabled.

This is because xfrm policies might apply to only one of the two
protocols. Caching dst would cause xfrm policies for one protocol
incorrectly used for the other.

Signed-off-by: Eli Cooper <elicooper@gmx.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c |    9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c
@@ -1081,10 +1081,11 @@ int ip6_tnl_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, st
 			memcpy(&fl6->daddr, addr6, sizeof(fl6->daddr));
 			neigh_release(neigh);
 		}
-	} else if (!(t->parms.flags &
-		     (IP6_TNL_F_USE_ORIG_TCLASS | IP6_TNL_F_USE_ORIG_FWMARK))) {
-		/* enable the cache only only if the routing decision does
-		 * not depend on the current inner header value
+	} else if (t->parms.proto != 0 && !(t->parms.flags &
+					    (IP6_TNL_F_USE_ORIG_TCLASS |
+					     IP6_TNL_F_USE_ORIG_FWMARK))) {
+		/* enable the cache only if neither the outer protocol nor the
+		 * routing decision depends on the current inner header value
 		 */
 		use_cache = true;
 	}

[PATCH 4.14 034/118] net: core: fix module type in sock_diag_bind

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andrii Vladyka <tulup@mail.ru>


[ Upstream commit b8fd0823e0770c2d5fdbd865bccf0d5e058e5287 ]

Use AF_INET6 instead of AF_INET in IPv6-related code path

Signed-off-by: Andrii Vladyka <tulup@mail.ru>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/core/sock_diag.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/core/sock_diag.c
+++ b/net/core/sock_diag.c
@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ static int sock_diag_bind(struct net *ne
 	case SKNLGRP_INET6_UDP_DESTROY:
 		if (!sock_diag_handlers[AF_INET6])
 			request_module("net-pf-%d-proto-%d-type-%d", PF_NETLINK,
-				       NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG, AF_INET);
+				       NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG, AF_INET6);
 		break;
 	}
 	return 0;

[PATCH 4.14 035/118] phylink: ensure we report link down when LOS asserted

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>


[ Upstream commit ac817f5ad066697e4d4d35ec68c974eba2c5f17a ]

Although we disable the netdev carrier, we fail to report in the kernel
log that the link went down.  Fix this.

Fixes: 9525ae83959b ("phylink: add phylink infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/phy/phylink.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/phy/phylink.c
+++ b/drivers/net/phy/phylink.c
@@ -1428,9 +1428,8 @@ static void phylink_sfp_link_down(void *
 	WARN_ON(!lockdep_rtnl_is_held());
 
 	set_bit(PHYLINK_DISABLE_LINK, &pl->phylink_disable_state);
+	queue_work(system_power_efficient_wq, &pl->resolve);
 	flush_work(&pl->resolve);
-
-	netif_carrier_off(pl->netdev);
 }
 
 static void phylink_sfp_link_up(void *upstream)

[PATCH 4.14 036/118] RDS: Heap OOB write in rds_message_alloc_sgs()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam@gmail.com>


[ Upstream commit c095508770aebf1b9218e77026e48345d719b17c ]

When args->nr_local is 0, nr_pages gets also 0 due some size
calculation via rds_rm_size(), which is later used to allocate
pages for DMA, this bug produces a heap Out-Of-Bound write access
to a specific memory region.

Signed-off-by: Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/rds/rdma.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/net/rds/rdma.c
+++ b/net/rds/rdma.c
@@ -525,6 +525,9 @@ int rds_rdma_extra_size(struct rds_rdma_
 
 	local_vec = (struct rds_iovec __user *)(unsigned long) args->local_vec_addr;
 
+	if (args->nr_local == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	/* figure out the number of pages in the vector */
 	for (i = 0; i < args->nr_local; i++) {
 		if (copy_from_user(&vec, &local_vec[i],

[PATCH 4.14 037/118] RDS: null pointer dereference in rds_atomic_free_op

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam@gmail.com>


[ Upstream commit 7d11f77f84b27cef452cee332f4e469503084737 ]

set rm->atomic.op_active to 0 when rds_pin_pages() fails
or the user supplied address is invalid,
this prevents a NULL pointer usage in rds_atomic_free_op()

Signed-off-by: Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/rds/rdma.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/net/rds/rdma.c
+++ b/net/rds/rdma.c
@@ -877,6 +877,7 @@ int rds_cmsg_atomic(struct rds_sock *rs,
 err:
 	if (page)
 		put_page(page);
+	rm->atomic.op_active = 0;
 	kfree(rm->atomic.op_notifier);
 
 	return ret;

[PATCH 4.14 038/118] net: fec: restore dev_id in the cases of probe error

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Fugang Duan <fugang.duan@nxp.com>


[ Upstream commit e90f686b4358d7d7e5dbaa48b8e78c9a4e41826e ]

The static variable dev_id always plus one before netdev registerred.
It should restore the dev_id value in the cases of probe error.

Signed-off-by: Fugang Duan <fugang.duan@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c
@@ -3543,6 +3543,7 @@ failed_phy:
 	of_node_put(phy_node);
 failed_ioremap:
 	free_netdev(ndev);
+	dev_id--;
 
 	return ret;
 }

[PATCH 4.14 039/118] net: fec: defer probe if regulator is not ready

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Fugang Duan <fugang.duan@nxp.com>


[ Upstream commit 3f38c683033a9a0a2738e7067f449deefabfa3ef ]

Defer probe if regulator is not ready. E.g. some regulator is fixed
regulator controlled by i2c expander gpio, the i2c device may be probed
after the driver, then it should handle the case of defer probe error.

Signed-off-by: Fugang Duan <fugang.duan@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c
@@ -3458,6 +3458,10 @@ fec_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 			goto failed_regulator;
 		}
 	} else {
+		if (PTR_ERR(fep->reg_phy) == -EPROBE_DEFER) {
+			ret = -EPROBE_DEFER;
+			goto failed_regulator;
+		}
 		fep->reg_phy = NULL;
 	}
 

[PATCH 4.14 040/118] net: fec: free/restore resource in related probe error pathes

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Fugang Duan <fugang.duan@nxp.com>


[ Upstream commit d1616f07e8f1a4a490d1791316d4a68906b284aa ]

Fixes in probe error path:
- Restore dev_id before failed_ioremap path.
  Fixes: ("net: fec: restore dev_id in the cases of probe error")
- Call of_node_put(phy_node) before failed_phy path.
  Fixes: ("net: fec: Support phys probed from devicetree and fixed-link")

Signed-off-by: Fugang Duan <fugang.duan@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c
@@ -3543,11 +3543,11 @@ failed_clk_ipg:
 failed_clk:
 	if (of_phy_is_fixed_link(np))
 		of_phy_deregister_fixed_link(np);
-failed_phy:
 	of_node_put(phy_node);
+failed_phy:
+	dev_id--;
 failed_ioremap:
 	free_netdev(ndev);
-	dev_id--;
 
 	return ret;
 }

[PATCH 4.14 041/118] sctp: do not retransmit upon FragNeeded if PMTU discovery is disabled

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>


[ Upstream commit cc35c3d1edf7a8373a1a5daa80a912dec96a9cd5 ]

Currently, if PMTU discovery is disabled on a given transport, but the
configured value is higher than the actual PMTU, it is likely that we
will get some icmp Frag Needed. The issue is, if PMTU discovery is
disabled, we won't update the information and will issue a
retransmission immediately, which may very well trigger another ICMP,
and another retransmission, leading to a loop.

The fix is to simply not trigger immediate retransmissions if PMTU
discovery is disabled on the given transport.

Changes from v2:
- updated stale comment, noticed by Xin Long

Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/sctp/input.c |   24 ++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

--- a/net/sctp/input.c
+++ b/net/sctp/input.c
@@ -399,20 +399,20 @@ void sctp_icmp_frag_needed(struct sock *
 		return;
 	}
 
-	if (t->param_flags & SPP_PMTUD_ENABLE) {
-		/* Update transports view of the MTU */
-		sctp_transport_update_pmtu(t, pmtu);
+	if (!(t->param_flags & SPP_PMTUD_ENABLE))
+		/* We can't allow retransmitting in such case, as the
+		 * retransmission would be sized just as before, and thus we
+		 * would get another icmp, and retransmit again.
+		 */
+		return;
 
-		/* Update association pmtu. */
-		sctp_assoc_sync_pmtu(asoc);
-	}
+	/* Update transports view of the MTU */
+	sctp_transport_update_pmtu(t, pmtu);
+
+	/* Update association pmtu. */
+	sctp_assoc_sync_pmtu(asoc);
 
-	/* Retransmit with the new pmtu setting.
-	 * Normally, if PMTU discovery is disabled, an ICMP Fragmentation
-	 * Needed will never be sent, but if a message was sent before
-	 * PMTU discovery was disabled that was larger than the PMTU, it
-	 * would not be fragmented, so it must be re-transmitted fragmented.
-	 */
+	/* Retransmit with the new pmtu setting. */
 	sctp_retransmit(&asoc->outqueue, t, SCTP_RTXR_PMTUD);
 }
 

[PATCH 4.14 042/118] sctp: fix the handling of ICMP Frag Needed for too small MTUs

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>


[ Upstream commit b6c5734db07079c9410147b32407f2366d584e6c ]

syzbot reported a hang involving SCTP, on which it kept flooding dmesg
with the message:
[  246.742374] sctp: sctp_transport_update_pmtu: Reported pmtu 508 too
low, using default minimum of 512

That happened because whenever SCTP hits an ICMP Frag Needed, it tries
to adjust to the new MTU and triggers an immediate retransmission. But
it didn't consider the fact that MTUs smaller than the SCTP minimum MTU
allowed (512) would not cause the PMTU to change, and issued the
retransmission anyway (thus leading to another ICMP Frag Needed, and so
on).

As IPv4 (ip_rt_min_pmtu=556) and IPv6 (IPV6_MIN_MTU=1280) minimum MTU
are higher than that, sctp_transport_update_pmtu() is changed to
re-fetch the PMTU that got set after our request, and with that, detect
if there was an actual change or not.

The fix, thus, skips the immediate retransmission if the received ICMP
resulted in no change, in the hope that SCTP will select another path.

Note: The value being used for the minimum MTU (512,
SCTP_DEFAULT_MINSEGMENT) is not right and instead it should be (576,
SCTP_MIN_PMTU), but such change belongs to another patch.

Changes from v1:
- do not disable PMTU discovery, in the light of commit
06ad391919b2 ("[SCTP] Don't disable PMTU discovery when mtu is small")
and as suggested by Xin Long.
- changed the way to break the rtx loop by detecting if the icmp
  resulted in a change or not
Changes from v2:
none

See-also: https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/12/22/811
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 include/net/sctp/structs.h |    2 +-
 net/sctp/input.c           |    8 ++++++--
 net/sctp/transport.c       |   29 +++++++++++++++++++----------
 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

--- a/include/net/sctp/structs.h
+++ b/include/net/sctp/structs.h
@@ -955,7 +955,7 @@ void sctp_transport_burst_limited(struct
 void sctp_transport_burst_reset(struct sctp_transport *);
 unsigned long sctp_transport_timeout(struct sctp_transport *);
 void sctp_transport_reset(struct sctp_transport *t);
-void sctp_transport_update_pmtu(struct sctp_transport *t, u32 pmtu);
+bool sctp_transport_update_pmtu(struct sctp_transport *t, u32 pmtu);
 void sctp_transport_immediate_rtx(struct sctp_transport *);
 void sctp_transport_dst_release(struct sctp_transport *t);
 void sctp_transport_dst_confirm(struct sctp_transport *t);
--- a/net/sctp/input.c
+++ b/net/sctp/input.c
@@ -406,8 +406,12 @@ void sctp_icmp_frag_needed(struct sock *
 		 */
 		return;
 
-	/* Update transports view of the MTU */
-	sctp_transport_update_pmtu(t, pmtu);
+	/* Update transports view of the MTU. Return if no update was needed.
+	 * If an update wasn't needed/possible, it also doesn't make sense to
+	 * try to retransmit now.
+	 */
+	if (!sctp_transport_update_pmtu(t, pmtu))
+		return;
 
 	/* Update association pmtu. */
 	sctp_assoc_sync_pmtu(asoc);
--- a/net/sctp/transport.c
+++ b/net/sctp/transport.c
@@ -251,28 +251,37 @@ void sctp_transport_pmtu(struct sctp_tra
 		transport->pathmtu = SCTP_DEFAULT_MAXSEGMENT;
 }
 
-void sctp_transport_update_pmtu(struct sctp_transport *t, u32 pmtu)
+bool sctp_transport_update_pmtu(struct sctp_transport *t, u32 pmtu)
 {
 	struct dst_entry *dst = sctp_transport_dst_check(t);
+	bool change = true;
 
 	if (unlikely(pmtu < SCTP_DEFAULT_MINSEGMENT)) {
-		pr_warn("%s: Reported pmtu %d too low, using default minimum of %d\n",
-			__func__, pmtu, SCTP_DEFAULT_MINSEGMENT);
-		/* Use default minimum segment size and disable
-		 * pmtu discovery on this transport.
-		 */
-		t->pathmtu = SCTP_DEFAULT_MINSEGMENT;
-	} else {
-		t->pathmtu = pmtu;
+		pr_warn_ratelimited("%s: Reported pmtu %d too low, using default minimum of %d\n",
+				    __func__, pmtu, SCTP_DEFAULT_MINSEGMENT);
+		/* Use default minimum segment instead */
+		pmtu = SCTP_DEFAULT_MINSEGMENT;
 	}
+	pmtu = SCTP_TRUNC4(pmtu);
 
 	if (dst) {
 		dst->ops->update_pmtu(dst, t->asoc->base.sk, NULL, pmtu);
 		dst = sctp_transport_dst_check(t);
 	}
 
-	if (!dst)
+	if (!dst) {
 		t->af_specific->get_dst(t, &t->saddr, &t->fl, t->asoc->base.sk);
+		dst = t->dst;
+	}
+
+	if (dst) {
+		/* Re-fetch, as under layers may have a higher minimum size */
+		pmtu = SCTP_TRUNC4(dst_mtu(dst));
+		change = t->pathmtu != pmtu;
+	}
+	t->pathmtu = pmtu;
+
+	return change;
 }
 
 /* Caches the dst entry and source address for a transport's destination

[PATCH 4.14 043/118] sh_eth: fix TSU resource handling

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sergei Shtylyov <sergei.shtylyov@cogentembedded.com>


[ Upstream commit dfe8266b8dd10e12a731c985b725fcf7f0e537f0 ]

When switching  the driver to the managed device API,  I managed to break
the  case of a  dual Ether devices sharing a single TSU: the 2nd Ether port
wouldn't probe. Iwamatsu-san has tried to fix this but his patch was buggy
and he then dropped the ball...

The solution is to  limit calling devm_request_mem_region() to the first
of  the two  ports  sharing the same TSU, so devm_ioremap_resource() can't
be used anymore for the TSU resource...

Fixes: d5e07e69218f ("sh_eth: use managed device API")
Reported-by: Nobuhiro Iwamatsu <nobuhiro.iwamatsu.yj@renesas.com>
Signed-off-by: Sergei Shtylyov <sergei.shtylyov@cogentembedded.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/sh_eth.c |   25 ++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/sh_eth.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/sh_eth.c
@@ -3212,10 +3212,29 @@ static int sh_eth_drv_probe(struct platf
 	/* ioremap the TSU registers */
 	if (mdp->cd->tsu) {
 		struct resource *rtsu;
+
 		rtsu = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 1);
-		mdp->tsu_addr = devm_ioremap_resource(&pdev->dev, rtsu);
-		if (IS_ERR(mdp->tsu_addr)) {
-			ret = PTR_ERR(mdp->tsu_addr);
+		if (!rtsu) {
+			dev_err(&pdev->dev, "no TSU resource\n");
+			ret = -ENODEV;
+			goto out_release;
+		}
+		/* We can only request the  TSU region  for the first port
+		 * of the two  sharing this TSU for the probe to succeed...
+		 */
+		if (devno % 2 == 0 &&
+		    !devm_request_mem_region(&pdev->dev, rtsu->start,
+					     resource_size(rtsu),
+					     dev_name(&pdev->dev))) {
+			dev_err(&pdev->dev, "can't request TSU resource.\n");
+			ret = -EBUSY;
+			goto out_release;
+		}
+		mdp->tsu_addr = devm_ioremap(&pdev->dev, rtsu->start,
+					     resource_size(rtsu));
+		if (!mdp->tsu_addr) {
+			dev_err(&pdev->dev, "TSU region ioremap() failed.\n");
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
 			goto out_release;
 		}
 		mdp->port = devno % 2;

[PATCH 4.14 044/118] net: stmmac: enable EEE in MII, GMII or RGMII only

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jerome Brunet <jbrunet@baylibre.com>


[ Upstream commit 879626e3a52630316d817cbda7cec9a5446d1d82 ]

Note in the databook - Section 4.4 - EEE :
" The EEE feature is not supported when the MAC is configured to use the
TBI, RTBI, SMII, RMII or SGMII single PHY interface. Even if the MAC
supports multiple PHY interfaces, you should activate the EEE mode only
when the MAC is operating with GMII, MII, or RGMII interface."

Applying this restriction solves a stability issue observed on Amlogic
gxl platforms operating with RMII interface and the internal PHY.

Fixes: 83bf79b6bb64 ("stmmac: disable at run-time the EEE if not supported")
Signed-off-by: Jerome Brunet <jbrunet@baylibre.com>
Tested-by: Arnaud Patard <arnaud.patard@rtp-net.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c
@@ -364,9 +364,15 @@ static void stmmac_eee_ctrl_timer(unsign
 bool stmmac_eee_init(struct stmmac_priv *priv)
 {
 	struct net_device *ndev = priv->dev;
+	int interface = priv->plat->interface;
 	unsigned long flags;
 	bool ret = false;
 
+	if ((interface != PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_MII) &&
+	    (interface != PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_GMII) &&
+	    !phy_interface_mode_is_rgmii(interface))
+		goto out;
+
 	/* Using PCS we cannot dial with the phy registers at this stage
 	 * so we do not support extra feature like EEE.
 	 */

[PATCH 4.14 045/118] sh_eth: fix SH7757 GEther initialization

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sergei Shtylyov <sergei.shtylyov@cogentembedded.com>


[ Upstream commit 5133550296d43236439494aa955bfb765a89f615 ]

Renesas  SH7757 has 2 Fast and 2 Gigabit Ether controllers, while the
'sh_eth' driver can only reset and initialize TSU of the first controller
pair. Shimoda-san tried to solve that adding the 'needs_init' member to the
'struct sh_eth_plat_data', however the platform code still never sets this
flag. I think  that we can infer this information from the 'devno' variable
(set  to 'platform_device::id') and reset/init the Ether controller pair
only for an even 'devno'; therefore 'sh_eth_plat_data::needs_init' can be
removed...

Fixes: 150647fb2c31 ("net: sh_eth: change the condition of initialization")
Signed-off-by: Sergei Shtylyov <sergei.shtylyov@cogentembedded.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/sh_eth.c |    4 ++--
 include/linux/sh_eth.h                |    1 -
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/sh_eth.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/sh_eth.c
@@ -3241,8 +3241,8 @@ static int sh_eth_drv_probe(struct platf
 		ndev->features = NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_FILTER;
 	}
 
-	/* initialize first or needed device */
-	if (!devno || pd->needs_init) {
+	/* Need to init only the first port of the two sharing a TSU */
+	if (devno % 2 == 0) {
 		if (mdp->cd->chip_reset)
 			mdp->cd->chip_reset(ndev);
 
--- a/include/linux/sh_eth.h
+++ b/include/linux/sh_eth.h
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ struct sh_eth_plat_data {
 	unsigned char mac_addr[ETH_ALEN];
 	unsigned no_ether_link:1;
 	unsigned ether_link_active_low:1;
-	unsigned needs_init:1;
 };
 
 #endif

[PATCH 4.14 046/118] ipv6: fix possible mem leaks in ipv6_make_skb()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>


[ Upstream commit 862c03ee1deb7e19e0f9931682e0294ecd1fcaf9 ]

ip6_setup_cork() might return an error, while memory allocations have
been done and must be rolled back.

Fixes: 6422398c2ab0 ("ipv6: introduce ipv6_make_skb")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mike Maloney <maloney@google.com>
Acked-by:  Mike Maloney <maloney@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
@@ -1735,9 +1735,10 @@ struct sk_buff *ip6_make_skb(struct sock
 	cork.base.opt = NULL;
 	v6_cork.opt = NULL;
 	err = ip6_setup_cork(sk, &cork, &v6_cork, ipc6, rt, fl6);
-	if (err)
+	if (err) {
+		ip6_cork_release(&cork, &v6_cork);
 		return ERR_PTR(err);
-
+	}
 	if (ipc6->dontfrag < 0)
 		ipc6->dontfrag = inet6_sk(sk)->dontfrag;
 

[PATCH 4.14 047/118] ethtool: do not print warning for applications using legacy API

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>


[ Upstream commit 71891e2dab6b55a870f8f7735e44a2963860b5c6 ]

In kernel log ths message appears on every boot:
 "warning: `NetworkChangeNo' uses legacy ethtool link settings API,
  link modes are only partially reported"

When ethtool link settings API changed, it started complaining about
usages of old API. Ironically, the original patch was from google but
the application using the legacy API is chrome.

Linux ABI is fixed as much as possible. The kernel must not break it
and should not complain about applications using legacy API's.
This patch just removes the warning since using legacy API's
in Linux is perfectly acceptable.

Fixes: 3f1ac7a700d0 ("net: ethtool: add new ETHTOOL_xLINKSETTINGS API")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Signed-off-by: David Decotigny <decot@googlers.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/core/ethtool.c |   15 ++-------------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

--- a/net/core/ethtool.c
+++ b/net/core/ethtool.c
@@ -754,15 +754,6 @@ static int ethtool_set_link_ksettings(st
 	return dev->ethtool_ops->set_link_ksettings(dev, &link_ksettings);
 }
 
-static void
-warn_incomplete_ethtool_legacy_settings_conversion(const char *details)
-{
-	char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
-
-	pr_info_once("warning: `%s' uses legacy ethtool link settings API, %s\n",
-		     get_task_comm(name, current), details);
-}
-
 /* Query device for its ethtool_cmd settings.
  *
  * Backward compatibility note: for compatibility with legacy ethtool,
@@ -789,10 +780,8 @@ static int ethtool_get_settings(struct n
 							   &link_ksettings);
 		if (err < 0)
 			return err;
-		if (!convert_link_ksettings_to_legacy_settings(&cmd,
-							       &link_ksettings))
-			warn_incomplete_ethtool_legacy_settings_conversion(
-				"link modes are only partially reported");
+		convert_link_ksettings_to_legacy_settings(&cmd,
+							  &link_ksettings);
 
 		/* send a sensible cmd tag back to user */
 		cmd.cmd = ETHTOOL_GSET;

[PATCH 4.14 048/118] mlxsw: spectrum_router: Fix NULL pointer deref

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>


[ Upstream commit 8764a8267b128405cf383157d5e9a4a3735d2409 ]

When we remove the neighbour associated with a nexthop we should always
refuse to write the nexthop to the adjacency table. Regardless if it is
already present in the table or not.

Otherwise, we risk dereferencing the NULL pointer that was set instead
of the neighbour.

Fixes: a7ff87acd995 ("mlxsw: spectrum_router: Implement next-hop routing")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
Reported-by: Alexander Petrovskiy <alexpe@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_router.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_router.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_router.c
@@ -2536,7 +2536,7 @@ static void __mlxsw_sp_nexthop_neigh_upd
 {
 	if (!removing)
 		nh->should_offload = 1;
-	else if (nh->offloaded)
+	else
 		nh->should_offload = 0;
 	nh->update = 1;
 }

[PATCH 4.14 049/118] net/sched: Fix update of lastuse in act modules implementing stats_update

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Roi Dayan <roid@mellanox.com>


[ Upstream commit 3bb23421a504f01551b7cb9dff0e41dbf16656b0 ]

We need to update lastuse to to the most updated value between what
is already set and the new value.
If HW matching fails, i.e. because of an issue, the stats are not updated
but it could be that software did match and updated lastuse.

Fixes: 5712bf9c5c30 ("net/sched: act_mirred: Use passed lastuse argument")
Fixes: 9fea47d93bcc ("net/sched: act_gact: Update statistics when offloaded to hardware")
Signed-off-by: Roi Dayan <roid@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Blakey <paulb@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/sched/act_gact.c   |    2 +-
 net/sched/act_mirred.c |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/sched/act_gact.c
+++ b/net/sched/act_gact.c
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ static void tcf_gact_stats_update(struct
 	if (action == TC_ACT_SHOT)
 		this_cpu_ptr(gact->common.cpu_qstats)->drops += packets;
 
-	tm->lastuse = lastuse;
+	tm->lastuse = max_t(u64, tm->lastuse, lastuse);
 }
 
 static int tcf_gact_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct tc_action *a,
--- a/net/sched/act_mirred.c
+++ b/net/sched/act_mirred.c
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ static void tcf_stats_update(struct tc_a
 	struct tcf_t *tm = &m->tcf_tm;
 
 	_bstats_cpu_update(this_cpu_ptr(a->cpu_bstats), bytes, packets);
-	tm->lastuse = lastuse;
+	tm->lastuse = max_t(u64, tm->lastuse, lastuse);
 }
 
 static int tcf_mirred_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct tc_action *a, int bind,

[PATCH 4.14 050/118] ipv6: sr: fix TLVs not being copied using setsockopt

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mathieu Xhonneux <m.xhonneux@gmail.com>


[ Upstream commit ccc12b11c5332c84442ef120dcd631523be75089 ]

Function ipv6_push_rthdr4 allows to add an IPv6 Segment Routing Header
to a socket through setsockopt, but the current implementation doesn't
copy possible TLVs at the end of the SRH received from userspace.

Therefore, the execution of the following branch if (sr_has_hmac(sr_phdr))
{ ... } will never complete since the len and type fields of a possible
HMAC TLV are not copied, hence seg6_get_tlv_hmac will return an error,
and the HMAC will not be computed.

This commit adds a memcpy in case TLVs have been appended to the SRH.

Fixes: a149e7c7ce81 ("ipv6: sr: add support for SRH injection through setsockopt")
Acked-by: David Lebrun <dlebrun@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Xhonneux <m.xhonneux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c |    9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

--- a/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c
@@ -884,6 +884,15 @@ static void ipv6_push_rthdr4(struct sk_b
 	sr_phdr->segments[0] = **addr_p;
 	*addr_p = &sr_ihdr->segments[sr_ihdr->segments_left];
 
+	if (sr_ihdr->hdrlen > hops * 2) {
+		int tlvs_offset, tlvs_length;
+
+		tlvs_offset = (1 + hops * 2) << 3;
+		tlvs_length = (sr_ihdr->hdrlen - hops * 2) << 3;
+		memcpy((char *)sr_phdr + tlvs_offset,
+		       (char *)sr_ihdr + tlvs_offset, tlvs_length);
+	}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SEG6_HMAC
 	if (sr_has_hmac(sr_phdr)) {
 		struct net *net = NULL;

[PATCH 4.14 051/118] mlxsw: spectrum: Relax sanity checks during enslavement

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>


[ Upstream commit 90045fc9c78855bdc625a0ab185d97b72a937613 ]

Since commit 25cc72a33835 ("mlxsw: spectrum: Forbid linking to devices that
have uppers") the driver forbids enslavement to netdevs that already
have uppers of their own, as this can result in various ordering
problems.

This requirement proved to be too strict for some users who need to be
able to enslave ports to a bridge that already has uppers. In this case,
we can allow the enslavement if the bridge is already known to us, as
any configuration performed on top of the bridge was already reflected
to the device.

Fixes: 25cc72a33835 ("mlxsw: spectrum: Forbid linking to devices that have uppers")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
Reported-by: Alexander Petrovskiy <alexpe@mellanox.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Petrovskiy <alexpe@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum.c           |   11 +++++++++--
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum.h           |    2 ++
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_switchdev.c |    6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum.c
@@ -4235,7 +4235,10 @@ static int mlxsw_sp_netdevice_port_upper
 			return -EINVAL;
 		if (!info->linking)
 			break;
-		if (netdev_has_any_upper_dev(upper_dev))
+		if (netdev_has_any_upper_dev(upper_dev) &&
+		    (!netif_is_bridge_master(upper_dev) ||
+		     !mlxsw_sp_bridge_device_is_offloaded(mlxsw_sp,
+							  upper_dev)))
 			return -EINVAL;
 		if (netif_is_lag_master(upper_dev) &&
 		    !mlxsw_sp_master_lag_check(mlxsw_sp, upper_dev,
@@ -4347,6 +4350,7 @@ static int mlxsw_sp_netdevice_port_vlan_
 					      u16 vid)
 {
 	struct mlxsw_sp_port *mlxsw_sp_port = netdev_priv(dev);
+	struct mlxsw_sp *mlxsw_sp = mlxsw_sp_port->mlxsw_sp;
 	struct netdev_notifier_changeupper_info *info = ptr;
 	struct net_device *upper_dev;
 	int err = 0;
@@ -4358,7 +4362,10 @@ static int mlxsw_sp_netdevice_port_vlan_
 			return -EINVAL;
 		if (!info->linking)
 			break;
-		if (netdev_has_any_upper_dev(upper_dev))
+		if (netdev_has_any_upper_dev(upper_dev) &&
+		    (!netif_is_bridge_master(upper_dev) ||
+		     !mlxsw_sp_bridge_device_is_offloaded(mlxsw_sp,
+							  upper_dev)))
 			return -EINVAL;
 		break;
 	case NETDEV_CHANGEUPPER:
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum.h
@@ -326,6 +326,8 @@ int mlxsw_sp_port_bridge_join(struct mlx
 void mlxsw_sp_port_bridge_leave(struct mlxsw_sp_port *mlxsw_sp_port,
 				struct net_device *brport_dev,
 				struct net_device *br_dev);
+bool mlxsw_sp_bridge_device_is_offloaded(const struct mlxsw_sp *mlxsw_sp,
+					 const struct net_device *br_dev);
 
 /* spectrum.c */
 int mlxsw_sp_port_ets_set(struct mlxsw_sp_port *mlxsw_sp_port,
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_switchdev.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_switchdev.c
@@ -134,6 +134,12 @@ mlxsw_sp_bridge_device_find(const struct
 	return NULL;
 }
 
+bool mlxsw_sp_bridge_device_is_offloaded(const struct mlxsw_sp *mlxsw_sp,
+					 const struct net_device *br_dev)
+{
+	return !!mlxsw_sp_bridge_device_find(mlxsw_sp->bridge, br_dev);
+}
+
 static struct mlxsw_sp_bridge_device *
 mlxsw_sp_bridge_device_create(struct mlxsw_sp_bridge *bridge,
 			      struct net_device *br_dev)

[PATCH 4.14 052/118] sfp: fix sfp-bus oops when removing socket/upstream

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>


[ Upstream commit 0b2122e4934c7783d336397864e34ee53aad0965 ]

When we remove a socket or upstream, and the other side isn't
registered, we dereference a NULL pointer, causing a kernel oops.
Fix this.

Fixes: ce0aa27ff3f6 ("sfp: add sfp-bus to bridge between network devices and sfp cages")
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/phy/sfp-bus.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/phy/sfp-bus.c
+++ b/drivers/net/phy/sfp-bus.c
@@ -359,7 +359,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sfp_register_upstream)
 void sfp_unregister_upstream(struct sfp_bus *bus)
 {
 	rtnl_lock();
-	sfp_unregister_bus(bus);
+	if (bus->sfp)
+		sfp_unregister_bus(bus);
 	bus->upstream = NULL;
 	bus->netdev = NULL;
 	rtnl_unlock();
@@ -464,7 +465,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sfp_register_socket);
 void sfp_unregister_socket(struct sfp_bus *bus)
 {
 	rtnl_lock();
-	sfp_unregister_bus(bus);
+	if (bus->netdev)
+		sfp_unregister_bus(bus);
 	bus->sfp_dev = NULL;
 	bus->sfp = NULL;
 	bus->socket_ops = NULL;

[PATCH 4.14 053/118] Revert "Revert "xfrm: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in xfrm_state_find.""

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>


This reverts commit 94802151894d482e82c324edf2c658f8e6b96508.

It breaks transport mode when the policy template has
wildcard addresses configured.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c |   29 +++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
@@ -1362,36 +1362,29 @@ xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one(struct xfrm_policy
 	struct net *net = xp_net(policy);
 	int nx;
 	int i, error;
-	xfrm_address_t *daddr = xfrm_flowi_daddr(fl, family);
-	xfrm_address_t *saddr = xfrm_flowi_saddr(fl, family);
 	xfrm_address_t tmp;
 
 	for (nx = 0, i = 0; i < policy->xfrm_nr; i++) {
 		struct xfrm_state *x;
-		xfrm_address_t *remote = daddr;
-		xfrm_address_t *local  = saddr;
+		xfrm_address_t *local;
+		xfrm_address_t *remote;
 		struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl = &policy->xfrm_vec[i];
 
-		if (tmpl->mode == XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL ||
-		    tmpl->mode == XFRM_MODE_BEET) {
-			remote = &tmpl->id.daddr;
-			local = &tmpl->saddr;
-			if (xfrm_addr_any(local, tmpl->encap_family)) {
-				error = xfrm_get_saddr(net, fl->flowi_oif,
-						       &tmp, remote,
-						       tmpl->encap_family, 0);
-				if (error)
-					goto fail;
-				local = &tmp;
-			}
+		remote = &tmpl->id.daddr;
+		local = &tmpl->saddr;
+		if (xfrm_addr_any(local, tmpl->encap_family)) {
+			error = xfrm_get_saddr(net, fl->flowi_oif,
+					       &tmp, remote,
+					       tmpl->encap_family, 0);
+			if (error)
+				goto fail;
+			local = &tmp;
 		}
 
 		x = xfrm_state_find(remote, local, fl, tmpl, policy, &error, family);
 
 		if (x && x->km.state == XFRM_STATE_VALID) {
 			xfrm[nx++] = x;
-			daddr = remote;
-			saddr = local;
 			continue;
 		}
 		if (x) {

[PATCH 4.14 054/118] membarrier: Disable preemption when calling smp_call_function_many()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>

commit 541676078b52f365f53d46ee5517d305cd1b6350 upstream.

smp_call_function_many() requires disabling preemption around the call.

Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrea Parri <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Hunter <ahh@google.com>
Cc: Avi Kivity <avi@scylladb.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Maged Michael <maged.michael@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Paul E . McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171215192310.25293-1-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 kernel/sched/membarrier.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/kernel/sched/membarrier.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/membarrier.c
@@ -89,7 +89,9 @@ static int membarrier_private_expedited(
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 	}
 	if (!fallback) {
+		preempt_disable();
 		smp_call_function_many(tmpmask, ipi_mb, NULL, 1);
+		preempt_enable();
 		free_cpumask_var(tmpmask);
 	}
 	cpus_read_unlock();

[PATCH 4.14 055/118] crypto: algapi - fix NULL dereference in crypto_remove_spawns()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

commit 9a00674213a3f00394f4e3221b88f2d21fc05789 upstream.

syzkaller triggered a NULL pointer dereference in crypto_remove_spawns()
via a program that repeatedly and concurrently requests AEADs
"authenc(cmac(des3_ede-asm),pcbc-aes-aesni)" and hashes "cmac(des3_ede)"
through AF_ALG, where the hashes are requested as "untested"
(CRYPTO_ALG_TESTED is set in ->salg_mask but clear in ->salg_feat; this
causes the template to be instantiated for every request).

Although AF_ALG users really shouldn't be able to request an "untested"
algorithm, the NULL pointer dereference is actually caused by a
longstanding race condition where crypto_remove_spawns() can encounter
an instance which has had spawn(s) "grabbed" but hasn't yet been
registered, resulting in ->cra_users still being NULL.

We probably should properly initialize ->cra_users earlier, but that
would require updating many templates individually.  For now just fix
the bug in a simple way that can easily be backported: make
crypto_remove_spawns() treat a NULL ->cra_users list as empty.

Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 crypto/algapi.c |   12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

--- a/crypto/algapi.c
+++ b/crypto/algapi.c
@@ -167,6 +167,18 @@ void crypto_remove_spawns(struct crypto_
 
 			spawn->alg = NULL;
 			spawns = &inst->alg.cra_users;
+
+			/*
+			 * We may encounter an unregistered instance here, since
+			 * an instance's spawns are set up prior to the instance
+			 * being registered.  An unregistered instance will have
+			 * NULL ->cra_users.next, since ->cra_users isn't
+			 * properly initialized until registration.  But an
+			 * unregistered instance cannot have any users, so treat
+			 * it the same as ->cra_users being empty.
+			 */
+			if (spawns->next == NULL)
+				break;
 		}
 	} while ((spawns = crypto_more_spawns(alg, &stack, &top,
 					      &secondary_spawns)));

[PATCH 4.14 056/118] mmc: renesas_sdhi: Add MODULE_LICENSE

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Masaharu Hayakawa <masaharu.hayakawa.ry@renesas.com>

commit 967a6a07e95c58eb9c1581d22a1d9c2d1929843f upstream.

The following error occurs when loading renesas_sdhi_core.c module,
so add MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2").

 renesas_sdhi_core: module license 'unspecified' taints kernel.

Signed-off-by: Masaharu Hayakawa <masaharu.hayakawa.ry@renesas.com>
Fixes: 9d08428afb72 ("mmc: renesas-sdhi: make renesas_sdhi_sys_dmac main module file")
[Shimoda: Added Fixes tag and Cc to the stable ML]
Signed-off-by: Yoshihiro Shimoda <yoshihiro.shimoda.uh@renesas.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms+renesas@verge.net.au>
Acked-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_core.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_core.c
+++ b/drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_core.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/clk.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/of_device.h>
 #include <linux/platform_device.h>
 #include <linux/mmc/host.h>
@@ -667,3 +668,5 @@ int renesas_sdhi_remove(struct platform_
 	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(renesas_sdhi_remove);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");

[PATCH 4.14 057/118] rbd: reacquire lock should update lock owner client id

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Florian Margaine <florian@platform.sh>

commit edd8ca8015800b354453b891d38960f3a474b7e4 upstream.

Otherwise, future operations on this RBD using exclusive-lock are
going to require the lock from a non-existent client id.

Fixes: 14bb211d324d ("rbd: support updating the lock cookie without releasing the lock")
Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/19929
Signed-off-by: Florian Margaine <florian@platform.sh>
[idryomov@gmail.com: rbd_set_owner_cid() call, __rbd_lock() helper]
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/block/rbd.c |   16 +++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/block/rbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/rbd.c
@@ -3074,13 +3074,21 @@ static void format_lock_cookie(struct rb
 	mutex_unlock(&rbd_dev->watch_mutex);
 }
 
+static void __rbd_lock(struct rbd_device *rbd_dev, const char *cookie)
+{
+	struct rbd_client_id cid = rbd_get_cid(rbd_dev);
+
+	strcpy(rbd_dev->lock_cookie, cookie);
+	rbd_set_owner_cid(rbd_dev, &cid);
+	queue_work(rbd_dev->task_wq, &rbd_dev->acquired_lock_work);
+}
+
 /*
  * lock_rwsem must be held for write
  */
 static int rbd_lock(struct rbd_device *rbd_dev)
 {
 	struct ceph_osd_client *osdc = &rbd_dev->rbd_client->client->osdc;
-	struct rbd_client_id cid = rbd_get_cid(rbd_dev);
 	char cookie[32];
 	int ret;
 
@@ -3095,9 +3103,7 @@ static int rbd_lock(struct rbd_device *r
 		return ret;
 
 	rbd_dev->lock_state = RBD_LOCK_STATE_LOCKED;
-	strcpy(rbd_dev->lock_cookie, cookie);
-	rbd_set_owner_cid(rbd_dev, &cid);
-	queue_work(rbd_dev->task_wq, &rbd_dev->acquired_lock_work);
+	__rbd_lock(rbd_dev, cookie);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -3883,7 +3889,7 @@ static void rbd_reacquire_lock(struct rb
 			queue_delayed_work(rbd_dev->task_wq,
 					   &rbd_dev->lock_dwork, 0);
 	} else {
-		strcpy(rbd_dev->lock_cookie, cookie);
+		__rbd_lock(rbd_dev, cookie);
 	}
 }
 

[PATCH 4.14 058/118] rbd: set max_segments to USHRT_MAX

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

commit 21acdf45f4958135940f0b4767185cf911d4b010 upstream.

Commit d3834fefcfe5 ("rbd: bump queue_max_segments") bumped
max_segments (unsigned short) to max_hw_sectors (unsigned int).
max_hw_sectors is set to the number of 512-byte sectors in an object
and overflows unsigned short for 32M (largest possible) objects, making
the block layer resort to handing us single segment (i.e. single page
or even smaller) bios in that case.

Fixes: d3834fefcfe5 ("rbd: bump queue_max_segments")
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/block/rbd.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/block/rbd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/rbd.c
@@ -4421,7 +4421,7 @@ static int rbd_init_disk(struct rbd_devi
 	segment_size = rbd_obj_bytes(&rbd_dev->header);
 	blk_queue_max_hw_sectors(q, segment_size / SECTOR_SIZE);
 	q->limits.max_sectors = queue_max_hw_sectors(q);
-	blk_queue_max_segments(q, segment_size / SECTOR_SIZE);
+	blk_queue_max_segments(q, USHRT_MAX);
 	blk_queue_max_segment_size(q, segment_size);
 	blk_queue_io_min(q, segment_size);
 	blk_queue_io_opt(q, segment_size);

[PATCH 4.14 059/118] iwlwifi: pcie: fix DMA memory mapping / unmapping

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>

commit 943309d4aad6732b905f3f500e6e17e33c211494 upstream.

22000 devices (previously referenced as A000) can support
short transmit queues. This means that we have less DMA
descriptors (TFD) for those shorter queues.
Previous devices must still have 256 TFDs for each queue
even if those 256 TFDs point to fewer buffers.

When I introduced support for the short queues for 22000
I broke older devices by assuming that they can also have
less TFDs in their queues. This led to several problems:

1) the payload of the commands weren't unmapped properly
   which caused the SWIOTLB to complain at some point.
2) the hardware could get confused and we get hardware
   crashes.

The corresponding bugzilla entries are:

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198201
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198265

Fixes: 4ecab5616023 ("iwlwifi: pcie: support short Tx queues for A000 device family")
Reviewed-by: Sharon, Sara <sara.sharon@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/internal.h |   10 +++++++---
 drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx-gen2.c  |   11 +++--------
 drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx.c       |    8 ++++----
 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/internal.h
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/internal.h
@@ -666,11 +666,15 @@ static inline u8 iwl_pcie_get_cmd_index(
 	return index & (q->n_window - 1);
 }
 
-static inline void *iwl_pcie_get_tfd(struct iwl_trans_pcie *trans_pcie,
+static inline void *iwl_pcie_get_tfd(struct iwl_trans *trans,
 				     struct iwl_txq *txq, int idx)
 {
-	return txq->tfds + trans_pcie->tfd_size * iwl_pcie_get_cmd_index(txq,
-									 idx);
+	struct iwl_trans_pcie *trans_pcie = IWL_TRANS_GET_PCIE_TRANS(trans);
+
+	if (trans->cfg->use_tfh)
+		idx = iwl_pcie_get_cmd_index(txq, idx);
+
+	return txq->tfds + trans_pcie->tfd_size * idx;
 }
 
 static inline void iwl_enable_rfkill_int(struct iwl_trans *trans)
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx-gen2.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx-gen2.c
@@ -171,8 +171,6 @@ static void iwl_pcie_gen2_tfd_unmap(stru
 
 static void iwl_pcie_gen2_free_tfd(struct iwl_trans *trans, struct iwl_txq *txq)
 {
-	struct iwl_trans_pcie *trans_pcie = IWL_TRANS_GET_PCIE_TRANS(trans);
-
 	/* rd_ptr is bounded by TFD_QUEUE_SIZE_MAX and
 	 * idx is bounded by n_window
 	 */
@@ -181,7 +179,7 @@ static void iwl_pcie_gen2_free_tfd(struc
 	lockdep_assert_held(&txq->lock);
 
 	iwl_pcie_gen2_tfd_unmap(trans, &txq->entries[idx].meta,
-				iwl_pcie_get_tfd(trans_pcie, txq, idx));
+				iwl_pcie_get_tfd(trans, txq, idx));
 
 	/* free SKB */
 	if (txq->entries) {
@@ -367,11 +365,9 @@ struct iwl_tfh_tfd *iwl_pcie_gen2_build_
 					    struct sk_buff *skb,
 					    struct iwl_cmd_meta *out_meta)
 {
-	struct iwl_trans_pcie *trans_pcie = IWL_TRANS_GET_PCIE_TRANS(trans);
 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
 	int idx = iwl_pcie_get_cmd_index(txq, txq->write_ptr);
-	struct iwl_tfh_tfd *tfd =
-		iwl_pcie_get_tfd(trans_pcie, txq, idx);
+	struct iwl_tfh_tfd *tfd = iwl_pcie_get_tfd(trans, txq, idx);
 	dma_addr_t tb_phys;
 	bool amsdu;
 	int i, len, tb1_len, tb2_len, hdr_len;
@@ -568,8 +564,7 @@ static int iwl_pcie_gen2_enqueue_hcmd(st
 	u8 group_id = iwl_cmd_groupid(cmd->id);
 	const u8 *cmddata[IWL_MAX_CMD_TBS_PER_TFD];
 	u16 cmdlen[IWL_MAX_CMD_TBS_PER_TFD];
-	struct iwl_tfh_tfd *tfd =
-		iwl_pcie_get_tfd(trans_pcie, txq, txq->write_ptr);
+	struct iwl_tfh_tfd *tfd = iwl_pcie_get_tfd(trans, txq, txq->write_ptr);
 
 	memset(tfd, 0, sizeof(*tfd));
 
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx.c
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ static void iwl_pcie_tfd_unmap(struct iw
 {
 	struct iwl_trans_pcie *trans_pcie = IWL_TRANS_GET_PCIE_TRANS(trans);
 	int i, num_tbs;
-	void *tfd = iwl_pcie_get_tfd(trans_pcie, txq, index);
+	void *tfd = iwl_pcie_get_tfd(trans, txq, index);
 
 	/* Sanity check on number of chunks */
 	num_tbs = iwl_pcie_tfd_get_num_tbs(trans, tfd);
@@ -1999,7 +1999,7 @@ static int iwl_fill_data_tbs(struct iwl_
 	}
 
 	trace_iwlwifi_dev_tx(trans->dev, skb,
-			     iwl_pcie_get_tfd(trans_pcie, txq, txq->write_ptr),
+			     iwl_pcie_get_tfd(trans, txq, txq->write_ptr),
 			     trans_pcie->tfd_size,
 			     &dev_cmd->hdr, IWL_FIRST_TB_SIZE + tb1_len,
 			     hdr_len);
@@ -2073,7 +2073,7 @@ static int iwl_fill_data_tbs_amsdu(struc
 		IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN : 0;
 
 	trace_iwlwifi_dev_tx(trans->dev, skb,
-			     iwl_pcie_get_tfd(trans_pcie, txq, txq->write_ptr),
+			     iwl_pcie_get_tfd(trans, txq, txq->write_ptr),
 			     trans_pcie->tfd_size,
 			     &dev_cmd->hdr, IWL_FIRST_TB_SIZE + tb1_len, 0);
 
@@ -2406,7 +2406,7 @@ int iwl_trans_pcie_tx(struct iwl_trans *
 	memcpy(&txq->first_tb_bufs[txq->write_ptr], &dev_cmd->hdr,
 	       IWL_FIRST_TB_SIZE);
 
-	tfd = iwl_pcie_get_tfd(trans_pcie, txq, txq->write_ptr);
+	tfd = iwl_pcie_get_tfd(trans, txq, txq->write_ptr);
 	/* Set up entry for this TFD in Tx byte-count array */
 	iwl_pcie_txq_update_byte_cnt_tbl(trans, txq, le16_to_cpu(tx_cmd->len),
 					 iwl_pcie_tfd_get_num_tbs(trans, tfd));

[PATCH 4.14 060/118] x86/microcode/intel: Extend BDW late-loading with a revision check

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jia Zhang <qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.com>

commit b94b7373317164402ff7728d10f7023127a02b60 upstream.

Instead of blacklisting all model 79 CPUs when attempting a late
microcode loading, limit that only to CPUs with microcode revisions <
0x0b000021 because only on those late loading may cause a system hang.

For such processors either:

a) a BIOS update which might contain a newer microcode revision

or

b) the early microcode loading method

should be considered.

Processors with revisions 0x0b000021 or higher will not experience such
hangs.

For more details, see erratum BDF90 in document #334165 (Intel Xeon
Processor E7-8800/4800 v4 Product Family Specification Update) from
September 2017.

[ bp: Heavily massage commit message and pr_* statements. ]

Fixes: 723f2828a98c ("x86/microcode/intel: Disable late loading on model 79")
Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang <qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1514772287-92959-1-git-send-email-qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c |   13 +++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
@@ -910,8 +910,17 @@ static bool is_blacklisted(unsigned int
 {
 	struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(cpu);
 
-	if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model == INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X) {
-		pr_err_once("late loading on model 79 is disabled.\n");
+	/*
+	 * Late loading on model 79 with microcode revision less than 0x0b000021
+	 * may result in a system hang. This behavior is documented in item
+	 * BDF90, #334165 (Intel Xeon Processor E7-8800/4800 v4 Product Family).
+	 */
+	if (c->x86 == 6 &&
+	    c->x86_model == INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X &&
+	    c->x86_mask == 0x01 &&
+	    c->microcode < 0x0b000021) {
+		pr_err_once("Erratum BDF90: late loading with revision < 0x0b000021 (0x%x) disabled.\n", c->microcode);
+		pr_err_once("Please consider either early loading through initrd/built-in or a potential BIOS update.\n");
 		return true;
 	}
 

[PATCH 4.14 061/118] KVM: x86: Add memory barrier on vmcs field lookup

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>

commit 75f139aaf896d6fdeec2e468ddfa4b2fe469bf40 upstream.

This adds a memory barrier when performing a lookup into
the vmcs_field_to_offset_table.  This is related to
CVE-2017-5753.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c |   12 ++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -888,8 +888,16 @@ static inline short vmcs_field_to_offset
 {
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table) > SHRT_MAX);
 
-	if (field >= ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table) ||
-	    vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field] == 0)
+	if (field >= ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table))
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	/*
+	 * FIXME: Mitigation for CVE-2017-5753.  To be replaced with a
+	 * generic mechanism.
+	 */
+	asm("lfence");
+
+	if (vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field] == 0)
 		return -ENOENT;
 
 	return vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field];

[PATCH 4.14 062/118] KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Fix WIMG handling under pHyp

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>

commit 6c7d47c33ed323f14f2a3b8de925e831dbaa4e69 upstream.

Commit 96df226 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Preserve storage control bits")
added code to preserve WIMG bits but it missed 2 special cases:
- a magic page in kvmppc_mmu_book3s_64_xlate() and
- guest real mode in kvmppc_handle_pagefault().

For these ptes, WIMG was 0 and pHyp failed on these causing a guest to
stop in the very beginning at NIP=0x100 (due to bd9166ffe "KVM: PPC:
Book3S PR: Exit KVM on failed mapping").

According to LoPAPR v1.1 14.5.4.1.2 H_ENTER:

 The hypervisor checks that the WIMG bits within the PTE are appropriate
 for the physical page number else H_Parameter return. (For System Memory
 pages WIMG=0010, or, 1110 if the SAO option is enabled, and for IO pages
 WIMG=01**.)

This hence initializes WIMG to non-zero value HPTE_R_M (0x10), as expected
by pHyp.

[paulus@ozlabs.org - fix compile for 32-bit]

Fixes: 96df226 "KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Preserve storage control bits"
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Tested-by: Ruediger Oertel <ro@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Tested-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu.c |    1 +
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_pr.c     |    2 ++
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu.c
@@ -235,6 +235,7 @@ static int kvmppc_mmu_book3s_64_xlate(st
 		gpte->may_read = true;
 		gpte->may_write = true;
 		gpte->page_size = MMU_PAGE_4K;
+		gpte->wimg = HPTE_R_M;
 
 		return 0;
 	}
--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_pr.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_pr.c
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ static void kvmppc_giveup_fac(struct kvm
 #define MSR_USER32 MSR_USER
 #define MSR_USER64 MSR_USER
 #define HW_PAGE_SIZE PAGE_SIZE
+#define HPTE_R_M   _PAGE_COHERENT
 #endif
 
 static bool kvmppc_is_split_real(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -557,6 +558,7 @@ int kvmppc_handle_pagefault(struct kvm_r
 		pte.eaddr = eaddr;
 		pte.vpage = eaddr >> 12;
 		pte.page_size = MMU_PAGE_64K;
+		pte.wimg = HPTE_R_M;
 	}
 
 	switch (kvmppc_get_msr(vcpu) & (MSR_DR|MSR_IR)) {

[PATCH 4.14 063/118] KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Drop prepare_done from struct kvm_resize_hpt

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Serhii Popovych <spopovyc@redhat.com>

commit 3073774e638ef18d222465fe92bfc8fccb90d288 upstream.

Currently the kvm_resize_hpt structure has two fields relevant to the
state of an ongoing resize: 'prepare_done', which indicates whether
the worker thread has completed or not, and 'error' which indicates
whether it was successful or not.

Since the success/failure isn't known until completion, this is
confusingly redundant.  This patch consolidates the information into
just the 'error' value: -EBUSY indicates the worked is still in
progress, other negative values indicate (completed) failure, 0
indicates successful completion.

As a bonus this reduces size of struct kvm_resize_hpt by
__alignof__(struct kvm_hpt_info) and saves few bytes of code.

While there correct comment in struct kvm_resize_hpt which references
a non-existent semaphore (leftover from an early draft).

Assert with WARN_ON() in case of HPT allocation thread work runs more
than once for resize request or resize_hpt_allocate() returns -EBUSY
that is treated specially.

Change comparison against zero to make checkpatch.pl happy.

Signed-off-by: Serhii Popovych <spopovyc@redhat.com>
[dwg: Changed BUG_ON()s to WARN_ON()s and altered commit message for
 clarity]
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c |   44 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c
@@ -65,11 +65,17 @@ struct kvm_resize_hpt {
 	u32 order;
 
 	/* These fields protected by kvm->lock */
+
+	/* Possible values and their usage:
+	 *  <0     an error occurred during allocation,
+	 *  -EBUSY allocation is in the progress,
+	 *  0      allocation made successfuly.
+	 */
 	int error;
-	bool prepare_done;
 
-	/* Private to the work thread, until prepare_done is true,
-	 * then protected by kvm->resize_hpt_sem */
+	/* Private to the work thread, until error != -EBUSY,
+	 * then protected by kvm->lock.
+	 */
 	struct kvm_hpt_info hpt;
 };
 
@@ -1444,15 +1450,23 @@ static void resize_hpt_prepare_work(stru
 	struct kvm *kvm = resize->kvm;
 	int err;
 
+	if (WARN_ON(resize->error != -EBUSY))
+		return;
+
 	resize_hpt_debug(resize, "resize_hpt_prepare_work(): order = %d\n",
 			 resize->order);
 
 	err = resize_hpt_allocate(resize);
 
+	/* We have strict assumption about -EBUSY
+	 * when preparing for HPT resize.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON(err == -EBUSY))
+		err = -EINPROGRESS;
+
 	mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
 
 	resize->error = err;
-	resize->prepare_done = true;
 
 	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
 }
@@ -1477,14 +1491,12 @@ long kvm_vm_ioctl_resize_hpt_prepare(str
 
 	if (resize) {
 		if (resize->order == shift) {
-			/* Suitable resize in progress */
-			if (resize->prepare_done) {
-				ret = resize->error;
-				if (ret != 0)
-					resize_hpt_release(kvm, resize);
-			} else {
+			/* Suitable resize in progress? */
+			ret = resize->error;
+			if (ret == -EBUSY)
 				ret = 100; /* estimated time in ms */
-			}
+			else if (ret)
+				resize_hpt_release(kvm, resize);
 
 			goto out;
 		}
@@ -1504,6 +1516,8 @@ long kvm_vm_ioctl_resize_hpt_prepare(str
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out;
 	}
+
+	resize->error = -EBUSY;
 	resize->order = shift;
 	resize->kvm = kvm;
 	INIT_WORK(&resize->work, resize_hpt_prepare_work);
@@ -1558,16 +1572,12 @@ long kvm_vm_ioctl_resize_hpt_commit(stru
 	if (!resize || (resize->order != shift))
 		goto out;
 
-	ret = -EBUSY;
-	if (!resize->prepare_done)
-		goto out;
-
 	ret = resize->error;
-	if (ret != 0)
+	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 
 	ret = resize_hpt_rehash(resize);
-	if (ret != 0)
+	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 
 	resize_hpt_pivot(resize);

[PATCH 4.14 064/118] KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix use after free in case of multiple resize requests

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Serhii Popovych <spopovyc@redhat.com>

commit 4ed11aeefda439c76ddae3ceebcfa4fad111f149 upstream.

When serving multiple resize requests following could happen:

    CPU0                                    CPU1
    ----                                    ----
    kvm_vm_ioctl_resize_hpt_prepare(1);
      -> schedule_work()
                                            /* system_rq might be busy: delay */
    kvm_vm_ioctl_resize_hpt_prepare(2);
      mutex_lock();
      if (resize) {
         ...
         release_hpt_resize();
      }
      ...                                   resize_hpt_prepare_work()
      -> schedule_work()                    {
      mutex_unlock()                           /* resize->kvm could be wrong */
                                               struct kvm *kvm = resize->kvm;

                                               mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);   <<<< UAF
                                               ...
                                            }

i.e. a second resize request with different order could be started by
kvm_vm_ioctl_resize_hpt_prepare(), causing the previous request to be
free()d when there's still an active worker thread which will try to
access it.  This leads to a use after free in point marked with UAF on
the diagram above.

To prevent this from happening, instead of unconditionally releasing a
pre-existing resize structure from the prepare ioctl(), we check if
the existing structure has an in-progress worker.  We do that by
checking if the resize->error == -EBUSY, which is safe because the
resize->error field is protected by the kvm->lock.  If there is an
active worker, instead of releasing, we mark the structure as stale by
unlinking it from kvm_struct.

In the worker thread we check for a stale structure (with kvm->lock
held), and in that case abort, releasing the stale structure ourself.
We make the check both before and the actual allocation.  Strictly,
only the check afterwards is needed, the check before is an
optimization: if the structure happens to become stale before the
worker thread is dispatched, rather than during the allocation, it
means we can avoid allocating then immediately freeing a potentially
substantial amount of memory.

This fixes following or similar host kernel crash message:

[  635.277361] Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00000000
[  635.277438] Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000052f568
[  635.277446] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
[  635.277451] SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV
[  635.277470] Modules linked in: xt_CHECKSUM iptable_mangle ipt_MASQUERADE
nf_nat_masquerade_ipv4 iptable_nat nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4
nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 tun bridge stp llc
ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter nfsv3 nfs_acl nfs
lockd grace fscache kvm_hv kvm rpcrdma sunrpc ib_isert iscsi_target_mod ib_iser libiscsi
scsi_transport_iscsi ib_srpt target_core_mod ext4 ib_srp scsi_transport_srp
ib_ipoib mbcache jbd2 rdma_ucm ib_ucm ib_uverbs ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm ocrdma(T)
ib_core ses enclosure scsi_transport_sas sg shpchp leds_powernv ibmpowernv i2c_opal
i2c_core powernv_rng ipmi_powernv ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler ip_tables xfs
libcrc32c sr_mod sd_mod cdrom lpfc nvme_fc(T) nvme_fabrics nvme_core ipr nvmet_fc(T)
tg3 nvmet libata be2net crc_t10dif crct10dif_generic scsi_transport_fc ptp scsi_tgt
pps_core crct10dif_common dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
[  635.278687] CPU: 40 PID: 749 Comm: kworker/40:1 Tainted: G
------------ T 3.10.0.bz1510771+ #1
[  635.278782] Workqueue: events resize_hpt_prepare_work [kvm_hv]
[  635.278851] task: c0000007e6840000 ti: c0000007e9180000 task.ti: c0000007e9180000
[  635.278919] NIP: c00000000052f568 LR: c0000000009ea310 CTR: c0000000009ea4f0
[  635.278988] REGS: c0000007e91837f0 TRAP: 0300   Tainted: G
------------ T  (3.10.0.bz1510771+)
[  635.279077] MSR: 9000000100009033 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 24002022  XER:
00000000
[  635.279248] CFAR: c000000000009368 DAR: 0000000000000000 DSISR: 40000000 SOFTE: 1
GPR00: c0000000009ea310 c0000007e9183a70 c000000001250b00 c0000007e9183b10
GPR04: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c0000007e9183650 0000000000000000
GPR08: c0000007ffff7b80 00000000ffffffff 0000000080000028 d00000000d2529a0
GPR12: 0000000000002200 c000000007b56800 c000000000120028 c0000007f135bb40
GPR16: 0000000000000000 c000000005c1e018 c000000005c1e018 0000000000000000
GPR20: 0000000000000001 c0000000011bf778 0000000000000001 fffffffffffffef7
GPR24: 0000000000000000 c000000f1e262e50 0000000000000002 c0000007e9180000
GPR28: c000000f1e262e4c c000000f1e262e50 0000000000000000 c0000007e9183b10
[  635.280149] NIP [c00000000052f568] __list_add+0x38/0x110
[  635.280197] LR [c0000000009ea310] __mutex_lock_slowpath+0xe0/0x2c0
[  635.280253] Call Trace:
[  635.280277] [c0000007e9183af0] [c0000000009ea310] __mutex_lock_slowpath+0xe0/0x2c0
[  635.280356] [c0000007e9183b70] [c0000000009ea554] mutex_lock+0x64/0x70
[  635.280426] [c0000007e9183ba0] [d00000000d24da04]
resize_hpt_prepare_work+0xe4/0x1c0 [kvm_hv]
[  635.280507] [c0000007e9183c40] [c000000000113c0c] process_one_work+0x1dc/0x680
[  635.280587] [c0000007e9183ce0] [c000000000114250] worker_thread+0x1a0/0x520
[  635.280655] [c0000007e9183d80] [c00000000012010c] kthread+0xec/0x100
[  635.280724] [c0000007e9183e30] [c00000000000a4b8] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0xa4
[  635.280814] Instruction dump:
[  635.280880] 7c0802a6 fba1ffe8 fbc1fff0 7cbd2b78 fbe1fff8 7c9e2378 7c7f1b78
f8010010
[  635.281099] f821ff81 e8a50008 7fa52040 40de00b8 <e8be0000> 7fbd2840 40de008c
7fbff040
[  635.281324] ---[ end trace b628b73449719b9d ]---

Fixes: b5baa6877315 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: KVM-HV HPT resizing implementation")
Signed-off-by: Serhii Popovych <spopovyc@redhat.com>
[dwg: Replaced BUG_ON()s with WARN_ONs() and reworded commit message
 for clarity]
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c |   54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c
@@ -1430,16 +1430,20 @@ static void resize_hpt_pivot(struct kvm_
 
 static void resize_hpt_release(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_resize_hpt *resize)
 {
-	BUG_ON(kvm->arch.resize_hpt != resize);
+	if (WARN_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&kvm->lock)))
+		return;
 
 	if (!resize)
 		return;
 
-	if (resize->hpt.virt)
-		kvmppc_free_hpt(&resize->hpt);
+	if (resize->error != -EBUSY) {
+		if (resize->hpt.virt)
+			kvmppc_free_hpt(&resize->hpt);
+		kfree(resize);
+	}
 
-	kvm->arch.resize_hpt = NULL;
-	kfree(resize);
+	if (kvm->arch.resize_hpt == resize)
+		kvm->arch.resize_hpt = NULL;
 }
 
 static void resize_hpt_prepare_work(struct work_struct *work)
@@ -1448,26 +1452,42 @@ static void resize_hpt_prepare_work(stru
 						     struct kvm_resize_hpt,
 						     work);
 	struct kvm *kvm = resize->kvm;
-	int err;
+	int err = 0;
 
 	if (WARN_ON(resize->error != -EBUSY))
 		return;
 
-	resize_hpt_debug(resize, "resize_hpt_prepare_work(): order = %d\n",
-			 resize->order);
-
-	err = resize_hpt_allocate(resize);
-
-	/* We have strict assumption about -EBUSY
-	 * when preparing for HPT resize.
-	 */
-	if (WARN_ON(err == -EBUSY))
-		err = -EINPROGRESS;
-
 	mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
 
+	/* Request is still current? */
+	if (kvm->arch.resize_hpt == resize) {
+		/* We may request large allocations here:
+		 * do not sleep with kvm->lock held for a while.
+		 */
+		mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+
+		resize_hpt_debug(resize, "resize_hpt_prepare_work(): order = %d\n",
+				 resize->order);
+
+		err = resize_hpt_allocate(resize);
+
+		/* We have strict assumption about -EBUSY
+		 * when preparing for HPT resize.
+		 */
+		if (WARN_ON(err == -EBUSY))
+			err = -EINPROGRESS;
+
+		mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+		/* It is possible that kvm->arch.resize_hpt != resize
+		 * after we grab kvm->lock again.
+		 */
+	}
+
 	resize->error = err;
 
+	if (kvm->arch.resize_hpt != resize)
+		resize_hpt_release(kvm, resize);
+
 	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
 }
 

[PATCH 4.14 065/118] KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Always flush TLB in kvmppc_alloc_reset_hpt()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>

commit ecba8297aafd50db6ae867e90844eead1611ef1c upstream.

The KVM_PPC_ALLOCATE_HTAB ioctl(), implemented by kvmppc_alloc_reset_hpt()
is supposed to completely clear and reset a guest's Hashed Page Table (HPT)
allocating or re-allocating it if necessary.

In the case where an HPT of the right size already exists and it just
zeroes it, it forces a TLB flush on all guest CPUs, to remove any stale TLB
entries loaded from the old HPT.

However, that situation can arise when the HPT is resizing as well - or
even when switching from an RPT to HPT - so those cases need a TLB flush as
well.

So, move the TLB flush to trigger in all cases except for errors.

Fixes: f98a8bf9ee20 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Allow KVM_PPC_ALLOCATE_HTAB ioctl() to change HPT size")
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c
@@ -165,8 +165,6 @@ long kvmppc_alloc_reset_hpt(struct kvm *
 		 * Reset all the reverse-mapping chains for all memslots
 		 */
 		kvmppc_rmap_reset(kvm);
-		/* Ensure that each vcpu will flush its TLB on next entry. */
-		cpumask_setall(&kvm->arch.need_tlb_flush);
 		err = 0;
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -182,6 +180,10 @@ long kvmppc_alloc_reset_hpt(struct kvm *
 	kvmppc_set_hpt(kvm, &info);
 
 out:
+	if (err == 0)
+		/* Ensure that each vcpu will flush its TLB on next entry. */
+		cpumask_setall(&kvm->arch.need_tlb_flush);
+
 	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
 	return err;
 }

[PATCH 4.14 066/118] drm/vmwgfx: Dont cache framebuffer maps

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>

commit 98648ae6ef6bdcdcb88c46cad963906ab452e96d upstream.

Buffer objects need to be either pinned or reserved while a map is active,
that's not the case here, so avoid caching the framebuffer map.
This will cause increasing mapping activity mainly when we don't do
page flipping.

This fixes occasional garbage filled screens when the framebuffer has been
evicted after the map.

Since in-kernel mapping of whole buffer objects is error-prone on 32-bit
architectures and also quite inefficient, we will revisit this later.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: Sinclair Yeh <syeh@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_kms.c  |    6 -----
 drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_kms.h  |    2 -
 drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_stdu.c |   41 ++++++++++-------------------------
 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_kms.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_kms.c
@@ -697,7 +697,6 @@ vmw_du_plane_duplicate_state(struct drm_
 	vps->pinned = 0;
 
 	/* Mapping is managed by prepare_fb/cleanup_fb */
-	memset(&vps->guest_map, 0, sizeof(vps->guest_map));
 	memset(&vps->host_map, 0, sizeof(vps->host_map));
 	vps->cpp = 0;
 
@@ -760,11 +759,6 @@ vmw_du_plane_destroy_state(struct drm_pl
 
 
 	/* Should have been freed by cleanup_fb */
-	if (vps->guest_map.virtual) {
-		DRM_ERROR("Guest mapping not freed\n");
-		ttm_bo_kunmap(&vps->guest_map);
-	}
-
 	if (vps->host_map.virtual) {
 		DRM_ERROR("Host mapping not freed\n");
 		ttm_bo_kunmap(&vps->host_map);
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_kms.h
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_kms.h
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ struct vmw_plane_state {
 	int pinned;
 
 	/* For CPU Blit */
-	struct ttm_bo_kmap_obj host_map, guest_map;
+	struct ttm_bo_kmap_obj host_map;
 	unsigned int cpp;
 };
 
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_stdu.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_stdu.c
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ struct vmw_screen_target_display_unit {
 	bool defined;
 
 	/* For CPU Blit */
-	struct ttm_bo_kmap_obj host_map, guest_map;
+	struct ttm_bo_kmap_obj host_map;
 	unsigned int cpp;
 };
 
@@ -695,7 +695,8 @@ static void vmw_stdu_dmabuf_cpu_commit(s
 	s32 src_pitch, dst_pitch;
 	u8 *src, *dst;
 	bool not_used;
-
+	struct ttm_bo_kmap_obj guest_map;
+	int ret;
 
 	if (!dirty->num_hits)
 		return;
@@ -706,6 +707,13 @@ static void vmw_stdu_dmabuf_cpu_commit(s
 	if (width == 0 || height == 0)
 		return;
 
+	ret = ttm_bo_kmap(&ddirty->buf->base, 0, ddirty->buf->base.num_pages,
+			  &guest_map);
+	if (ret) {
+		DRM_ERROR("Failed mapping framebuffer for blit: %d\n",
+			  ret);
+		goto out_cleanup;
+	}
 
 	/* Assume we are blitting from Host (display_srf) to Guest (dmabuf) */
 	src_pitch = stdu->display_srf->base_size.width * stdu->cpp;
@@ -713,7 +721,7 @@ static void vmw_stdu_dmabuf_cpu_commit(s
 	src += ddirty->top * src_pitch + ddirty->left * stdu->cpp;
 
 	dst_pitch = ddirty->pitch;
-	dst = ttm_kmap_obj_virtual(&stdu->guest_map, &not_used);
+	dst = ttm_kmap_obj_virtual(&guest_map, &not_used);
 	dst += ddirty->fb_top * dst_pitch + ddirty->fb_left * stdu->cpp;
 
 
@@ -772,6 +780,7 @@ static void vmw_stdu_dmabuf_cpu_commit(s
 		vmw_fifo_commit(dev_priv, sizeof(*cmd));
 	}
 
+	ttm_bo_kunmap(&guest_map);
 out_cleanup:
 	ddirty->left = ddirty->top = ddirty->fb_left = ddirty->fb_top = S32_MAX;
 	ddirty->right = ddirty->bottom = S32_MIN;
@@ -1109,9 +1118,6 @@ vmw_stdu_primary_plane_cleanup_fb(struct
 {
 	struct vmw_plane_state *vps = vmw_plane_state_to_vps(old_state);
 
-	if (vps->guest_map.virtual)
-		ttm_bo_kunmap(&vps->guest_map);
-
 	if (vps->host_map.virtual)
 		ttm_bo_kunmap(&vps->host_map);
 
@@ -1277,33 +1283,11 @@ vmw_stdu_primary_plane_prepare_fb(struct
 	 */
 	if (vps->content_fb_type == SEPARATE_DMA &&
 	    !(dev_priv->capabilities & SVGA_CAP_3D)) {
-
-		struct vmw_framebuffer_dmabuf *new_vfbd;
-
-		new_vfbd = vmw_framebuffer_to_vfbd(new_fb);
-
-		ret = ttm_bo_reserve(&new_vfbd->buffer->base, false, false,
-				     NULL);
-		if (ret)
-			goto out_srf_unpin;
-
-		ret = ttm_bo_kmap(&new_vfbd->buffer->base, 0,
-				  new_vfbd->buffer->base.num_pages,
-				  &vps->guest_map);
-
-		ttm_bo_unreserve(&new_vfbd->buffer->base);
-
-		if (ret) {
-			DRM_ERROR("Failed to map content buffer to CPU\n");
-			goto out_srf_unpin;
-		}
-
 		ret = ttm_bo_kmap(&vps->surf->res.backup->base, 0,
 				  vps->surf->res.backup->base.num_pages,
 				  &vps->host_map);
 		if (ret) {
 			DRM_ERROR("Failed to map display buffer to CPU\n");
-			ttm_bo_kunmap(&vps->guest_map);
 			goto out_srf_unpin;
 		}
 
@@ -1350,7 +1334,6 @@ vmw_stdu_primary_plane_atomic_update(str
 	stdu->display_srf = vps->surf;
 	stdu->content_fb_type = vps->content_fb_type;
 	stdu->cpp = vps->cpp;
-	memcpy(&stdu->guest_map, &vps->guest_map, sizeof(vps->guest_map));
 	memcpy(&stdu->host_map, &vps->host_map, sizeof(vps->host_map));
 
 	if (!stdu->defined)

[PATCH 4.14 067/118] drm/vmwgfx: Potential off by one in vmw_view_add()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>

commit 0d9cac0ca0429830c40fe1a4e50e60f6221fd7b6 upstream.

The vmw_view_cmd_to_type() function returns vmw_view_max (3) on error.
It's one element beyond the end of the vmw_view_cotables[] table.

My read on this is that it's possible to hit this failure.  header->id
comes from vmw_cmd_check() and it's a user controlled number between
1040 and 1225 so we can hit that error.  But I don't have the hardware
to test this code.

Fixes: d80efd5cb3de ("drm/vmwgfx: Initial DX support")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c
@@ -2731,6 +2731,8 @@ static int vmw_cmd_dx_view_define(struct
 	}
 
 	view_type = vmw_view_cmd_to_type(header->id);
+	if (view_type == vmw_view_max)
+		return -EINVAL;
 	cmd = container_of(header, typeof(*cmd), header);
 	ret = vmw_cmd_res_check(dev_priv, sw_context, vmw_res_surface,
 				user_surface_converter,

[PATCH 4.14 068/118] drm/i915/gvt: Clear the shadow page table entry after post-sync

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhi Wang <zhi.a.wang@intel.com>

commit 121d760d0788f95619049c63449d977065cab69d upstream.

A shadow page table entry needs to be cleared after being set as
post-sync. This patch fixes the recent error reported in Win7-32 test.

Fixes: 2707e4446688 ("drm/i915/gvt: vGPU graphics memory virtualization")
Signed-off-by: Zhi Wang <zhi.a.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhenyu Wang <zhenyuw@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c
@@ -1359,12 +1359,15 @@ static int ppgtt_handle_guest_write_page
 			return ret;
 	} else {
 		if (!test_bit(index, spt->post_shadow_bitmap)) {
+			int type = spt->shadow_page.type;
+
 			ppgtt_get_shadow_entry(spt, &se, index);
 			ret = ppgtt_handle_guest_entry_removal(gpt, &se, index);
 			if (ret)
 				return ret;
+			ops->set_pfn(&se, vgpu->gtt.scratch_pt[type].page_mfn);
+			ppgtt_set_shadow_entry(spt, &se, index);
 		}
-
 		ppgtt_set_post_shadow(spt, index);
 	}
 

[PATCH 4.14 069/118] drm/i915: Whitelist SLICE_COMMON_ECO_CHICKEN1 on Geminilake.

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kenneth Graunke <kenneth@whitecape.org>

commit 4636bda86aa1f34f45c629477476a0dcfa04e597 upstream.

Geminilake requires the 3D driver to select whether barriers are
intended for compute shaders, or tessellation control shaders, by
whacking a "Barrier Mode" bit in SLICE_COMMON_ECO_CHICKEN1 when
switching pipelines.  Failure to do this properly can result in GPU
hangs.

Unfortunately, this means it needs to switch mid-batch, so only
userspace can properly set it.  To facilitate this, the kernel needs
to whitelist the register.

The workarounds page currently tags this as applying to Broxton only,
but that doesn't make sense.  The documentation for the register it
references says the bit userspace is supposed to toggle only exists on
Geminilake.  Empirically, the Mesa patch to toggle this bit appears to
fix intermittent GPU hangs in tessellation control shader barrier tests
on Geminilake; we haven't seen those hangs on Broxton.

v2: Mention WA #0862 in the comment (it doesn't have a name).

Signed-off-by: Kenneth Graunke <kenneth@whitecape.org>
Acked-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20180105085905.9298-1-kenneth@whitecape.org
(cherry picked from commit ab062639edb0412daf6de540725276b9a5d217f9)
Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_reg.h        |    2 ++
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_engine_cs.c |    5 +++++
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_reg.h
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_reg.h
@@ -6987,6 +6987,8 @@ enum {
 #define GEN9_SLICE_COMMON_ECO_CHICKEN0		_MMIO(0x7308)
 #define  DISABLE_PIXEL_MASK_CAMMING		(1<<14)
 
+#define GEN9_SLICE_COMMON_ECO_CHICKEN1		_MMIO(0x731c)
+
 #define GEN7_L3SQCREG1				_MMIO(0xB010)
 #define  VLV_B0_WA_L3SQCREG1_VALUE		0x00D30000
 
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_engine_cs.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_engine_cs.c
@@ -1125,6 +1125,11 @@ static int glk_init_workarounds(struct i
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
+	/* WA #0862: Userspace has to set "Barrier Mode" to avoid hangs. */
+	ret = wa_ring_whitelist_reg(engine, GEN9_SLICE_COMMON_ECO_CHICKEN1);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
 	/* WaToEnableHwFixForPushConstHWBug:glk */
 	WA_SET_BIT_MASKED(COMMON_SLICE_CHICKEN2,
 			  GEN8_SBE_DISABLE_REPLAY_BUF_OPTIMIZATION);

[PATCH 4.14 070/118] drm/i915: Move init_clock_gating() back to where it was

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>

commit 6ac43272768ca901daac4076a66c2c4e3c7b9321 upstream.

Apparently setting up a bunch of GT registers before we've properly
initialized the rest of the GT hardware leads to these setting being
lost. So looks like I broke HSW with commit b7048ea12fbb ("drm/i915:
Do .init_clock_gating() earlier to avoid it clobbering watermarks")
by doing init_clock_gating() too early. This should actually affect
other platforms as well, but apparently not to such a great degree.

What I was ultimately after in that commit was to move the
ilk_init_lp_watermarks() call earlier. So let's undo the damage and
move init_clock_gating() back to where it was, and call
ilk_init_lp_watermarks() just before the watermark state readout.

This highlights how fragile and messed up our init order really is.
I wonder why we even initialize the display before gem. The opposite
order would make much more sense to me...

v2: Keep WaRsPkgCStateDisplayPMReq:hsw early as it really must
    be done before all planes might get disabled.

Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Mark Janes <mark.a.janes@intel.com>
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Oscar Mateo <oscar.mateo@intel.com>
Cc: Mika Kuoppala <mika.kuoppala@linux.intel.com>
Reported-by: Mark Janes <mark.a.janes@intel.com>
Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=103549
Fixes: b7048ea12fbb ("drm/i915: Do .init_clock_gating() earlier to avoid it clobbering watermarks")
References: https://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/intel-gfx/2017-November/145432.html
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20171108133555.14091-1-ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com
Tested-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
(cherry picked from commit f72b84c677d61f201b869223a8d6e389c7bb7d3d)
Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>


---
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_display.c |   14 +++++++++--
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_pm.c      |   44 ++++++++++++++---------------------
 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_display.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_display.c
@@ -3800,6 +3800,7 @@ void intel_finish_reset(struct drm_i915_
 
 		intel_pps_unlock_regs_wa(dev_priv);
 		intel_modeset_init_hw(dev);
+		intel_init_clock_gating(dev_priv);
 
 		spin_lock_irq(&dev_priv->irq_lock);
 		if (dev_priv->display.hpd_irq_setup)
@@ -14406,8 +14407,6 @@ void intel_modeset_init_hw(struct drm_de
 
 	intel_update_cdclk(dev_priv);
 	dev_priv->cdclk.logical = dev_priv->cdclk.actual = dev_priv->cdclk.hw;
-
-	intel_init_clock_gating(dev_priv);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -15124,6 +15123,15 @@ intel_modeset_setup_hw_state(struct drm_
 	struct intel_encoder *encoder;
 	int i;
 
+	if (IS_HASWELL(dev_priv)) {
+		/*
+		 * WaRsPkgCStateDisplayPMReq:hsw
+		 * System hang if this isn't done before disabling all planes!
+		 */
+		I915_WRITE(CHICKEN_PAR1_1,
+			   I915_READ(CHICKEN_PAR1_1) | FORCE_ARB_IDLE_PLANES);
+	}
+
 	intel_modeset_readout_hw_state(dev);
 
 	/* HW state is read out, now we need to sanitize this mess. */
@@ -15220,6 +15228,8 @@ void intel_modeset_gem_init(struct drm_d
 
 	intel_init_gt_powersave(dev_priv);
 
+	intel_init_clock_gating(dev_priv);
+
 	intel_setup_overlay(dev_priv);
 }
 
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_pm.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_pm.c
@@ -5669,12 +5669,30 @@ void vlv_wm_sanitize(struct drm_i915_pri
 	mutex_unlock(&dev_priv->wm.wm_mutex);
 }
 
+/*
+ * FIXME should probably kill this and improve
+ * the real watermark readout/sanitation instead
+ */
+static void ilk_init_lp_watermarks(struct drm_i915_private *dev_priv)
+{
+	I915_WRITE(WM3_LP_ILK, I915_READ(WM3_LP_ILK) & ~WM1_LP_SR_EN);
+	I915_WRITE(WM2_LP_ILK, I915_READ(WM2_LP_ILK) & ~WM1_LP_SR_EN);
+	I915_WRITE(WM1_LP_ILK, I915_READ(WM1_LP_ILK) & ~WM1_LP_SR_EN);
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't touch WM1S_LP_EN here.
+	 * Doing so could cause underruns.
+	 */
+}
+
 void ilk_wm_get_hw_state(struct drm_device *dev)
 {
 	struct drm_i915_private *dev_priv = to_i915(dev);
 	struct ilk_wm_values *hw = &dev_priv->wm.hw;
 	struct drm_crtc *crtc;
 
+	ilk_init_lp_watermarks(dev_priv);
+
 	for_each_crtc(dev, crtc)
 		ilk_pipe_wm_get_hw_state(crtc);
 
@@ -7959,18 +7977,6 @@ static void g4x_disable_trickle_feed(str
 	}
 }
 
-static void ilk_init_lp_watermarks(struct drm_i915_private *dev_priv)
-{
-	I915_WRITE(WM3_LP_ILK, I915_READ(WM3_LP_ILK) & ~WM1_LP_SR_EN);
-	I915_WRITE(WM2_LP_ILK, I915_READ(WM2_LP_ILK) & ~WM1_LP_SR_EN);
-	I915_WRITE(WM1_LP_ILK, I915_READ(WM1_LP_ILK) & ~WM1_LP_SR_EN);
-
-	/*
-	 * Don't touch WM1S_LP_EN here.
-	 * Doing so could cause underruns.
-	 */
-}
-
 static void ironlake_init_clock_gating(struct drm_i915_private *dev_priv)
 {
 	uint32_t dspclk_gate = ILK_VRHUNIT_CLOCK_GATE_DISABLE;
@@ -8004,8 +8010,6 @@ static void ironlake_init_clock_gating(s
 		   (I915_READ(DISP_ARB_CTL) |
 		    DISP_FBC_WM_DIS));
 
-	ilk_init_lp_watermarks(dev_priv);
-
 	/*
 	 * Based on the document from hardware guys the following bits
 	 * should be set unconditionally in order to enable FBC.
@@ -8118,8 +8122,6 @@ static void gen6_init_clock_gating(struc
 	I915_WRITE(GEN6_GT_MODE,
 		   _MASKED_FIELD(GEN6_WIZ_HASHING_MASK, GEN6_WIZ_HASHING_16x4));
 
-	ilk_init_lp_watermarks(dev_priv);
-
 	I915_WRITE(CACHE_MODE_0,
 		   _MASKED_BIT_DISABLE(CM0_STC_EVICT_DISABLE_LRA_SNB));
 
@@ -8293,8 +8295,6 @@ static void broadwell_init_clock_gating(
 {
 	enum pipe pipe;
 
-	ilk_init_lp_watermarks(dev_priv);
-
 	/* WaSwitchSolVfFArbitrationPriority:bdw */
 	I915_WRITE(GAM_ECOCHK, I915_READ(GAM_ECOCHK) | HSW_ECOCHK_ARB_PRIO_SOL);
 
@@ -8349,8 +8349,6 @@ static void broadwell_init_clock_gating(
 
 static void haswell_init_clock_gating(struct drm_i915_private *dev_priv)
 {
-	ilk_init_lp_watermarks(dev_priv);
-
 	/* L3 caching of data atomics doesn't work -- disable it. */
 	I915_WRITE(HSW_SCRATCH1, HSW_SCRATCH1_L3_DATA_ATOMICS_DISABLE);
 	I915_WRITE(HSW_ROW_CHICKEN3,
@@ -8394,10 +8392,6 @@ static void haswell_init_clock_gating(st
 	/* WaSwitchSolVfFArbitrationPriority:hsw */
 	I915_WRITE(GAM_ECOCHK, I915_READ(GAM_ECOCHK) | HSW_ECOCHK_ARB_PRIO_SOL);
 
-	/* WaRsPkgCStateDisplayPMReq:hsw */
-	I915_WRITE(CHICKEN_PAR1_1,
-		   I915_READ(CHICKEN_PAR1_1) | FORCE_ARB_IDLE_PLANES);
-
 	lpt_init_clock_gating(dev_priv);
 }
 
@@ -8405,8 +8399,6 @@ static void ivybridge_init_clock_gating(
 {
 	uint32_t snpcr;
 
-	ilk_init_lp_watermarks(dev_priv);
-
 	I915_WRITE(ILK_DSPCLK_GATE_D, ILK_VRHUNIT_CLOCK_GATE_DISABLE);
 
 	/* WaDisableEarlyCull:ivb */

[PATCH 4.14 071/118] drm/i915: Fix init_clock_gating for resume

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>

commit 3572f04c69ed4369da5d3c65d84fb18774aa60b6 upstream.

Moving the init_clock_gating() call from intel_modeset_init_hw() to
intel_modeset_gem_init() had an unintended effect of not applying
some workarounds on resume. This, for example, cause some kind of
corruption to appear at the top of my IVB Thinkpad X1 Carbon LVDS
screen after hibernation. Fix the problem by explicitly calling
init_clock_gating() from the resume path.

I really hope this doesn't break something else again. At least
the problems reported at https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=103549
didn't make a comeback, even after a hibernate cycle.

v2: Reorder the init_clock_gating vs. modeset_init_hw to match
    the display reset path (Rodrigo)

Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Fixes: 6ac43272768c ("drm/i915: Move init_clock_gating() back to where it was")
Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20171116160215.25715-1-ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit 675f7ff35bd256e65d3d0f52718d8babf5d1002a)
Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_drv.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_drv.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_drv.c
@@ -1693,6 +1693,7 @@ static int i915_drm_resume(struct drm_de
 	intel_guc_resume(dev_priv);
 
 	intel_modeset_init_hw(dev);
+	intel_init_clock_gating(dev_priv);
 
 	spin_lock_irq(&dev_priv->irq_lock);
 	if (dev_priv->display.hpd_irq_setup)

[PATCH 4.14 072/118] bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

commit b2157399cc9898260d6031c5bfe45fe137c1fbe7 upstream.

Under speculation, CPUs may mis-predict branches in bounds checks. Thus,
memory accesses under a bounds check may be speculated even if the
bounds check fails, providing a primitive for building a side channel.

To avoid leaking kernel data round up array-based maps and mask the index
after bounds check, so speculated load with out of bounds index will load
either valid value from the array or zero from the padded area.

Unconditionally mask index for all array types even when max_entries
are not rounded to power of 2 for root user.
When map is created by unpriv user generate a sequence of bpf insns
that includes AND operation to make sure that JITed code includes
the same 'index & index_mask' operation.

If prog_array map is created by unpriv user replace
  bpf_tail_call(ctx, map, index);
with
  if (index >= max_entries) {
    index &= map->index_mask;
    bpf_tail_call(ctx, map, index);
  }
(along with roundup to power 2) to prevent out-of-bounds speculation.
There is secondary redundant 'if (index >= max_entries)' in the interpreter
and in all JITs, but they can be optimized later if necessary.

Other array-like maps (cpumap, devmap, sockmap, perf_event_array, cgroup_array)
cannot be used by unpriv, so no changes there.

That fixes bpf side of "Variant 1: bounds check bypass (CVE-2017-5753)" on
all architectures with and without JIT.

v2->v3:
Daniel noticed that attack potentially can be crafted via syscall commands
without loading the program, so add masking to those paths as well.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 include/linux/bpf.h   |    2 ++
 kernel/bpf/arraymap.c |   47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c |   36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ struct bpf_map {
 	u32 pages;
 	u32 id;
 	int numa_node;
+	bool unpriv_array;
 	struct user_struct *user;
 	const struct bpf_map_ops *ops;
 	struct work_struct work;
@@ -195,6 +196,7 @@ struct bpf_prog_aux {
 struct bpf_array {
 	struct bpf_map map;
 	u32 elem_size;
+	u32 index_mask;
 	/* 'ownership' of prog_array is claimed by the first program that
 	 * is going to use this map or by the first program which FD is stored
 	 * in the map to make sure that all callers and callees have the same
--- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
@@ -50,9 +50,10 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(u
 {
 	bool percpu = attr->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY;
 	int numa_node = bpf_map_attr_numa_node(attr);
+	u32 elem_size, index_mask, max_entries;
+	bool unpriv = !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
 	struct bpf_array *array;
 	u64 array_size;
-	u32 elem_size;
 
 	/* check sanity of attributes */
 	if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 4 ||
@@ -68,11 +69,20 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(u
 
 	elem_size = round_up(attr->value_size, 8);
 
+	max_entries = attr->max_entries;
+	index_mask = roundup_pow_of_two(max_entries) - 1;
+
+	if (unpriv)
+		/* round up array size to nearest power of 2,
+		 * since cpu will speculate within index_mask limits
+		 */
+		max_entries = index_mask + 1;
+
 	array_size = sizeof(*array);
 	if (percpu)
-		array_size += (u64) attr->max_entries * sizeof(void *);
+		array_size += (u64) max_entries * sizeof(void *);
 	else
-		array_size += (u64) attr->max_entries * elem_size;
+		array_size += (u64) max_entries * elem_size;
 
 	/* make sure there is no u32 overflow later in round_up() */
 	if (array_size >= U32_MAX - PAGE_SIZE)
@@ -82,6 +92,8 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(u
 	array = bpf_map_area_alloc(array_size, numa_node);
 	if (!array)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	array->index_mask = index_mask;
+	array->map.unpriv_array = unpriv;
 
 	/* copy mandatory map attributes */
 	array->map.map_type = attr->map_type;
@@ -117,12 +129,13 @@ static void *array_map_lookup_elem(struc
 	if (unlikely(index >= array->map.max_entries))
 		return NULL;
 
-	return array->value + array->elem_size * index;
+	return array->value + array->elem_size * (index & array->index_mask);
 }
 
 /* emit BPF instructions equivalent to C code of array_map_lookup_elem() */
 static u32 array_map_gen_lookup(struct bpf_map *map, struct bpf_insn *insn_buf)
 {
+	struct bpf_array *array = container_of(map, struct bpf_array, map);
 	struct bpf_insn *insn = insn_buf;
 	u32 elem_size = round_up(map->value_size, 8);
 	const int ret = BPF_REG_0;
@@ -131,7 +144,12 @@ static u32 array_map_gen_lookup(struct b
 
 	*insn++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, map_ptr, offsetof(struct bpf_array, value));
 	*insn++ = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, ret, index, 0);
-	*insn++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, ret, map->max_entries, 3);
+	if (map->unpriv_array) {
+		*insn++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, ret, map->max_entries, 4);
+		*insn++ = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, ret, array->index_mask);
+	} else {
+		*insn++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, ret, map->max_entries, 3);
+	}
 
 	if (is_power_of_2(elem_size)) {
 		*insn++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, ret, ilog2(elem_size));
@@ -153,7 +171,7 @@ static void *percpu_array_map_lookup_ele
 	if (unlikely(index >= array->map.max_entries))
 		return NULL;
 
-	return this_cpu_ptr(array->pptrs[index]);
+	return this_cpu_ptr(array->pptrs[index & array->index_mask]);
 }
 
 int bpf_percpu_array_copy(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value)
@@ -173,7 +191,7 @@ int bpf_percpu_array_copy(struct bpf_map
 	 */
 	size = round_up(map->value_size, 8);
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	pptr = array->pptrs[index];
+	pptr = array->pptrs[index & array->index_mask];
 	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
 		bpf_long_memcpy(value + off, per_cpu_ptr(pptr, cpu), size);
 		off += size;
@@ -221,10 +239,11 @@ static int array_map_update_elem(struct
 		return -EEXIST;
 
 	if (array->map.map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY)
-		memcpy(this_cpu_ptr(array->pptrs[index]),
+		memcpy(this_cpu_ptr(array->pptrs[index & array->index_mask]),
 		       value, map->value_size);
 	else
-		memcpy(array->value + array->elem_size * index,
+		memcpy(array->value +
+		       array->elem_size * (index & array->index_mask),
 		       value, map->value_size);
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -258,7 +277,7 @@ int bpf_percpu_array_update(struct bpf_m
 	 */
 	size = round_up(map->value_size, 8);
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	pptr = array->pptrs[index];
+	pptr = array->pptrs[index & array->index_mask];
 	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
 		bpf_long_memcpy(per_cpu_ptr(pptr, cpu), value + off, size);
 		off += size;
@@ -609,6 +628,7 @@ static void *array_of_map_lookup_elem(st
 static u32 array_of_map_gen_lookup(struct bpf_map *map,
 				   struct bpf_insn *insn_buf)
 {
+	struct bpf_array *array = container_of(map, struct bpf_array, map);
 	u32 elem_size = round_up(map->value_size, 8);
 	struct bpf_insn *insn = insn_buf;
 	const int ret = BPF_REG_0;
@@ -617,7 +637,12 @@ static u32 array_of_map_gen_lookup(struc
 
 	*insn++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, map_ptr, offsetof(struct bpf_array, value));
 	*insn++ = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, ret, index, 0);
-	*insn++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, ret, map->max_entries, 5);
+	if (map->unpriv_array) {
+		*insn++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, ret, map->max_entries, 6);
+		*insn++ = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, ret, array->index_mask);
+	} else {
+		*insn++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, ret, map->max_entries, 5);
+	}
 	if (is_power_of_2(elem_size))
 		*insn++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, ret, ilog2(elem_size));
 	else
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -1701,6 +1701,13 @@ static int check_call(struct bpf_verifie
 	err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_2, fn->arg2_type, &meta);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
+	if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
+		if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) {
+			verbose("verifier bug\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr;
+	}
 	err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_3, fn->arg3_type, &meta);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
@@ -4315,6 +4322,35 @@ static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_ve
 			 */
 			insn->imm = 0;
 			insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL;
+
+			/* instead of changing every JIT dealing with tail_call
+			 * emit two extra insns:
+			 * if (index >= max_entries) goto out;
+			 * index &= array->index_mask;
+			 * to avoid out-of-bounds cpu speculation
+			 */
+			map_ptr = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].map_ptr;
+			if (map_ptr == BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON) {
+				verbose("tail_call obusing map_ptr\n");
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+			if (!map_ptr->unpriv_array)
+				continue;
+			insn_buf[0] = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_3,
+						  map_ptr->max_entries, 2);
+			insn_buf[1] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_3,
+						    container_of(map_ptr,
+								 struct bpf_array,
+								 map)->index_mask);
+			insn_buf[2] = *insn;
+			cnt = 3;
+			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
+			if (!new_prog)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+
+			delta    += cnt - 1;
+			env->prog = prog = new_prog;
+			insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
 			continue;
 		}
 

[PATCH 4.14 073/118] bpf, array: fix overflow in max_entries and undefined behavior in index_mask

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

commit bbeb6e4323dad9b5e0ee9f60c223dd532e2403b1 upstream.

syzkaller tried to alloc a map with 0xfffffffd entries out of a userns,
and thus unprivileged. With the recently added logic in b2157399cc98
("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") we round this up to the next
power of two value for max_entries for unprivileged such that we can
apply proper masking into potentially zeroed out map slots.

However, this will generate an index_mask of 0xffffffff, and therefore
a + 1 will let this overflow into new max_entries of 0. This will pass
allocation, etc, and later on map access we still enforce on the original
attr->max_entries value which was 0xfffffffd, therefore triggering GPF
all over the place. Thus bail out on overflow in such case.

Moreover, on 32 bit archs roundup_pow_of_two() can also not be used,
since fls_long(max_entries - 1) can result in 32 and 1UL << 32 in 32 bit
space is undefined. Therefore, do this by hand in a 64 bit variable.

This fixes all the issues triggered by syzkaller's reproducers.

Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation")
Reported-by: syzbot+b0efb8e572d01bce1ae0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+6c15e9744f75f2364773@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+d2f5524fb46fd3b312ee@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+61d23c95395cc90dbc2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+0d363c942452cca68c01@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 kernel/bpf/arraymap.c |   18 +++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(u
 	u32 elem_size, index_mask, max_entries;
 	bool unpriv = !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
 	struct bpf_array *array;
-	u64 array_size;
+	u64 array_size, mask64;
 
 	/* check sanity of attributes */
 	if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 4 ||
@@ -70,13 +70,25 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(u
 	elem_size = round_up(attr->value_size, 8);
 
 	max_entries = attr->max_entries;
-	index_mask = roundup_pow_of_two(max_entries) - 1;
 
-	if (unpriv)
+	/* On 32 bit archs roundup_pow_of_two() with max_entries that has
+	 * upper most bit set in u32 space is undefined behavior due to
+	 * resulting 1U << 32, so do it manually here in u64 space.
+	 */
+	mask64 = fls_long(max_entries - 1);
+	mask64 = 1ULL << mask64;
+	mask64 -= 1;
+
+	index_mask = mask64;
+	if (unpriv) {
 		/* round up array size to nearest power of 2,
 		 * since cpu will speculate within index_mask limits
 		 */
 		max_entries = index_mask + 1;
+		/* Check for overflows. */
+		if (max_entries < attr->max_entries)
+			return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG);
+	}
 
 	array_size = sizeof(*array);
 	if (percpu)

[PATCH 4.14 074/118] bpf: arsh is not supported in 32 bit alu thus reject it

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

commit 7891a87efc7116590eaba57acc3c422487802c6f upstream.

The following snippet was throwing an 'unknown opcode cc' warning
in BPF interpreter:

  0: (18) r0 = 0x0
  2: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r0
  3: (cc) (u32) r0 s>>= (u32) r0
  4: (95) exit

Although a number of JITs do support BPF_ALU | BPF_ARSH | BPF_{K,X}
generation, not all of them do and interpreter does neither. We can
leave existing ones and implement it later in bpf-next for the
remaining ones, but reject this properly in verifier for the time
being.

Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Reported-by: syzbot+93c4904c5c70348a6890@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c                       |    5 +++
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c |   40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+)

--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2493,6 +2493,11 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verif
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 
+		if (opcode == BPF_ARSH && BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) {
+			verbose("BPF_ARSH not supported for 32 bit ALU\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
 		if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH ||
 		     opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
 			int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32;
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
@@ -273,6 +273,46 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
 		.result = REJECT,
 	},
 	{
+		"arsh32 on imm",
+		.insns = {
+			BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1),
+			BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_0, 5),
+			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+		},
+		.result = REJECT,
+		.errstr = "BPF_ARSH not supported for 32 bit ALU",
+	},
+	{
+		"arsh32 on reg",
+		.insns = {
+			BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1),
+			BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 5),
+			BPF_ALU32_REG(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
+			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+		},
+		.result = REJECT,
+		.errstr = "BPF_ARSH not supported for 32 bit ALU",
+	},
+	{
+		"arsh64 on imm",
+		.insns = {
+			BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1),
+			BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_0, 5),
+			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+		},
+		.result = ACCEPT,
+	},
+	{
+		"arsh64 on reg",
+		.insns = {
+			BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1),
+			BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 5),
+			BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
+			BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+		},
+		.result = ACCEPT,
+	},
+	{
 		"no bpf_exit",
 		.insns = {
 			BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2),

[PATCH 4.14 075/118] USB: serial: cp210x: add IDs for LifeScan OneTouch Verio IQ

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Diego Elio Pettenò <flameeyes@flameeyes.eu>

commit 4307413256ac1e09b8f53e8715af3df9e49beec3 upstream.

Add IDs for the OneTouch Verio IQ that comes with an embedded
USB-to-serial converter.

Signed-off-by: Diego Elio Pettenò <flameeyes@flameeyes.eu>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_tab
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x8470) }, /* Juniper Networks BX Series System Console */
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x8477) }, /* Balluff RFID */
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x84B6) }, /* Starizona Hyperion */
+	{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x85A7) }, /* LifeScan OneTouch Verio IQ */
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x85EA) }, /* AC-Services IBUS-IF */
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x85EB) }, /* AC-Services CIS-IBUS */
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x10C4, 0x85F8) }, /* Virtenio Preon32 */

[PATCH 4.14 076/118] USB: serial: cp210x: add new device ID ELV ALC 8xxx

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Holl <cyborgx1@gmail.com>

commit d14ac576d10f865970bb1324d337e5e24d79aaf4 upstream.

This adds the ELV ALC 8xxx Battery Charging device
to the list of USB IDs of drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c

Signed-off-by: Christian Holl <cyborgx1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c
@@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_tab
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x1843, 0x0200) }, /* Vaisala USB Instrument Cable */
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x18EF, 0xE00F) }, /* ELV USB-I2C-Interface */
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x18EF, 0xE025) }, /* ELV Marble Sound Board 1 */
+	{ USB_DEVICE(0x18EF, 0xE030) }, /* ELV ALC 8xxx Battery Charger */
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x18EF, 0xE032) }, /* ELV TFD500 Data Logger */
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x1901, 0x0190) }, /* GE B850 CP2105 Recorder interface */
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x1901, 0x0193) }, /* GE B650 CP2104 PMC interface */

[PATCH 4.14 077/118] usb: misc: usb3503: make sure reset is low for at least 100us

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Stefan Agner <stefan@agner.ch>

commit b8626f1dc29d3eee444bfaa92146ec7b291ef41c upstream.

When using a GPIO which is high by default, and initialize the
driver in USB Hub mode, initialization fails with:
  [  111.757794] usb3503 0-0008: SP_ILOCK failed (-5)

The reason seems to be that the chip is not properly reset.
Probe does initialize reset low, however some lines later the
code already set it back high, which is not long enouth.

Make sure reset is asserted for at least 100us by inserting a
delay after initializing the reset pin during probe.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Agner <stefan@agner.ch>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/usb/misc/usb3503.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/usb/misc/usb3503.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/misc/usb3503.c
@@ -292,6 +292,8 @@ static int usb3503_probe(struct usb3503
 	if (gpio_is_valid(hub->gpio_reset)) {
 		err = devm_gpio_request_one(dev, hub->gpio_reset,
 				GPIOF_OUT_INIT_LOW, "usb3503 reset");
+		/* Datasheet defines a hardware reset to be at least 100us */
+		usleep_range(100, 10000);
 		if (err) {
 			dev_err(dev,
 				"unable to request GPIO %d as reset pin (%d)\n",

[PATCH 4.14 078/118] USB: fix usbmon BUG trigger

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pete Zaitcev <zaitcev@redhat.com>

commit 46eb14a6e1585d99c1b9f58d0e7389082a5f466b upstream.

Automated tests triggered this by opening usbmon and accessing the
mmap while simultaneously resizing the buffers. This bug was with
us since 2006, because typically applications only size the buffers
once and thus avoid racing. Reported by Kirill A. Shutemov.

Reported-by: <syzbot+f9831b881b3e849829fc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pete Zaitcev <zaitcev@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/usb/mon/mon_bin.c |    8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/mon/mon_bin.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/mon/mon_bin.c
@@ -1004,7 +1004,9 @@ static long mon_bin_ioctl(struct file *f
 		break;
 
 	case MON_IOCQ_RING_SIZE:
+		mutex_lock(&rp->fetch_lock);
 		ret = rp->b_size;
+		mutex_unlock(&rp->fetch_lock);
 		break;
 
 	case MON_IOCT_RING_SIZE:
@@ -1231,12 +1233,16 @@ static int mon_bin_vma_fault(struct vm_f
 	unsigned long offset, chunk_idx;
 	struct page *pageptr;
 
+	mutex_lock(&rp->fetch_lock);
 	offset = vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
-	if (offset >= rp->b_size)
+	if (offset >= rp->b_size) {
+		mutex_unlock(&rp->fetch_lock);
 		return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+	}
 	chunk_idx = offset / CHUNK_SIZE;
 	pageptr = rp->b_vec[chunk_idx].pg;
 	get_page(pageptr);
+	mutex_unlock(&rp->fetch_lock);
 	vmf->page = pageptr;
 	return 0;
 }

[PATCH 4.14 079/118] USB: UDC core: fix double-free in usb_add_gadget_udc_release

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>

commit 7ae2c3c280db183ca9ada2675c34ec2f7378abfa upstream.

The error-handling pathways in usb_add_gadget_udc_release() are messed
up.  Aside from the uninformative statement labels, they can deallocate
the udc structure after calling put_device(), which is a double-free.
This was observed by KASAN in automatic testing.

This patch cleans up the routine.  It preserves the requirement that
when any failure occurs, we call put_device(&gadget->dev).

Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Chen <peter.chen@nxp.com>
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c |   28 +++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c
@@ -1158,11 +1158,7 @@ int usb_add_gadget_udc_release(struct de
 
 	udc = kzalloc(sizeof(*udc), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!udc)
-		goto err1;
-
-	ret = device_add(&gadget->dev);
-	if (ret)
-		goto err2;
+		goto err_put_gadget;
 
 	device_initialize(&udc->dev);
 	udc->dev.release = usb_udc_release;
@@ -1171,7 +1167,11 @@ int usb_add_gadget_udc_release(struct de
 	udc->dev.parent = parent;
 	ret = dev_set_name(&udc->dev, "%s", kobject_name(&parent->kobj));
 	if (ret)
-		goto err3;
+		goto err_put_udc;
+
+	ret = device_add(&gadget->dev);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err_put_udc;
 
 	udc->gadget = gadget;
 	gadget->udc = udc;
@@ -1181,7 +1181,7 @@ int usb_add_gadget_udc_release(struct de
 
 	ret = device_add(&udc->dev);
 	if (ret)
-		goto err4;
+		goto err_unlist_udc;
 
 	usb_gadget_set_state(gadget, USB_STATE_NOTATTACHED);
 	udc->vbus = true;
@@ -1189,27 +1189,25 @@ int usb_add_gadget_udc_release(struct de
 	/* pick up one of pending gadget drivers */
 	ret = check_pending_gadget_drivers(udc);
 	if (ret)
-		goto err5;
+		goto err_del_udc;
 
 	mutex_unlock(&udc_lock);
 
 	return 0;
 
-err5:
+ err_del_udc:
 	device_del(&udc->dev);
 
-err4:
+ err_unlist_udc:
 	list_del(&udc->list);
 	mutex_unlock(&udc_lock);
 
-err3:
-	put_device(&udc->dev);
 	device_del(&gadget->dev);
 
-err2:
-	kfree(udc);
+ err_put_udc:
+	put_device(&udc->dev);
 
-err1:
+ err_put_gadget:
 	put_device(&gadget->dev);
 	return ret;
 }

[PATCH 4.14 080/118] usbip: remove kernel addresses from usb device and urb debug msgs

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>

commit e1346fd87c71a1f61de1fe476ec8df1425ac931c upstream.

usbip_dump_usb_device() and usbip_dump_urb() print kernel addresses.
Remove kernel addresses from usb device and urb debug msgs and improve
the message content.

Instead of printing parent device and bus addresses, print parent device
and bus names.

Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c |   17 +++--------------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ static void usbip_dump_usb_device(struct
 	dev_dbg(dev, "       devnum(%d) devpath(%s) usb speed(%s)",
 		udev->devnum, udev->devpath, usb_speed_string(udev->speed));
 
-	pr_debug("tt %p, ttport %d\n", udev->tt, udev->ttport);
+	pr_debug("tt hub ttport %d\n", udev->ttport);
 
 	dev_dbg(dev, "                    ");
 	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
@@ -138,12 +138,8 @@ static void usbip_dump_usb_device(struct
 	}
 	pr_debug("\n");
 
-	dev_dbg(dev, "parent %p, bus %p\n", udev->parent, udev->bus);
-
-	dev_dbg(dev,
-		"descriptor %p, config %p, actconfig %p, rawdescriptors %p\n",
-		&udev->descriptor, udev->config,
-		udev->actconfig, udev->rawdescriptors);
+	dev_dbg(dev, "parent %s, bus %s\n", dev_name(&udev->parent->dev),
+		udev->bus->bus_name);
 
 	dev_dbg(dev, "have_langid %d, string_langid %d\n",
 		udev->have_langid, udev->string_langid);
@@ -251,9 +247,6 @@ void usbip_dump_urb(struct urb *urb)
 
 	dev = &urb->dev->dev;
 
-	dev_dbg(dev, "   urb                   :%p\n", urb);
-	dev_dbg(dev, "   dev                   :%p\n", urb->dev);
-
 	usbip_dump_usb_device(urb->dev);
 
 	dev_dbg(dev, "   pipe                  :%08x ", urb->pipe);
@@ -262,11 +255,9 @@ void usbip_dump_urb(struct urb *urb)
 
 	dev_dbg(dev, "   status                :%d\n", urb->status);
 	dev_dbg(dev, "   transfer_flags        :%08X\n", urb->transfer_flags);
-	dev_dbg(dev, "   transfer_buffer       :%p\n", urb->transfer_buffer);
 	dev_dbg(dev, "   transfer_buffer_length:%d\n",
 						urb->transfer_buffer_length);
 	dev_dbg(dev, "   actual_length         :%d\n", urb->actual_length);
-	dev_dbg(dev, "   setup_packet          :%p\n", urb->setup_packet);
 
 	if (urb->setup_packet && usb_pipetype(urb->pipe) == PIPE_CONTROL)
 		usbip_dump_usb_ctrlrequest(
@@ -276,8 +267,6 @@ void usbip_dump_urb(struct urb *urb)
 	dev_dbg(dev, "   number_of_packets     :%d\n", urb->number_of_packets);
 	dev_dbg(dev, "   interval              :%d\n", urb->interval);
 	dev_dbg(dev, "   error_count           :%d\n", urb->error_count);
-	dev_dbg(dev, "   context               :%p\n", urb->context);
-	dev_dbg(dev, "   complete              :%p\n", urb->complete);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usbip_dump_urb);
 

[PATCH 4.14 081/118] usbip: fix vudc_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>

commit b78d830f0049ef1966dc1e0ebd1ec2a594e2cf25 upstream.

Harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input that could trigger
large memory allocations. Add checks to validate transfer_buffer_length
and number_of_packets to protect against bad input requesting for
unbounded memory allocations.

Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_rx.c |   19 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_rx.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_rx.c
@@ -132,6 +132,25 @@ static int v_recv_cmd_submit(struct vudc
 	urb_p->new = 1;
 	urb_p->seqnum = pdu->base.seqnum;
 
+	if (urb_p->ep->type == USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_ISOC) {
+		/* validate packet size and number of packets */
+		unsigned int maxp, packets, bytes;
+
+		maxp = usb_endpoint_maxp(urb_p->ep->desc);
+		maxp *= usb_endpoint_maxp_mult(urb_p->ep->desc);
+		bytes = pdu->u.cmd_submit.transfer_buffer_length;
+		packets = DIV_ROUND_UP(bytes, maxp);
+
+		if (pdu->u.cmd_submit.number_of_packets < 0 ||
+		    pdu->u.cmd_submit.number_of_packets > packets) {
+			dev_err(&udc->gadget.dev,
+				"CMD_SUBMIT: isoc invalid num packets %d\n",
+				pdu->u.cmd_submit.number_of_packets);
+			ret = -EMSGSIZE;
+			goto free_urbp;
+		}
+	}
+
 	ret = alloc_urb_from_cmd(&urb_p->urb, pdu, urb_p->ep->type);
 	if (ret) {
 		usbip_event_add(&udc->ud, VUDC_EVENT_ERROR_MALLOC);

[PATCH 4.14 082/118] usbip: vudc_tx: fix v_send_ret_submit() vulnerability to null xfer buffer

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>

commit 5fd77a3a0e408c23ab4002a57db980e46bc16e72 upstream.

v_send_ret_submit() handles urb with a null transfer_buffer, when it
replays a packet with potential malicious data that could contain a
null buffer.

Add a check for the condition when actual_length > 0 and transfer_buffer
is null.

Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_tx.c |   11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_tx.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_tx.c
@@ -97,6 +97,13 @@ static int v_send_ret_submit(struct vudc
 	memset(&pdu_header, 0, sizeof(pdu_header));
 	memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
 
+	if (urb->actual_length > 0 && !urb->transfer_buffer) {
+		dev_err(&udc->gadget.dev,
+			"urb: actual_length %d transfer_buffer null\n",
+			urb->actual_length);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
 	if (urb_p->type == USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_ISOC)
 		iovnum = 2 + urb->number_of_packets;
 	else
@@ -112,8 +119,8 @@ static int v_send_ret_submit(struct vudc
 
 	/* 1. setup usbip_header */
 	setup_ret_submit_pdu(&pdu_header, urb_p);
-	usbip_dbg_stub_tx("setup txdata seqnum: %d urb: %p\n",
-			  pdu_header.base.seqnum, urb);
+	usbip_dbg_stub_tx("setup txdata seqnum: %d\n",
+			  pdu_header.base.seqnum);
 	usbip_header_correct_endian(&pdu_header, 1);
 
 	iov[iovnum].iov_base = &pdu_header;

[PATCH 4.14 083/118] staging: android: ashmem: fix a race condition in ASHMEM_SET_SIZE ioctl

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Viktor Slavkovic <viktors@google.com>

commit 443064cb0b1fb4569fe0a71209da7625129fb760 upstream.

A lock-unlock is missing in ASHMEM_SET_SIZE ioctl which can result in a
race condition when mmap is called. After the !asma->file check, before
setting asma->size, asma->file can be set in mmap. That would result in
having different asma->size than the mapped memory size. Combined with
ASHMEM_UNPIN ioctl and shrinker invocation, this can result in memory
corruption.

Signed-off-by: Viktor Slavkovic <viktors@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c
@@ -765,10 +765,12 @@ static long ashmem_ioctl(struct file *fi
 		break;
 	case ASHMEM_SET_SIZE:
 		ret = -EINVAL;
+		mutex_lock(&ashmem_mutex);
 		if (!asma->file) {
 			ret = 0;
 			asma->size = (size_t)arg;
 		}
+		mutex_unlock(&ashmem_mutex);
 		break;
 	case ASHMEM_GET_SIZE:
 		ret = asma->size;

[PATCH 4.14 084/118] Bluetooth: Prevent stack info leak from the EFS element.

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ben Seri <ben@armis.com>

commit 06e7e776ca4d36547e503279aeff996cbb292c16 upstream.

In the function l2cap_parse_conf_rsp and in the function
l2cap_parse_conf_req the following variable is declared without
initialization:

struct l2cap_conf_efs efs;

In addition, when parsing input configuration parameters in both of
these functions, the switch case for handling EFS elements may skip the
memcpy call that will write to the efs variable:

...
case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
if (olen == sizeof(efs))
memcpy(&efs, (void *)val, olen);
...

The olen in the above if is attacker controlled, and regardless of that
if, in both of these functions the efs variable would eventually be
added to the outgoing configuration request that is being built:

l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs), (unsigned long) &efs);

So by sending a configuration request, or response, that contains an
L2CAP_CONF_EFS element, but with an element length that is not
sizeof(efs) - the memcpy to the uninitialized efs variable can be
avoided, and the uninitialized variable would be returned to the
attacker (16 bytes).

This issue has been assigned CVE-2017-1000410

Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Seri <ben@armis.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c |   20 +++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
@@ -3363,9 +3363,10 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_req(struct l
 			break;
 
 		case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
-			remote_efs = 1;
-			if (olen == sizeof(efs))
+			if (olen == sizeof(efs)) {
+				remote_efs = 1;
 				memcpy(&efs, (void *) val, olen);
+			}
 			break;
 
 		case L2CAP_CONF_EWS:
@@ -3584,16 +3585,17 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_rsp(struct l
 			break;
 
 		case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
-			if (olen == sizeof(efs))
+			if (olen == sizeof(efs)) {
 				memcpy(&efs, (void *)val, olen);
 
-			if (chan->local_stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
-			    efs.stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
-			    efs.stype != chan->local_stype)
-				return -ECONNREFUSED;
+				if (chan->local_stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
+				    efs.stype != L2CAP_SERV_NOTRAFIC &&
+				    efs.stype != chan->local_stype)
+					return -ECONNREFUSED;
 
-			l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs),
-					   (unsigned long) &efs, endptr - ptr);
+				l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs),
+						   (unsigned long) &efs, endptr - ptr);
+			}
 			break;
 
 		case L2CAP_CONF_FCS:

[PATCH 4.14 085/118] uas: ignore UAS for Norelsys NS1068(X) chips

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Icenowy Zheng <icenowy@aosc.io>

commit 928afc85270753657b5543e052cc270c279a3fe9 upstream.

The UAS mode of Norelsys NS1068(X) is reported to fail to work on
several platforms with the following error message:

xhci-hcd xhci-hcd.0.auto: ERROR Transfer event for unknown stream ring slot 1 ep 8
xhci-hcd xhci-hcd.0.auto: @00000000bf04a400 00000000 00000000 1b000000 01098001

And when trying to mount a partition on the disk the disk will
disconnect from the USB controller, then after re-connecting the device
will be offlined and not working at all.

Falling back to USB mass storage can solve this problem, so ignore UAS
function of this chip.

Signed-off-by: Icenowy Zheng <icenowy@aosc.io>
Acked-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/usb/storage/unusual_uas.h |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/usb/storage/unusual_uas.h
+++ b/drivers/usb/storage/unusual_uas.h
@@ -156,6 +156,13 @@ UNUSUAL_DEV(0x2109, 0x0711, 0x0000, 0x99
 		USB_SC_DEVICE, USB_PR_DEVICE, NULL,
 		US_FL_NO_ATA_1X),
 
+/* Reported-by: Icenowy Zheng <icenowy@aosc.io> */
+UNUSUAL_DEV(0x2537, 0x1068, 0x0000, 0x9999,
+		"Norelsys",
+		"NS1068X",
+		USB_SC_DEVICE, USB_PR_DEVICE, NULL,
+		US_FL_IGNORE_UAS),
+
 /* Reported-by: Takeo Nakayama <javhera@gmx.com> */
 UNUSUAL_DEV(0x357d, 0x7788, 0x0000, 0x9999,
 		"JMicron",

[PATCH 4.14 086/118] mux: core: fix double get_device()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>

commit aa1f10e85b0ab53dee85d8e293c8159d18d293a8 upstream.

class_find_device already does a get_device on the returned device.
So the device returned by of_find_mux_chip_by_node is already referenced
and we should not reference it again (and unref it on error).

Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Rosin <peda@axentia.se>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/mux/core.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/mux/core.c
+++ b/drivers/mux/core.c
@@ -413,6 +413,7 @@ static int of_dev_node_match(struct devi
 	return dev->of_node == data;
 }
 
+/* Note this function returns a reference to the mux_chip dev. */
 static struct mux_chip *of_find_mux_chip_by_node(struct device_node *np)
 {
 	struct device *dev;
@@ -466,6 +467,7 @@ struct mux_control *mux_control_get(stru
 	    (!args.args_count && (mux_chip->controllers > 1))) {
 		dev_err(dev, "%pOF: wrong #mux-control-cells for %pOF\n",
 			np, args.np);
+		put_device(&mux_chip->dev);
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 	}
 
@@ -476,10 +478,10 @@ struct mux_control *mux_control_get(stru
 	if (controller >= mux_chip->controllers) {
 		dev_err(dev, "%pOF: bad mux controller %u specified in %pOF\n",
 			np, controller, args.np);
+		put_device(&mux_chip->dev);
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 	}
 
-	get_device(&mux_chip->dev);
 	return &mux_chip->mux[controller];
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mux_control_get);

[PATCH 4.14 087/118] kdump: write correct address of mem_section into vmcoreinfo

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>

commit a0b1280368d1e91ab72f849ef095b4f07a39bbf1 upstream.

Depending on configuration mem_section can now be an array or a pointer
to an array allocated dynamically.  In most cases, we can continue to
refer to it as 'mem_section' regardless of what it is.

But there's one exception: '&mem_section' means "address of the array"
if mem_section is an array, but if mem_section is a pointer, it would
mean "address of the pointer".

We've stepped onto this in kdump code.  VMCOREINFO_SYMBOL(mem_section)
writes down address of pointer into vmcoreinfo, not array as we wanted.

Let's introduce VMCOREINFO_SYMBOL_ARRAY() that would handle the
situation correctly for both cases.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180112162532.35896-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Fixes: 83e3c48729d9 ("mm/sparsemem: Allocate mem_section at runtime for CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_EXTREME=y")
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 include/linux/crash_core.h |    2 ++
 kernel/crash_core.c        |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/include/linux/crash_core.h
+++ b/include/linux/crash_core.h
@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ phys_addr_t paddr_vmcoreinfo_note(void);
 	vmcoreinfo_append_str("PAGESIZE=%ld\n", value)
 #define VMCOREINFO_SYMBOL(name) \
 	vmcoreinfo_append_str("SYMBOL(%s)=%lx\n", #name, (unsigned long)&name)
+#define VMCOREINFO_SYMBOL_ARRAY(name) \
+	vmcoreinfo_append_str("SYMBOL(%s)=%lx\n", #name, (unsigned long)name)
 #define VMCOREINFO_SIZE(name) \
 	vmcoreinfo_append_str("SIZE(%s)=%lu\n", #name, \
 			      (unsigned long)sizeof(name))
--- a/kernel/crash_core.c
+++ b/kernel/crash_core.c
@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ static int __init crash_save_vmcoreinfo_
 	VMCOREINFO_SYMBOL(contig_page_data);
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_SPARSEMEM
-	VMCOREINFO_SYMBOL(mem_section);
+	VMCOREINFO_SYMBOL_ARRAY(mem_section);
 	VMCOREINFO_LENGTH(mem_section, NR_SECTION_ROOTS);
 	VMCOREINFO_STRUCT_SIZE(mem_section);
 	VMCOREINFO_OFFSET(mem_section, section_mem_map);

[PATCH 4.14 088/118] apparmor: fix ptrace label match when matching stacked labels

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

commit 0dda0b3fb255048a221f736c8a2a24c674da8bf3 upstream.

Given a label with a profile stack of
  A//&B or A//&C ...

A ptrace rule should be able to specify a generic trace pattern with
a rule like

  ptrace trace A//&**,

however this is failing because while the correct label match routine
is called, it is being done post label decomposition so it is always
being done against a profile instead of the stacked label.

To fix this refactor the cross check to pass the full peer label in to
the label_match.

Fixes: 290f458a4f16 ("apparmor: allow ptrace checks to be finer grained than just capability")
Reported-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Tested-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 security/apparmor/include/perms.h |    3 ++
 security/apparmor/ipc.c           |   53 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

--- a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h
@@ -133,6 +133,9 @@ extern struct aa_perms allperms;
 #define xcheck_labels_profiles(L1, L2, FN, args...)		\
 	xcheck_ns_labels((L1), (L2), xcheck_ns_profile_label, (FN), args)
 
+#define xcheck_labels(L1, L2, P, FN1, FN2)			\
+	xcheck(fn_for_each((L1), (P), (FN1)), fn_for_each((L2), (P), (FN2)))
+
 
 void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask);
 void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask);
--- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
@@ -64,40 +64,48 @@ static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit
 			FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
 }
 
+/* assumes check for PROFILE_MEDIATES is already done */
 /* TODO: conditionals */
 static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
-			       struct aa_profile *peer, u32 request,
-			       struct common_audit_data *sa)
+			     struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
+			     struct common_audit_data *sa)
 {
 	struct aa_perms perms = { };
 
-	/* need because of peer in cross check */
-	if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
-	    !PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
-		return 0;
-
-	aad(sa)->peer = &peer->label;
-	aa_profile_match_label(profile, &peer->label, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
+	aad(sa)->peer = peer;
+	aa_profile_match_label(profile, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
 			       &perms);
 	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
 	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
 }
 
-static int cross_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
-			     struct aa_profile *tracee, u32 request,
-			     struct common_audit_data *sa)
+static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee,
+			       struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request,
+			       struct common_audit_data *sa)
 {
+	if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) ||
+	    !PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracee, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
+		return 0;
+
+	return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa);
+}
+
+static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
+			       struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request,
+			       struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+	if (profile_unconfined(tracer))
+		return 0;
+
 	if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
-		return xcheck(profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa),
-			      profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer,
-						  request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT,
-						  sa));
-	/* policy uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
-	if (profile_unconfined(tracer) || tracer == tracee)
+		return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa);
+
+	/* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
+	if (&tracer->label == tracee)
 		return 0;
 
 	aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label;
-	aad(sa)->peer = &tracee->label;
+	aad(sa)->peer = tracee;
 	aad(sa)->request = 0;
 	aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1);
 
@@ -115,10 +123,13 @@ static int cross_ptrace_perm(struct aa_p
 int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
 		  u32 request)
 {
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT;
 	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE);
 
-	return xcheck_labels_profiles(tracer, tracee, cross_ptrace_perm,
-				      request, &sa);
+	return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile,
+			profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa),
+			profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa));
 }
 
 

[PATCH 4.14 089/118] e1000e: Fix e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan return value.

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.com>

commit 4110e02eb45ea447ec6f5459c9934de0a273fb91 upstream.

e1000e_check_for_copper_link() and e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan()
are the two functions that may be assigned to mac.ops.check_for_link when
phy.media_type == e1000_media_type_copper. Commit 19110cfbb34d ("e1000e:
Separate signaling for link check/link up") changed the meaning of the
return value of check_for_link for copper media but only adjusted the first
function. This patch adjusts the second function likewise.

Reported-by: Christian Hesse <list@eworm.de>
Reported-by: Gabriel C <nix.or.die@gmail.com>
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198047
Fixes: 19110cfbb34d ("e1000e: Separate signaling for link check/link up")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.com>
Tested-by: Aaron Brown <aaron.f.brown@intel.com>
Tested-by: Christian Hesse <list@eworm.de>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c |   11 ++++++++---
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c
@@ -1367,6 +1367,9 @@ out:
  *  Checks to see of the link status of the hardware has changed.  If a
  *  change in link status has been detected, then we read the PHY registers
  *  to get the current speed/duplex if link exists.
+ *
+ *  Returns a negative error code (-E1000_ERR_*) or 0 (link down) or 1 (link
+ *  up).
  **/
 static s32 e1000_check_for_copper_link_ich8lan(struct e1000_hw *hw)
 {
@@ -1382,7 +1385,7 @@ static s32 e1000_check_for_copper_link_i
 	 * Change or Rx Sequence Error interrupt.
 	 */
 	if (!mac->get_link_status)
-		return 0;
+		return 1;
 
 	/* First we want to see if the MII Status Register reports
 	 * link.  If so, then we want to get the current speed/duplex
@@ -1613,10 +1616,12 @@ static s32 e1000_check_for_copper_link_i
 	 * different link partner.
 	 */
 	ret_val = e1000e_config_fc_after_link_up(hw);
-	if (ret_val)
+	if (ret_val) {
 		e_dbg("Error configuring flow control\n");
+		return ret_val;
+	}
 
-	return ret_val;
+	return 1;
 }
 
 static s32 e1000_get_variants_ich8lan(struct e1000_adapter *adapter)

[PATCH 4.14 090/118] x86/pti: Unbreak EFI old_memmap

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>

commit de53c3786a3ce162a1c815d0c04c766c23ec9c0a upstream.

EFI_OLD_MEMMAP's efi_call_phys_prolog() calls set_pgd() with swapper PGD that
has PAGE_USER set, which makes PTI set NX on it, and therefore EFI can't
execute it's code.

Fix that by forcefully clearing _PAGE_NX from the PGD (this can't be done
by the pgprot API).

_PAGE_NX will be automatically reintroduced in efi_call_phys_epilog(), as
_set_pgd() will again notice that this is _PAGE_USER, and set _PAGE_NX on
it.

Tested-by: Dimitri Sivanich <sivanich@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1801052215460.11852@cbobk.fhfr.pm
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
@@ -134,7 +134,9 @@ pgd_t * __init efi_call_phys_prolog(void
 				pud[j] = *pud_offset(p4d_k, vaddr);
 			}
 		}
+		pgd_offset_k(pgd * PGDIR_SIZE)->pgd &= ~_PAGE_NX;
 	}
+
 out:
 	__flush_tlb_all();
 

[PATCH 4.14 091/118] x86/Documentation: Add PTI description

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>

commit 01c9b17bf673b05bb401b76ec763e9730ccf1376 upstream.

Add some details about how PTI works, what some of the downsides
are, and how to debug it when things go wrong.

Also document the kernel parameter: 'pti/nopti'.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Moritz Lipp <moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at>
Cc: Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at>
Cc: Michael Schwarz <michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at>
Cc: Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Andi Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180105174436.1BC6FA2B@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |   21 +-
 Documentation/x86/pti.txt                       |  186 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 200 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2685,8 +2685,6 @@
 			steal time is computed, but won't influence scheduler
 			behaviour
 
-	nopti		[X86-64] Disable kernel page table isolation
-
 	nolapic		[X86-32,APIC] Do not enable or use the local APIC.
 
 	nolapic_timer	[X86-32,APIC] Do not use the local APIC timer.
@@ -3255,11 +3253,20 @@
 	pt.		[PARIDE]
 			See Documentation/blockdev/paride.txt.
 
-	pti=		[X86_64]
-			Control user/kernel address space isolation:
-			on - enable
-			off - disable
-			auto - default setting
+	pti=		[X86_64] Control Page Table Isolation of user and
+			kernel address spaces.  Disabling this feature
+			removes hardening, but improves performance of
+			system calls and interrupts.
+
+			on   - unconditionally enable
+			off  - unconditionally disable
+			auto - kernel detects whether your CPU model is
+			       vulnerable to issues that PTI mitigates
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to pti=auto.
+
+	nopti		[X86_64]
+			Equivalent to pti=off
 
 	pty.legacy_count=
 			[KNL] Number of legacy pty's. Overwrites compiled-in
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/x86/pti.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+Overview
+========
+
+Page Table Isolation (pti, previously known as KAISER[1]) is a
+countermeasure against attacks on the shared user/kernel address
+space such as the "Meltdown" approach[2].
+
+To mitigate this class of attacks, we create an independent set of
+page tables for use only when running userspace applications.  When
+the kernel is entered via syscalls, interrupts or exceptions, the
+page tables are switched to the full "kernel" copy.  When the system
+switches back to user mode, the user copy is used again.
+
+The userspace page tables contain only a minimal amount of kernel
+data: only what is needed to enter/exit the kernel such as the
+entry/exit functions themselves and the interrupt descriptor table
+(IDT).  There are a few strictly unnecessary things that get mapped
+such as the first C function when entering an interrupt (see
+comments in pti.c).
+
+This approach helps to ensure that side-channel attacks leveraging
+the paging structures do not function when PTI is enabled.  It can be
+enabled by setting CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y at compile time.
+Once enabled at compile-time, it can be disabled at boot with the
+'nopti' or 'pti=' kernel parameters (see kernel-parameters.txt).
+
+Page Table Management
+=====================
+
+When PTI is enabled, the kernel manages two sets of page tables.
+The first set is very similar to the single set which is present in
+kernels without PTI.  This includes a complete mapping of userspace
+that the kernel can use for things like copy_to_user().
+
+Although _complete_, the user portion of the kernel page tables is
+crippled by setting the NX bit in the top level.  This ensures
+that any missed kernel->user CR3 switch will immediately crash
+userspace upon executing its first instruction.
+
+The userspace page tables map only the kernel data needed to enter
+and exit the kernel.  This data is entirely contained in the 'struct
+cpu_entry_area' structure which is placed in the fixmap which gives
+each CPU's copy of the area a compile-time-fixed virtual address.
+
+For new userspace mappings, the kernel makes the entries in its
+page tables like normal.  The only difference is when the kernel
+makes entries in the top (PGD) level.  In addition to setting the
+entry in the main kernel PGD, a copy of the entry is made in the
+userspace page tables' PGD.
+
+This sharing at the PGD level also inherently shares all the lower
+layers of the page tables.  This leaves a single, shared set of
+userspace page tables to manage.  One PTE to lock, one set of
+accessed bits, dirty bits, etc...
+
+Overhead
+========
+
+Protection against side-channel attacks is important.  But,
+this protection comes at a cost:
+
+1. Increased Memory Use
+  a. Each process now needs an order-1 PGD instead of order-0.
+     (Consumes an additional 4k per process).
+  b. The 'cpu_entry_area' structure must be 2MB in size and 2MB
+     aligned so that it can be mapped by setting a single PMD
+     entry.  This consumes nearly 2MB of RAM once the kernel
+     is decompressed, but no space in the kernel image itself.
+
+2. Runtime Cost
+  a. CR3 manipulation to switch between the page table copies
+     must be done at interrupt, syscall, and exception entry
+     and exit (it can be skipped when the kernel is interrupted,
+     though.)  Moves to CR3 are on the order of a hundred
+     cycles, and are required at every entry and exit.
+  b. A "trampoline" must be used for SYSCALL entry.  This
+     trampoline depends on a smaller set of resources than the
+     non-PTI SYSCALL entry code, so requires mapping fewer
+     things into the userspace page tables.  The downside is
+     that stacks must be switched at entry time.
+  d. Global pages are disabled for all kernel structures not
+     mapped into both kernel and userspace page tables.  This
+     feature of the MMU allows different processes to share TLB
+     entries mapping the kernel.  Losing the feature means more
+     TLB misses after a context switch.  The actual loss of
+     performance is very small, however, never exceeding 1%.
+  d. Process Context IDentifiers (PCID) is a CPU feature that
+     allows us to skip flushing the entire TLB when switching page
+     tables by setting a special bit in CR3 when the page tables
+     are changed.  This makes switching the page tables (at context
+     switch, or kernel entry/exit) cheaper.  But, on systems with
+     PCID support, the context switch code must flush both the user
+     and kernel entries out of the TLB.  The user PCID TLB flush is
+     deferred until the exit to userspace, minimizing the cost.
+     See intel.com/sdm for the gory PCID/INVPCID details.
+  e. The userspace page tables must be populated for each new
+     process.  Even without PTI, the shared kernel mappings
+     are created by copying top-level (PGD) entries into each
+     new process.  But, with PTI, there are now *two* kernel
+     mappings: one in the kernel page tables that maps everything
+     and one for the entry/exit structures.  At fork(), we need to
+     copy both.
+  f. In addition to the fork()-time copying, there must also
+     be an update to the userspace PGD any time a set_pgd() is done
+     on a PGD used to map userspace.  This ensures that the kernel
+     and userspace copies always map the same userspace
+     memory.
+  g. On systems without PCID support, each CR3 write flushes
+     the entire TLB.  That means that each syscall, interrupt
+     or exception flushes the TLB.
+  h. INVPCID is a TLB-flushing instruction which allows flushing
+     of TLB entries for non-current PCIDs.  Some systems support
+     PCIDs, but do not support INVPCID.  On these systems, addresses
+     can only be flushed from the TLB for the current PCID.  When
+     flushing a kernel address, we need to flush all PCIDs, so a
+     single kernel address flush will require a TLB-flushing CR3
+     write upon the next use of every PCID.
+
+Possible Future Work
+====================
+1. We can be more careful about not actually writing to CR3
+   unless its value is actually changed.
+2. Allow PTI to be enabled/disabled at runtime in addition to the
+   boot-time switching.
+
+Testing
+========
+
+To test stability of PTI, the following test procedure is recommended,
+ideally doing all of these in parallel:
+
+1. Set CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY=y
+2. Run several copies of all of the tools/testing/selftests/x86/ tests
+   (excluding MPX and protection_keys) in a loop on multiple CPUs for
+   several minutes.  These tests frequently uncover corner cases in the
+   kernel entry code.  In general, old kernels might cause these tests
+   themselves to crash, but they should never crash the kernel.
+3. Run the 'perf' tool in a mode (top or record) that generates many
+   frequent performance monitoring non-maskable interrupts (see "NMI"
+   in /proc/interrupts).  This exercises the NMI entry/exit code which
+   is known to trigger bugs in code paths that did not expect to be
+   interrupted, including nested NMIs.  Using "-c" boosts the rate of
+   NMIs, and using two -c with separate counters encourages nested NMIs
+   and less deterministic behavior.
+
+	while true; do perf record -c 10000 -e instructions,cycles -a sleep 10; done
+
+4. Launch a KVM virtual machine.
+5. Run 32-bit binaries on systems supporting the SYSCALL instruction.
+   This has been a lightly-tested code path and needs extra scrutiny.
+
+Debugging
+=========
+
+Bugs in PTI cause a few different signatures of crashes
+that are worth noting here.
+
+ * Failures of the selftests/x86 code.  Usually a bug in one of the
+   more obscure corners of entry_64.S
+ * Crashes in early boot, especially around CPU bringup.  Bugs
+   in the trampoline code or mappings cause these.
+ * Crashes at the first interrupt.  Caused by bugs in entry_64.S,
+   like screwing up a page table switch.  Also caused by
+   incorrectly mapping the IRQ handler entry code.
+ * Crashes at the first NMI.  The NMI code is separate from main
+   interrupt handlers and can have bugs that do not affect
+   normal interrupts.  Also caused by incorrectly mapping NMI
+   code.  NMIs that interrupt the entry code must be very
+   careful and can be the cause of crashes that show up when
+   running perf.
+ * Kernel crashes at the first exit to userspace.  entry_64.S
+   bugs, or failing to map some of the exit code.
+ * Crashes at first interrupt that interrupts userspace. The paths
+   in entry_64.S that return to userspace are sometimes separate
+   from the ones that return to the kernel.
+ * Double faults: overflowing the kernel stack because of page
+   faults upon page faults.  Caused by touching non-pti-mapped
+   data in the entry code, or forgetting to switch to kernel
+   CR3 before calling into C functions which are not pti-mapped.
+ * Userspace segfaults early in boot, sometimes manifesting
+   as mount(8) failing to mount the rootfs.  These have
+   tended to be TLB invalidation issues.  Usually invalidating
+   the wrong PCID, or otherwise missing an invalidation.
+
+1. https://gruss.cc/files/kaiser.pdf
+2. https://meltdownattack.com/meltdown.pdf

[PATCH 4.14 092/118] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V[12]

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

commit 99c6fa2511d8a683e61468be91b83f85452115fa upstream.

Add the bug bits for spectre v1/2 and force them unconditionally for all
cpus.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515239374-23361-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h |    2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c       |    3 +++
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -342,5 +342,7 @@
 #define X86_BUG_MONITOR			X86_BUG(12) /* IPI required to wake up remote CPU */
 #define X86_BUG_AMD_E400		X86_BUG(13) /* CPU is among the affected by Erratum 400 */
 #define X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN		X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is affected by meltdown attack and needs kernel page table isolation */
+#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1		X86_BUG(15) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 1 attack with conditional branches */
+#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2		X86_BUG(16) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack with indirect branches */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -902,6 +902,9 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(st
 	if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD)
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
 
+	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
+	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
+
 	fpu__init_system(c);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32

[PATCH 4.14 093/118] sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit 87590ce6e373d1a5401f6539f0c59ef92dd924a9 upstream.

As the meltdown/spectre problem affects several CPU architectures, it makes
sense to have common way to express whether a system is affected by a
particular vulnerability or not. If affected the way to express the
mitigation should be common as well.

Create /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities folder and files for
meltdown, spectre_v1 and spectre_v2.

Allow architectures to override the show function.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180107214913.096657732@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu |   16 +++++++
 drivers/base/Kconfig                               |    3 +
 drivers/base/cpu.c                                 |   48 +++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/cpu.h                                |    7 +++
 4 files changed, 74 insertions(+)

--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
@@ -373,3 +373,19 @@ Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linu
 Description:	information about CPUs heterogeneity.
 
 		cpu_capacity: capacity of cpu#.
+
+What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
+Date:		Januar 2018
+Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
+Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
+
+		The files are named after the code names of CPU
+		vulnerabilities. The output of those files reflects the
+		state of the CPUs in the system. Possible output values:
+
+		"Not affected"	  CPU is not affected by the vulnerability
+		"Vulnerable"	  CPU is affected and no mitigation in effect
+		"Mitigation: $M"  CPU is affetcted and mitigation $M is in effect
--- a/drivers/base/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/base/Kconfig
@@ -236,6 +236,9 @@ config GENERIC_CPU_DEVICES
 config GENERIC_CPU_AUTOPROBE
 	bool
 
+config GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES
+	bool
+
 config SOC_BUS
 	bool
 	select GLOB
--- a/drivers/base/cpu.c
+++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c
@@ -501,10 +501,58 @@ static void __init cpu_dev_register_gene
 #endif
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES
+
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev,
+				 struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev,
+				   struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
+				   struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
+static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
+
+static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
+	&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
+	&dev_attr_spectre_v1.attr,
+	&dev_attr_spectre_v2.attr,
+	NULL
+};
+
+static const struct attribute_group cpu_root_vulnerabilities_group = {
+	.name  = "vulnerabilities",
+	.attrs = cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs,
+};
+
+static void __init cpu_register_vulnerabilities(void)
+{
+	if (sysfs_create_group(&cpu_subsys.dev_root->kobj,
+			       &cpu_root_vulnerabilities_group))
+		pr_err("Unable to register CPU vulnerabilities\n");
+}
+
+#else
+static inline void cpu_register_vulnerabilities(void) { }
+#endif
+
 void __init cpu_dev_init(void)
 {
 	if (subsys_system_register(&cpu_subsys, cpu_root_attr_groups))
 		panic("Failed to register CPU subsystem");
 
 	cpu_dev_register_generic();
+	cpu_register_vulnerabilities();
 }
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -47,6 +47,13 @@ extern void cpu_remove_dev_attr(struct d
 extern int cpu_add_dev_attr_group(struct attribute_group *attrs);
 extern void cpu_remove_dev_attr_group(struct attribute_group *attrs);
 
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev,
+				 struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev,
+				   struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
+				   struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
+
 extern __printf(4, 5)
 struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,
 				 const struct attribute_group **groups,

[PATCH 4.14 094/118] x86/cpu: Implement CPU vulnerabilites sysfs functions

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit 61dc0f555b5c761cdafb0ba5bd41ecf22d68a4c4 upstream.

Implement the CPU vulnerabilty show functions for meltdown, spectre_v1 and
spectre_v2.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180107214913.177414879@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/Kconfig           |    1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |   29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ config X86
 	select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_MIN_ADJUST
 	select GENERIC_CMOS_UPDATE
 	select GENERIC_CPU_AUTOPROBE
+	select GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES
 	select GENERIC_EARLY_IOREMAP
 	select GENERIC_FIND_FIRST_BIT
 	select GENERIC_IOMAP
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
  */
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/utsname.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/bugs.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
@@ -60,3 +61,31 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 		set_memory_4k((unsigned long)__va(0), 1);
 #endif
 }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
+ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev,
+			  struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
+		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
+		return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: PTI\n");
+	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev,
+			    struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1))
+		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
+			    struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
+		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+}
+#endif

[PATCH 4.14 095/118] x86/tboot: Unbreak tboot with PTI enabled

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>

commit 262b6b30087246abf09d6275eb0c0dc421bcbe38 upstream.

This is another case similar to what EFI does: create a new set of
page tables, map some code at a low address, and jump to it.  PTI
mistakes this low address for userspace and mistakenly marks it
non-executable in an effort to make it unusable for userspace.

Undo the poison to allow execution.

Fixes: 385ce0ea4c07 ("x86/mm/pti: Add Kconfig")
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Jeff Law <law@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: David <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Nick Clifton <nickc@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180108102805.GK25546@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ static int map_tboot_page(unsigned long
 	p4d = p4d_alloc(&tboot_mm, pgd, vaddr);
 	if (!p4d)
 		return -1;
+	pgd->pgd &= ~_PAGE_NX;
 	pud = pud_alloc(&tboot_mm, p4d, vaddr);
 	if (!pud)
 		return -1;

[PATCH 4.14 096/118] x86/mm/pti: Remove dead logic in pti_user_pagetable_walk*()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jike Song <albcamus@gmail.com>

commit 8d56eff266f3e41a6c39926269c4c3f58f881a8e upstream.

The following code contains dead logic:

 162 if (pgd_none(*pgd)) {
 163         unsigned long new_p4d_page = __get_free_page(gfp);
 164         if (!new_p4d_page)
 165                 return NULL;
 166
 167         if (pgd_none(*pgd)) {
 168                 set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_p4d_page)));
 169                 new_p4d_page = 0;
 170         }
 171         if (new_p4d_page)
 172                 free_page(new_p4d_page);
 173 }

There can't be any difference between two pgd_none(*pgd) at L162 and L167,
so it's always false at L171.

Dave Hansen explained:

 Yes, the double-test was part of an optimization where we attempted to
 avoid using a global spinlock in the fork() path.  We would check for
 unallocated mid-level page tables without the lock.  The lock was only
 taken when we needed to *make* an entry to avoid collisions.

 Now that it is all single-threaded, there is no chance of a collision,
 no need for a lock, and no need for the re-check.

As all these functions are only called during init, mark them __init as
well.

Fixes: 03f4424f348e ("x86/mm/pti: Add functions to clone kernel PMDs")
Signed-off-by: Jike Song <albcamus@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Koshina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Andi Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180108160341.3461-1-albcamus@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/mm/pti.c |   32 ++++++--------------------------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ pgd_t __pti_set_user_pgd(pgd_t *pgdp, pg
  *
  * Returns a pointer to a P4D on success, or NULL on failure.
  */
-static p4d_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(unsigned long address)
+static __init p4d_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(unsigned long address)
 {
 	pgd_t *pgd = kernel_to_user_pgdp(pgd_offset_k(address));
 	gfp_t gfp = (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOTRACK | __GFP_ZERO);
@@ -164,12 +164,7 @@ static p4d_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4
 		if (!new_p4d_page)
 			return NULL;
 
-		if (pgd_none(*pgd)) {
-			set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_p4d_page)));
-			new_p4d_page = 0;
-		}
-		if (new_p4d_page)
-			free_page(new_p4d_page);
+		set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_p4d_page)));
 	}
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(pgd_large(*pgd) != 0);
 
@@ -182,7 +177,7 @@ static p4d_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4
  *
  * Returns a pointer to a PMD on success, or NULL on failure.
  */
-static pmd_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(unsigned long address)
+static __init pmd_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(unsigned long address)
 {
 	gfp_t gfp = (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOTRACK | __GFP_ZERO);
 	p4d_t *p4d = pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(address);
@@ -194,12 +189,7 @@ static pmd_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pm
 		if (!new_pud_page)
 			return NULL;
 
-		if (p4d_none(*p4d)) {
-			set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pud_page)));
-			new_pud_page = 0;
-		}
-		if (new_pud_page)
-			free_page(new_pud_page);
+		set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pud_page)));
 	}
 
 	pud = pud_offset(p4d, address);
@@ -213,12 +203,7 @@ static pmd_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pm
 		if (!new_pmd_page)
 			return NULL;
 
-		if (pud_none(*pud)) {
-			set_pud(pud, __pud(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pmd_page)));
-			new_pmd_page = 0;
-		}
-		if (new_pmd_page)
-			free_page(new_pmd_page);
+		set_pud(pud, __pud(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pmd_page)));
 	}
 
 	return pmd_offset(pud, address);
@@ -251,12 +236,7 @@ static __init pte_t *pti_user_pagetable_
 		if (!new_pte_page)
 			return NULL;
 
-		if (pmd_none(*pmd)) {
-			set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pte_page)));
-			new_pte_page = 0;
-		}
-		if (new_pte_page)
-			free_page(new_pte_page);
+		set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pte_page)));
 	}
 
 	pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, address);

[PATCH 4.14 097/118] x86/cpu/AMD: Make LFENCE a serializing instruction

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

commit e4d0e84e490790798691aaa0f2e598637f1867ec upstream.

To aid in speculation control, make LFENCE a serializing instruction
since it has less overhead than MFENCE.  This is done by setting bit 1
of MSR 0xc0011029 (DE_CFG).  Some families that support LFENCE do not
have this MSR.  For these families, the LFENCE instruction is already
serializing.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180108220921.12580.71694.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h |    2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c        |   10 ++++++++++
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -352,6 +352,8 @@
 #define FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE_MASK	0xfffffffULL
 #define FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE_SHIFT	20
 #define MSR_FAM10H_NODE_ID		0xc001100c
+#define MSR_F10H_DECFG			0xc0011029
+#define MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT	1
 
 /* K8 MSRs */
 #define MSR_K8_TOP_MEM1			0xc001001a
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -829,6 +829,16 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86
 		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_K8);
 
 	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XMM2)) {
+		/*
+		 * A serializing LFENCE has less overhead than MFENCE, so
+		 * use it for execution serialization.  On families which
+		 * don't have that MSR, LFENCE is already serializing.
+		 * msr_set_bit() uses the safe accessors, too, even if the MSR
+		 * is not present.
+		 */
+		msr_set_bit(MSR_F10H_DECFG,
+			    MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT);
+
 		/* MFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */
 		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC);
 	}

[PATCH 4.14 098/118] x86/cpu/AMD: Use LFENCE_RDTSC in preference to MFENCE_RDTSC

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

commit 9c6a73c75864ad9fa49e5fa6513e4c4071c0e29f upstream.

With LFENCE now a serializing instruction, use LFENCE_RDTSC in preference
to MFENCE_RDTSC.  However, since the kernel could be running under a
hypervisor that does not support writing that MSR, read the MSR back and
verify that the bit has been set successfully.  If the MSR can be read
and the bit is set, then set the LFENCE_RDTSC feature, otherwise set the
MFENCE_RDTSC feature.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180108220932.12580.52458.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h |    1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c        |   18 ++++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -354,6 +354,7 @@
 #define MSR_FAM10H_NODE_ID		0xc001100c
 #define MSR_F10H_DECFG			0xc0011029
 #define MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT	1
+#define MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE		BIT_ULL(MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT)
 
 /* K8 MSRs */
 #define MSR_K8_TOP_MEM1			0xc001001a
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -829,6 +829,9 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86
 		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_K8);
 
 	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XMM2)) {
+		unsigned long long val;
+		int ret;
+
 		/*
 		 * A serializing LFENCE has less overhead than MFENCE, so
 		 * use it for execution serialization.  On families which
@@ -839,8 +842,19 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86
 		msr_set_bit(MSR_F10H_DECFG,
 			    MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT);
 
-		/* MFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */
-		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC);
+		/*
+		 * Verify that the MSR write was successful (could be running
+		 * under a hypervisor) and only then assume that LFENCE is
+		 * serializing.
+		 */
+		ret = rdmsrl_safe(MSR_F10H_DECFG, &val);
+		if (!ret && (val & MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE)) {
+			/* A serializing LFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */
+			set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC);
+		} else {
+			/* MFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */
+			set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC);
+		}
 	}
 
 	/*

[PATCH 4.14 099/118] sysfs/cpu: Fix typos in vulnerability documentation

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

commit 9ecccfaa7cb5249bd31bdceb93fcf5bedb8a24d8 upstream.

Fixes: 87590ce6e ("sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder")
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabi
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
-Date:		Januar 2018
+Date:		January 2018
 Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
 Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
 
@@ -388,4 +388,4 @@ Description:	Information about CPU vulne
 
 		"Not affected"	  CPU is not affected by the vulnerability
 		"Vulnerable"	  CPU is affected and no mitigation in effect
-		"Mitigation: $M"  CPU is affetcted and mitigation $M is in effect
+		"Mitigation: $M"  CPU is affected and mitigation $M is in effect

[PATCH 4.14 100/118] x86/alternatives: Fix optimize_nops() checking

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

commit 612e8e9350fd19cae6900cf36ea0c6892d1a0dca upstream.

The alternatives code checks only the first byte whether it is a NOP, but
with NOPs in front of the payload and having actual instructions after it
breaks the "optimized' test.

Make sure to scan all bytes before deciding to optimize the NOPs in there.

Reported-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Andrew Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180110112815.mgciyf5acwacphkq@pd.tnic
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c |    7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -344,9 +344,12 @@ done:
 static void __init_or_module noinline optimize_nops(struct alt_instr *a, u8 *instr)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
+	int i;
 
-	if (instr[0] != 0x90)
-		return;
+	for (i = 0; i < a->padlen; i++) {
+		if (instr[i] != 0x90)
+			return;
+	}
 
 	local_irq_save(flags);
 	add_nops(instr + (a->instrlen - a->padlen), a->padlen);

[PATCH 4.14 101/118] x86/pti: Make unpoison of pgd for trusted boot work for real

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>

commit 445b69e3b75e42362a5bdc13c8b8f61599e2228a upstream.

The inital fix for trusted boot and PTI potentially misses the pgd clearing
if pud_alloc() sets a PGD.  It probably works in *practice* because for two
adjacent calls to map_tboot_page() that share a PGD entry, the first will
clear NX, *then* allocate and set the PGD (without NX clear).  The second
call will *not* allocate but will clear the NX bit.

Defer the NX clearing to a point after it is known that all top-level
allocations have occurred.  Add a comment to clarify why.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]

Fixes: 262b6b30087 ("x86/tboot: Unbreak tboot with PTI enabled")
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: "Tim Chen" <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: ning.sun@intel.com
Cc: tboot-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: andi@firstfloor.org
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Cc: law@redhat.com
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Cc: dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Cc: nickc@redhat.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180110224939.2695CD47@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c |   12 +++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
@@ -127,7 +127,6 @@ static int map_tboot_page(unsigned long
 	p4d = p4d_alloc(&tboot_mm, pgd, vaddr);
 	if (!p4d)
 		return -1;
-	pgd->pgd &= ~_PAGE_NX;
 	pud = pud_alloc(&tboot_mm, p4d, vaddr);
 	if (!pud)
 		return -1;
@@ -139,6 +138,17 @@ static int map_tboot_page(unsigned long
 		return -1;
 	set_pte_at(&tboot_mm, vaddr, pte, pfn_pte(pfn, prot));
 	pte_unmap(pte);
+
+	/*
+	 * PTI poisons low addresses in the kernel page tables in the
+	 * name of making them unusable for userspace.  To execute
+	 * code at such a low address, the poison must be cleared.
+	 *
+	 * Note: 'pgd' actually gets set in p4d_alloc() _or_
+	 * pud_alloc() depending on 4/5-level paging.
+	 */
+	pgd->pgd &= ~_PAGE_NX;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 

[PATCH 4.14 102/118] objtool: Detect jumps to retpoline thunks

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>

commit 39b735332cb8b33a27c28592d969e4016c86c3ea upstream.

A direct jump to a retpoline thunk is really an indirect jump in
disguise.  Change the objtool instruction type accordingly.

Objtool needs to know where indirect branches are so it can detect
switch statement jump tables.

This fixes a bunch of warnings with CONFIG_RETPOLINE like:

  arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_nhmex.o: warning: objtool: nhmex_rbox_msr_enable_event()+0x44: sibling call from callable instruction with modified stack frame
  kernel/signal.o: warning: objtool: copy_siginfo_to_user()+0x91: sibling call from callable instruction with modified stack frame
  ...

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 tools/objtool/check.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -456,6 +456,13 @@ static int add_jump_destinations(struct
 		} else if (rela->sym->sec->idx) {
 			dest_sec = rela->sym->sec;
 			dest_off = rela->sym->sym.st_value + rela->addend + 4;
+		} else if (strstr(rela->sym->name, "_indirect_thunk_")) {
+			/*
+			 * Retpoline jumps are really dynamic jumps in
+			 * disguise, so convert them accordingly.
+			 */
+			insn->type = INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC;
+			continue;
 		} else {
 			/* sibling call */
 			insn->jump_dest = 0;

[PATCH 4.14 103/118] objtool: Allow alternatives to be ignored

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>

commit 258c76059cece01bebae098e81bacb1af2edad17 upstream.

Getting objtool to understand retpolines is going to be a bit of a
challenge.  For now, take advantage of the fact that retpolines are
patched in with alternatives.  Just read the original (sane)
non-alternative instruction, and ignore the patched-in retpoline.

This allows objtool to understand the control flow *around* the
retpoline, even if it can't yet follow what's inside.  This means the
ORC unwinder will fail to unwind from inside a retpoline, but will work
fine otherwise.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-3-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 tools/objtool/check.c |   62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 tools/objtool/check.h |    2 -
 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -428,6 +428,40 @@ static void add_ignores(struct objtool_f
 }
 
 /*
+ * FIXME: For now, just ignore any alternatives which add retpolines.  This is
+ * a temporary hack, as it doesn't allow ORC to unwind from inside a retpoline.
+ * But it at least allows objtool to understand the control flow *around* the
+ * retpoline.
+ */
+static int add_nospec_ignores(struct objtool_file *file)
+{
+	struct section *sec;
+	struct rela *rela;
+	struct instruction *insn;
+
+	sec = find_section_by_name(file->elf, ".rela.discard.nospec");
+	if (!sec)
+		return 0;
+
+	list_for_each_entry(rela, &sec->rela_list, list) {
+		if (rela->sym->type != STT_SECTION) {
+			WARN("unexpected relocation symbol type in %s", sec->name);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		insn = find_insn(file, rela->sym->sec, rela->addend);
+		if (!insn) {
+			WARN("bad .discard.nospec entry");
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		insn->ignore_alts = true;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
  * Find the destination instructions for all jumps.
  */
 static int add_jump_destinations(struct objtool_file *file)
@@ -509,11 +543,18 @@ static int add_call_destinations(struct
 			dest_off = insn->offset + insn->len + insn->immediate;
 			insn->call_dest = find_symbol_by_offset(insn->sec,
 								dest_off);
+			/*
+			 * FIXME: Thanks to retpolines, it's now considered
+			 * normal for a function to call within itself.  So
+			 * disable this warning for now.
+			 */
+#if 0
 			if (!insn->call_dest) {
 				WARN_FUNC("can't find call dest symbol at offset 0x%lx",
 					  insn->sec, insn->offset, dest_off);
 				return -1;
 			}
+#endif
 		} else if (rela->sym->type == STT_SECTION) {
 			insn->call_dest = find_symbol_by_offset(rela->sym->sec,
 								rela->addend+4);
@@ -678,12 +719,6 @@ static int add_special_section_alts(stru
 		return ret;
 
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(special_alt, tmp, &special_alts, list) {
-		alt = malloc(sizeof(*alt));
-		if (!alt) {
-			WARN("malloc failed");
-			ret = -1;
-			goto out;
-		}
 
 		orig_insn = find_insn(file, special_alt->orig_sec,
 				      special_alt->orig_off);
@@ -694,6 +729,10 @@ static int add_special_section_alts(stru
 			goto out;
 		}
 
+		/* Ignore retpoline alternatives. */
+		if (orig_insn->ignore_alts)
+			continue;
+
 		new_insn = NULL;
 		if (!special_alt->group || special_alt->new_len) {
 			new_insn = find_insn(file, special_alt->new_sec,
@@ -719,6 +758,13 @@ static int add_special_section_alts(stru
 				goto out;
 		}
 
+		alt = malloc(sizeof(*alt));
+		if (!alt) {
+			WARN("malloc failed");
+			ret = -1;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
 		alt->insn = new_insn;
 		list_add_tail(&alt->list, &orig_insn->alts);
 
@@ -1035,6 +1081,10 @@ static int decode_sections(struct objtoo
 
 	add_ignores(file);
 
+	ret = add_nospec_ignores(file);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
 	ret = add_jump_destinations(file);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
--- a/tools/objtool/check.h
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.h
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ struct instruction {
 	unsigned int len;
 	unsigned char type;
 	unsigned long immediate;
-	bool alt_group, visited, dead_end, ignore, hint, save, restore;
+	bool alt_group, visited, dead_end, ignore, hint, save, restore, ignore_alts;
 	struct symbol *call_dest;
 	struct instruction *jump_dest;
 	struct list_head alts;

[PATCH 4.14 104/118] x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

commit 76b043848fd22dbf7f8bf3a1452f8c70d557b860 upstream.

Enable the use of -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern in newer GCC, and provide
the corresponding thunks. Provide assembler macros for invoking the thunks
in the same way that GCC does, from native and inline assembler.

This adds X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE and sets it by default on all CPUs. In
some circumstances, IBRS microcode features may be used instead, and the
retpoline can be disabled.

On AMD CPUs if lfence is serialising, the retpoline can be dramatically
simplified to a simple "lfence; jmp *\reg". A future patch, after it has
been verified that lfence really is serialising in all circumstances, can
enable this by setting the X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD feature bit in addition
to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE.

Do not align the retpoline in the altinstr section, because there is no
guarantee that it stays aligned when it's copied over the oldinstr during
alternative patching.

[ Andi Kleen: Rename the macros, add CONFIG_RETPOLINE option, export thunks]
[ tglx: Put actual function CALL/JMP in front of the macros, convert to
  	symbolic labels ]
[ dwmw2: Convert back to numeric labels, merge objtool fixes ]

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                      |   13 +++
 arch/x86/Makefile                     |   10 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h |   25 ++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h    |    2 
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h  |  128 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c          |    4 +
 arch/x86/lib/Makefile                 |    1 
 arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S              |   48 ++++++++++++
 8 files changed, 231 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -429,6 +429,19 @@ config GOLDFISH
        def_bool y
        depends on X86_GOLDFISH
 
+config RETPOLINE
+	bool "Avoid speculative indirect branches in kernel"
+	default y
+	help
+	  Compile kernel with the retpoline compiler options to guard against
+	  kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding speculative indirect
+	  branches. Requires a compiler with -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern
+	  support for full protection. The kernel may run slower.
+
+	  Without compiler support, at least indirect branches in assembler
+	  code are eliminated. Since this includes the syscall entry path,
+	  it is not entirely pointless.
+
 config INTEL_RDT
 	bool "Intel Resource Director Technology support"
 	default n
--- a/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -235,6 +235,16 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += -Wno-sign-compare
 #
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables
 
+# Avoid indirect branches in kernel to deal with Spectre
+ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+    RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register)
+    ifneq ($(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),)
+        KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS) -DRETPOLINE
+    else
+        $(warning CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y, but not supported by the compiler. Toolchain update recommended.)
+    endif
+endif
+
 archscripts: scripts_basic
 	$(Q)$(MAKE) $(build)=arch/x86/tools relocs
 
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h
@@ -11,7 +11,32 @@
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 #include <asm/special_insns.h>
 #include <asm/preempt.h>
+#include <asm/asm.h>
 
 #ifndef CONFIG_X86_CMPXCHG64
 extern void cmpxchg8b_emu(void);
 #endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+#define INDIRECT_THUNK(reg) extern asmlinkage void __x86_indirect_thunk_e ## reg(void);
+#else
+#define INDIRECT_THUNK(reg) extern asmlinkage void __x86_indirect_thunk_r ## reg(void);
+INDIRECT_THUNK(8)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(9)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(10)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(11)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(12)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(13)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(14)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(15)
+#endif
+INDIRECT_THUNK(ax)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(bx)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(cx)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(dx)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(si)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(di)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(bp)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(sp)
+#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -203,6 +203,8 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK	( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SME			( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */
 #define X86_FEATURE_PTI			( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE		( 7*32+12) /* Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD	( 7*32+13) /* AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN		( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */
 #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT		( 7*32+15) /* Intel Processor Trace */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW	( 7*32+16) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#ifndef __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__
+#define __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__
+
+#include <asm/alternative.h>
+#include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
+
+#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+/*
+ * This should be used immediately before a retpoline alternative.  It tells
+ * objtool where the retpolines are so that it can make sense of the control
+ * flow by just reading the original instruction(s) and ignoring the
+ * alternatives.
+ */
+.macro ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
+	.Lannotate_\@:
+	.pushsection .discard.nospec
+	.long .Lannotate_\@ - .
+	.popsection
+.endm
+
+/*
+ * These are the bare retpoline primitives for indirect jmp and call.
+ * Do not use these directly; they only exist to make the ALTERNATIVE
+ * invocation below less ugly.
+ */
+.macro RETPOLINE_JMP reg:req
+	call	.Ldo_rop_\@
+.Lspec_trap_\@:
+	pause
+	jmp	.Lspec_trap_\@
+.Ldo_rop_\@:
+	mov	\reg, (%_ASM_SP)
+	ret
+.endm
+
+/*
+ * This is a wrapper around RETPOLINE_JMP so the called function in reg
+ * returns to the instruction after the macro.
+ */
+.macro RETPOLINE_CALL reg:req
+	jmp	.Ldo_call_\@
+.Ldo_retpoline_jmp_\@:
+	RETPOLINE_JMP \reg
+.Ldo_call_\@:
+	call	.Ldo_retpoline_jmp_\@
+.endm
+
+/*
+ * JMP_NOSPEC and CALL_NOSPEC macros can be used instead of a simple
+ * indirect jmp/call which may be susceptible to the Spectre variant 2
+ * attack.
+ */
+.macro JMP_NOSPEC reg:req
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+	ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
+	ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(jmp *\reg),				\
+		__stringify(RETPOLINE_JMP \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,	\
+		__stringify(lfence; jmp *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
+#else
+	jmp	*\reg
+#endif
+.endm
+
+.macro CALL_NOSPEC reg:req
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+	ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
+	ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(call *\reg),				\
+		__stringify(RETPOLINE_CALL \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,\
+		__stringify(lfence; call *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
+#else
+	call	*\reg
+#endif
+.endm
+
+#else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#define ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE				\
+	"999:\n\t"						\
+	".pushsection .discard.nospec\n\t"			\
+	".long 999b - .\n\t"					\
+	".popsection\n\t"
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && defined(RETPOLINE)
+
+/*
+ * Since the inline asm uses the %V modifier which is only in newer GCC,
+ * the 64-bit one is dependent on RETPOLINE not CONFIG_RETPOLINE.
+ */
+# define CALL_NOSPEC						\
+	ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE				\
+	ALTERNATIVE(						\
+	"call *%[thunk_target]\n",				\
+	"call __x86_indirect_thunk_%V[thunk_target]\n",		\
+	X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
+# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "r" (addr)
+
+#elif defined(CONFIG_X86_32) && defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)
+/*
+ * For i386 we use the original ret-equivalent retpoline, because
+ * otherwise we'll run out of registers. We don't care about CET
+ * here, anyway.
+ */
+# define CALL_NOSPEC ALTERNATIVE("call *%[thunk_target]\n",	\
+	"       jmp    904f;\n"					\
+	"       .align 16\n"					\
+	"901:	call   903f;\n"					\
+	"902:	pause;\n"					\
+	"       jmp    902b;\n"					\
+	"       .align 16\n"					\
+	"903:	addl   $4, %%esp;\n"				\
+	"       pushl  %[thunk_target];\n"			\
+	"       ret;\n"						\
+	"       .align 16\n"					\
+	"904:	call   901b;\n",				\
+	X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
+
+# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
+#else /* No retpoline */
+# define CALL_NOSPEC "call *%[thunk_target]\n"
+# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
+#endif
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+#endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -905,6 +905,10 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(st
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
+#endif
+
 	fpu__init_system(c);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
--- a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ lib-y += memcpy_$(BITS).o
 lib-$(CONFIG_RWSEM_XCHGADD_ALGORITHM) += rwsem.o
 lib-$(CONFIG_INSTRUCTION_DECODER) += insn.o inat.o
 lib-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += kaslr.o
+lib-$(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) += retpoline.o
 
 obj-y += msr.o msr-reg.o msr-reg-export.o hweight.o
 
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#include <linux/stringify.h>
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <asm/dwarf2.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
+#include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
+#include <asm/export.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+
+.macro THUNK reg
+	.section .text.__x86.indirect_thunk.\reg
+
+ENTRY(__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg)
+	CFI_STARTPROC
+	JMP_NOSPEC %\reg
+	CFI_ENDPROC
+ENDPROC(__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg)
+.endm
+
+/*
+ * Despite being an assembler file we can't just use .irp here
+ * because __KSYM_DEPS__ only uses the C preprocessor and would
+ * only see one instance of "__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg" rather
+ * than one per register with the correct names. So we do it
+ * the simple and nasty way...
+ */
+#define EXPORT_THUNK(reg) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__x86_indirect_thunk_ ## reg)
+#define GENERATE_THUNK(reg) THUNK reg ; EXPORT_THUNK(reg)
+
+GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_AX)
+GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_BX)
+GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_CX)
+GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_DX)
+GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_SI)
+GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_DI)
+GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_BP)
+GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_SP)
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+GENERATE_THUNK(r8)
+GENERATE_THUNK(r9)
+GENERATE_THUNK(r10)
+GENERATE_THUNK(r11)
+GENERATE_THUNK(r12)
+GENERATE_THUNK(r13)
+GENERATE_THUNK(r14)
+GENERATE_THUNK(r15)
+#endif

[PATCH 4.14 105/118] x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

commit da285121560e769cc31797bba6422eea71d473e0 upstream.

Add a spectre_v2= option to select the mitigation used for the indirect
branch speculation vulnerability.

Currently, the only option available is retpoline, in its various forms.
This will be expanded to cover the new IBRS/IBPB microcode features.

The RETPOLINE_AMD feature relies on a serializing LFENCE for speculation
control. For AMD hardware, only set RETPOLINE_AMD if LFENCE is a
serializing instruction, which is indicated by the LFENCE_RDTSC feature.

[ tglx: Folded back the LFENCE/AMD fixes and reworked it so IBRS
  	integration becomes simple ]

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-5-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |   28 ++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h            |   10 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                      |  158 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                    |    4 
 4 files changed, 195 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2599,6 +2599,11 @@
 	nosmt		[KNL,S390] Disable symmetric multithreading (SMT).
 			Equivalent to smt=1.
 
+	nospectre_v2	[X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
+			(indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
+			allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
+			to spectre_v2=off.
+
 	noxsave		[BUGS=X86] Disables x86 extended register state save
 			and restore using xsave. The kernel will fallback to
 			enabling legacy floating-point and sse state.
@@ -3908,6 +3913,29 @@
 	sonypi.*=	[HW] Sony Programmable I/O Control Device driver
 			See Documentation/laptops/sonypi.txt
 
+	spectre_v2=	[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
+			(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
+
+			on   - unconditionally enable
+			off  - unconditionally disable
+			auto - kernel detects whether your CPU model is
+			       vulnerable
+
+			Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a
+			mitigation method at run time according to the
+			CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the
+			CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the
+			compiler with which the kernel was built.
+
+			Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
+
+			retpoline	  - replace indirect branches
+			retpoline,generic - google's original retpoline
+			retpoline,amd     - AMD-specific minimal thunk
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+			spectre_v2=auto.
+
 	spia_io_base=	[HW,MTD]
 	spia_fio_base=
 	spia_pedr=
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -124,5 +124,15 @@
 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
 #endif
 
+/* The Spectre V2 mitigation variants */
+enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
+	SPECTRE_V2_NONE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL,
+	SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD,
+	SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
+	SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD,
+	SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
+};
+
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 #endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/utsname.h>
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
+
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+#include <asm/cmdline.h>
 #include <asm/bugs.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
@@ -21,6 +24,8 @@
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 #include <asm/set_memory.h>
 
+static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
+
 void __init check_bugs(void)
 {
 	identify_boot_cpu();
@@ -30,6 +35,9 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 		print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data);
 	}
 
+	/* Select the proper spectre mitigation before patching alternatives */
+	spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
 	/*
 	 * Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP.
@@ -62,6 +70,153 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 #endif
 }
 
+/* The kernel command line selection */
+enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd {
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD,
+};
+
+static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = {
+	[SPECTRE_V2_NONE]			= "Vulnerable",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL]		= "Vulnerable: Minimal generic ASM retpoline",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD]	= "Vulnerable: Minimal AMD ASM retpoline",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC]		= "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD]		= "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline",
+};
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V2 mitigation: " fmt
+
+static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+
+static void __init spec2_print_if_insecure(const char *reason)
+{
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
+		pr_info("%s\n", reason);
+}
+
+static void __init spec2_print_if_secure(const char *reason)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
+		pr_info("%s\n", reason);
+}
+
+static inline bool retp_compiler(void)
+{
+	return __is_defined(RETPOLINE);
+}
+
+static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt)
+{
+	int len = strlen(opt);
+
+	return len == arglen && !strncmp(arg, opt, len);
+}
+
+static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
+{
+	char arg[20];
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg,
+				  sizeof(arg));
+	if (ret > 0)  {
+		if (match_option(arg, ret, "off")) {
+			goto disable;
+		} else if (match_option(arg, ret, "on")) {
+			spec2_print_if_secure("force enabled on command line.");
+			return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE;
+		} else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline")) {
+			spec2_print_if_insecure("retpoline selected on command line.");
+			return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE;
+		} else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline,amd")) {
+			if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
+				pr_err("retpoline,amd selected but CPU is not AMD. Switching to AUTO select\n");
+				return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+			}
+			spec2_print_if_insecure("AMD retpoline selected on command line.");
+			return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD;
+		} else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline,generic")) {
+			spec2_print_if_insecure("generic retpoline selected on command line.");
+			return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC;
+		} else if (match_option(arg, ret, "auto")) {
+			return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
+		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+disable:
+	spec2_print_if_insecure("disabled on command line.");
+	return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
+}
+
+static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
+	enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the CPU is not affected and the command line mode is NONE or AUTO
+	 * then nothing to do.
+	 */
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) &&
+	    (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE || cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO))
+		return;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE:
+		return;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
+		/* FALLTRHU */
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO:
+		goto retpoline_auto;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD:
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
+			goto retpoline_amd;
+		break;
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC:
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
+			goto retpoline_generic;
+		break;
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE:
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
+			goto retpoline_auto;
+		break;
+	}
+	pr_err("kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
+	return;
+
+retpoline_auto:
+	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
+	retpoline_amd:
+		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
+			pr_err("LFENCE not serializing. Switching to generic retpoline\n");
+			goto retpoline_generic;
+		}
+		mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD :
+					 SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD;
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD);
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
+	} else {
+	retpoline_generic:
+		mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC :
+					 SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL;
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
+	}
+
+	spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
+	pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
 ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev,
 			  struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
@@ -86,6 +241,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct devic
 {
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
 		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
-	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled]);
 }
 #endif
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -905,10 +905,6 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(st
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
-	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
-#endif
-
 	fpu__init_system(c);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32

[PATCH 4.14 106/118] x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

commit 9697fa39efd3fc3692f2949d4045f393ec58450b upstream.

Convert all indirect jumps in crypto assembler code to use non-speculative
sequences when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-6-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S            |    5 +++--
 arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.S  |    3 ++-
 arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S |    3 ++-
 arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S    |    3 ++-
 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <asm/inst.h>
 #include <asm/frame.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 /*
  * The following macros are used to move an (un)aligned 16 byte value to/from
@@ -2884,7 +2885,7 @@ ENTRY(aesni_xts_crypt8)
 	pxor INC, STATE4
 	movdqu IV, 0x30(OUTP)
 
-	call *%r11
+	CALL_NOSPEC %r11
 
 	movdqu 0x00(OUTP), INC
 	pxor INC, STATE1
@@ -2929,7 +2930,7 @@ ENTRY(aesni_xts_crypt8)
 	_aesni_gf128mul_x_ble()
 	movups IV, (IVP)
 
-	call *%r11
+	CALL_NOSPEC %r11
 
 	movdqu 0x40(OUTP), INC
 	pxor INC, STATE1
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.S
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <asm/frame.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 #define CAMELLIA_TABLE_BYTE_LEN 272
 
@@ -1227,7 +1228,7 @@ camellia_xts_crypt_16way:
 	vpxor 14 * 16(%rax), %xmm15, %xmm14;
 	vpxor 15 * 16(%rax), %xmm15, %xmm15;
 
-	call *%r9;
+	CALL_NOSPEC %r9;
 
 	addq $(16 * 16), %rsp;
 
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <asm/frame.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 #define CAMELLIA_TABLE_BYTE_LEN 272
 
@@ -1343,7 +1344,7 @@ camellia_xts_crypt_32way:
 	vpxor 14 * 32(%rax), %ymm15, %ymm14;
 	vpxor 15 * 32(%rax), %ymm15, %ymm15;
 
-	call *%r9;
+	CALL_NOSPEC %r9;
 
 	addq $(16 * 32), %rsp;
 
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
 
 #include <asm/inst.h>
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 ## ISCSI CRC 32 Implementation with crc32 and pclmulqdq Instruction
 
@@ -172,7 +173,7 @@ continue_block:
 	movzxw  (bufp, %rax, 2), len
 	lea	crc_array(%rip), bufp
 	lea     (bufp, len, 1), bufp
-	jmp     *bufp
+	JMP_NOSPEC bufp
 
 	################################################################
 	## 2a) PROCESS FULL BLOCKS:

[PATCH 4.14 107/118] x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry assembler indirect jumps

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

commit 2641f08bb7fc63a636a2b18173221d7040a3512e upstream.

Convert indirect jumps in core 32/64bit entry assembler code to use
non-speculative sequences when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled.

Don't use CALL_NOSPEC in entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath because the return
address after the 'call' instruction must be *precisely* at the
.Lentry_SYSCALL_64_after_fastpath label for stub_ptregs_64 to work,
and the use of alternatives will mess that up unless we play horrid
games to prepend with NOPs and make the variants the same length. It's
not worth it; in the case where we ALTERNATIVE out the retpoline, the
first instruction at __x86.indirect_thunk.rax is going to be a bare
jmp *%rax anyway.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-7-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S |    5 +++--
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S |   12 +++++++++---
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
 #include <asm/asm.h>
 #include <asm/smap.h>
 #include <asm/frame.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 	.section .entry.text, "ax"
 
@@ -290,7 +291,7 @@ ENTRY(ret_from_fork)
 
 	/* kernel thread */
 1:	movl	%edi, %eax
-	call	*%ebx
+	CALL_NOSPEC %ebx
 	/*
 	 * A kernel thread is allowed to return here after successfully
 	 * calling do_execve().  Exit to userspace to complete the execve()
@@ -919,7 +920,7 @@ common_exception:
 	movl	%ecx, %es
 	TRACE_IRQS_OFF
 	movl	%esp, %eax			# pt_regs pointer
-	call	*%edi
+	CALL_NOSPEC %edi
 	jmp	ret_from_exception
 END(common_exception)
 
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
 #include <asm/pgtable_types.h>
 #include <asm/export.h>
 #include <asm/frame.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 
 #include "calling.h"
@@ -187,7 +188,7 @@ ENTRY(entry_SYSCALL_64_trampoline)
 	 */
 	pushq	%rdi
 	movq	$entry_SYSCALL_64_stage2, %rdi
-	jmp	*%rdi
+	JMP_NOSPEC %rdi
 END(entry_SYSCALL_64_trampoline)
 
 	.popsection
@@ -266,7 +267,12 @@ entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath:
 	 * It might end up jumping to the slow path.  If it jumps, RAX
 	 * and all argument registers are clobbered.
 	 */
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+	movq	sys_call_table(, %rax, 8), %rax
+	call	__x86_indirect_thunk_rax
+#else
 	call	*sys_call_table(, %rax, 8)
+#endif
 .Lentry_SYSCALL_64_after_fastpath_call:
 
 	movq	%rax, RAX(%rsp)
@@ -438,7 +444,7 @@ ENTRY(stub_ptregs_64)
 	jmp	entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path
 
 1:
-	jmp	*%rax				/* Called from C */
+	JMP_NOSPEC %rax				/* Called from C */
 END(stub_ptregs_64)
 
 .macro ptregs_stub func
@@ -517,7 +523,7 @@ ENTRY(ret_from_fork)
 1:
 	/* kernel thread */
 	movq	%r12, %rdi
-	call	*%rbx
+	CALL_NOSPEC %rbx
 	/*
 	 * A kernel thread is allowed to return here after successfully
 	 * calling do_execve().  Exit to userspace to complete the execve()

[PATCH 4.14 108/118] x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace assembler indirect jumps

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

commit 9351803bd803cdbeb9b5a7850b7b6f464806e3db upstream.

Convert all indirect jumps in ftrace assembler code to use non-speculative
sequences when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-8-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_32.S |    6 ++++--
 arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S |    8 ++++----
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_32.S
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 #include <asm/segment.h>
 #include <asm/export.h>
 #include <asm/ftrace.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 #ifdef CC_USING_FENTRY
 # define function_hook	__fentry__
@@ -197,7 +198,8 @@ ftrace_stub:
 	movl	0x4(%ebp), %edx
 	subl	$MCOUNT_INSN_SIZE, %eax
 
-	call	*ftrace_trace_function
+	movl	ftrace_trace_function, %ecx
+	CALL_NOSPEC %ecx
 
 	popl	%edx
 	popl	%ecx
@@ -241,5 +243,5 @@ return_to_handler:
 	movl	%eax, %ecx
 	popl	%edx
 	popl	%eax
-	jmp	*%ecx
+	JMP_NOSPEC %ecx
 #endif
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 #include <asm/ptrace.h>
 #include <asm/ftrace.h>
 #include <asm/export.h>
-
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 	.code64
 	.section .entry.text, "ax"
@@ -286,8 +286,8 @@ trace:
 	 * ip and parent ip are used and the list function is called when
 	 * function tracing is enabled.
 	 */
-	call   *ftrace_trace_function
-
+	movq ftrace_trace_function, %r8
+	CALL_NOSPEC %r8
 	restore_mcount_regs
 
 	jmp fgraph_trace
@@ -329,5 +329,5 @@ GLOBAL(return_to_handler)
 	movq 8(%rsp), %rdx
 	movq (%rsp), %rax
 	addq $24, %rsp
-	jmp *%rdi
+	JMP_NOSPEC %rdi
 #endif

[PATCH 4.14 109/118] x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

commit e70e5892b28c18f517f29ab6e83bd57705104b31 upstream.

Convert all indirect jumps in hyperv inline asm code to use non-speculative
sequences when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-9-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h |   18 ++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 #include <linux/nmi.h>
 #include <asm/io.h>
 #include <asm/hyperv.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 /*
  * The below CPUID leaves are present if VersionAndFeatures.HypervisorPresent
@@ -186,10 +187,11 @@ static inline u64 hv_do_hypercall(u64 co
 		return U64_MAX;
 
 	__asm__ __volatile__("mov %4, %%r8\n"
-			     "call *%5"
+			     CALL_NOSPEC
 			     : "=a" (hv_status), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT,
 			       "+c" (control), "+d" (input_address)
-			     :  "r" (output_address), "m" (hv_hypercall_pg)
+			     :  "r" (output_address),
+				THUNK_TARGET(hv_hypercall_pg)
 			     : "cc", "memory", "r8", "r9", "r10", "r11");
 #else
 	u32 input_address_hi = upper_32_bits(input_address);
@@ -200,13 +202,13 @@ static inline u64 hv_do_hypercall(u64 co
 	if (!hv_hypercall_pg)
 		return U64_MAX;
 
-	__asm__ __volatile__("call *%7"
+	__asm__ __volatile__(CALL_NOSPEC
 			     : "=A" (hv_status),
 			       "+c" (input_address_lo), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
 			     : "A" (control),
 			       "b" (input_address_hi),
 			       "D"(output_address_hi), "S"(output_address_lo),
-			       "m" (hv_hypercall_pg)
+			       THUNK_TARGET(hv_hypercall_pg)
 			     : "cc", "memory");
 #endif /* !x86_64 */
 	return hv_status;
@@ -227,10 +229,10 @@ static inline u64 hv_do_fast_hypercall8(
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 	{
-		__asm__ __volatile__("call *%4"
+		__asm__ __volatile__(CALL_NOSPEC
 				     : "=a" (hv_status), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT,
 				       "+c" (control), "+d" (input1)
-				     : "m" (hv_hypercall_pg)
+				     : THUNK_TARGET(hv_hypercall_pg)
 				     : "cc", "r8", "r9", "r10", "r11");
 	}
 #else
@@ -238,13 +240,13 @@ static inline u64 hv_do_fast_hypercall8(
 		u32 input1_hi = upper_32_bits(input1);
 		u32 input1_lo = lower_32_bits(input1);
 
-		__asm__ __volatile__ ("call *%5"
+		__asm__ __volatile__ (CALL_NOSPEC
 				      : "=A"(hv_status),
 					"+c"(input1_lo),
 					ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
 				      :	"A" (control),
 					"b" (input1_hi),
-					"m" (hv_hypercall_pg)
+					THUNK_TARGET(hv_hypercall_pg)
 				      : "cc", "edi", "esi");
 	}
 #endif

[PATCH 4.14 110/118] x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall indirect jumps

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

commit ea08816d5b185ab3d09e95e393f265af54560350 upstream.

Convert indirect call in Xen hypercall to use non-speculative sequence,
when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-10-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
 #include <asm/page.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 #include <asm/smap.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 #include <xen/interface/xen.h>
 #include <xen/interface/sched.h>
@@ -217,9 +218,9 @@ privcmd_call(unsigned call,
 	__HYPERCALL_5ARG(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5);
 
 	stac();
-	asm volatile("call *%[call]"
+	asm volatile(CALL_NOSPEC
 		     : __HYPERCALL_5PARAM
-		     : [call] "a" (&hypercall_page[call])
+		     : [thunk_target] "a" (&hypercall_page[call])
 		     : __HYPERCALL_CLOBBER5);
 	clac();
 

[PATCH 4.14 111/118] x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler indirect jumps

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

commit 5096732f6f695001fa2d6f1335a2680b37912c69 upstream.

Convert all indirect jumps in 32bit checksum assembler code to use
non-speculative sequences when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-11-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S |    7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S
@@ -29,7 +29,8 @@
 #include <asm/errno.h>
 #include <asm/asm.h>
 #include <asm/export.h>
-				
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+
 /*
  * computes a partial checksum, e.g. for TCP/UDP fragments
  */
@@ -156,7 +157,7 @@ ENTRY(csum_partial)
 	negl %ebx
 	lea 45f(%ebx,%ebx,2), %ebx
 	testl %esi, %esi
-	jmp *%ebx
+	JMP_NOSPEC %ebx
 
 	# Handle 2-byte-aligned regions
 20:	addw (%esi), %ax
@@ -439,7 +440,7 @@ ENTRY(csum_partial_copy_generic)
 	andl $-32,%edx
 	lea 3f(%ebx,%ebx), %ebx
 	testl %esi, %esi 
-	jmp *%ebx
+	JMP_NOSPEC %ebx
 1:	addl $64,%esi
 	addl $64,%edi 
 	SRC(movb -32(%edx),%bl)	; SRC(movb (%edx),%bl)

[PATCH 4.14 112/118] x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>

commit 7614e913db1f40fff819b36216484dc3808995d4 upstream.

Convert all indirect jumps in 32bit irq inline asm code to use non
speculative sequences.

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-12-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c |    9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 
 #include <asm/apic.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW
 
@@ -55,11 +56,11 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct irq_stack *, softi
 static void call_on_stack(void *func, void *stack)
 {
 	asm volatile("xchgl	%%ebx,%%esp	\n"
-		     "call	*%%edi		\n"
+		     CALL_NOSPEC
 		     "movl	%%ebx,%%esp	\n"
 		     : "=b" (stack)
 		     : "0" (stack),
-		       "D"(func)
+		       [thunk_target] "D"(func)
 		     : "memory", "cc", "edx", "ecx", "eax");
 }
 
@@ -95,11 +96,11 @@ static inline int execute_on_irq_stack(i
 		call_on_stack(print_stack_overflow, isp);
 
 	asm volatile("xchgl	%%ebx,%%esp	\n"
-		     "call	*%%edi		\n"
+		     CALL_NOSPEC
 		     "movl	%%ebx,%%esp	\n"
 		     : "=a" (arg1), "=b" (isp)
 		     :  "0" (desc),   "1" (isp),
-			"D" (desc->handle_irq)
+			[thunk_target] "D" (desc->handle_irq)
 		     : "memory", "cc", "ecx");
 	return 1;
 }

[PATCH 4.14 113/118] x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

commit 117cc7a908c83697b0b737d15ae1eb5943afe35b upstream.

In accordance with the Intel and AMD documentation, we need to overwrite
all entries in the RSB on exiting a guest, to prevent malicious branch
target predictions from affecting the host kernel. This is needed both
for retpoline and for IBRS.

[ak: numbers again for the RSB stuffing labels]

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515755487-8524-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |   78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c                   |    4 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c                   |    4 +
 3 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -7,6 +7,48 @@
 #include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
 
+/*
+ * Fill the CPU return stack buffer.
+ *
+ * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an
+ * infinite 'pause; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution.
+ *
+ * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based
+ * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to
+ * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes
+ * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would
+ * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used.
+ *
+ * We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and
+ * inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that
+ * from C via asm(".include <asm/nospec-branch.h>") but let's not go there.
+ */
+
+#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS		32	/* To forcibly overwrite all entries */
+#define RSB_FILL_LOOPS		16	/* To avoid underflow */
+
+/*
+ * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be
+ * the optimal version — two calls, each with their own speculation
+ * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop.
+ */
+#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp)	\
+	mov	$(nr/2), reg;			\
+771:						\
+	call	772f;				\
+773:	/* speculation trap */			\
+	pause;					\
+	jmp	773b;				\
+772:						\
+	call	774f;				\
+775:	/* speculation trap */			\
+	pause;					\
+	jmp	775b;				\
+774:						\
+	dec	reg;				\
+	jnz	771b;				\
+	add	$(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp;
+
 #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
 
 /*
@@ -76,6 +118,20 @@
 #endif
 .endm
 
+ /*
+  * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP
+  * monstrosity above, manually.
+  */
+.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+	ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
+	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@",				\
+		__stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP))	\
+		\ftr
+.Lskip_rsb_\@:
+#endif
+.endm
+
 #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 #define ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE				\
@@ -119,7 +175,7 @@
 	X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
 
 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
-#else /* No retpoline */
+#else /* No retpoline for C / inline asm */
 # define CALL_NOSPEC "call *%[thunk_target]\n"
 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
 #endif
@@ -134,5 +190,25 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
 	SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
 };
 
+/*
+ * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
+ * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
+ * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future
+ * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided.
+ */
+static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+	unsigned long loops = RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS / 2;
+
+	asm volatile (ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
+		      ALTERNATIVE("jmp 910f",
+				  __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%0, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %1)),
+				  X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
+		      "910:"
+		      : "=&r" (loops), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
+		      : "r" (loops) : "memory" );
+#endif
+}
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 #endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
 #include <asm/debugreg.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_para.h>
 #include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 #include <asm/virtext.h>
 #include "trace.h"
@@ -5013,6 +5014,9 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu
 #endif
 		);
 
+	/* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */
+	vmexit_fill_RSB();
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 	wrmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, svm->host.gs_base);
 #else
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
 #include <asm/apic.h>
 #include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 #include "trace.h"
 #include "pmu.h"
@@ -9483,6 +9484,9 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struc
 #endif
 	      );
 
+	/* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */
+	vmexit_fill_RSB();
+
 	/* MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR is zeroed on vmexit. Restore it if needed */
 	if (debugctlmsr)
 		update_debugctlmsr(debugctlmsr);

[PATCH 4.14 114/118] selftests/x86: Add test_vsyscall

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>

commit 352909b49ba0d74929b96af6dfbefc854ab6ebb5 upstream.

This tests that the vsyscall entries do what they're expected to do.
It also confirms that attempts to read the vsyscall page behave as
expected.

If changes are made to the vsyscall code or its memory map handling,
running this test in all three of vsyscall=none, vsyscall=emulate,
and vsyscall=native are helpful.

(Because it's easy, this also compares the vsyscall results to their
 vDSO equivalents.)

Note to KAISER backporters: please test this under all three
vsyscall modes.  Also, in the emulate and native modes, make sure
that test_vsyscall_64 agrees with the command line or config
option as to which mode you're in.  It's quite easy to mess up
the kernel such that native mode accidentally emulates
or vice versa.

Greg, etc: please backport this to all your Meltdown-patched
kernels.  It'll help make sure the patches didn't regress
vsyscalls.

CSigned-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/2b9c5a174c1d60fd7774461d518aa75598b1d8fd.1515719552.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile        |    2 
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_vsyscall.c |  500 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 501 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ include ../lib.mk
 
 TARGETS_C_BOTHBITS := single_step_syscall sysret_ss_attrs syscall_nt ptrace_syscall test_mremap_vdso \
 			check_initial_reg_state sigreturn ldt_gdt iopl mpx-mini-test ioperm \
-			protection_keys test_vdso
+			protection_keys test_vdso test_vsyscall
 TARGETS_C_32BIT_ONLY := entry_from_vm86 syscall_arg_fault test_syscall_vdso unwind_vdso \
 			test_FCMOV test_FCOMI test_FISTTP \
 			vdso_restorer
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_vsyscall.c
@@ -0,0 +1,500 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <dlfcn.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <inttypes.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <sys/ucontext.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <err.h>
+#include <sched.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <setjmp.h>
+
+#ifdef __x86_64__
+# define VSYS(x) (x)
+#else
+# define VSYS(x) 0
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SYS_getcpu
+# ifdef __x86_64__
+#  define SYS_getcpu 309
+# else
+#  define SYS_getcpu 318
+# endif
+#endif
+
+static void sethandler(int sig, void (*handler)(int, siginfo_t *, void *),
+		       int flags)
+{
+	struct sigaction sa;
+	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+	sa.sa_sigaction = handler;
+	sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO | flags;
+	sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
+	if (sigaction(sig, &sa, 0))
+		err(1, "sigaction");
+}
+
+/* vsyscalls and vDSO */
+bool should_read_vsyscall = false;
+
+typedef long (*gtod_t)(struct timeval *tv, struct timezone *tz);
+gtod_t vgtod = (gtod_t)VSYS(0xffffffffff600000);
+gtod_t vdso_gtod;
+
+typedef int (*vgettime_t)(clockid_t, struct timespec *);
+vgettime_t vdso_gettime;
+
+typedef long (*time_func_t)(time_t *t);
+time_func_t vtime = (time_func_t)VSYS(0xffffffffff600400);
+time_func_t vdso_time;
+
+typedef long (*getcpu_t)(unsigned *, unsigned *, void *);
+getcpu_t vgetcpu = (getcpu_t)VSYS(0xffffffffff600800);
+getcpu_t vdso_getcpu;
+
+static void init_vdso(void)
+{
+	void *vdso = dlopen("linux-vdso.so.1", RTLD_LAZY | RTLD_LOCAL | RTLD_NOLOAD);
+	if (!vdso)
+		vdso = dlopen("linux-gate.so.1", RTLD_LAZY | RTLD_LOCAL | RTLD_NOLOAD);
+	if (!vdso) {
+		printf("[WARN]\tfailed to find vDSO\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	vdso_gtod = (gtod_t)dlsym(vdso, "__vdso_gettimeofday");
+	if (!vdso_gtod)
+		printf("[WARN]\tfailed to find gettimeofday in vDSO\n");
+
+	vdso_gettime = (vgettime_t)dlsym(vdso, "__vdso_clock_gettime");
+	if (!vdso_gettime)
+		printf("[WARN]\tfailed to find clock_gettime in vDSO\n");
+
+	vdso_time = (time_func_t)dlsym(vdso, "__vdso_time");
+	if (!vdso_time)
+		printf("[WARN]\tfailed to find time in vDSO\n");
+
+	vdso_getcpu = (getcpu_t)dlsym(vdso, "__vdso_getcpu");
+	if (!vdso_getcpu) {
+		/* getcpu() was never wired up in the 32-bit vDSO. */
+		printf("[%s]\tfailed to find getcpu in vDSO\n",
+		       sizeof(long) == 8 ? "WARN" : "NOTE");
+	}
+}
+
+static int init_vsys(void)
+{
+#ifdef __x86_64__
+	int nerrs = 0;
+	FILE *maps;
+	char line[128];
+	bool found = false;
+
+	maps = fopen("/proc/self/maps", "r");
+	if (!maps) {
+		printf("[WARN]\tCould not open /proc/self/maps -- assuming vsyscall is r-x\n");
+		should_read_vsyscall = true;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), maps)) {
+		char r, x;
+		void *start, *end;
+		char name[128];
+		if (sscanf(line, "%p-%p %c-%cp %*x %*x:%*x %*u %s",
+			   &start, &end, &r, &x, name) != 5)
+			continue;
+
+		if (strcmp(name, "[vsyscall]"))
+			continue;
+
+		printf("\tvsyscall map: %s", line);
+
+		if (start != (void *)0xffffffffff600000 ||
+		    end != (void *)0xffffffffff601000) {
+			printf("[FAIL]\taddress range is nonsense\n");
+			nerrs++;
+		}
+
+		printf("\tvsyscall permissions are %c-%c\n", r, x);
+		should_read_vsyscall = (r == 'r');
+		if (x != 'x') {
+			vgtod = NULL;
+			vtime = NULL;
+			vgetcpu = NULL;
+		}
+
+		found = true;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	fclose(maps);
+
+	if (!found) {
+		printf("\tno vsyscall map in /proc/self/maps\n");
+		should_read_vsyscall = false;
+		vgtod = NULL;
+		vtime = NULL;
+		vgetcpu = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return nerrs;
+#else
+	return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* syscalls */
+static inline long sys_gtod(struct timeval *tv, struct timezone *tz)
+{
+	return syscall(SYS_gettimeofday, tv, tz);
+}
+
+static inline int sys_clock_gettime(clockid_t id, struct timespec *ts)
+{
+	return syscall(SYS_clock_gettime, id, ts);
+}
+
+static inline long sys_time(time_t *t)
+{
+	return syscall(SYS_time, t);
+}
+
+static inline long sys_getcpu(unsigned * cpu, unsigned * node,
+			      void* cache)
+{
+	return syscall(SYS_getcpu, cpu, node, cache);
+}
+
+static jmp_buf jmpbuf;
+
+static void sigsegv(int sig, siginfo_t *info, void *ctx_void)
+{
+	siglongjmp(jmpbuf, 1);
+}
+
+static double tv_diff(const struct timeval *a, const struct timeval *b)
+{
+	return (double)(a->tv_sec - b->tv_sec) +
+		(double)((int)a->tv_usec - (int)b->tv_usec) * 1e-6;
+}
+
+static int check_gtod(const struct timeval *tv_sys1,
+		      const struct timeval *tv_sys2,
+		      const struct timezone *tz_sys,
+		      const char *which,
+		      const struct timeval *tv_other,
+		      const struct timezone *tz_other)
+{
+	int nerrs = 0;
+	double d1, d2;
+
+	if (tz_other && (tz_sys->tz_minuteswest != tz_other->tz_minuteswest || tz_sys->tz_dsttime != tz_other->tz_dsttime)) {
+		printf("[FAIL] %s tz mismatch\n", which);
+		nerrs++;
+	}
+
+	d1 = tv_diff(tv_other, tv_sys1);
+	d2 = tv_diff(tv_sys2, tv_other);
+	printf("\t%s time offsets: %lf %lf\n", which, d1, d2);
+
+	if (d1 < 0 || d2 < 0) {
+		printf("[FAIL]\t%s time was inconsistent with the syscall\n", which);
+		nerrs++;
+	} else {
+		printf("[OK]\t%s gettimeofday()'s timeval was okay\n", which);
+	}
+
+	return nerrs;
+}
+
+static int test_gtod(void)
+{
+	struct timeval tv_sys1, tv_sys2, tv_vdso, tv_vsys;
+	struct timezone tz_sys, tz_vdso, tz_vsys;
+	long ret_vdso = -1;
+	long ret_vsys = -1;
+	int nerrs = 0;
+
+	printf("[RUN]\ttest gettimeofday()\n");
+
+	if (sys_gtod(&tv_sys1, &tz_sys) != 0)
+		err(1, "syscall gettimeofday");
+	if (vdso_gtod)
+		ret_vdso = vdso_gtod(&tv_vdso, &tz_vdso);
+	if (vgtod)
+		ret_vsys = vgtod(&tv_vsys, &tz_vsys);
+	if (sys_gtod(&tv_sys2, &tz_sys) != 0)
+		err(1, "syscall gettimeofday");
+
+	if (vdso_gtod) {
+		if (ret_vdso == 0) {
+			nerrs += check_gtod(&tv_sys1, &tv_sys2, &tz_sys, "vDSO", &tv_vdso, &tz_vdso);
+		} else {
+			printf("[FAIL]\tvDSO gettimeofday() failed: %ld\n", ret_vdso);
+			nerrs++;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (vgtod) {
+		if (ret_vsys == 0) {
+			nerrs += check_gtod(&tv_sys1, &tv_sys2, &tz_sys, "vsyscall", &tv_vsys, &tz_vsys);
+		} else {
+			printf("[FAIL]\tvsys gettimeofday() failed: %ld\n", ret_vsys);
+			nerrs++;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nerrs;
+}
+
+static int test_time(void) {
+	int nerrs = 0;
+
+	printf("[RUN]\ttest time()\n");
+	long t_sys1, t_sys2, t_vdso = 0, t_vsys = 0;
+	long t2_sys1 = -1, t2_sys2 = -1, t2_vdso = -1, t2_vsys = -1;
+	t_sys1 = sys_time(&t2_sys1);
+	if (vdso_time)
+		t_vdso = vdso_time(&t2_vdso);
+	if (vtime)
+		t_vsys = vtime(&t2_vsys);
+	t_sys2 = sys_time(&t2_sys2);
+	if (t_sys1 < 0 || t_sys1 != t2_sys1 || t_sys2 < 0 || t_sys2 != t2_sys2) {
+		printf("[FAIL]\tsyscall failed (ret1:%ld output1:%ld ret2:%ld output2:%ld)\n", t_sys1, t2_sys1, t_sys2, t2_sys2);
+		nerrs++;
+		return nerrs;
+	}
+
+	if (vdso_time) {
+		if (t_vdso < 0 || t_vdso != t2_vdso) {
+			printf("[FAIL]\tvDSO failed (ret:%ld output:%ld)\n", t_vdso, t2_vdso);
+			nerrs++;
+		} else if (t_vdso < t_sys1 || t_vdso > t_sys2) {
+			printf("[FAIL]\tvDSO returned the wrong time (%ld %ld %ld)\n", t_sys1, t_vdso, t_sys2);
+			nerrs++;
+		} else {
+			printf("[OK]\tvDSO time() is okay\n");
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (vtime) {
+		if (t_vsys < 0 || t_vsys != t2_vsys) {
+			printf("[FAIL]\tvsyscall failed (ret:%ld output:%ld)\n", t_vsys, t2_vsys);
+			nerrs++;
+		} else if (t_vsys < t_sys1 || t_vsys > t_sys2) {
+			printf("[FAIL]\tvsyscall returned the wrong time (%ld %ld %ld)\n", t_sys1, t_vsys, t_sys2);
+			nerrs++;
+		} else {
+			printf("[OK]\tvsyscall time() is okay\n");
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nerrs;
+}
+
+static int test_getcpu(int cpu)
+{
+	int nerrs = 0;
+	long ret_sys, ret_vdso = -1, ret_vsys = -1;
+
+	printf("[RUN]\tgetcpu() on CPU %d\n", cpu);
+
+	cpu_set_t cpuset;
+	CPU_ZERO(&cpuset);
+	CPU_SET(cpu, &cpuset);
+	if (sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(cpuset), &cpuset) != 0) {
+		printf("[SKIP]\tfailed to force CPU %d\n", cpu);
+		return nerrs;
+	}
+
+	unsigned cpu_sys, cpu_vdso, cpu_vsys, node_sys, node_vdso, node_vsys;
+	unsigned node = 0;
+	bool have_node = false;
+	ret_sys = sys_getcpu(&cpu_sys, &node_sys, 0);
+	if (vdso_getcpu)
+		ret_vdso = vdso_getcpu(&cpu_vdso, &node_vdso, 0);
+	if (vgetcpu)
+		ret_vsys = vgetcpu(&cpu_vsys, &node_vsys, 0);
+
+	if (ret_sys == 0) {
+		if (cpu_sys != cpu) {
+			printf("[FAIL]\tsyscall reported CPU %hu but should be %d\n", cpu_sys, cpu);
+			nerrs++;
+		}
+
+		have_node = true;
+		node = node_sys;
+	}
+
+	if (vdso_getcpu) {
+		if (ret_vdso) {
+			printf("[FAIL]\tvDSO getcpu() failed\n");
+			nerrs++;
+		} else {
+			if (!have_node) {
+				have_node = true;
+				node = node_vdso;
+			}
+
+			if (cpu_vdso != cpu) {
+				printf("[FAIL]\tvDSO reported CPU %hu but should be %d\n", cpu_vdso, cpu);
+				nerrs++;
+			} else {
+				printf("[OK]\tvDSO reported correct CPU\n");
+			}
+
+			if (node_vdso != node) {
+				printf("[FAIL]\tvDSO reported node %hu but should be %hu\n", node_vdso, node);
+				nerrs++;
+			} else {
+				printf("[OK]\tvDSO reported correct node\n");
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (vgetcpu) {
+		if (ret_vsys) {
+			printf("[FAIL]\tvsyscall getcpu() failed\n");
+			nerrs++;
+		} else {
+			if (!have_node) {
+				have_node = true;
+				node = node_vsys;
+			}
+
+			if (cpu_vsys != cpu) {
+				printf("[FAIL]\tvsyscall reported CPU %hu but should be %d\n", cpu_vsys, cpu);
+				nerrs++;
+			} else {
+				printf("[OK]\tvsyscall reported correct CPU\n");
+			}
+
+			if (node_vsys != node) {
+				printf("[FAIL]\tvsyscall reported node %hu but should be %hu\n", node_vsys, node);
+				nerrs++;
+			} else {
+				printf("[OK]\tvsyscall reported correct node\n");
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nerrs;
+}
+
+static int test_vsys_r(void)
+{
+#ifdef __x86_64__
+	printf("[RUN]\tChecking read access to the vsyscall page\n");
+	bool can_read;
+	if (sigsetjmp(jmpbuf, 1) == 0) {
+		*(volatile int *)0xffffffffff600000;
+		can_read = true;
+	} else {
+		can_read = false;
+	}
+
+	if (can_read && !should_read_vsyscall) {
+		printf("[FAIL]\tWe have read access, but we shouldn't\n");
+		return 1;
+	} else if (!can_read && should_read_vsyscall) {
+		printf("[FAIL]\tWe don't have read access, but we should\n");
+		return 1;
+	} else {
+		printf("[OK]\tgot expected result\n");
+	}
+#endif
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+#ifdef __x86_64__
+#define X86_EFLAGS_TF (1UL << 8)
+static volatile sig_atomic_t num_vsyscall_traps;
+
+static unsigned long get_eflags(void)
+{
+	unsigned long eflags;
+	asm volatile ("pushfq\n\tpopq %0" : "=rm" (eflags));
+	return eflags;
+}
+
+static void set_eflags(unsigned long eflags)
+{
+	asm volatile ("pushq %0\n\tpopfq" : : "rm" (eflags) : "flags");
+}
+
+static void sigtrap(int sig, siginfo_t *info, void *ctx_void)
+{
+	ucontext_t *ctx = (ucontext_t *)ctx_void;
+	unsigned long ip = ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RIP];
+
+	if (((ip ^ 0xffffffffff600000UL) & ~0xfffUL) == 0)
+		num_vsyscall_traps++;
+}
+
+static int test_native_vsyscall(void)
+{
+	time_t tmp;
+	bool is_native;
+
+	if (!vtime)
+		return 0;
+
+	printf("[RUN]\tchecking for native vsyscall\n");
+	sethandler(SIGTRAP, sigtrap, 0);
+	set_eflags(get_eflags() | X86_EFLAGS_TF);
+	vtime(&tmp);
+	set_eflags(get_eflags() & ~X86_EFLAGS_TF);
+
+	/*
+	 * If vsyscalls are emulated, we expect a single trap in the
+	 * vsyscall page -- the call instruction will trap with RIP
+	 * pointing to the entry point before emulation takes over.
+	 * In native mode, we expect two traps, since whatever code
+	 * the vsyscall page contains will be more than just a ret
+	 * instruction.
+	 */
+	is_native = (num_vsyscall_traps > 1);
+
+	printf("\tvsyscalls are %s (%d instructions in vsyscall page)\n",
+	       (is_native ? "native" : "emulated"),
+	       (int)num_vsyscall_traps);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	int nerrs = 0;
+
+	init_vdso();
+	nerrs += init_vsys();
+
+	nerrs += test_gtod();
+	nerrs += test_time();
+	nerrs += test_getcpu(0);
+	nerrs += test_getcpu(1);
+
+	sethandler(SIGSEGV, sigsegv, 0);
+	nerrs += test_vsys_r();
+
+#ifdef __x86_64__
+	nerrs += test_native_vsyscall();
+#endif
+
+	return nerrs ? 1 : 0;
+}

[PATCH 4.14 115/118] x86/pti: Fix !PCID and sanitize defines

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit f10ee3dcc9f0aba92a5c4c064628be5200765dc2 upstream.

The switch to the user space page tables in the low level ASM code sets
unconditionally bit 12 and bit 11 of CR3. Bit 12 is switching the base
address of the page directory to the user part, bit 11 is switching the
PCID to the PCID associated with the user page tables.

This fails on a machine which lacks PCID support because bit 11 is set in
CR3. Bit 11 is reserved when PCID is inactive.

While the Intel SDM claims that the reserved bits are ignored when PCID is
disabled, the AMD APM states that they should be cleared.

This went unnoticed as the AMD APM was not checked when the code was
developed and reviewed and test systems with Intel CPUs never failed to
boot. The report is against a Centos 6 host where the guest fails to boot,
so it's not yet clear whether this is a virt issue or can happen on real
hardware too, but thats irrelevant as the AMD APM clearly ask for clearing
the reserved bits.

Make sure that on non PCID machines bit 11 is not set by the page table
switching code.

Andy suggested to rename the related bits and masks so they are clearly
describing what they should be used for, which is done as well for clarity.

That split could have been done with alternatives but the macro hell is
horrible and ugly. This can be done on top if someone cares to remove the
extra orq. For now it's a straight forward fix.

Fixes: 6fd166aae78c ("x86/mm: Use/Fix PCID to optimize user/kernel switches")
Reported-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801140009150.2371@nanos
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/entry/calling.h               |   36 +++++++++++++++++----------------
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h |    2 -
 arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h        |    6 ++---
 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
@@ -198,8 +198,11 @@ For 32-bit we have the following convent
  * PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION PGDs are 8k.  Flip bit 12 to switch between the two
  * halves:
  */
-#define PTI_SWITCH_PGTABLES_MASK	(1<<PAGE_SHIFT)
-#define PTI_SWITCH_MASK		(PTI_SWITCH_PGTABLES_MASK|(1<<X86_CR3_PTI_SWITCH_BIT))
+#define PTI_USER_PGTABLE_BIT		PAGE_SHIFT
+#define PTI_USER_PGTABLE_MASK		(1 << PTI_USER_PGTABLE_BIT)
+#define PTI_USER_PCID_BIT		X86_CR3_PTI_PCID_USER_BIT
+#define PTI_USER_PCID_MASK		(1 << PTI_USER_PCID_BIT)
+#define PTI_USER_PGTABLE_AND_PCID_MASK  (PTI_USER_PCID_MASK | PTI_USER_PGTABLE_MASK)
 
 .macro SET_NOFLUSH_BIT	reg:req
 	bts	$X86_CR3_PCID_NOFLUSH_BIT, \reg
@@ -208,7 +211,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following convent
 .macro ADJUST_KERNEL_CR3 reg:req
 	ALTERNATIVE "", "SET_NOFLUSH_BIT \reg", X86_FEATURE_PCID
 	/* Clear PCID and "PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION bit", point CR3 at kernel pagetables: */
-	andq    $(~PTI_SWITCH_MASK), \reg
+	andq    $(~PTI_USER_PGTABLE_AND_PCID_MASK), \reg
 .endm
 
 .macro SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg:req
@@ -239,15 +242,19 @@ For 32-bit we have the following convent
 	/* Flush needed, clear the bit */
 	btr	\scratch_reg, THIS_CPU_user_pcid_flush_mask
 	movq	\scratch_reg2, \scratch_reg
-	jmp	.Lwrcr3_\@
+	jmp	.Lwrcr3_pcid_\@
 
 .Lnoflush_\@:
 	movq	\scratch_reg2, \scratch_reg
 	SET_NOFLUSH_BIT \scratch_reg
 
+.Lwrcr3_pcid_\@:
+	/* Flip the ASID to the user version */
+	orq	$(PTI_USER_PCID_MASK), \scratch_reg
+
 .Lwrcr3_\@:
-	/* Flip the PGD and ASID to the user version */
-	orq     $(PTI_SWITCH_MASK), \scratch_reg
+	/* Flip the PGD to the user version */
+	orq     $(PTI_USER_PGTABLE_MASK), \scratch_reg
 	mov	\scratch_reg, %cr3
 .Lend_\@:
 .endm
@@ -263,17 +270,12 @@ For 32-bit we have the following convent
 	movq	%cr3, \scratch_reg
 	movq	\scratch_reg, \save_reg
 	/*
-	 * Is the "switch mask" all zero?  That means that both of
-	 * these are zero:
-	 *
-	 *	1. The user/kernel PCID bit, and
-	 *	2. The user/kernel "bit" that points CR3 to the
-	 *	   bottom half of the 8k PGD
-	 *
-	 * That indicates a kernel CR3 value, not a user CR3.
+	 * Test the user pagetable bit. If set, then the user page tables
+	 * are active. If clear CR3 already has the kernel page table
+	 * active.
 	 */
-	testq	$(PTI_SWITCH_MASK), \scratch_reg
-	jz	.Ldone_\@
+	bt	$PTI_USER_PGTABLE_BIT, \scratch_reg
+	jnc	.Ldone_\@
 
 	ADJUST_KERNEL_CR3 \scratch_reg
 	movq	\scratch_reg, %cr3
@@ -290,7 +292,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following convent
 	 * KERNEL pages can always resume with NOFLUSH as we do
 	 * explicit flushes.
 	 */
-	bt	$X86_CR3_PTI_SWITCH_BIT, \save_reg
+	bt	$PTI_USER_PGTABLE_BIT, \save_reg
 	jnc	.Lnoflush_\@
 
 	/*
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
 #define CR3_NOFLUSH	BIT_ULL(63)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
-# define X86_CR3_PTI_SWITCH_BIT	11
+# define X86_CR3_PTI_PCID_USER_BIT	11
 #endif
 
 #else
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
@@ -81,13 +81,13 @@ static inline u16 kern_pcid(u16 asid)
 	 * Make sure that the dynamic ASID space does not confict with the
 	 * bit we are using to switch between user and kernel ASIDs.
 	 */
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS >= (1 << X86_CR3_PTI_SWITCH_BIT));
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS >= (1 << X86_CR3_PTI_PCID_USER_BIT));
 
 	/*
 	 * The ASID being passed in here should have respected the
 	 * MAX_ASID_AVAILABLE and thus never have the switch bit set.
 	 */
-	VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(asid & (1 << X86_CR3_PTI_SWITCH_BIT));
+	VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(asid & (1 << X86_CR3_PTI_PCID_USER_BIT));
 #endif
 	/*
 	 * The dynamically-assigned ASIDs that get passed in are small
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static inline u16 user_pcid(u16 asid)
 {
 	u16 ret = kern_pcid(asid);
 #ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
-	ret |= 1 << X86_CR3_PTI_SWITCH_BIT;
+	ret |= 1 << X86_CR3_PTI_PCID_USER_BIT;
 #endif
 	return ret;
 }

[PATCH 4.14 116/118] security/Kconfig: Correct the Documentation reference for PTI

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: W. Trevor King <wking@tremily.us>

commit a237f762681e2a394ca67f21df2feb2b76a3609b upstream.

When the config option for PTI was added a reference to documentation was
added as well. But the documentation did not exist at that point. The final
documentation has a different file name.

Fix it up to point to the proper file.

Fixes: 385ce0ea ("x86/mm/pti: Add Kconfig")
Signed-off-by: W. Trevor King <wking@tremily.us>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3009cc8ccbddcd897ec1e0cb6dda524929de0d14.1515799398.git.wking@tremily.us
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 security/Kconfig |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 	  ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped
 	  into userspace.
 
-	  See Documentation/x86/pagetable-isolation.txt for more details.
+	  See Documentation/x86/pti.txt for more details.
 
 config SECURITY_INFINIBAND
 	bool "Infiniband Security Hooks"

[PATCH 4.14 117/118] x86,perf: Disable intel_bts when PTI

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>

commit 99a9dc98ba52267ce5e062b52de88ea1f1b2a7d8 upstream.

The intel_bts driver does not use the 'normal' BTS buffer which is exposed
through the cpu_entry_area but instead uses the memory allocated for the
perf AUX buffer.

This obviously comes apart when using PTI because then the kernel mapping;
which includes that AUX buffer memory; disappears. Fixing this requires to
expose a mapping which is visible in all context and that's not trivial.

As a quick fix disable this driver when PTI is enabled to prevent
malfunction.

Fixes: 385ce0ea4c07 ("x86/mm/pti: Add Kconfig")
Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Reported-by: Robert Święcki <robert@swiecki.net>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: greg@kroah.com
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: luto@amacapital.net
Cc: Vince Weaver <vince@deater.net>
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180114102713.GB6166@worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c |   18 ++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
@@ -582,6 +582,24 @@ static __init int bts_init(void)
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DTES64) || !x86_pmu.bts)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI)) {
+		/*
+		 * BTS hardware writes through a virtual memory map we must
+		 * either use the kernel physical map, or the user mapping of
+		 * the AUX buffer.
+		 *
+		 * However, since this driver supports per-CPU and per-task inherit
+		 * we cannot use the user mapping since it will not be availble
+		 * if we're not running the owning process.
+		 *
+		 * With PTI we can't use the kernal map either, because its not
+		 * there when we run userspace.
+		 *
+		 * For now, disable this driver when using PTI.
+		 */
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+
 	bts_pmu.capabilities	= PERF_PMU_CAP_AUX_NO_SG | PERF_PMU_CAP_ITRACE |
 				  PERF_PMU_CAP_EXCLUSIVE;
 	bts_pmu.task_ctx_nr	= perf_sw_context;

[PATCH 4.14 118/118] x86/retpoline: Remove compile time warning

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit b8b9ce4b5aec8de9e23cabb0a26b78641f9ab1d6 upstream.

Remove the compile time warning when CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y and the compiler
does not have retpoline support. Linus rationale for this is:

  It's wrong because it will just make people turn off RETPOLINE, and the
  asm updates - and return stack clearing - that are independent of the
  compiler are likely the most important parts because they are likely the
  ones easiest to target.

  And it's annoying because most people won't be able to do anything about
  it. The number of people building their own compiler? Very small. So if
  their distro hasn't got a compiler yet (and pretty much nobody does), the
  warning is just annoying crap.

  It is already properly reported as part of the sysfs interface. The
  compile-time warning only encourages bad things.

Fixes: 76b043848fd2 ("x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support")
Requested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzWgquv4i6Mab6bASqYXg3ErV3XDFEYf=GEcCDQg5uAtw@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/Makefile |    2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -240,8 +240,6 @@ ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
     RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register)
     ifneq ($(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),)
         KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS) -DRETPOLINE
-    else
-        $(warning CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y, but not supported by the compiler. Toolchain update recommended.)
     endif
 endif
 

Re: [PATCH 4.14 053/118] Revert "Revert "xfrm: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in xfrm_state_find.""

[Steffen Klassert]

On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 01:34:40PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> 4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
> 
> ------------------
> 
> From: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
> 
> 
> This reverts commit 94802151894d482e82c324edf2c658f8e6b96508.
> 
> It breaks transport mode when the policy template has
> wildcard addresses configured.
> 
> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Hm, this seems to be one revert too much.

commit 94802151894d482e82c324edf2c658f8e6b96508 reverted already
the buggy commit. Reverting the revert will bring the bug back.

Re: [PATCH 4.14 053/118] Revert "Revert "xfrm: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in xfrm_state_find.""

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 02:23:29PM +0100, Steffen Klassert wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 01:34:40PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > 4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
> > 
> > ------------------
> > 
> > From: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
> > 
> > 
> > This reverts commit 94802151894d482e82c324edf2c658f8e6b96508.
> > 
> > It breaks transport mode when the policy template has
> > wildcard addresses configured.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
> > Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> 
> Hm, this seems to be one revert too much.
> 
> commit 94802151894d482e82c324edf2c658f8e6b96508 reverted already
> the buggy commit. Reverting the revert will bring the bug back.

Really?  I have no idea what is going on here, I just take the patches
that David gives me :)

David, should I drop this one?

thanks,

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH 4.14 000/118] 4.14.14-stable review

[Holger Hoffstätte]

On 01/15/18 13:33, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.14 release.
> There are 118 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.

Applied to 4.14.13 & built on 3 machines with different old CPUs
(Core2Duo, i5/i7 SandyBridge), current gcc 7.2.0 still without retpoline
magic (so syscalls only). Ensured CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled.

No regressions, no filesystems on fire, no spontaneous reboots.

Also gave this a syscall-heavy workout with iperf, still pushing >10 GB/s
locally just as before (within expected deviation). perf bench shows some
expected impact though, ~0.2-0.3 µs for scheduling.

cheers,
Holger

Re: [PATCH 4.14 000/118] 4.14.14-stable review

[Alan J. Wylie]

After updating from 4.4 to 4.14, I found that my 
ASUSTeK M5A99X EVO with an AMD FX(tm)-4300 was only showing 1 core
instead of 4.

I tracked it down to this bug:

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=194501

Cherry-picking 2b85b3d22920db7473e5fed5719e7955c0ec323e applied
cleanly and all cores were then present

Could we have this patch included too, please.

Thanks

-- 
Alan J. Wylie                                          https://www.wylie.me.uk/

Dance like no-one's watching. / Encrypt like everyone is.
Security is inversely proportional to convenience

Re: [PATCH 4.14 000/118] 4.14.14-stable review

[kernelci.org bot]

stable-rc/linux-4.14.y boot: 140 boots: 3 failed, 134 passed with 3 offline (v4.14.13-119-gb32d455a94d0)

Full Boot Summary: https://kernelci.org/boot/all/job/stable-rc/branch/linux-4.14.y/kernel/v4.14.13-119-gb32d455a94d0/
Full Build Summary: https://kernelci.org/build/stable-rc/branch/linux-4.14.y/kernel/v4.14.13-119-gb32d455a94d0/

Tree: stable-rc
Branch: linux-4.14.y
Git Describe: v4.14.13-119-gb32d455a94d0
Git Commit: b32d455a94d078c78756fd637bad8d46050c1163
Git URL: http://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
Tested: 79 unique boards, 23 SoC families, 17 builds out of 185

Boot Regressions Detected:

arm:

    multi_v7_defconfig:
        mt7623n-bananapi-bpi-r2:
            lab-baylibre-seattle: failing since 1 day (last pass: v4.14.13-32-g8317937bacb7 - first fail: v4.14.13-75-g8289047d7506)

    sunxi_defconfig:
        sun8i-a83t-allwinner-h8homlet-v2:
            lab-free-electrons: new failure (last pass: v4.14.13-75-g8289047d7506)

Boot Failures Detected:

arm:

    multi_v7_defconfig
        mt7623n-bananapi-bpi-r2: 1 failed lab

    mvebu_v5_defconfig
        kirkwood-openblocks_a7_rootfs:nfs: 1 failed lab

    sunxi_defconfig
        sun8i-a83t-allwinner-h8homlet-v2: 1 failed lab

Offline Platforms:

arm:

    multi_v7_defconfig:
        exynos5420-arndale-octa: 1 offline lab
        tegra124-jetson-tk1: 1 offline lab

    exynos_defconfig:
        exynos5420-arndale-octa: 1 offline lab

---
For more info write to <info@kernelci.org>

Re: [PATCH 4.14 053/118] Revert "Revert "xfrm: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in xfrm_state_find.""

[David Miller]

From: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2018 14:23:29 +0100

> On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 01:34:40PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
>> 4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
>> 
>> ------------------
>> 
>> From: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
>> 
>> 
>> This reverts commit 94802151894d482e82c324edf2c658f8e6b96508.
>> 
>> It breaks transport mode when the policy template has
>> wildcard addresses configured.
>> 
>> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
>> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> 
> Hm, this seems to be one revert too much.
> 
> commit 94802151894d482e82c324edf2c658f8e6b96508 reverted already
> the buggy commit. Reverting the revert will bring the bug back.

Steffen, in the email where you asked me to revert that is the
commit ID you referenced.

We can drop this, but you need to then tell us whether 4.14 needs
the revert any longer and if so what the correct SHA ID would
be.

Re: [PATCH 4.14 000/118] 4.14.14-stable review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 04:04:32PM +0000, Alan J. Wylie wrote:
> 
> After updating from 4.4 to 4.14, I found that my 
> ASUSTeK M5A99X EVO with an AMD FX(tm)-4300 was only showing 1 core
> instead of 4.
> 
> I tracked it down to this bug:
> 
> https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=194501
> 
> Cherry-picking 2b85b3d22920db7473e5fed5719e7955c0ec323e applied
> cleanly and all cores were then present

That commit showed up in 4.11-rc3, why would you need this on 4.14?  It
shouldn't even apply, right?

> Could we have this patch included too, please.

Do you also have problems with Linus's tree?

thanks,

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH 4.14 000/118] 4.14.14-stable review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 04:24:59PM +0100, Holger Hoffstätte wrote:
> On 01/15/18 13:33, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.14 release.
> > There are 118 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > let me know.
> 
> Applied to 4.14.13 & built on 3 machines with different old CPUs
> (Core2Duo, i5/i7 SandyBridge), current gcc 7.2.0 still without retpoline
> magic (so syscalls only). Ensured CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled.
> 
> No regressions, no filesystems on fire, no spontaneous reboots.
> 
> Also gave this a syscall-heavy workout with iperf, still pushing >10 GB/s
> locally just as before (within expected deviation). perf bench shows some
> expected impact though, ~0.2-0.3 µs for scheduling.

Great, thanks for testing, much appreciated.

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH 4.14 000/118] 4.14.14-stable review

[Dan Rue]

On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 01:33:47PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.14 release.
> There are 118 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Wed Jan 17 12:33:32 UTC 2018.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.14-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
>   git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm and x86_64.

Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------

kernel: 4.14.14-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.14.y
git commit: 03153128f7d26492581ded52990c6f71e9d53afb
git describe: v4.14.13-119-g03153128f7d2
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.14-oe/build/v4.14.13-119-g03153128f7d2


No regressions (compared to build v4.14.13-119-gb32d455a94d0)

Boards, architectures and test suites:
-------------------------------------

hi6220-hikey - arm64
* boot - pass: 19,
* kselftest - skip: 16, pass: 46,
* libhugetlbfs - skip: 1, pass: 90,
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-containers-tests - pass: 64,
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19,
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - skip: 1, pass: 21,
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3,
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9,
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11,
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-sched-tests - pass: 14,
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-syscalls-tests - skip: 121, pass: 983,
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 12,

juno-r2 - arm64
* boot - pass: 20,
* kselftest - skip: 17, pass: 45,
* libhugetlbfs - skip: 1, pass: 90,
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-containers-tests - pass: 64,
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs-tests - pass: 60,
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19,
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - pass: 22,
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3,
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9,
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11,
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-sched-tests - pass: 14,
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-syscalls-tests - skip: 121, pass: 987,
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 12,

x15 - arm
* boot - pass: 20,
* kselftest - skip: 19, pass: 42,
* libhugetlbfs - skip: 1, pass: 87,
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-containers-tests - pass: 64,
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs-tests - pass: 60,
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19,
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - skip: 2, pass: 20,
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3,
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9,
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11,
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-sched-tests - skip: 1, pass: 13,
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-syscalls-tests - skip: 66, pass: 1037,
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 12,

x86_64
* boot - pass: 20,
* kselftest - skip: 17, pass: 57, fail: 1
* libhugetlbfs - skip: 1, pass: 90,
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-containers-tests - pass: 64,
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs-tests - skip: 1, pass: 61,
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19,
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - pass: 22,
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3,
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9,
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11,
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-sched-tests - skip: 1, pass: 9,
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-syscalls-tests - skip: 116, pass: 1016,
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 12,

Re: [PATCH 4.14 000/118] 4.14.14-stable review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 04:11:15PM -0600, Dan Rue wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 01:33:47PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.14 release.
> > There are 118 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > let me know.
> > 
> > Responses should be made by Wed Jan 17 12:33:32 UTC 2018.
> > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> > 
> > The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> > 	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.14-rc1.gz
> > or in the git tree and branch at:
> >   git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
> > and the diffstat can be found below.
> 
> Results from Linaro’s test farm.
> No regressions on arm64, arm and x86_64.

Great, thanks for testing.

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH 4.14 053/118] Revert "Revert "xfrm: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in xfrm_state_find.""

[Steffen Klassert]

On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 11:56:12AM -0500, David Miller wrote:
> From: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
> Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2018 14:23:29 +0100
> 
> > On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 01:34:40PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> >> 4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
> >> 
> >> ------------------
> >> 
> >> From: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
> >> 
> >> 
> >> This reverts commit 94802151894d482e82c324edf2c658f8e6b96508.
> >> 
> >> It breaks transport mode when the policy template has
> >> wildcard addresses configured.
> >> 
> >> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
> >> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> > 
> > Hm, this seems to be one revert too much.
> > 
> > commit 94802151894d482e82c324edf2c658f8e6b96508 reverted already
> > the buggy commit. Reverting the revert will bring the bug back.
> 
> Steffen, in the email where you asked me to revert that is the
> commit ID you referenced.

I think there was a misunderstanding. I asked you to queue the
commit with that ID to stable on Dec 23 (this commit ID is the
revert of the buggy patch). This commit was included to stable
on Jan 4 then:

https://www.spinics.net/lists/stable/msg208727.html

So with this, everything was ok.

Maybe you started to look again into this because Nicolas Dichtel
(Cced) asked to queue this patch on Jan 5, the patch was already
in the stable tree (Jan 4) but probably not in an actual release
at this time.

> 
> We can drop this, but you need to then tell us whether 4.14 needs
> the revert any longer and if so what the correct SHA ID would
> be.

I think we can we can just drop this.

Unless Nicolas knows something that is still missing, v4.14.12 and
above should be ok as is.

Re: [PATCH 4.14 053/118] Revert "Revert "xfrm: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in xfrm_state_find.""

[Nicolas Dichtel]

Le 16/01/2018 à 07:33, Steffen Klassert a écrit :
> On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 11:56:12AM -0500, David Miller wrote:
>> From: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
>> Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2018 14:23:29 +0100
>>
>>> On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 01:34:40PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
>>>> 4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
>>>>
>>>> ------------------
>>>>
>>>> From: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This reverts commit 94802151894d482e82c324edf2c658f8e6b96508.
>>>>
>>>> It breaks transport mode when the policy template has
>>>> wildcard addresses configured.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
>>>
>>> Hm, this seems to be one revert too much.
>>>
>>> commit 94802151894d482e82c324edf2c658f8e6b96508 reverted already
>>> the buggy commit. Reverting the revert will bring the bug back.
>>
>> Steffen, in the email where you asked me to revert that is the
>> commit ID you referenced.
> 
> I think there was a misunderstanding. I asked you to queue the
> commit with that ID to stable on Dec 23 (this commit ID is the
> revert of the buggy patch). This commit was included to stable
> on Jan 4 then:
> 
> https://www.spinics.net/lists/stable/msg208727.html
> 
> So with this, everything was ok.
> 
> Maybe you started to look again into this because Nicolas Dichtel
> (Cced) asked to queue this patch on Jan 5, the patch was already
> in the stable tree (Jan 4) but probably not in an actual release
> at this time.
Oh, I didn't find it at this time in the linux-stable tree nor in the stable
patchwork. Bad timing :/

I still don't find it in the patchwork:
http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/bundle/davem/stable/?series=&submitter=1442&state=*&q=&archive=both
Am I missing something?

> 
>>
>> We can drop this, but you need to then tell us whether 4.14 needs
>> the revert any longer and if so what the correct SHA ID would
>> be.
> 
> I think we can we can just drop this.
> 
> Unless Nicolas knows something that is still missing, v4.14.12 and
> above should be ok as is.
I agree, we can drop this.


Thank you,
Nicolas

Re: [PATCH 4.14 053/118] Revert "Revert "xfrm: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in xfrm_state_find.""

[Steffen Klassert]

On Tue, Jan 16, 2018 at 08:44:41AM +0100, Nicolas Dichtel wrote:
> Le 16/01/2018 à 07:33, Steffen Klassert a écrit :
> > 
> > Maybe you started to look again into this because Nicolas Dichtel
> > (Cced) asked to queue this patch on Jan 5, the patch was already
> > in the stable tree (Jan 4) but probably not in an actual release
> > at this time.
> Oh, I didn't find it at this time in the linux-stable tree nor in the stable
> patchwork. Bad timing :/
> 
> I still don't find it in the patchwork:
> http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/bundle/davem/stable/?series=&submitter=1442&state=*&q=&archive=both
> Am I missing something?

Not so sure which patches are included here, maybe just the ones
that still needs to be submitted to stable.

Anyway, the commit we need is included in v4.14.12:

commit 2d01ac8cc12b973668bf898b03bf9ffb12d83b83
Author: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Nov 2017 06:40:57 +0100

Revert "xfrm: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in xfrm_state_find."

commit 94802151894d482e82c324edf2c658f8e6b96508 upstream.

This reverts commit c9f3f813d462c72dbe412cee6a5cbacf13c4ad5e.

This commit breaks transport mode when the policy template
has widlcard addresses configured, so revert it.

Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: From: Derek Robson <robsonde@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

> 
> > 
> >>
> >> We can drop this, but you need to then tell us whether 4.14 needs
> >> the revert any longer and if so what the correct SHA ID would
> >> be.
> > 
> > I think we can we can just drop this.
> > 
> > Unless Nicolas knows something that is still missing, v4.14.12 and
> > above should be ok as is.
> I agree, we can drop this.

Ok, so let's drop it.

Thanks!

Re: [PATCH 4.14 000/118] 4.14.14-stable review

[Alan J. Wylie]

at 18:40 on Mon 15-Jan-2018 Greg Kroah-Hartman (gregkh@linuxfoundation.org) wrote:

> That commit showed up in 4.11-rc3, why would you need this on 4.14?  It
> shouldn't even apply, right?

Profuse apologies for this - I had mistakenly checked out a 4.10
kernel rather than 4.14.

Thanks for correcting my mistake. I need more coffee and sleep. Shift
work isn't agreeing with me.

Regards
Alan

-- 
Alan J. Wylie                                          https://www.wylie.me.uk/

Dance like no-one's watching. / Encrypt like everyone is.
Security is inversely proportional to convenience

Re: [PATCH 4.14 000/118] 4.14.14-stable review

[Guenter Roeck]

On 01/15/2018 04:33 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.14 release.
> There are 118 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Wed Jan 17 12:33:32 UTC 2018.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 

Build results:
	total: 145 pass: 145 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 126 pass: 126 fail: 0

Details are available at http://kerneltests.org/builders.

Guenter

Re: [PATCH 4.14 000/118] 4.14.14-stable review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Tue, Jan 16, 2018 at 06:30:39AM -0800, Guenter Roeck wrote:
> On 01/15/2018 04:33 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.14 release.
> > There are 118 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > let me know.
> > 
> > Responses should be made by Wed Jan 17 12:33:32 UTC 2018.
> > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> > 
> 
> Build results:
> 	total: 145 pass: 145 fail: 0
> Qemu test results:
> 	total: 126 pass: 126 fail: 0
> 
> Details are available at http://kerneltests.org/builders.

Thanks for testing all of these and letting me know.

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH 4.14 053/118] Revert "Revert "xfrm: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in xfrm_state_find.""

[David Miller]

From: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2018 07:33:39 +0100

> Maybe you started to look again into this because Nicolas Dichtel
> (Cced) asked to queue this patch on Jan 5, the patch was already
> in the stable tree (Jan 4) but probably not in an actual release
> at this time.

Yeah that's part of why I was confused.

> I think we can we can just drop this.
> 
> Unless Nicolas knows something that is still missing, v4.14.12 and
> above should be ok as is.

Ok, then Greg please drop this.

Thanks Steffen.

Re: [PATCH 4.14 053/118] Revert "Revert "xfrm: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in xfrm_state_find.""

[Greg KH]

On Tue, Jan 16, 2018 at 10:32:38AM -0500, David Miller wrote:
> From: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
> Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2018 07:33:39 +0100
> 
> > Maybe you started to look again into this because Nicolas Dichtel
> > (Cced) asked to queue this patch on Jan 5, the patch was already
> > in the stable tree (Jan 4) but probably not in an actual release
> > at this time.
> 
> Yeah that's part of why I was confused.
> 
> > I think we can we can just drop this.
> > 
> > Unless Nicolas knows something that is still missing, v4.14.12 and
> > above should be ok as is.
> 
> Ok, then Greg please drop this.

Now dropped, thanks.

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH 4.14 000/118] 4.14.14-stable review

[Shuah Khan]

On 01/15/2018 05:33 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.14 release.
> There are 118 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Wed Jan 17 12:33:32 UTC 2018.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.14-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
>   git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h
> 

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

thanks,
-- Shuah

Re: [PATCH 4.14 000/118] 4.14.14-stable review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Tue, Jan 16, 2018 at 11:08:13AM -0700, Shuah Khan wrote:
> On 01/15/2018 05:33 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.14 release.
> > There are 118 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > let me know.
> > 
> > Responses should be made by Wed Jan 17 12:33:32 UTC 2018.
> > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> > 
> > The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> > 	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.14-rc1.gz
> > or in the git tree and branch at:
> >   git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
> > and the diffstat can be found below.
> > 
> > thanks,
> > 
> > greg k-h
> > 
> 
> Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

Wonderful, thanks for testing all of these and letting me know.

greg k-h