From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH security-next v2 16/26] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2018 09:23:28 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180920162338.21060-17-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180920162338.21060-1-keescook@chromium.org>
This moves the string handling for "security=" boot parameter into
a stored pointer instead of a string duplicate. This will allow
easier handling of the string when switching logic to use the coming
enable/disable infrastructure.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
security/security.c | 17 ++++++++---------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 72d1ef2fc4cc..5cacbcefbc32 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -34,16 +34,12 @@
#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
-/* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */
-#define SECURITY_NAME_MAX 10
-
struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init;
static ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(lsm_notifier_chain);
char *lsm_names;
/* Boot-time LSM user choice */
-static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
- CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY;
+static __initdata const char *chosen_major_lsm;
static bool debug __initdata;
#define init_debug(...) \
@@ -90,7 +86,7 @@ static bool __init lsm_allowed(struct lsm_info *lsm)
return true;
/* Disabled if this LSM isn't the chosen one. */
- if (strcmp(lsm->name, chosen_lsm) != 0)
+ if (strcmp(lsm->name, chosen_major_lsm) != 0)
return false;
return true;
@@ -154,6 +150,9 @@ int __init security_init(void)
i++)
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&list[i]);
+ if (!chosen_major_lsm)
+ chosen_major_lsm = CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY;
+
/*
* Load minor LSMs, with the capability module always first.
*/
@@ -173,12 +172,12 @@ int __init security_init(void)
}
/* Save user chosen LSM */
-static int __init choose_lsm(char *str)
+static int __init choose_major_lsm(char *str)
{
- strncpy(chosen_lsm, str, SECURITY_NAME_MAX);
+ chosen_major_lsm = str;
return 1;
}
-__setup("security=", choose_lsm);
+__setup("security=", choose_major_lsm);
/* Enable LSM order debugging. */
static int __init enable_debug(char *str)
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-09-20 16:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-09-20 16:23 [PATCH security-next v2 00/26] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 01/26] LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-20 23:39 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 02/26] vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 03/26] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 04/26] LSM: Remove initcall tracing Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 05/26] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 06/26] vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 07/26] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 08/26] LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 09/26] LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 10/26] LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 11/26] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 12/26] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 13/26] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 14/26] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 15/26] LSM: Introduce lsm.enable= and lsm.disable= Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 17/26] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 18/26] LSM: Build ordered list of ordered LSMs for init Kees Cook
2018-09-21 0:04 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 0:37 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 19/26] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ORDER Kees Cook
2018-09-21 0:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 0:14 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 20/26] LSM: Introduce "lsm.order=" for boottime ordering Kees Cook
2018-09-21 0:12 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 0:40 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 21/26] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 22/26] Yama: " Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 23/26] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 24/26] capability: Mark as LSM_ORDER_FIRST Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 25/26] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 26/26] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-21 0:25 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 0:45 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21 1:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 1:39 ` John Johansen
2018-09-21 2:05 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21 2:14 ` John Johansen
2018-09-21 3:02 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21 13:19 ` John Johansen
2018-09-21 14:57 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-20 20:14 ` [PATCH security-next v2 00/26] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Martin Steigerwald
2018-09-20 21:55 ` Kees Cook
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