From: "Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
To: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
"bp@suse.de" <bp@suse.de>,
"kexec@lists.infradead.org" <kexec@lists.infradead.org>,
"dyoung@redhat.com" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/boot: Fix kexec booting failure after SEV early boot support
Date: Tue, 25 Sep 2018 14:33:48 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <6e15796e-31e9-2dc6-4a31-5c1b01554b45@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180925111020.23834-1-kasong@redhat.com>
On 09/25/2018 06:10 AM, Kairui Song wrote:
> Commit 1958b5fc4010 ("x86/boot: Add early boot support when running
> with SEV active") is causing kexec becomes sometimes unstable, kexec
> reboot won't start a second kernel bypassing BIOS boot process, instead,
> the system got reset.
>
> That's because, in get_sev_encryption_bit function, we are using
> 32-bit RIP-relative addressing to read the value of enc_bit, but
> kexec may alloc the early boot up code to a higher location, which
> is beyond 32-bit addressing limit. Some garbage will be read and
> get_sev_encryption_bit will return the wrong value, which lead to
> wrong memory page flag.
>
> This patch adds a get_sev_encryption_bit_64 function to avoid this
> problem. 64-bit early boot code will use this function instead, it
> uses native RIP addressing to read the enc_bit which have no problem
> with any location.
>
> Fixes: 1958b5fc4010 ("x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active")
> Signed-off-by: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S | 64 ++++++++++++++++++--------
> 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S
> index eaa843a52907..41933550449a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S
> @@ -18,27 +18,13 @@
>
> .text
> .code32
> -ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit)
> +do_get_sev_encryption_bit:
> xor %eax, %eax
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
> push %ebx
> push %ecx
> push %edx
> - push %edi
> -
> - /*
> - * RIP-relative addressing is needed to access the encryption bit
> - * variable. Since we are running in 32-bit mode we need this call/pop
> - * sequence to get the proper relative addressing.
> - */
> - call 1f
> -1: popl %edi
> - subl $1b, %edi
> -
> - movl enc_bit(%edi), %eax
> - cmpl $0, %eax
> - jge .Lsev_exit
>
> /* Check if running under a hypervisor */
> movl $1, %eax
> @@ -69,25 +55,65 @@ ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit)
>
> movl %ebx, %eax
> andl $0x3f, %eax /* Return the encryption bit location */
> - movl %eax, enc_bit(%edi)
> jmp .Lsev_exit
>
> .Lno_sev:
> xor %eax, %eax
> - movl %eax, enc_bit(%edi)
>
> .Lsev_exit:
> - pop %edi
> pop %edx
> pop %ecx
> pop %ebx
>
> +#endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
> +
> + ret
> +
> +ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit)
> + xor %eax, %eax
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
> + push %edi
> +
> + /*
> + * RIP-relative addressing is needed to access the encryption bit
> + * variable. Since we are running in 32-bit mode we need this call/pop
> + * sequence to get the proper relative addressing.
> + */
> + call 1f
> +1: popl %edi
> + subl $1b, %edi
> +
> + movl enc_bit(%edi), %eax
> + cmpl $0, %eax
> + jge 2f
> +
> + call do_get_sev_encryption_bit
> + movl %eax, enc_bit(%edi)
> +2:
> + pop %edi
> #endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
>
> ret
> ENDPROC(get_sev_encryption_bit)
>
> .code64
> +ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit_64)
> + xor %rax, %rax
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
> + movl enc_bit(%rip), %eax
> + cmpl $0, %eax
> + jge 1f
> +
> + call do_get_sev_encryption_bit
> + movl %eax, enc_bit(%rip)
> +1:
> +#endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
> +
> + ret
> +ENDPROC(get_sev_encryption_bit_64)
> +
> ENTRY(set_sev_encryption_mask)
> #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
> push %rbp
> @@ -95,7 +121,7 @@ ENTRY(set_sev_encryption_mask)
>
> movq %rsp, %rbp /* Save current stack pointer */
>
> - call get_sev_encryption_bit /* Get the encryption bit position */
> + call get_sev_encryption_bit_64 /* Get the encryption bit position */
> testl %eax, %eax
> jz .Lno_sev_mask
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-09-25 14:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-09-25 11:10 [PATCH] x86/boot: Fix kexec booting failure after SEV early boot support Kairui Song
2018-09-25 14:33 ` Lendacky, Thomas [this message]
2018-09-25 17:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-09-26 7:32 ` Baoquan He
2018-09-26 10:52 ` Kairui Song
2018-09-26 11:22 ` Baoquan He
2018-09-26 13:01 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2018-09-26 13:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-09-26 13:21 ` Baoquan He
2018-09-27 12:38 Kairui Song
2018-09-27 13:16 ` Lendacky, Thomas
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