* [PATCH] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1
@ 2018-05-16 22:22 Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-05-17 6:51 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Gustavo A. R. Silva @ 2018-05-16 22:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Valentina Manea, Shuah Khan, Greg Kroah-Hartman
Cc: linux-usb, linux-kernel, Gustavo A. R. Silva
pdev_nr and rhport can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:238 detach_store() warn: potential
spectre issue 'vhcis'
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:328 attach_store() warn: potential
spectre issue 'vhcis'
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:338 attach_store() warn: potential
spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev'
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:340 attach_store() warn: potential
spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_hs->vdev'
Fix this by sanitizing pdev_nr and rhport before using them to index
vhcis and vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev respectively.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
---
drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
index 4880838..9045888 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@
#include <linux/platform_device.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+
#include "usbip_common.h"
#include "vhci.h"
@@ -235,6 +237,8 @@ static ssize_t detach_store(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
if (!valid_port(pdev_nr, rhport))
return -EINVAL;
+ pdev_nr = array_index_nospec(pdev_nr, vhci_num_controllers);
+ rhport = array_index_nospec(rhport, VHCI_HC_PORTS);
hcd = platform_get_drvdata(vhcis[pdev_nr].pdev);
if (hcd == NULL) {
dev_err(dev, "port is not ready %u\n", port);
@@ -325,6 +329,8 @@ static ssize_t attach_store(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
if (!valid_args(pdev_nr, rhport, speed))
return -EINVAL;
+ pdev_nr = array_index_nospec(pdev_nr, vhci_num_controllers);
+ rhport = array_index_nospec(rhport, VHCI_HC_PORTS);
hcd = platform_get_drvdata(vhcis[pdev_nr].pdev);
if (hcd == NULL) {
dev_err(dev, "port %d is not ready\n", port);
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1
2018-05-16 22:22 [PATCH] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1 Gustavo A. R. Silva
@ 2018-05-17 6:51 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-17 17:57 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-17 6:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Gustavo A. R. Silva; +Cc: Valentina Manea, Shuah Khan, linux-usb, linux-kernel
On Wed, May 16, 2018 at 05:22:00PM -0500, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
> pdev_nr and rhport can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to
> a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
>
> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:238 detach_store() warn: potential
> spectre issue 'vhcis'
> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:328 attach_store() warn: potential
> spectre issue 'vhcis'
> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:338 attach_store() warn: potential
> spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev'
> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:340 attach_store() warn: potential
> spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_hs->vdev'
Nit, no need to line-wrap long error messages from tools :)
> Fix this by sanitizing pdev_nr and rhport before using them to index
> vhcis and vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev respectively.
>
> Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
> to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
> completed with a dependent load/store [1].
>
> [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
> ---
> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c | 6 ++++++
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
> index 4880838..9045888 100644
> --- a/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
> +++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
> @@ -10,6 +10,8 @@
> #include <linux/platform_device.h>
> #include <linux/slab.h>
>
> +#include <linux/nospec.h>
> +
> #include "usbip_common.h"
> #include "vhci.h"
>
> @@ -235,6 +237,8 @@ static ssize_t detach_store(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
> if (!valid_port(pdev_nr, rhport))
> return -EINVAL;
>
> + pdev_nr = array_index_nospec(pdev_nr, vhci_num_controllers);
> + rhport = array_index_nospec(rhport, VHCI_HC_PORTS);
Shouldn't we just do this in one place, in the valid_port() function?
That way it keeps the range checking logic in one place (now it is in 3
places in the function), which should make maintenance much simpler.
thanks,
greg k-h
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1
2018-05-17 6:51 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-17 17:57 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-05-17 19:15 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Gustavo A. R. Silva @ 2018-05-17 17:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman; +Cc: Valentina Manea, Shuah Khan, linux-usb, linux-kernel
Hi Greg,
On 05/17/2018 01:51 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Wed, May 16, 2018 at 05:22:00PM -0500, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
>> pdev_nr and rhport can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to
>> a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
>>
>> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
>> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:238 detach_store() warn: potential
>> spectre issue 'vhcis'
>> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:328 attach_store() warn: potential
>> spectre issue 'vhcis'
>> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:338 attach_store() warn: potential
>> spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev'
>> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:340 attach_store() warn: potential
>> spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_hs->vdev'
>
> Nit, no need to line-wrap long error messages from tools :)
>
Got it.
>> Fix this by sanitizing pdev_nr and rhport before using them to index
>> vhcis and vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev respectively.
>>
>> Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
>> to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
>> completed with a dependent load/store [1].
>>
>> [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
>>
>> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
>> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
>> ---
>> drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c | 6 ++++++
>> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
>> index 4880838..9045888 100644
>> --- a/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
>> +++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
>> @@ -10,6 +10,8 @@
>> #include <linux/platform_device.h>
>> #include <linux/slab.h>
>>
>> +#include <linux/nospec.h>
>> +
>> #include "usbip_common.h"
>> #include "vhci.h"
>>
>> @@ -235,6 +237,8 @@ static ssize_t detach_store(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
>> if (!valid_port(pdev_nr, rhport))
>> return -EINVAL;
>>
>> + pdev_nr = array_index_nospec(pdev_nr, vhci_num_controllers);
>> + rhport = array_index_nospec(rhport, VHCI_HC_PORTS);
>
> Shouldn't we just do this in one place, in the valid_port() function?
>
> That way it keeps the range checking logic in one place (now it is in 3
> places in the function), which should make maintenance much simpler.
>
Yep, I thought about that, the thing is: what happens if the hardware is
"trained" to predict that valid_port always evaluates to false, and then
malicious values are stored in pdev_nr and nhport?
It seems to me that under this scenario we need to serialize
instructions in this place.
What do you think?
Thanks
--
Gustavo
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1
2018-05-17 17:57 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
@ 2018-05-17 19:15 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-17 19:29 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-17 19:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Gustavo A. R. Silva; +Cc: Valentina Manea, Shuah Khan, linux-usb, linux-kernel
On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 12:57:49PM -0500, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
> Hi Greg,
>
> On 05/17/2018 01:51 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > On Wed, May 16, 2018 at 05:22:00PM -0500, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
> > > pdev_nr and rhport can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to
> > > a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
> > >
> > > This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
> > > drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:238 detach_store() warn: potential
> > > spectre issue 'vhcis'
> > > drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:328 attach_store() warn: potential
> > > spectre issue 'vhcis'
> > > drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:338 attach_store() warn: potential
> > > spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev'
> > > drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c:340 attach_store() warn: potential
> > > spectre issue 'vhci->vhci_hcd_hs->vdev'
> >
> > Nit, no need to line-wrap long error messages from tools :)
> >
>
> Got it.
>
> > > Fix this by sanitizing pdev_nr and rhport before using them to index
> > > vhcis and vhci->vhci_hcd_ss->vdev respectively.
> > >
> > > Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
> > > to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
> > > completed with a dependent load/store [1].
> > >
> > > [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
> > >
> > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> > > Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
> > > ---
> > > drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c | 6 ++++++
> > > 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
> > > index 4880838..9045888 100644
> > > --- a/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
> > > +++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_sysfs.c
> > > @@ -10,6 +10,8 @@
> > > #include <linux/platform_device.h>
> > > #include <linux/slab.h>
> > > +#include <linux/nospec.h>
> > > +
> > > #include "usbip_common.h"
> > > #include "vhci.h"
> > > @@ -235,6 +237,8 @@ static ssize_t detach_store(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
> > > if (!valid_port(pdev_nr, rhport))
> > > return -EINVAL;
> > > + pdev_nr = array_index_nospec(pdev_nr, vhci_num_controllers);
> > > + rhport = array_index_nospec(rhport, VHCI_HC_PORTS);
> >
> > Shouldn't we just do this in one place, in the valid_port() function?
> >
> > That way it keeps the range checking logic in one place (now it is in 3
> > places in the function), which should make maintenance much simpler.
> >
>
> Yep, I thought about that, the thing is: what happens if the hardware is
> "trained" to predict that valid_port always evaluates to false, and then
> malicious values are stored in pdev_nr and nhport?
>
> It seems to me that under this scenario we need to serialize instructions in
> this place.
>
> What do you think?
I don't understand, it should not matter where you put the barrier. Be
it a function call back or right after it, it does the same thing, it
stops speculation from crossing that barrier.
So it _should_ work either way, if I understand the issue correctly.
If not, what am I missing?
thanks,
greg k-h
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1
2018-05-17 19:15 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-17 19:29 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
0 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Gustavo A. R. Silva @ 2018-05-17 19:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman; +Cc: Valentina Manea, Shuah Khan, linux-usb, linux-kernel
On 05/17/2018 02:15 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
>>> Shouldn't we just do this in one place, in the valid_port() function?
>>>
>>> That way it keeps the range checking logic in one place (now it is in 3
>>> places in the function), which should make maintenance much simpler.
>>>
>>
>> Yep, I thought about that, the thing is: what happens if the hardware is
>> "trained" to predict that valid_port always evaluates to false, and then
>> malicious values are stored in pdev_nr and nhport?
>>
>> It seems to me that under this scenario we need to serialize instructions in
>> this place.
>>
>> What do you think?
>
> I don't understand, it should not matter where you put the barrier. Be
> it a function call back or right after it, it does the same thing, it
> stops speculation from crossing that barrier.
>
Yeah. It makes sense.
> So it _should_ work either way, if I understand the issue correctly.
>
> If not, what am I missing?
>
No. It seems I'm the one who was missing something.
I'll place the barrier into valid_port and send v2 shortly.
Thanks!
--
Gustavo
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
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2018-05-16 22:22 [PATCH] usbip: vhci_sysfs: fix potential Spectre v1 Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-05-17 6:51 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-17 17:57 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-05-17 19:15 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-17 19:29 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
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