linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
* [PATCH v2] ima: drop vla in ima_audit_measurement()
@ 2018-03-08 20:23 Tycho Andersen
  2018-03-08 20:36 ` Mimi Zohar
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Tycho Andersen @ 2018-03-08 20:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Mimi Zohar, Dmitry Kasatkin
  Cc: linux-integrity, linux-kernel, kernel-hardening, Tycho Andersen

In keeping with the directive to get rid of VLAs [1], let's drop the VLA
from ima_audit_measurement(). We need to adjust the return type of
ima_audit_measurement, because now this function can fail if an allocation
fails.

[1]: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/3/7/621

v2: just use audit_log_format instead of doing a second allocation

Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h      |  4 ++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c  | 22 +++++++++++++---------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c |  7 +++++--
 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index d52b487ad259..8e2470f72f7f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -201,8 +201,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			   const unsigned char *filename,
 			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
 			   int xattr_len, int pcr);
-void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			   const unsigned char *filename);
+int ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			  const unsigned char *filename);
 int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 			    struct ima_template_entry **entry);
 int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 08fe405338e1..3a4442405cc8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -304,17 +304,20 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		ima_free_template_entry(entry);
 }
 
-void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			   const unsigned char *filename)
+int ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			  const unsigned char *filename)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
-	char hash[(iint->ima_hash->length * 2) + 1];
+	char *hash;
 	const char *algo_name = hash_algo_name[iint->ima_hash->algo];
-	char algo_hash[sizeof(hash) + strlen(algo_name) + 2];
 	int i;
 
 	if (iint->flags & IMA_AUDITED)
-		return;
+		return 0;
+
+	hash = kzalloc((iint->ima_hash->length * 2) + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!hash)
+		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < iint->ima_hash->length; i++)
 		hex_byte_pack(hash + (i * 2), iint->ima_hash->digest[i]);
@@ -323,18 +326,19 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL,
 			     AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
 	if (!ab)
-		return;
+		goto out;
 
 	audit_log_format(ab, "file=");
 	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, filename);
-	audit_log_format(ab, " hash=");
-	snprintf(algo_hash, sizeof(algo_hash), "%s:%s", algo_name, hash);
-	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, algo_hash);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " hash=\"%s:%s\"", algo_name, hash);
 
 	audit_log_task_info(ab, current);
 	audit_log_end(ab);
 
 	iint->flags |= IMA_AUDITED;
+out:
+	kfree(hash);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 2cfb0c714967..356faae6f09c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -288,8 +288,11 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 					      xattr_value, xattr_len, opened);
 		inode_unlock(inode);
 	}
-	if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
-		ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
+	if (action & IMA_AUDIT) {
+		rc = ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
+		if (rc < 0)
+			goto out_locked;
+	}
 
 	if ((file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) && (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO))
 		rc = 0;
-- 
2.14.1

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v2] ima: drop vla in ima_audit_measurement()
  2018-03-08 20:23 [PATCH v2] ima: drop vla in ima_audit_measurement() Tycho Andersen
@ 2018-03-08 20:36 ` Mimi Zohar
  2018-03-08 21:45   ` Tycho Andersen
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2018-03-08 20:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Tycho Andersen, Dmitry Kasatkin
  Cc: linux-integrity, linux-kernel, kernel-hardening

On Thu, 2018-03-08 at 13:23 -0700, Tycho Andersen wrote:

>  /*
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 2cfb0c714967..356faae6f09c 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -288,8 +288,11 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
>  					      xattr_value, xattr_len, opened);
>  		inode_unlock(inode);
>  	}
> -	if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
> -		ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
> +	if (action & IMA_AUDIT) {
> +		rc = ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
> +		if (rc < 0)
> +			goto out_locked;
> +	}
> 
>  	if ((file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) && (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO))
>  		rc = 0;

Only when IMA-appraisal is enforcing file data integrity should
process_measurement() ever fail.  Other errors can be logged/audited.

Mimi

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v2] ima: drop vla in ima_audit_measurement()
  2018-03-08 20:36 ` Mimi Zohar
@ 2018-03-08 21:45   ` Tycho Andersen
  2018-03-08 22:05     ` Mimi Zohar
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Tycho Andersen @ 2018-03-08 21:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Mimi Zohar
  Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin, linux-integrity, linux-kernel, kernel-hardening

Hi Mimi,

On Thu, Mar 08, 2018 at 03:36:14PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Thu, 2018-03-08 at 13:23 -0700, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> 
> >  /*
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > index 2cfb0c714967..356faae6f09c 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > @@ -288,8 +288,11 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
> >  					      xattr_value, xattr_len, opened);
> >  		inode_unlock(inode);
> >  	}
> > -	if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
> > -		ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
> > +	if (action & IMA_AUDIT) {
> > +		rc = ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
> > +		if (rc < 0)
> > +			goto out_locked;
> > +	}
> > 
> >  	if ((file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) && (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO))
> >  		rc = 0;
> 
> Only when IMA-appraisal is enforcing file data integrity should
> process_measurement() ever fail.  Other errors can be logged/audited.

Ok, so previously in ima_audit_measurement() when allocation failed,
there was nothing logged. If we just keep this behavior like below,
does that look good?

Thanks!

Tycho

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 356faae6f09c..4e699bc7adc5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -289,9 +289,13 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 		inode_unlock(inode);
 	}
 	if (action & IMA_AUDIT) {
-		rc = ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
-		if (rc < 0)
+		int ret;
+
+		ret = ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
+		if (ret < 0 && ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) {
+			rc = ret;
 			goto out_locked;
+		}
 	}
 
 	if ((file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) && (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO))

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v2] ima: drop vla in ima_audit_measurement()
  2018-03-08 21:45   ` Tycho Andersen
@ 2018-03-08 22:05     ` Mimi Zohar
  2018-03-08 22:15       ` Tycho Andersen
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2018-03-08 22:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Tycho Andersen
  Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin, linux-integrity, linux-kernel, kernel-hardening

On Thu, 2018-03-08 at 14:45 -0700, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> Hi Mimi,
> 
> On Thu, Mar 08, 2018 at 03:36:14PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Thu, 2018-03-08 at 13:23 -0700, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> > 
> > >  /*
> > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > > index 2cfb0c714967..356faae6f09c 100644
> > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > > @@ -288,8 +288,11 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
> > >  					      xattr_value, xattr_len, opened);
> > >  		inode_unlock(inode);
> > >  	}
> > > -	if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
> > > -		ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
> > > +	if (action & IMA_AUDIT) {
> > > +		rc = ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
> > > +		if (rc < 0)
> > > +			goto out_locked;
> > > +	}
> > > 
> > >  	if ((file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) && (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO))
> > >  		rc = 0;
> > 
> > Only when IMA-appraisal is enforcing file data integrity should
> > process_measurement() ever fail.  Other errors can be logged/audited.
> 
> Ok, so previously in ima_audit_measurement() when allocation failed,
> there was nothing logged. If we just keep this behavior like below,
> does that look good?

Before the IMA locking change that were just upstreamed, there were
problems with measuring/appraising files that were opened with the
O_DIRECT flag.  Unless the IMA policy specified permit_directio, the
measurement/appraisal failed.  With the new locking, opening files
with the O_DIRECTIO flag shouldn't be a problem.  It just needs to be
fully tested before removing this code.

On failure, the code below tests the ima_audit_measurement() result
and skips the IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO test.  Unless I'm missing something,
I don't see the point.

Mimi


> Thanks!
> 
> Tycho
> 
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 356faae6f09c..4e699bc7adc5 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -289,9 +289,13 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
>  		inode_unlock(inode);
>  	}
>  	if (action & IMA_AUDIT) {
> -		rc = ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
> -		if (rc < 0)
> +		int ret;
> +
> +		ret = ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
> +		if (ret < 0 && ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) {
> +			rc = ret;
>  			goto out_locked;
> +		}
>  	}
> 
>  	if ((file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) && (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO))
> 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v2] ima: drop vla in ima_audit_measurement()
  2018-03-08 22:05     ` Mimi Zohar
@ 2018-03-08 22:15       ` Tycho Andersen
  2018-03-08 22:28         ` Mimi Zohar
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Tycho Andersen @ 2018-03-08 22:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Mimi Zohar
  Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin, linux-integrity, linux-kernel, kernel-hardening

Hi Mimi,

On Thu, Mar 08, 2018 at 05:05:40PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Thu, 2018-03-08 at 14:45 -0700, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> > Hi Mimi,
> > 
> > On Thu, Mar 08, 2018 at 03:36:14PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > On Thu, 2018-03-08 at 13:23 -0700, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> > > 
> > > >  /*
> > > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > > > index 2cfb0c714967..356faae6f09c 100644
> > > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > > > @@ -288,8 +288,11 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
> > > >  					      xattr_value, xattr_len, opened);
> > > >  		inode_unlock(inode);
> > > >  	}
> > > > -	if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
> > > > -		ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
> > > > +	if (action & IMA_AUDIT) {
> > > > +		rc = ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
> > > > +		if (rc < 0)
> > > > +			goto out_locked;
> > > > +	}
> > > > 
> > > >  	if ((file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) && (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO))
> > > >  		rc = 0;
> > > 
> > > Only when IMA-appraisal is enforcing file data integrity should
> > > process_measurement() ever fail.  Other errors can be logged/audited.
> > 
> > Ok, so previously in ima_audit_measurement() when allocation failed,
> > there was nothing logged. If we just keep this behavior like below,
> > does that look good?
> 
> Before the IMA locking change that were just upstreamed, there were
> problems with measuring/appraising files that were opened with the
> O_DIRECT flag.  Unless the IMA policy specified permit_directio, the
> measurement/appraisal failed.  With the new locking, opening files
> with the O_DIRECTIO flag shouldn't be a problem.  It just needs to be
> fully tested before removing this code.
> 
> On failure, the code below tests the ima_audit_measurement() result
> and skips the IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO test.  Unless I'm missing something,
> I don't see the point.

It skips the IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO test because it's already going to
fail: we're in enforce mode and we got an allocation failure and so we
can't audit this access (note: there is another allocation failure in
ima_audit_measurement() which is still ignored after this patch, so
maybe ignoring failures is ok; seems like it's not, though).

I'm not sure I really understand the rest of your message though. Can
you suggest what the patch should do here? Should we just ignore all
failures as before?

Tycho

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v2] ima: drop vla in ima_audit_measurement()
  2018-03-08 22:15       ` Tycho Andersen
@ 2018-03-08 22:28         ` Mimi Zohar
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2018-03-08 22:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Tycho Andersen
  Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin, linux-integrity, linux-kernel, kernel-hardening

On Thu, 2018-03-08 at 15:15 -0700, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> Hi Mimi,
> 
> On Thu, Mar 08, 2018 at 05:05:40PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Thu, 2018-03-08 at 14:45 -0700, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> > > Hi Mimi,
> > > 
> > > On Thu, Mar 08, 2018 at 03:36:14PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > > On Thu, 2018-03-08 at 13:23 -0700, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> > > > 
> > > > >  /*
> > > > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > > > > index 2cfb0c714967..356faae6f09c 100644
> > > > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > > > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > > > > @@ -288,8 +288,11 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
> > > > >  					      xattr_value, xattr_len, opened);
> > > > >  		inode_unlock(inode);
> > > > >  	}
> > > > > -	if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
> > > > > -		ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
> > > > > +	if (action & IMA_AUDIT) {
> > > > > +		rc = ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
> > > > > +		if (rc < 0)
> > > > > +			goto out_locked;
> > > > > +	}
> > > > > 
> > > > >  	if ((file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) && (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO))
> > > > >  		rc = 0;
> > > > 
> > > > Only when IMA-appraisal is enforcing file data integrity should
> > > > process_measurement() ever fail.  Other errors can be logged/audited.
> > > 
> > > Ok, so previously in ima_audit_measurement() when allocation failed,
> > > there was nothing logged. If we just keep this behavior like below,
> > > does that look good?
> > 
> > Before the IMA locking change that were just upstreamed, there were
> > problems with measuring/appraising files that were opened with the
> > O_DIRECT flag.  Unless the IMA policy specified permit_directio, the
> > measurement/appraisal failed.  With the new locking, opening files
> > with the O_DIRECTIO flag shouldn't be a problem.  It just needs to be
> > fully tested before removing this code.
> > 
> > On failure, the code below tests the ima_audit_measurement() result
> > and skips the IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO test.  Unless I'm missing something,
> > I don't see the point.
> 
> It skips the IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO test because it's already going to
> fail: we're in enforce mode and we got an allocation failure and so we
> can't audit this access (note: there is another allocation failure in
> ima_audit_measurement() which is still ignored after this patch, so
> maybe ignoring failures is ok; seems like it's not, though

By the time we get here, we've already verified the file's integrity,
if it is in policy.  At this point, we're attempting to add the file
hash to the audit log.  If for some reason the audit fails, there's
not much we can do.

> I'm not sure I really understand the rest of your message though. Can
> you suggest what the patch should do here? Should we just ignore all
> failures as before?

I would leave it as it is.

Mimi
 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2018-03-08 22:28 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2018-03-08 20:23 [PATCH v2] ima: drop vla in ima_audit_measurement() Tycho Andersen
2018-03-08 20:36 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-08 21:45   ` Tycho Andersen
2018-03-08 22:05     ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-08 22:15       ` Tycho Andersen
2018-03-08 22:28         ` Mimi Zohar

This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).