[PATCH 0/2] Fix kexec forbidding kernels signed with keys in the secondary keyring to boot

From: Yannik Sembritzki <yannik@sembritzki.me>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>,
	the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>, Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>,
	"Justin M. Forbes" <jforbes@redhat.com>,
	Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>,
	James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
	Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Yannik Sembritzki <yannik@sembritzki.me>
Subject: [PATCH 0/2] Fix kexec forbidding kernels signed with keys in the secondary keyring to boot
Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2018 21:42:42 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180815194244.29564-1-yannik@sembritzki.me> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+55aFxXzfW+85Xf5OmNCsp2YRQqN3zJT5NhobauK=yn44_xiQ@mail.gmail.com>

I've written two patches for (a) the logical change of allowing kernels
signed with keys in the secondary keyring to be kexec'd (b) the refactoring
of the magic 1UL Linus requested.

Yannik Sembritzki (2):
  Fix kexec forbidding kernels signed with keys in the secondary keyring
    to boot
  Replace magic for trusting the secondary keyring with #define

 arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c       | 2 +-
 certs/system_keyring.c                  | 3 ++-
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c | 2 +-
 include/linux/verification.h            | 4 ++++
 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

-- 
2.17.1