From: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: "Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>,
"Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"kexec@lists.infradead.org" <kexec@lists.infradead.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"dyoung@redhat.com" <dyoung@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/boot: Fix kexec booting failure after SEV early boot support
Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2018 15:32:52 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180926073252.GC2555@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180925172608.GB15464@zn.tnic>
On 09/25/18 at 07:26pm, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> IINM, the problem can be addressed in a simpler way by getting rid of
> enc_bit and thus getting rid of the need to do relative addressing of
> anything and simply doing the whole dance of figuring out the C-bit each
> time. It probably wouldn't be even measurable...
Couldn't agree more.
Obviously enc_bit is redundent here. We only check eax each time,
removing it can fix the RIP-relative addressing issue in kexec.
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S
index eaa843a52907..0b60eb867d25 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S
@@ -27,19 +27,6 @@ ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit)
push %edx
push %edi
- /*
- * RIP-relative addressing is needed to access the encryption bit
- * variable. Since we are running in 32-bit mode we need this call/pop
- * sequence to get the proper relative addressing.
- */
- call 1f
-1: popl %edi
- subl $1b, %edi
-
- movl enc_bit(%edi), %eax
- cmpl $0, %eax
- jge .Lsev_exit
-
/* Check if running under a hypervisor */
movl $1, %eax
cpuid
@@ -69,12 +56,10 @@ ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit)
movl %ebx, %eax
andl $0x3f, %eax /* Return the encryption bit location */
- movl %eax, enc_bit(%edi)
jmp .Lsev_exit
.Lno_sev:
xor %eax, %eax
- movl %eax, enc_bit(%edi)
.Lsev_exit:
pop %edi
@@ -113,9 +98,6 @@ ENTRY(set_sev_encryption_mask)
ENDPROC(set_sev_encryption_mask)
.data
-enc_bit:
- .int 0xffffffff
-
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
.balign 8
GLOBAL(sme_me_mask)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-09-26 7:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-09-25 11:10 [PATCH] x86/boot: Fix kexec booting failure after SEV early boot support Kairui Song
2018-09-25 14:33 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2018-09-25 17:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-09-26 7:32 ` Baoquan He [this message]
2018-09-26 10:52 ` Kairui Song
2018-09-26 11:22 ` Baoquan He
2018-09-26 13:01 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2018-09-26 13:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-09-26 13:21 ` Baoquan He
2018-09-27 12:38 Kairui Song
2018-09-27 13:16 ` Lendacky, Thomas
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