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From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
	"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	"Woodhouse, David" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 0/3] Harden spectrev2 userspace-userspace protection
Date: Sat, 22 Sep 2018 12:18:44 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180922101844.GF24124@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.21.1809221022250.1391@nanos.tec.linutronix.de>

On Sat, Sep 22, 2018 at 11:53:14AM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> @@ -86,6 +88,7 @@ extern void exit_ptrace(struct task_stru
>   * process_vm_writev or ptrace (and should use the real credentials).
>   */
>  extern bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode);
> +extern bool ptrace_may_access_sched(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode);

I like that..

>  static inline int ptrace_reparented(struct task_struct *child)
>  {
> --- a/kernel/ptrace.c
> +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c

> +bool ptrace_may_access_sched(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
> +{
> +	struct mm_struct *mm;
> +	int res;
> +
> +	res = __ptrace_may_access_basic(task, mode);
> +	if (res <= 0)
> +		return !res;
> +
> +	rcu_read_lock();
> +	res = __ptrace_may_access_cred(__task_cred(task), mode);
>  	rcu_read_unlock();
> +	if (res)
> +		return false;
> +
> +	mm = task->mm;
> +	if (mm && get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER)
> +		return false;
> +	return true;
> +}
> +
> +/* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */
> +static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
> +{
> +	const struct cred *tcred;
> +	struct mm_struct *mm;
> +	int res;
> +
> +	res = __ptrace_may_access_basic(task, mode);
> +	if (res <= 0)
> +		return res;
> +
> +	rcu_read_lock();
> +	tcred = __task_cred(task);
> +	res = __ptrace_may_access_cred(tcred, mode);
> +	if (res > 0)
> +		res = ptrace_has_cap(tcred->user_ns, mode) ? 0 : -EPERM;
>  	rcu_read_unlock();
> +	if (res < 0)
> +		return res;
> +
>  	mm = task->mm;
> +	if (mm && (get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER &&
> +		   !ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode)))
> +		return -EPERM;
>  
>  	return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
>  }

This has some unfortunate duplication.

Lets go with it for now, but I'll see if I can do something about that
later.

  reply	other threads:[~2018-09-22 10:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-09-10  9:22 [PATCH v5 0/2] Harden spectrev2 userspace-userspace protection Jiri Kosina
2018-09-10  9:23 ` [PATCH v5 1/2] x86/speculation: apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak Jiri Kosina
2018-09-10 18:26   ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-09-10 19:14     ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-10 19:26       ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-09-10 19:36         ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-10 20:27           ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-09-10 20:42             ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-10 21:29               ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-09-10 21:36                 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-11 21:15                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-11 22:25                   ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-09-12 12:01                     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-21 19:38   ` Pavel Machek
2018-10-21 23:32     ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-10  9:24 ` [PATCH v5 2/2] x86/speculation: Enable cross-hyperthread spectre v2 STIBP mitigation Jiri Kosina
2018-09-10 10:04   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-10 11:01     ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-10 11:46       ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-11 17:32         ` Tim Chen
2018-09-11 21:16           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-11 21:46             ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-12 17:16             ` Tom Lendacky
2018-09-12 21:26               ` Tim Chen
2018-09-12 21:45                 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-12 22:56                   ` Tim Chen
2018-09-13 14:53                 ` Tom Lendacky
2018-09-12  9:05 ` [PATCH v6 0/3] Harden spectrev2 userspace-userspace protection Jiri Kosina
2018-09-12  9:06   ` [PATCH v6 1/3] x86/speculation: apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak Jiri Kosina
2018-09-13  0:04     ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-09-14 11:00       ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-14 11:05         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-12  9:07   ` [PATCH v6 2/3] x86/speculation: Enable cross-hyperthread spectre v2 STIBP mitigation Jiri Kosina
2018-09-12 19:14     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-12 19:16       ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-12  9:08   ` [PATCH v6 3/3] x86/speculation: Propagate information about RSB filling mitigation to sysfs Jiri Kosina
2018-09-17 16:09   ` [PATCH v6 0/3] Harden spectrev2 userspace-userspace protection Schaufler, Casey
2018-09-19 15:48     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-09-22  7:38       ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-22  9:53         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-22 10:18           ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2018-09-22 10:20             ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-22 13:30               ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-22 14:31                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-09-24  8:43                 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-24 12:38                   ` Thomas Gleixner

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