* [PATCH 4.9 001/101] Kbuild: suppress packed-not-aligned warning for default setting only
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 002/101] disable stringop truncation warnings for now Greg Kroah-Hartman
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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Xiongfeng Wang, Masahiro Yamada
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Xiongfeng Wang <xiongfeng.wang@linaro.org>
commit 321cb0308a9e76841394b4bbab6a1107cfedbae0 upstream.
gcc-8 reports many -Wpacked-not-aligned warnings. The below are some
examples.
./include/linux/ceph/msgr.h:67:1: warning: alignment 1 of 'struct
ceph_entity_addr' is less than 8 [-Wpacked-not-aligned]
} __attribute__ ((packed));
./include/linux/ceph/msgr.h:67:1: warning: alignment 1 of 'struct
ceph_entity_addr' is less than 8 [-Wpacked-not-aligned]
} __attribute__ ((packed));
./include/linux/ceph/msgr.h:67:1: warning: alignment 1 of 'struct
ceph_entity_addr' is less than 8 [-Wpacked-not-aligned]
} __attribute__ ((packed));
This patch suppresses this kind of warnings for default setting.
Signed-off-by: Xiongfeng Wang <xiongfeng.wang@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
scripts/Makefile.extrawarn | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/scripts/Makefile.extrawarn
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.extrawarn
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@
# are not supported by all versions of the compiler
# ==========================================================================
+KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, packed-not-aligned)
+
ifeq ("$(origin W)", "command line")
export KBUILD_ENABLE_EXTRA_GCC_CHECKS := $(W)
endif
@@ -25,6 +27,7 @@ warning-1 += -Wold-style-definition
warning-1 += $(call cc-option, -Wmissing-include-dirs)
warning-1 += $(call cc-option, -Wunused-but-set-variable)
warning-1 += $(call cc-option, -Wunused-const-variable)
+warning-1 += $(call cc-option, -Wpacked-not-aligned)
warning-1 += $(call cc-disable-warning, missing-field-initializers)
warning-1 += $(call cc-disable-warning, sign-compare)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 002/101] disable stringop truncation warnings for now
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 001/101] Kbuild: suppress packed-not-aligned warning for default setting only Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 003/101] test_hexdump: use memcpy instead of strncpy Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (103 subsequent siblings)
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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Stephen Rothwell, Linus Torvalds
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
commit 217c3e0196758662aa0429863b09d1c13da1c5d6 upstream.
They are too noisy
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
Makefile | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -802,6 +802,9 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Wdecl
# disable pointer signed / unsigned warnings in gcc 4.0
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, pointer-sign)
+# disable stringop warnings in gcc 8+
+KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, stringop-truncation)
+
# disable invalid "can't wrap" optimizations for signed / pointers
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-fno-strict-overflow)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 003/101] test_hexdump: use memcpy instead of strncpy
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 001/101] Kbuild: suppress packed-not-aligned warning for default setting only Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 002/101] disable stringop truncation warnings for now Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 004/101] kobject: Replace strncpy with memcpy Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (102 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Linus Torvalds
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
commit b1286ed7158e9b62787508066283ab0b8850b518 upstream.
New versions of gcc reasonably warn about the odd pattern of
strncpy(p, q, strlen(q));
which really doesn't make sense: the strncpy() ends up being just a slow
and odd way to write memcpy() in this case.
Apparently there was a patch for this floating around earlier, but it
got lost.
Acked-again-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
lib/test_hexdump.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/lib/test_hexdump.c
+++ b/lib/test_hexdump.c
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ static void __init test_hexdump_prepare_
const char *q = *result++;
size_t amount = strlen(q);
- strncpy(p, q, amount);
+ memcpy(p, q, amount);
p += amount;
*p++ = ' ';
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 004/101] kobject: Replace strncpy with memcpy
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 003/101] test_hexdump: use memcpy instead of strncpy Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 005/101] unifdef: use memcpy instead of strncpy Greg Kroah-Hartman
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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Guenter Roeck
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
commit 77d2a24b6107bd9b3bf2403a65c1428a9da83dd0 upstream.
gcc 8.1.0 complains:
lib/kobject.c:128:3: warning:
'strncpy' output truncated before terminating nul copying as many
bytes from a string as its length [-Wstringop-truncation]
lib/kobject.c: In function 'kobject_get_path':
lib/kobject.c:125:13: note: length computed here
Using strncpy() is indeed less than perfect since the length of data to
be copied has already been determined with strlen(). Replace strncpy()
with memcpy() to address the warning and optimize the code a little.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
lib/kobject.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/lib/kobject.c
+++ b/lib/kobject.c
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static void fill_kobj_path(struct kobjec
int cur = strlen(kobject_name(parent));
/* back up enough to print this name with '/' */
length -= cur;
- strncpy(path + length, kobject_name(parent), cur);
+ memcpy(path + length, kobject_name(parent), cur);
*(path + --length) = '/';
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 005/101] unifdef: use memcpy instead of strncpy
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 004/101] kobject: Replace strncpy with memcpy Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 006/101] kernfs: Replace strncpy with memcpy Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (100 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Linus Torvalds
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
commit 38c7b224ce22c25fed04007839edf974bd13439d upstream.
New versions of gcc reasonably warn about the odd pattern of
strncpy(p, q, strlen(q));
which really doesn't make sense: the strncpy() ends up being just a slow
and odd way to write memcpy() in this case.
There was a comment about _why_ the code used strncpy - to avoid the
terminating NUL byte, but memcpy does the same and avoids the warning.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
scripts/unifdef.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/scripts/unifdef.c
+++ b/scripts/unifdef.c
@@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ usage(void)
* When we have processed a group that starts off with a known-false
* #if/#elif sequence (which has therefore been deleted) followed by a
* #elif that we don't understand and therefore must keep, we edit the
- * latter into a #if to keep the nesting correct. We use strncpy() to
+ * latter into a #if to keep the nesting correct. We use memcpy() to
* overwrite the 4 byte token "elif" with "if " without a '\0' byte.
*
* When we find a true #elif in a group, the following block will
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ static void Idrop (void) { Fdrop(); ign
static void Itrue (void) { Ftrue(); ignoreon(); }
static void Ifalse(void) { Ffalse(); ignoreon(); }
/* modify this line */
-static void Mpass (void) { strncpy(keyword, "if ", 4); Pelif(); }
+static void Mpass (void) { memcpy(keyword, "if ", 4); Pelif(); }
static void Mtrue (void) { keywordedit("else"); state(IS_TRUE_MIDDLE); }
static void Melif (void) { keywordedit("endif"); state(IS_FALSE_TRAILER); }
static void Melse (void) { keywordedit("endif"); state(IS_FALSE_ELSE); }
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 006/101] kernfs: Replace strncpy with memcpy
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 005/101] unifdef: use memcpy instead of strncpy Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 007/101] ip_tunnel: Fix name string concatenate in __ip_tunnel_create() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (99 subsequent siblings)
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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Guenter Roeck, Tejun Heo
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
commit 166126c1e54d927c2e8efa2702d420e0ce301fd9 upstream.
gcc 8.1.0 complains:
fs/kernfs/symlink.c:91:3: warning:
'strncpy' output truncated before terminating nul copying
as many bytes from a string as its length
fs/kernfs/symlink.c: In function 'kernfs_iop_get_link':
fs/kernfs/symlink.c:88:14: note: length computed here
Using strncpy() is indeed less than perfect since the length of data to
be copied has already been determined with strlen(). Replace strncpy()
with memcpy() to address the warning and optimize the code a little.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/kernfs/symlink.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/kernfs/symlink.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/symlink.c
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static int kernfs_get_target_path(struct
int slen = strlen(kn->name);
len -= slen;
- strncpy(s + len, kn->name, slen);
+ memcpy(s + len, kn->name, slen);
if (len)
s[--len] = '/';
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 007/101] ip_tunnel: Fix name string concatenate in __ip_tunnel_create()
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 006/101] kernfs: Replace strncpy with memcpy Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 008/101] drm: gma500: fix logic error Greg Kroah-Hartman
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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Sultan Alsawaf, David S. Miller
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sultan Alsawaf <sultanxda@gmail.com>
commit 000ade8016400d93b4d7c89970d96b8c14773d45 upstream.
By passing a limit of 2 bytes to strncat, strncat is limited to writing
fewer bytes than what it's supposed to append to the name here.
Since the bounds are checked on the line above this, just remove the string
bounds checks entirely since they're unneeded.
Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <sultanxda@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c
@@ -261,8 +261,8 @@ static struct net_device *__ip_tunnel_cr
} else {
if (strlen(ops->kind) > (IFNAMSIZ - 3))
goto failed;
- strlcpy(name, ops->kind, IFNAMSIZ);
- strncat(name, "%d", 2);
+ strcpy(name, ops->kind);
+ strcat(name, "%d");
}
ASSERT_RTNL();
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 008/101] drm: gma500: fix logic error
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 007/101] ip_tunnel: Fix name string concatenate in __ip_tunnel_create() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 009/101] scsi: bfa: convert to strlcpy/strlcat Greg Kroah-Hartman
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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Arnd Bergmann, Daniel Vetter
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
commit 67a3b63a54cbe18944191f43d644686731cf30c7 upstream.
gcc-8 points out a condition that almost certainly doesn't
do what the author had in mind:
drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/mdfld_intel_display.c: In function 'mdfldWaitForPipeEnable':
drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/mdfld_intel_display.c:102:37: error: bitwise comparison always evaluates to false [-Werror=tautological-compare]
This changes it to a simple bit mask operation to check
whether the bit is set.
Fixes: 026abc333205 ("gma500: initial medfield merge")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20170905074741.435324-1-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/mdfld_intel_display.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/mdfld_intel_display.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/mdfld_intel_display.c
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ void mdfldWaitForPipeEnable(struct drm_d
/* Wait for for the pipe enable to take effect. */
for (count = 0; count < COUNT_MAX; count++) {
temp = REG_READ(map->conf);
- if ((temp & PIPEACONF_PIPE_STATE) == 1)
+ if (temp & PIPEACONF_PIPE_STATE)
break;
}
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 009/101] scsi: bfa: convert to strlcpy/strlcat
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 008/101] drm: gma500: fix logic error Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 010/101] staging: rts5208: fix gcc-8 logic error warning Greg Kroah-Hartman
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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Arnd Bergmann, Johannes Thumshirn,
Sudarsana Kalluru, Martin K. Petersen
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
commit 8c5a50e8e7ad812a62f7ccf28d9a5e74fddf3000 upstream.
The bfa driver has a number of real issues with string termination
that gcc-8 now points out:
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad_bsg.c: In function 'bfad_iocmd_port_get_attr':
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad_bsg.c:320:9: error: argument to 'sizeof' in 'strncpy' call is the same expression as the source; did you mean to use the size of the destination? [-Werror=sizeof-pointer-memaccess]
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs.c: In function 'bfa_fcs_fabric_psymb_init':
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs.c:775:9: error: argument to 'sizeof' in 'strncat' call is the same expression as the source; did you mean to use the size of the destination? [-Werror=sizeof-pointer-memaccess]
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs.c:781:9: error: argument to 'sizeof' in 'strncat' call is the same expression as the source; did you mean to use the size of the destination? [-Werror=sizeof-pointer-memaccess]
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs.c:788:9: error: argument to 'sizeof' in 'strncat' call is the same expression as the source; did you mean to use the size of the destination? [-Werror=sizeof-pointer-memaccess]
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs.c:801:10: error: argument to 'sizeof' in 'strncat' call is the same expression as the source; did you mean to use the size of the destination? [-Werror=sizeof-pointer-memaccess]
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs.c:808:10: error: argument to 'sizeof' in 'strncat' call is the same expression as the source; did you mean to use the size of the destination? [-Werror=sizeof-pointer-memaccess]
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs.c: In function 'bfa_fcs_fabric_nsymb_init':
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs.c:837:10: error: argument to 'sizeof' in 'strncat' call is the same expression as the source; did you mean to use the size of the destination? [-Werror=sizeof-pointer-memaccess]
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs.c:844:10: error: argument to 'sizeof' in 'strncat' call is the same expression as the source; did you mean to use the size of the destination? [-Werror=sizeof-pointer-memaccess]
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs.c:852:10: error: argument to 'sizeof' in 'strncat' call is the same expression as the source; did you mean to use the size of the destination? [-Werror=sizeof-pointer-memaccess]
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs.c: In function 'bfa_fcs_fabric_psymb_init':
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs.c:778:2: error: 'strncat' output may be truncated copying 10 bytes from a string of length 63 [-Werror=stringop-truncation]
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs.c:784:2: error: 'strncat' output may be truncated copying 30 bytes from a string of length 63 [-Werror=stringop-truncation]
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs.c:803:3: error: 'strncat' output may be truncated copying 44 bytes from a string of length 63 [-Werror=stringop-truncation]
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs.c:811:3: error: 'strncat' output may be truncated copying 16 bytes from a string of length 63 [-Werror=stringop-truncation]
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs.c: In function 'bfa_fcs_fabric_nsymb_init':
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs.c:840:2: error: 'strncat' output may be truncated copying 10 bytes from a string of length 63 [-Werror=stringop-truncation]
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs.c:847:2: error: 'strncat' output may be truncated copying 30 bytes from a string of length 63 [-Werror=stringop-truncation]
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs_lport.c: In function 'bfa_fcs_fdmi_get_hbaattr':
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs_lport.c:2657:10: error: argument to 'sizeof' in 'strncat' call is the same expression as the source; did you mean to use the size of the destination? [-Werror=sizeof-pointer-memaccess]
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs_lport.c:2659:11: error: argument to 'sizeof' in 'strncat' call is the same expression as the source; did you mean to use the size of the destination? [-Werror=sizeof-pointer-memaccess]
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs_lport.c: In function 'bfa_fcs_lport_ms_gmal_response':
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs_lport.c:3232:5: error: 'strncpy' output may be truncated copying 16 bytes from a string of length 247 [-Werror=stringop-truncation]
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs_lport.c: In function 'bfa_fcs_lport_ns_send_rspn_id':
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs_lport.c:4670:3: error: 'strncpy' output truncated before terminating nul copying as many bytes from a string as its length [-Werror=stringop-truncation]
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs_lport.c:4682:3: error: 'strncat' output truncated before terminating nul copying as many bytes from a string as its length [-Werror=stringop-truncation]
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs_lport.c: In function 'bfa_fcs_lport_ns_util_send_rspn_id':
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs_lport.c:5206:3: error: 'strncpy' output truncated before terminating nul copying as many bytes from a string as its length [-Werror=stringop-truncation]
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs_lport.c:5215:3: error: 'strncat' output truncated before terminating nul copying as many bytes from a string as its length [-Werror=stringop-truncation]
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs_lport.c: In function 'bfa_fcs_fdmi_get_portattr':
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs_lport.c:2751:2: error: 'strncpy' specified bound 128 equals destination size [-Werror=stringop-truncation]
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcbuild.c: In function 'fc_rspnid_build':
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcbuild.c:1254:2: error: 'strncpy' output truncated before terminating nul copying as many bytes from a string as its length [-Werror=stringop-truncation]
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcbuild.c:1253:25: note: length computed here
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcbuild.c: In function 'fc_rsnn_nn_build':
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcbuild.c:1275:2: error: 'strncpy' output truncated before terminating nul copying as many bytes from a string as its length [-Werror=stringop-truncation]
In most cases, this can be addressed by correctly calling strlcpy and
strlcat instead of strncpy/strncat, with the size of the destination
buffer as the last argument.
For consistency, I'm changing the other callers of strncpy() in this
driver the same way.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Acked-by: Sudarsana Kalluru <Sudarsana.Kalluru@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcbuild.c | 8 ++--
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs.c | 78 +++++++++++++++++++--------------------
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs_lport.c | 62 ++++++++++++-------------------
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_ioc.c | 2 -
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_svc.c | 4 +-
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad.c | 20 +++++-----
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad_attr.c | 2 -
drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad_bsg.c | 6 +--
8 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 98 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcbuild.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcbuild.c
@@ -1250,8 +1250,8 @@ fc_rspnid_build(struct fchs_s *fchs, voi
memset(rspnid, 0, sizeof(struct fcgs_rspnid_req_s));
rspnid->dap = s_id;
- rspnid->spn_len = (u8) strlen((char *)name);
- strncpy((char *)rspnid->spn, (char *)name, rspnid->spn_len);
+ strlcpy(rspnid->spn, name, sizeof(rspnid->spn));
+ rspnid->spn_len = (u8) strlen(rspnid->spn);
return sizeof(struct fcgs_rspnid_req_s) + sizeof(struct ct_hdr_s);
}
@@ -1271,8 +1271,8 @@ fc_rsnn_nn_build(struct fchs_s *fchs, vo
memset(rsnn_nn, 0, sizeof(struct fcgs_rsnn_nn_req_s));
rsnn_nn->node_name = node_name;
- rsnn_nn->snn_len = (u8) strlen((char *)name);
- strncpy((char *)rsnn_nn->snn, (char *)name, rsnn_nn->snn_len);
+ strlcpy(rsnn_nn->snn, name, sizeof(rsnn_nn->snn));
+ rsnn_nn->snn_len = (u8) strlen(rsnn_nn->snn);
return sizeof(struct fcgs_rsnn_nn_req_s) + sizeof(struct ct_hdr_s);
}
--- a/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs.c
@@ -832,23 +832,23 @@ bfa_fcs_fabric_psymb_init(struct bfa_fcs
bfa_ioc_get_adapter_model(&fabric->fcs->bfa->ioc, model);
/* Model name/number */
- strncpy((char *)&port_cfg->sym_name, model,
- BFA_FCS_PORT_SYMBNAME_MODEL_SZ);
- strncat((char *)&port_cfg->sym_name, BFA_FCS_PORT_SYMBNAME_SEPARATOR,
- sizeof(BFA_FCS_PORT_SYMBNAME_SEPARATOR));
+ strlcpy(port_cfg->sym_name.symname, model,
+ BFA_SYMNAME_MAXLEN);
+ strlcat(port_cfg->sym_name.symname, BFA_FCS_PORT_SYMBNAME_SEPARATOR,
+ BFA_SYMNAME_MAXLEN);
/* Driver Version */
- strncat((char *)&port_cfg->sym_name, (char *)driver_info->version,
- BFA_FCS_PORT_SYMBNAME_VERSION_SZ);
- strncat((char *)&port_cfg->sym_name, BFA_FCS_PORT_SYMBNAME_SEPARATOR,
- sizeof(BFA_FCS_PORT_SYMBNAME_SEPARATOR));
+ strlcat(port_cfg->sym_name.symname, driver_info->version,
+ BFA_SYMNAME_MAXLEN);
+ strlcat(port_cfg->sym_name.symname, BFA_FCS_PORT_SYMBNAME_SEPARATOR,
+ BFA_SYMNAME_MAXLEN);
/* Host machine name */
- strncat((char *)&port_cfg->sym_name,
- (char *)driver_info->host_machine_name,
- BFA_FCS_PORT_SYMBNAME_MACHINENAME_SZ);
- strncat((char *)&port_cfg->sym_name, BFA_FCS_PORT_SYMBNAME_SEPARATOR,
- sizeof(BFA_FCS_PORT_SYMBNAME_SEPARATOR));
+ strlcat(port_cfg->sym_name.symname,
+ driver_info->host_machine_name,
+ BFA_SYMNAME_MAXLEN);
+ strlcat(port_cfg->sym_name.symname, BFA_FCS_PORT_SYMBNAME_SEPARATOR,
+ BFA_SYMNAME_MAXLEN);
/*
* Host OS Info :
@@ -856,24 +856,24 @@ bfa_fcs_fabric_psymb_init(struct bfa_fcs
* OS name string and instead copy the entire OS info string (64 bytes).
*/
if (driver_info->host_os_patch[0] == '\0') {
- strncat((char *)&port_cfg->sym_name,
- (char *)driver_info->host_os_name,
- BFA_FCS_OS_STR_LEN);
- strncat((char *)&port_cfg->sym_name,
+ strlcat(port_cfg->sym_name.symname,
+ driver_info->host_os_name,
+ BFA_SYMNAME_MAXLEN);
+ strlcat(port_cfg->sym_name.symname,
BFA_FCS_PORT_SYMBNAME_SEPARATOR,
- sizeof(BFA_FCS_PORT_SYMBNAME_SEPARATOR));
+ BFA_SYMNAME_MAXLEN);
} else {
- strncat((char *)&port_cfg->sym_name,
- (char *)driver_info->host_os_name,
- BFA_FCS_PORT_SYMBNAME_OSINFO_SZ);
- strncat((char *)&port_cfg->sym_name,
+ strlcat(port_cfg->sym_name.symname,
+ driver_info->host_os_name,
+ BFA_SYMNAME_MAXLEN);
+ strlcat(port_cfg->sym_name.symname,
BFA_FCS_PORT_SYMBNAME_SEPARATOR,
- sizeof(BFA_FCS_PORT_SYMBNAME_SEPARATOR));
+ BFA_SYMNAME_MAXLEN);
/* Append host OS Patch Info */
- strncat((char *)&port_cfg->sym_name,
- (char *)driver_info->host_os_patch,
- BFA_FCS_PORT_SYMBNAME_OSPATCH_SZ);
+ strlcat(port_cfg->sym_name.symname,
+ driver_info->host_os_patch,
+ BFA_SYMNAME_MAXLEN);
}
/* null terminate */
@@ -893,26 +893,26 @@ bfa_fcs_fabric_nsymb_init(struct bfa_fcs
bfa_ioc_get_adapter_model(&fabric->fcs->bfa->ioc, model);
/* Model name/number */
- strncpy((char *)&port_cfg->node_sym_name, model,
- BFA_FCS_PORT_SYMBNAME_MODEL_SZ);
- strncat((char *)&port_cfg->node_sym_name,
+ strlcpy(port_cfg->node_sym_name.symname, model,
+ BFA_SYMNAME_MAXLEN);
+ strlcat(port_cfg->node_sym_name.symname,
BFA_FCS_PORT_SYMBNAME_SEPARATOR,
- sizeof(BFA_FCS_PORT_SYMBNAME_SEPARATOR));
+ BFA_SYMNAME_MAXLEN);
/* Driver Version */
- strncat((char *)&port_cfg->node_sym_name, (char *)driver_info->version,
- BFA_FCS_PORT_SYMBNAME_VERSION_SZ);
- strncat((char *)&port_cfg->node_sym_name,
+ strlcat(port_cfg->node_sym_name.symname, (char *)driver_info->version,
+ BFA_SYMNAME_MAXLEN);
+ strlcat(port_cfg->node_sym_name.symname,
BFA_FCS_PORT_SYMBNAME_SEPARATOR,
- sizeof(BFA_FCS_PORT_SYMBNAME_SEPARATOR));
+ BFA_SYMNAME_MAXLEN);
/* Host machine name */
- strncat((char *)&port_cfg->node_sym_name,
- (char *)driver_info->host_machine_name,
- BFA_FCS_PORT_SYMBNAME_MACHINENAME_SZ);
- strncat((char *)&port_cfg->node_sym_name,
+ strlcat(port_cfg->node_sym_name.symname,
+ driver_info->host_machine_name,
+ BFA_SYMNAME_MAXLEN);
+ strlcat(port_cfg->node_sym_name.symname,
BFA_FCS_PORT_SYMBNAME_SEPARATOR,
- sizeof(BFA_FCS_PORT_SYMBNAME_SEPARATOR));
+ BFA_SYMNAME_MAXLEN);
/* null terminate */
port_cfg->node_sym_name.symname[BFA_SYMNAME_MAXLEN - 1] = 0;
--- a/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs_lport.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_fcs_lport.c
@@ -2631,10 +2631,10 @@ bfa_fcs_fdmi_get_hbaattr(struct bfa_fcs_
bfa_ioc_get_adapter_fw_ver(&port->fcs->bfa->ioc,
hba_attr->fw_version);
- strncpy(hba_attr->driver_version, (char *)driver_info->version,
+ strlcpy(hba_attr->driver_version, (char *)driver_info->version,
sizeof(hba_attr->driver_version));
- strncpy(hba_attr->os_name, driver_info->host_os_name,
+ strlcpy(hba_attr->os_name, driver_info->host_os_name,
sizeof(hba_attr->os_name));
/*
@@ -2642,23 +2642,23 @@ bfa_fcs_fdmi_get_hbaattr(struct bfa_fcs_
* to the os name along with a separator
*/
if (driver_info->host_os_patch[0] != '\0') {
- strncat(hba_attr->os_name, BFA_FCS_PORT_SYMBNAME_SEPARATOR,
- sizeof(BFA_FCS_PORT_SYMBNAME_SEPARATOR));
- strncat(hba_attr->os_name, driver_info->host_os_patch,
- sizeof(driver_info->host_os_patch));
+ strlcat(hba_attr->os_name, BFA_FCS_PORT_SYMBNAME_SEPARATOR,
+ sizeof(hba_attr->os_name));
+ strlcat(hba_attr->os_name, driver_info->host_os_patch,
+ sizeof(hba_attr->os_name));
}
/* Retrieve the max frame size from the port attr */
bfa_fcs_fdmi_get_portattr(fdmi, &fcs_port_attr);
hba_attr->max_ct_pyld = fcs_port_attr.max_frm_size;
- strncpy(hba_attr->node_sym_name.symname,
+ strlcpy(hba_attr->node_sym_name.symname,
port->port_cfg.node_sym_name.symname, BFA_SYMNAME_MAXLEN);
strcpy(hba_attr->vendor_info, "QLogic");
hba_attr->num_ports =
cpu_to_be32(bfa_ioc_get_nports(&port->fcs->bfa->ioc));
hba_attr->fabric_name = port->fabric->lps->pr_nwwn;
- strncpy(hba_attr->bios_ver, hba_attr->option_rom_ver, BFA_VERSION_LEN);
+ strlcpy(hba_attr->bios_ver, hba_attr->option_rom_ver, BFA_VERSION_LEN);
}
@@ -2725,20 +2725,20 @@ bfa_fcs_fdmi_get_portattr(struct bfa_fcs
/*
* OS device Name
*/
- strncpy(port_attr->os_device_name, (char *)driver_info->os_device_name,
+ strlcpy(port_attr->os_device_name, driver_info->os_device_name,
sizeof(port_attr->os_device_name));
/*
* Host name
*/
- strncpy(port_attr->host_name, (char *)driver_info->host_machine_name,
+ strlcpy(port_attr->host_name, driver_info->host_machine_name,
sizeof(port_attr->host_name));
port_attr->node_name = bfa_fcs_lport_get_nwwn(port);
port_attr->port_name = bfa_fcs_lport_get_pwwn(port);
- strncpy(port_attr->port_sym_name.symname,
- (char *)&bfa_fcs_lport_get_psym_name(port), BFA_SYMNAME_MAXLEN);
+ strlcpy(port_attr->port_sym_name.symname,
+ bfa_fcs_lport_get_psym_name(port).symname, BFA_SYMNAME_MAXLEN);
bfa_fcs_lport_get_attr(port, &lport_attr);
port_attr->port_type = cpu_to_be32(lport_attr.port_type);
port_attr->scos = pport_attr.cos_supported;
@@ -3218,7 +3218,7 @@ bfa_fcs_lport_ms_gmal_response(void *fcs
rsp_str[gmal_entry->len-1] = 0;
/* copy IP Address to fabric */
- strncpy(bfa_fcs_lport_get_fabric_ipaddr(port),
+ strlcpy(bfa_fcs_lport_get_fabric_ipaddr(port),
gmal_entry->ip_addr,
BFA_FCS_FABRIC_IPADDR_SZ);
break;
@@ -4656,21 +4656,13 @@ bfa_fcs_lport_ns_send_rspn_id(void *ns_c
* to that of the base port.
*/
- strncpy((char *)psymbl,
- (char *) &
- (bfa_fcs_lport_get_psym_name
+ strlcpy(symbl,
+ (char *)&(bfa_fcs_lport_get_psym_name
(bfa_fcs_get_base_port(port->fcs))),
- strlen((char *) &
- bfa_fcs_lport_get_psym_name(bfa_fcs_get_base_port
- (port->fcs))));
-
- /* Ensure we have a null terminating string. */
- ((char *)psymbl)[strlen((char *) &
- bfa_fcs_lport_get_psym_name(bfa_fcs_get_base_port
- (port->fcs)))] = 0;
- strncat((char *)psymbl,
- (char *) &(bfa_fcs_lport_get_psym_name(port)),
- strlen((char *) &bfa_fcs_lport_get_psym_name(port)));
+ sizeof(symbl));
+
+ strlcat(symbl, (char *)&(bfa_fcs_lport_get_psym_name(port)),
+ sizeof(symbl));
} else {
psymbl = (u8 *) &(bfa_fcs_lport_get_psym_name(port));
}
@@ -5162,7 +5154,6 @@ bfa_fcs_lport_ns_util_send_rspn_id(void
struct fchs_s fchs;
struct bfa_fcxp_s *fcxp;
u8 symbl[256];
- u8 *psymbl = &symbl[0];
int len;
/* Avoid sending RSPN in the following states. */
@@ -5192,22 +5183,17 @@ bfa_fcs_lport_ns_util_send_rspn_id(void
* For Vports, we append the vport's port symbolic name
* to that of the base port.
*/
- strncpy((char *)psymbl, (char *)&(bfa_fcs_lport_get_psym_name
+ strlcpy(symbl, (char *)&(bfa_fcs_lport_get_psym_name
(bfa_fcs_get_base_port(port->fcs))),
- strlen((char *)&bfa_fcs_lport_get_psym_name(
- bfa_fcs_get_base_port(port->fcs))));
-
- /* Ensure we have a null terminating string. */
- ((char *)psymbl)[strlen((char *)&bfa_fcs_lport_get_psym_name(
- bfa_fcs_get_base_port(port->fcs)))] = 0;
+ sizeof(symbl));
- strncat((char *)psymbl,
+ strlcat(symbl,
(char *)&(bfa_fcs_lport_get_psym_name(port)),
- strlen((char *)&bfa_fcs_lport_get_psym_name(port)));
+ sizeof(symbl));
}
len = fc_rspnid_build(&fchs, bfa_fcxp_get_reqbuf(fcxp),
- bfa_fcs_lport_get_fcid(port), 0, psymbl);
+ bfa_fcs_lport_get_fcid(port), 0, symbl);
bfa_fcxp_send(fcxp, NULL, port->fabric->vf_id, port->lp_tag, BFA_FALSE,
FC_CLASS_3, len, &fchs, NULL, NULL, FC_MAX_PDUSZ, 0);
--- a/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_ioc.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_ioc.c
@@ -2803,7 +2803,7 @@ void
bfa_ioc_get_adapter_manufacturer(struct bfa_ioc_s *ioc, char *manufacturer)
{
memset((void *)manufacturer, 0, BFA_ADAPTER_MFG_NAME_LEN);
- strncpy(manufacturer, BFA_MFG_NAME, BFA_ADAPTER_MFG_NAME_LEN);
+ strlcpy(manufacturer, BFA_MFG_NAME, BFA_ADAPTER_MFG_NAME_LEN);
}
void
--- a/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_svc.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfa_svc.c
@@ -366,8 +366,8 @@ bfa_plog_str(struct bfa_plog_s *plog, en
lp.eid = event;
lp.log_type = BFA_PL_LOG_TYPE_STRING;
lp.misc = misc;
- strncpy(lp.log_entry.string_log, log_str,
- BFA_PL_STRING_LOG_SZ - 1);
+ strlcpy(lp.log_entry.string_log, log_str,
+ BFA_PL_STRING_LOG_SZ);
lp.log_entry.string_log[BFA_PL_STRING_LOG_SZ - 1] = '\0';
bfa_plog_add(plog, &lp);
}
--- a/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad.c
@@ -983,20 +983,20 @@ bfad_start_ops(struct bfad_s *bfad) {
/* Fill the driver_info info to fcs*/
memset(&driver_info, 0, sizeof(driver_info));
- strncpy(driver_info.version, BFAD_DRIVER_VERSION,
- sizeof(driver_info.version) - 1);
+ strlcpy(driver_info.version, BFAD_DRIVER_VERSION,
+ sizeof(driver_info.version));
if (host_name)
- strncpy(driver_info.host_machine_name, host_name,
- sizeof(driver_info.host_machine_name) - 1);
+ strlcpy(driver_info.host_machine_name, host_name,
+ sizeof(driver_info.host_machine_name));
if (os_name)
- strncpy(driver_info.host_os_name, os_name,
- sizeof(driver_info.host_os_name) - 1);
+ strlcpy(driver_info.host_os_name, os_name,
+ sizeof(driver_info.host_os_name));
if (os_patch)
- strncpy(driver_info.host_os_patch, os_patch,
- sizeof(driver_info.host_os_patch) - 1);
+ strlcpy(driver_info.host_os_patch, os_patch,
+ sizeof(driver_info.host_os_patch));
- strncpy(driver_info.os_device_name, bfad->pci_name,
- sizeof(driver_info.os_device_name) - 1);
+ strlcpy(driver_info.os_device_name, bfad->pci_name,
+ sizeof(driver_info.os_device_name));
/* FCS driver info init */
spin_lock_irqsave(&bfad->bfad_lock, flags);
--- a/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad_attr.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad_attr.c
@@ -843,7 +843,7 @@ bfad_im_symbolic_name_show(struct device
char symname[BFA_SYMNAME_MAXLEN];
bfa_fcs_lport_get_attr(&bfad->bfa_fcs.fabric.bport, &port_attr);
- strncpy(symname, port_attr.port_cfg.sym_name.symname,
+ strlcpy(symname, port_attr.port_cfg.sym_name.symname,
BFA_SYMNAME_MAXLEN);
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", symname);
}
--- a/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad_bsg.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/bfa/bfad_bsg.c
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ bfad_iocmd_ioc_get_attr(struct bfad_s *b
/* fill in driver attr info */
strcpy(iocmd->ioc_attr.driver_attr.driver, BFAD_DRIVER_NAME);
- strncpy(iocmd->ioc_attr.driver_attr.driver_ver,
+ strlcpy(iocmd->ioc_attr.driver_attr.driver_ver,
BFAD_DRIVER_VERSION, BFA_VERSION_LEN);
strcpy(iocmd->ioc_attr.driver_attr.fw_ver,
iocmd->ioc_attr.adapter_attr.fw_ver);
@@ -315,9 +315,9 @@ bfad_iocmd_port_get_attr(struct bfad_s *
iocmd->attr.port_type = port_attr.port_type;
iocmd->attr.loopback = port_attr.loopback;
iocmd->attr.authfail = port_attr.authfail;
- strncpy(iocmd->attr.port_symname.symname,
+ strlcpy(iocmd->attr.port_symname.symname,
port_attr.port_cfg.sym_name.symname,
- sizeof(port_attr.port_cfg.sym_name.symname));
+ sizeof(iocmd->attr.port_symname.symname));
iocmd->status = BFA_STATUS_OK;
return 0;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 010/101] staging: rts5208: fix gcc-8 logic error warning
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 009/101] scsi: bfa: convert to strlcpy/strlcat Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 011/101] kdb: use memmove instead of overlapping memcpy Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (95 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Arnd Bergmann
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
commit 58930cced012adb01bc78b3687049b17ef44d0a3 upstream.
As gcc-8 points out, the bit mask check makes no sense here:
drivers/staging/rts5208/sd.c: In function 'ext_sd_send_cmd_get_rsp':
drivers/staging/rts5208/sd.c:4130:25: error: bitwise comparison always evaluates to true [-Werror=tautological-compare]
However, the code is even more bogus, as we have already
checked for the SD_RSP_TYPE_R0 case earlier in the function
and returned success. As seen in the mmc/sd driver core,
SD_RSP_TYPE_R0 means "no response" anyway, so checking for
a particular response would not help either.
This just removes the nonsensical code to get rid of the
warning.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/staging/rts5208/sd.c | 6 ------
1 file changed, 6 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/staging/rts5208/sd.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rts5208/sd.c
@@ -4110,12 +4110,6 @@ RTY_SEND_CMD:
rtsx_trace(chip);
return STATUS_FAIL;
}
-
- } else if (rsp_type == SD_RSP_TYPE_R0) {
- if ((ptr[3] & 0x1E) != 0x03) {
- rtsx_trace(chip);
- return STATUS_FAIL;
- }
}
}
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 011/101] kdb: use memmove instead of overlapping memcpy
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 010/101] staging: rts5208: fix gcc-8 logic error warning Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 012/101] x86/power/64: Use char arrays for asm function names Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (94 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Arnd Bergmann, Jason Wessel
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
commit 2cf2f0d5b91fd1b06a6ae260462fc7945ea84add upstream.
gcc discovered that the memcpy() arguments in kdbnearsym() overlap, so
we should really use memmove(), which is defined to handle that correctly:
In function 'memcpy',
inlined from 'kdbnearsym' at /git/arm-soc/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_support.c:132:4:
/git/arm-soc/include/linux/string.h:353:9: error: '__builtin_memcpy' accessing 792 bytes at offsets 0 and 8 overlaps 784 bytes at offset 8 [-Werror=restrict]
return __builtin_memcpy(p, q, size);
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_support.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_support.c
+++ b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_support.c
@@ -129,13 +129,13 @@ int kdbnearsym(unsigned long addr, kdb_s
}
if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(kdb_name_table)) {
debug_kfree(kdb_name_table[0]);
- memcpy(kdb_name_table, kdb_name_table+1,
+ memmove(kdb_name_table, kdb_name_table+1,
sizeof(kdb_name_table[0]) *
(ARRAY_SIZE(kdb_name_table)-1));
} else {
debug_kfree(knt1);
knt1 = kdb_name_table[i];
- memcpy(kdb_name_table+i, kdb_name_table+i+1,
+ memmove(kdb_name_table+i, kdb_name_table+i+1,
sizeof(kdb_name_table[0]) *
(ARRAY_SIZE(kdb_name_table)-i-1));
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 012/101] x86/power/64: Use char arrays for asm function names
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 011/101] kdb: use memmove instead of overlapping memcpy Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 013/101] iser: set sector for ambiguous mr status errors Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (93 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Kees Cook, Ingo Molnar, Rafael J. Wysocki
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
commit c0944883c97c0ddc71da67cc731590a7c878a1a2 upstream.
This switches the hibernate_64.S function names into character arrays
to match other areas of the kernel where this is done (e.g., linker
scripts). Specifically this fixes a compile-time error noticed by the
future CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE routines that complained about PAGE_SIZE
being copied out of the "single byte" core_restore_code variable.
Additionally drops the "acpi_save_state_mem" exern which does not
appear to be used anywhere else in the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/suspend_64.h | 5 ++---
arch/x86/power/hibernate_64.c | 6 +++---
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend_64.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/suspend_64.h
@@ -42,8 +42,7 @@ struct saved_context {
set_debugreg((thread)->debugreg##register, register)
/* routines for saving/restoring kernel state */
-extern int acpi_save_state_mem(void);
-extern char core_restore_code;
-extern char restore_registers;
+extern char core_restore_code[];
+extern char restore_registers[];
#endif /* _ASM_X86_SUSPEND_64_H */
--- a/arch/x86/power/hibernate_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/power/hibernate_64.c
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static int relocate_restore_code(void)
if (!relocated_restore_code)
return -ENOMEM;
- memcpy((void *)relocated_restore_code, &core_restore_code, PAGE_SIZE);
+ memcpy((void *)relocated_restore_code, core_restore_code, PAGE_SIZE);
/* Make the page containing the relocated code executable */
pgd = (pgd_t *)__va(read_cr3()) + pgd_index(relocated_restore_code);
@@ -197,8 +197,8 @@ int arch_hibernation_header_save(void *a
if (max_size < sizeof(struct restore_data_record))
return -EOVERFLOW;
- rdr->jump_address = (unsigned long)&restore_registers;
- rdr->jump_address_phys = __pa_symbol(&restore_registers);
+ rdr->jump_address = (unsigned long)restore_registers;
+ rdr->jump_address_phys = __pa_symbol(restore_registers);
rdr->cr3 = restore_cr3;
rdr->magic = RESTORE_MAGIC;
return 0;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 013/101] iser: set sector for ambiguous mr status errors
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 012/101] x86/power/64: Use char arrays for asm function names Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 014/101] uprobes: Fix handle_swbp() vs. unregister() + register() race once more Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (92 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Dan Carpenter, Sagi Grimberg,
Jason Gunthorpe
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
commit 24c3456c8d5ee6fc1933ca40f7b4406130682668 upstream.
If for some reason we failed to query the mr status, we need to make sure
to provide sufficient information for an ambiguous error (guard error on
sector 0).
Fixes: 0a7a08ad6f5f ("IB/iser: Implement check_protection")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/infiniband/ulp/iser/iser_verbs.c | 7 +++----
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/iser/iser_verbs.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/iser/iser_verbs.c
@@ -1110,7 +1110,9 @@ u8 iser_check_task_pi_status(struct iscs
IB_MR_CHECK_SIG_STATUS, &mr_status);
if (ret) {
pr_err("ib_check_mr_status failed, ret %d\n", ret);
- goto err;
+ /* Not a lot we can do, return ambiguous guard error */
+ *sector = 0;
+ return 0x1;
}
if (mr_status.fail_status & IB_MR_CHECK_SIG_STATUS) {
@@ -1138,9 +1140,6 @@ u8 iser_check_task_pi_status(struct iscs
}
return 0;
-err:
- /* Not alot we can do here, return ambiguous guard error */
- return 0x1;
}
void iser_err_comp(struct ib_wc *wc, const char *type)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 014/101] uprobes: Fix handle_swbp() vs. unregister() + register() race once more
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (12 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 013/101] iser: set sector for ambiguous mr status errors Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 015/101] MIPS: ralink: Fix mt7620 nd_sd pinmux Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (91 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Andrea Parri, Oleg Nesterov,
Alexander Shishkin, Andrew Morton, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo,
Jiri Olsa, Linus Torvalds, Namhyung Kim, Paul E. McKenney,
Peter Zijlstra, Stephane Eranian, Thomas Gleixner, Vince Weaver,
stable, Ingo Molnar
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andrea Parri <andrea.parri@amarulasolutions.com>
commit 09d3f015d1e1b4fee7e9bbdcf54201d239393391 upstream.
Commit:
142b18ddc8143 ("uprobes: Fix handle_swbp() vs unregister() + register() race")
added the UPROBE_COPY_INSN flag, and corresponding smp_wmb() and smp_rmb()
memory barriers, to ensure that handle_swbp() uses fully-initialized
uprobes only.
However, the smp_rmb() is mis-placed: this barrier should be placed
after handle_swbp() has tested for the flag, thus guaranteeing that
(program-order) subsequent loads from the uprobe can see the initial
stores performed by prepare_uprobe().
Move the smp_rmb() accordingly. Also amend the comments associated
to the two memory barriers to indicate their actual locations.
Signed-off-by: Andrea Parri <andrea.parri@amarulasolutions.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 142b18ddc8143 ("uprobes: Fix handle_swbp() vs unregister() + register() race")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181122161031.15179-1-andrea.parri@amarulasolutions.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/events/uprobes.c | 12 ++++++++++--
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/events/uprobes.c
+++ b/kernel/events/uprobes.c
@@ -608,7 +608,7 @@ static int prepare_uprobe(struct uprobe
BUG_ON((uprobe->offset & ~PAGE_MASK) +
UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE);
- smp_wmb(); /* pairs with rmb() in find_active_uprobe() */
+ smp_wmb(); /* pairs with the smp_rmb() in handle_swbp() */
set_bit(UPROBE_COPY_INSN, &uprobe->flags);
out:
@@ -1902,10 +1902,18 @@ static void handle_swbp(struct pt_regs *
* After we hit the bp, _unregister + _register can install the
* new and not-yet-analyzed uprobe at the same address, restart.
*/
- smp_rmb(); /* pairs with wmb() in install_breakpoint() */
if (unlikely(!test_bit(UPROBE_COPY_INSN, &uprobe->flags)))
goto out;
+ /*
+ * Pairs with the smp_wmb() in prepare_uprobe().
+ *
+ * Guarantees that if we see the UPROBE_COPY_INSN bit set, then
+ * we must also see the stores to &uprobe->arch performed by the
+ * prepare_uprobe() call.
+ */
+ smp_rmb();
+
/* Tracing handlers use ->utask to communicate with fetch methods */
if (!get_utask())
goto out;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 015/101] MIPS: ralink: Fix mt7620 nd_sd pinmux
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (13 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 014/101] uprobes: Fix handle_swbp() vs. unregister() + register() race once more Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 016/101] mips: fix mips_get_syscall_arg o32 check Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (90 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Kristian Evensen, Mathias Kresin,
Paul Burton, John Crispin, Ralf Baechle, James Hogan, linux-mips
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mathias Kresin <dev@kresin.me>
commit 7d35baa4e9ec4b717bc0e58a39cdb6a1c50f5465 upstream.
In case the nd_sd group is set to the sd-card function, Pins 45 + 46 are
configured as GPIOs. If they are blocked by the sd function, they can't
be used as GPIOs.
Reported-by: Kristian Evensen <kristian.evensen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Kresin <dev@kresin.me>
Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Fixes: f576fb6a0700 ("MIPS: ralink: cleanup the soc specific pinmux data")
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/21220/
Cc: John Crispin <john@phrozen.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.18+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/mips/ralink/mt7620.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/mips/ralink/mt7620.c
+++ b/arch/mips/ralink/mt7620.c
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ static struct rt2880_pmx_func pcie_rst_g
};
static struct rt2880_pmx_func nd_sd_grp[] = {
FUNC("nand", MT7620_GPIO_MODE_NAND, 45, 15),
- FUNC("sd", MT7620_GPIO_MODE_SD, 45, 15)
+ FUNC("sd", MT7620_GPIO_MODE_SD, 47, 13)
};
static struct rt2880_pmx_group mt7620a_pinmux_data[] = {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 016/101] mips: fix mips_get_syscall_arg o32 check
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (14 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 015/101] MIPS: ralink: Fix mt7620 nd_sd pinmux Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 017/101] IB/mlx5: Avoid load failure due to unknown link width Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (89 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Dmitry V. Levin, Paul Burton,
Elvira Khabirova, Ralf Baechle, James Hogan, linux-mips
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org>
commit c50cbd85cd7027d32ac5945bb60217936b4f7eaf upstream.
When checking for TIF_32BIT_REGS flag, mips_get_syscall_arg() should
use the task specified as its argument instead of the current task.
This potentially affects all syscall_get_arguments() users
who specify tasks different from the current.
Fixes: c0ff3c53d4f99 ("MIPS: Enable HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK.")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/21185/
Cc: Elvira Khabirova <lineprinter@altlinux.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/mips/include/asm/syscall.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/mips/include/asm/syscall.h
+++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/syscall.h
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static inline unsigned long mips_get_sys
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
case 4: case 5: case 6: case 7:
#ifdef CONFIG_MIPS32_O32
- if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT_REGS))
+ if (test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_32BIT_REGS))
return get_user(*arg, (int *)usp + n);
else
#endif
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 017/101] IB/mlx5: Avoid load failure due to unknown link width
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (15 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 016/101] mips: fix mips_get_syscall_arg o32 check Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 018/101] drm/ast: Fix incorrect free on ioregs Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (88 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Michael Guralnik, Majd Dibbiny,
Leon Romanovsky, Jason Gunthorpe
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Guralnik <michaelgur@mellanox.com>
commit db7a691a1551a748cb92d9c89c6b190ea87e28d5 upstream.
If the firmware reports a connection width that is not 1x, 4x, 8x or 12x
it causes the driver to fail during initialization.
To prevent this failure every time a new width is introduced to the RDMA
stack, we will set a default 4x width for these widths which ar unknown to
the driver.
This is needed to allow to run old kernels with new firmware.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.1
Fixes: 1b5daf11b015 ("IB/mlx5: Avoid using the MAD_IFC command under ISSI > 0 mode")
Signed-off-by: Michael Guralnik <michaelgur@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Majd Dibbiny <majd@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/main.c | 29 +++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/main.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/main.c
@@ -710,31 +710,26 @@ enum mlx5_ib_width {
MLX5_IB_WIDTH_12X = 1 << 4
};
-static int translate_active_width(struct ib_device *ibdev, u8 active_width,
+static void translate_active_width(struct ib_device *ibdev, u8 active_width,
u8 *ib_width)
{
struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev = to_mdev(ibdev);
- int err = 0;
- if (active_width & MLX5_IB_WIDTH_1X) {
+ if (active_width & MLX5_IB_WIDTH_1X)
*ib_width = IB_WIDTH_1X;
- } else if (active_width & MLX5_IB_WIDTH_2X) {
- mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "active_width %d is not supported by IB spec\n",
- (int)active_width);
- err = -EINVAL;
- } else if (active_width & MLX5_IB_WIDTH_4X) {
+ else if (active_width & MLX5_IB_WIDTH_4X)
*ib_width = IB_WIDTH_4X;
- } else if (active_width & MLX5_IB_WIDTH_8X) {
+ else if (active_width & MLX5_IB_WIDTH_8X)
*ib_width = IB_WIDTH_8X;
- } else if (active_width & MLX5_IB_WIDTH_12X) {
+ else if (active_width & MLX5_IB_WIDTH_12X)
*ib_width = IB_WIDTH_12X;
- } else {
- mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "Invalid active_width %d\n",
+ else {
+ mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "Invalid active_width %d, setting width to default value: 4x\n",
(int)active_width);
- err = -EINVAL;
+ *ib_width = IB_WIDTH_4X;
}
- return err;
+ return;
}
static int mlx5_mtu_to_ib_mtu(int mtu)
@@ -842,10 +837,8 @@ static int mlx5_query_hca_port(struct ib
if (err)
goto out;
- err = translate_active_width(ibdev, ib_link_width_oper,
- &props->active_width);
- if (err)
- goto out;
+ translate_active_width(ibdev, ib_link_width_oper, &props->active_width);
+
err = mlx5_query_port_ib_proto_oper(mdev, &props->active_speed, port);
if (err)
goto out;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 018/101] drm/ast: Fix incorrect free on ioregs
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (16 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 017/101] IB/mlx5: Avoid load failure due to unknown link width Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 019/101] drm: set is_master to 0 upon drm_new_set_master() failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (87 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Sam Bobroff, Dave Airlie
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sam Bobroff <sbobroff@linux.ibm.com>
commit dc25ab067645eabd037f1a23d49a666f9e0b8c68 upstream.
If the platform has no IO space, ioregs is placed next to the already
allocated regs. In this case, it should not be separately freed.
This prevents a kernel warning from __vunmap "Trying to vfree()
nonexistent vm area" when unloading the driver.
Fixes: 0dd68309b9c5 ("drm/ast: Try to use MMIO registers when PIO isn't supported")
Signed-off-by: Sam Bobroff <sbobroff@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/ast/ast_main.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/ast/ast_main.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/ast/ast_main.c
@@ -556,7 +556,8 @@ int ast_driver_unload(struct drm_device
drm_mode_config_cleanup(dev);
ast_mm_fini(ast);
- pci_iounmap(dev->pdev, ast->ioregs);
+ if (ast->ioregs != ast->regs + AST_IO_MM_OFFSET)
+ pci_iounmap(dev->pdev, ast->ioregs);
pci_iounmap(dev->pdev, ast->regs);
kfree(ast);
return 0;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 019/101] drm: set is_master to 0 upon drm_new_set_master() failure
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (17 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 018/101] drm/ast: Fix incorrect free on ioregs Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 020/101] scsi: scsi_devinfo: cleanly zero-pad devinfo strings Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (86 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Sergio Correia, Daniel Vetter, Sean Paul
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sergio Correia <sergio@correia.cc>
commit 23a336b34258aba3b50ea6863cca4e81b5ef6384 upstream.
When drm_new_set_master() fails, set is_master to 0, to prevent a
possible NULL pointer deref.
Here is a problematic flow: we check is_master in drm_is_current_master(),
then proceed to call drm_lease_owner() passing master. If we do not restore
is_master status when drm_new_set_master() fails, we may have a situation
in which is_master will be 1 and master itself, NULL, leading to the deref
of a NULL pointer in drm_lease_owner().
This fixes the following OOPS, observed on an ArchLinux running a 4.19.2
kernel:
[ 97.804282] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000080
[ 97.807224] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 97.807224] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 97.807224] CPU: 0 PID: 1348 Comm: xfwm4 Tainted: P OE 4.19.2-arch1-1-ARCH #1
[ 97.807224] Hardware name: To Be Filled By O.E.M. To Be Filled By O.E.M./AB350 Pro4, BIOS P5.10 10/16/2018
[ 97.807224] RIP: 0010:drm_lease_owner+0xd/0x20 [drm]
[ 97.807224] Code: 83 c4 18 5b 5d c3 b8 ea ff ff ff eb e2 b8 ed ff ff ff eb db e8 b4 ca 68 fb 0f 1f 40 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 eb 03 48 89 d0 <48> 8b 90 80 00 00 00 48 85 d2 75 f1 c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44
[ 97.807224] RSP: 0018:ffffb8cf08e07bb0 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 97.807224] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9cf0f2586c00 RCX: ffff9cf0f2586c88
[ 97.807224] RDX: ffff9cf0ddbd8000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 97.807224] RBP: ffff9cf1040e9800 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 97.807224] R10: ffffdeb30fd5d680 R11: ffffdeb30f5d6808 R12: ffff9cf1040e9888
[ 97.807224] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: dead000000000200 R15: ffff9cf0f2586cc8
[ 97.807224] FS: 00007f4145513180(0000) GS:ffff9cf10ea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 97.807224] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 97.807224] CR2: 0000000000000080 CR3: 00000003d7548000 CR4: 00000000003406f0
[ 97.807224] Call Trace:
[ 97.807224] drm_is_current_master+0x1a/0x30 [drm]
[ 97.807224] drm_master_release+0x3e/0x130 [drm]
[ 97.807224] drm_file_free.part.0+0x2be/0x2d0 [drm]
[ 97.807224] drm_open+0x1ba/0x1e0 [drm]
[ 97.807224] drm_stub_open+0xaf/0xe0 [drm]
[ 97.807224] chrdev_open+0xa3/0x1b0
[ 97.807224] ? cdev_put.part.0+0x20/0x20
[ 97.807224] do_dentry_open+0x132/0x340
[ 97.807224] path_openat+0x2d1/0x14e0
[ 97.807224] ? mem_cgroup_commit_charge+0x7a/0x520
[ 97.807224] do_filp_open+0x93/0x100
[ 97.807224] ? __check_object_size+0x102/0x189
[ 97.807224] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x16/0x30
[ 97.807224] do_sys_open+0x186/0x210
[ 97.807224] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x170
[ 97.807224] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 97.807224] RIP: 0033:0x7f4147b07976
[ 97.807224] Code: 89 54 24 08 e8 7b f4 ff ff 8b 74 24 0c 48 8b 3c 24 41 89 c0 44 8b 54 24 08 b8 01 01 00 00 89 f2 48 89 fe bf 9c ff ff ff 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 30 44 89 c7 89 44 24 08 e8 a6 f4 ff ff 8b 44
[ 97.807224] RSP: 002b:00007ffcced96ca0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
[ 97.807224] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005619d5037f80 RCX: 00007f4147b07976
[ 97.807224] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 00005619d46b969c RDI: 00000000ffffff9c
[ 98.040039] RBP: 0000000000000024 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 98.040039] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000024
[ 98.040039] R13: 0000000000000012 R14: 00005619d5035950 R15: 0000000000000012
[ 98.040039] Modules linked in: nct6775 hwmon_vid algif_skcipher af_alg nls_iso8859_1 nls_cp437 vfat fat uvcvideo videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_common arc4 videodev media snd_usb_audio snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_usbmidi_lib snd_rawmidi snd_seq_device mousedev input_leds iwlmvm mac80211 snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec edac_mce_amd kvm_amd snd_hda_core kvm iwlwifi snd_hwdep r8169 wmi_bmof cfg80211 snd_pcm irqbypass snd_timer snd libphy soundcore pinctrl_amd rfkill pcspkr sp5100_tco evdev gpio_amdpt k10temp mac_hid i2c_piix4 wmi pcc_cpufreq acpi_cpufreq vboxnetflt(OE) vboxnetadp(OE) vboxpci(OE) vboxdrv(OE) msr sg crypto_user ip_tables x_tables ext4 crc32c_generic crc16 mbcache jbd2 fscrypto uas usb_storage dm_crypt hid_generic usbhid hid
[ 98.040039] dm_mod raid1 md_mod sd_mod crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc ahci libahci aesni_intel aes_x86_64 libata crypto_simd cryptd glue_helper ccp xhci_pci rng_core scsi_mod xhci_hcd nvidia_drm(POE) drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm agpgart nvidia_uvm(POE) nvidia_modeset(POE) nvidia(POE) ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler
[ 98.040039] CR2: 0000000000000080
[ 98.040039] ---[ end trace 3b65093b6fe62b2f ]---
[ 98.040039] RIP: 0010:drm_lease_owner+0xd/0x20 [drm]
[ 98.040039] Code: 83 c4 18 5b 5d c3 b8 ea ff ff ff eb e2 b8 ed ff ff ff eb db e8 b4 ca 68 fb 0f 1f 40 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 eb 03 48 89 d0 <48> 8b 90 80 00 00 00 48 85 d2 75 f1 c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44
[ 98.040039] RSP: 0018:ffffb8cf08e07bb0 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 98.040039] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9cf0f2586c00 RCX: ffff9cf0f2586c88
[ 98.040039] RDX: ffff9cf0ddbd8000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 98.040039] RBP: ffff9cf1040e9800 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 98.040039] R10: ffffdeb30fd5d680 R11: ffffdeb30f5d6808 R12: ffff9cf1040e9888
[ 98.040039] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: dead000000000200 R15: ffff9cf0f2586cc8
[ 98.040039] FS: 00007f4145513180(0000) GS:ffff9cf10ea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 98.040039] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 98.040039] CR2: 0000000000000080 CR3: 00000003d7548000 CR4: 00000000003406f0
Signed-off-by: Sergio Correia <sergio@correia.cc>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20181122053329.2692-1-sergio@correia.cc
Signed-off-by: Sean Paul <seanpaul@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_auth.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_auth.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_auth.c
@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ static int drm_new_set_master(struct drm
lockdep_assert_held_once(&dev->master_mutex);
+ WARN_ON(fpriv->is_master);
old_master = fpriv->master;
fpriv->master = drm_master_create(dev);
if (!fpriv->master) {
@@ -161,6 +162,7 @@ out_err:
/* drop references and restore old master on failure */
drm_master_put(&fpriv->master);
fpriv->master = old_master;
+ fpriv->is_master = 0;
return ret;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 020/101] scsi: scsi_devinfo: cleanly zero-pad devinfo strings
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (18 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 019/101] drm: set is_master to 0 upon drm_new_set_master() failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 021/101] ALSA: trident: Suppress gcc string warning Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (85 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Martin Wilck, Bart Van Assche,
Martin K. Petersen
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Martin Wilck <mwilck@suse.com>
commit 81df022b688d43d2a3667518b2f755d384397910 upstream.
Cleanly fill memory for "vendor" and "model" with 0-bytes for the
"compatible" case rather than adding only a single 0 byte. This
simplifies the devinfo code a a bit, and avoids mistakes in other places
of the code (not in current upstream, but we had one such mistake in the
SUSE kernel).
[mkp: applied by hand and added braces]
Signed-off-by: Martin Wilck <mwilck@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c | 22 +++++++---------------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/scsi_devinfo.c
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ struct scsi_dev_info_list_table {
};
-static const char spaces[] = " "; /* 16 of them */
static unsigned scsi_default_dev_flags;
static LIST_HEAD(scsi_dev_info_list);
static char scsi_dev_flags[256];
@@ -298,20 +297,13 @@ static void scsi_strcpy_devinfo(char *na
size_t from_length;
from_length = strlen(from);
- strncpy(to, from, min(to_length, from_length));
- if (from_length < to_length) {
- if (compatible) {
- /*
- * NUL terminate the string if it is short.
- */
- to[from_length] = '\0';
- } else {
- /*
- * space pad the string if it is short.
- */
- strncpy(&to[from_length], spaces,
- to_length - from_length);
- }
+ /* this zero-pads the destination */
+ strncpy(to, from, to_length);
+ if (from_length < to_length && !compatible) {
+ /*
+ * space pad the string if it is short.
+ */
+ memset(&to[from_length], ' ', to_length - from_length);
}
if (from_length > to_length)
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: %s string '%s' is too long\n",
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 021/101] ALSA: trident: Suppress gcc string warning
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (19 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 020/101] scsi: scsi_devinfo: cleanly zero-pad devinfo strings Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 022/101] scsi: csiostor: Avoid content leaks and casts Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (84 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Takashi Iwai
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
commit d6b340d7cb33c816ef4abe8143764ec5ab14a5cc upstream.
The meddlesome gcc warns about the possible shortname string in
trident driver code:
sound/pci/trident/trident.c: In function ‘snd_trident_probe’:
sound/pci/trident/trident.c:126:2: warning: ‘strcat’ accessing 17 or more bytes at offsets 36 and 20 may overlap 1 byte at offset 36 [-Wrestrict]
strcat(card->shortname, card->driver);
It happens since gcc calculates the possible string size from
card->driver, but this can't be true since we did set the string just
before that, and they are much shorter.
For shutting it up, use the exactly same string set to card->driver
for strcat() to card->shortname, too.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
sound/pci/trident/trident.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/sound/pci/trident/trident.c
+++ b/sound/pci/trident/trident.c
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ static int snd_trident_probe(struct pci_
} else {
strcpy(card->shortname, "Trident ");
}
- strcat(card->shortname, card->driver);
+ strcat(card->shortname, str);
sprintf(card->longname, "%s PCI Audio at 0x%lx, irq %d",
card->shortname, trident->port, trident->irq);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 022/101] scsi: csiostor: Avoid content leaks and casts
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (20 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 021/101] ALSA: trident: Suppress gcc string warning Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 023/101] kgdboc: Fix restrict error Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (83 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Daniel Micay, Kees Cook,
Varun Prakash, Martin K. Petersen
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
commit 42c335f7e67029d2e01711f2f2bc6252277c8993 upstream.
When copying attributes, the len argument was padded out and the
resulting memcpy() would copy beyond the end of the source buffer.
Avoid this, and use size_t for val_len to avoid all the casts.
Similarly, avoid source buffer casts and use void *.
Additionally enforces val_len can be represented by u16 and that the DMA
buffer was not overflowed. Fixes the size of mfa, which is not
FC_FDMI_PORT_ATTR_MAXFRAMESIZE_LEN (but it will be padded up to 4). This
was noticed by the future CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE checks.
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Varun Prakash <varun@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/scsi/csiostor/csio_lnode.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/scsi/csiostor/csio_lnode.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/csiostor/csio_lnode.c
@@ -238,14 +238,23 @@ csio_osname(uint8_t *buf, size_t buf_len
}
static inline void
-csio_append_attrib(uint8_t **ptr, uint16_t type, uint8_t *val, uint16_t len)
+csio_append_attrib(uint8_t **ptr, uint16_t type, void *val, size_t val_len)
{
+ uint16_t len;
struct fc_fdmi_attr_entry *ae = (struct fc_fdmi_attr_entry *)*ptr;
+
+ if (WARN_ON(val_len > U16_MAX))
+ return;
+
+ len = val_len;
+
ae->type = htons(type);
len += 4; /* includes attribute type and length */
len = (len + 3) & ~3; /* should be multiple of 4 bytes */
ae->len = htons(len);
- memcpy(ae->value, val, len);
+ memcpy(ae->value, val, val_len);
+ if (len > val_len)
+ memset(ae->value + val_len, 0, len - val_len);
*ptr += len;
}
@@ -335,7 +344,7 @@ csio_ln_fdmi_rhba_cbfn(struct csio_hw *h
numattrs++;
val = htonl(FC_PORTSPEED_1GBIT | FC_PORTSPEED_10GBIT);
csio_append_attrib(&pld, FC_FDMI_PORT_ATTR_SUPPORTEDSPEED,
- (uint8_t *)&val,
+ &val,
FC_FDMI_PORT_ATTR_SUPPORTEDSPEED_LEN);
numattrs++;
@@ -346,23 +355,22 @@ csio_ln_fdmi_rhba_cbfn(struct csio_hw *h
else
val = htonl(CSIO_HBA_PORTSPEED_UNKNOWN);
csio_append_attrib(&pld, FC_FDMI_PORT_ATTR_CURRENTPORTSPEED,
- (uint8_t *)&val,
- FC_FDMI_PORT_ATTR_CURRENTPORTSPEED_LEN);
+ &val, FC_FDMI_PORT_ATTR_CURRENTPORTSPEED_LEN);
numattrs++;
mfs = ln->ln_sparm.csp.sp_bb_data;
csio_append_attrib(&pld, FC_FDMI_PORT_ATTR_MAXFRAMESIZE,
- (uint8_t *)&mfs, FC_FDMI_PORT_ATTR_MAXFRAMESIZE_LEN);
+ &mfs, sizeof(mfs));
numattrs++;
strcpy(buf, "csiostor");
csio_append_attrib(&pld, FC_FDMI_PORT_ATTR_OSDEVICENAME, buf,
- (uint16_t)strlen(buf));
+ strlen(buf));
numattrs++;
if (!csio_hostname(buf, sizeof(buf))) {
csio_append_attrib(&pld, FC_FDMI_PORT_ATTR_HOSTNAME,
- buf, (uint16_t)strlen(buf));
+ buf, strlen(buf));
numattrs++;
}
attrib_blk->numattrs = htonl(numattrs);
@@ -444,33 +452,32 @@ csio_ln_fdmi_dprt_cbfn(struct csio_hw *h
strcpy(buf, "Chelsio Communications");
csio_append_attrib(&pld, FC_FDMI_HBA_ATTR_MANUFACTURER, buf,
- (uint16_t)strlen(buf));
+ strlen(buf));
numattrs++;
csio_append_attrib(&pld, FC_FDMI_HBA_ATTR_SERIALNUMBER,
- hw->vpd.sn, (uint16_t)sizeof(hw->vpd.sn));
+ hw->vpd.sn, sizeof(hw->vpd.sn));
numattrs++;
csio_append_attrib(&pld, FC_FDMI_HBA_ATTR_MODEL, hw->vpd.id,
- (uint16_t)sizeof(hw->vpd.id));
+ sizeof(hw->vpd.id));
numattrs++;
csio_append_attrib(&pld, FC_FDMI_HBA_ATTR_MODELDESCRIPTION,
- hw->model_desc, (uint16_t)strlen(hw->model_desc));
+ hw->model_desc, strlen(hw->model_desc));
numattrs++;
csio_append_attrib(&pld, FC_FDMI_HBA_ATTR_HARDWAREVERSION,
- hw->hw_ver, (uint16_t)sizeof(hw->hw_ver));
+ hw->hw_ver, sizeof(hw->hw_ver));
numattrs++;
csio_append_attrib(&pld, FC_FDMI_HBA_ATTR_FIRMWAREVERSION,
- hw->fwrev_str, (uint16_t)strlen(hw->fwrev_str));
+ hw->fwrev_str, strlen(hw->fwrev_str));
numattrs++;
if (!csio_osname(buf, sizeof(buf))) {
csio_append_attrib(&pld, FC_FDMI_HBA_ATTR_OSNAMEVERSION,
- buf, (uint16_t)strlen(buf));
+ buf, strlen(buf));
numattrs++;
}
csio_append_attrib(&pld, FC_FDMI_HBA_ATTR_MAXCTPAYLOAD,
- (uint8_t *)&maxpayload,
- FC_FDMI_HBA_ATTR_MAXCTPAYLOAD_LEN);
+ &maxpayload, FC_FDMI_HBA_ATTR_MAXCTPAYLOAD_LEN);
len = (uint32_t)(pld - (uint8_t *)cmd);
numattrs++;
attrib_blk->numattrs = htonl(numattrs);
@@ -1794,6 +1801,8 @@ csio_ln_mgmt_submit_req(struct csio_iore
struct csio_mgmtm *mgmtm = csio_hw_to_mgmtm(hw);
int rv;
+ BUG_ON(pld_len > pld->len);
+
io_req->io_cbfn = io_cbfn; /* Upper layer callback handler */
io_req->fw_handle = (uintptr_t) (io_req);
io_req->eq_idx = mgmtm->eq_idx;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 023/101] kgdboc: Fix restrict error
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (21 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 022/101] scsi: csiostor: Avoid content leaks and casts Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 024/101] kgdboc: Fix warning with module build Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (82 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Laura Abbott, Daniel Thompson
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
commit 2dd453168643d9475028cd867c57e65956a0f7f9 upstream.
There's an error when compiled with restrict:
drivers/tty/serial/kgdboc.c: In function ‘configure_kgdboc’:
drivers/tty/serial/kgdboc.c:137:2: error: ‘strcpy’ source argument is the same
as destination [-Werror=restrict]
strcpy(config, opt);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
As the error implies, this is from trying to use config as both source and
destination. Drop the call to the function where config is the argument
since nothing else happens in the function.
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/tty/serial/kgdboc.c | 6 ++----
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/tty/serial/kgdboc.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/kgdboc.c
@@ -162,15 +162,13 @@ static int configure_kgdboc(void)
{
struct tty_driver *p;
int tty_line = 0;
- int err;
+ int err = -ENODEV;
char *cptr = config;
struct console *cons;
- err = kgdboc_option_setup(config);
- if (err || !strlen(config) || isspace(config[0]))
+ if (!strlen(config) || isspace(config[0]))
goto noconfig;
- err = -ENODEV;
kgdboc_io_ops.is_console = 0;
kgdb_tty_driver = NULL;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 024/101] kgdboc: Fix warning with module build
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (22 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 023/101] kgdboc: Fix restrict error Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 025/101] binder: fix proc->files use-after-free Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (81 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Stephen Rothwell, Laura Abbott
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
commit 1cd25cbb2fedbc777f3a8c3cb1ba69b645aeaa64 upstream.
After 2dd453168643 ("kgdboc: Fix restrict error"), kgdboc_option_setup is
now only used when built in, resulting in a warning when compiled as a
module:
drivers/tty/serial/kgdboc.c:134:12: warning: 'kgdboc_option_setup' defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
static int kgdboc_option_setup(char *opt)
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Move the function under the appropriate ifdef for builtin only.
Fixes: 2dd453168643 ("kgdboc: Fix restrict error")
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/tty/serial/kgdboc.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/tty/serial/kgdboc.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/kgdboc.c
@@ -131,24 +131,6 @@ static void kgdboc_unregister_kbd(void)
#define kgdboc_restore_input()
#endif /* ! CONFIG_KDB_KEYBOARD */
-static int kgdboc_option_setup(char *opt)
-{
- if (!opt) {
- pr_err("kgdboc: config string not provided\n");
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- if (strlen(opt) >= MAX_CONFIG_LEN) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "kgdboc: config string too long\n");
- return -ENOSPC;
- }
- strcpy(config, opt);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-__setup("kgdboc=", kgdboc_option_setup);
-
static void cleanup_kgdboc(void)
{
if (kgdb_unregister_nmi_console())
@@ -316,6 +298,25 @@ static struct kgdb_io kgdboc_io_ops = {
};
#ifdef CONFIG_KGDB_SERIAL_CONSOLE
+static int kgdboc_option_setup(char *opt)
+{
+ if (!opt) {
+ pr_err("config string not provided\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (strlen(opt) >= MAX_CONFIG_LEN) {
+ pr_err("config string too long\n");
+ return -ENOSPC;
+ }
+ strcpy(config, opt);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+__setup("kgdboc=", kgdboc_option_setup);
+
+
/* This is only available if kgdboc is a built in for early debugging */
static int __init kgdboc_early_init(char *opt)
{
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 025/101] binder: fix proc->files use-after-free
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (23 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 024/101] kgdboc: Fix warning with module build Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 026/101] svm: Add mutex_lock to protect apic_access_page_done on AMD systems Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (80 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Todd Kjos
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Todd Kjos <tkjos@android.com>
commit 7f3dc0088b98533f17128058fac73cd8b2752ef1 upstream.
proc->files cleanup is initiated by binder_vma_close. Therefore
a reference on the binder_proc is not enough to prevent the
files_struct from being released while the binder_proc still has
a reference. This can lead to an attempt to dereference the
stale pointer obtained from proc->files prior to proc->files
cleanup. This has been seen once in task_get_unused_fd_flags()
when __alloc_fd() is called with a stale "files".
The fix is to protect proc->files with a mutex to prevent cleanup
while in use.
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -302,6 +302,7 @@ struct binder_proc {
struct mm_struct *vma_vm_mm;
struct task_struct *tsk;
struct files_struct *files;
+ struct mutex files_lock;
struct hlist_node deferred_work_node;
int deferred_work;
void *buffer;
@@ -375,20 +376,26 @@ binder_defer_work(struct binder_proc *pr
static int task_get_unused_fd_flags(struct binder_proc *proc, int flags)
{
- struct files_struct *files = proc->files;
unsigned long rlim_cur;
unsigned long irqs;
+ int ret;
- if (files == NULL)
- return -ESRCH;
-
- if (!lock_task_sighand(proc->tsk, &irqs))
- return -EMFILE;
-
+ mutex_lock(&proc->files_lock);
+ if (proc->files == NULL) {
+ ret = -ESRCH;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!lock_task_sighand(proc->tsk, &irqs)) {
+ ret = -EMFILE;
+ goto err;
+ }
rlim_cur = task_rlimit(proc->tsk, RLIMIT_NOFILE);
unlock_task_sighand(proc->tsk, &irqs);
- return __alloc_fd(files, 0, rlim_cur, flags);
+ ret = __alloc_fd(proc->files, 0, rlim_cur, flags);
+err:
+ mutex_unlock(&proc->files_lock);
+ return ret;
}
/*
@@ -397,8 +404,10 @@ static int task_get_unused_fd_flags(stru
static void task_fd_install(
struct binder_proc *proc, unsigned int fd, struct file *file)
{
+ mutex_lock(&proc->files_lock);
if (proc->files)
__fd_install(proc->files, fd, file);
+ mutex_unlock(&proc->files_lock);
}
/*
@@ -408,9 +417,11 @@ static long task_close_fd(struct binder_
{
int retval;
- if (proc->files == NULL)
- return -ESRCH;
-
+ mutex_lock(&proc->files_lock);
+ if (proc->files == NULL) {
+ retval = -ESRCH;
+ goto err;
+ }
retval = __close_fd(proc->files, fd);
/* can't restart close syscall because file table entry was cleared */
if (unlikely(retval == -ERESTARTSYS ||
@@ -418,7 +429,8 @@ static long task_close_fd(struct binder_
retval == -ERESTARTNOHAND ||
retval == -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK))
retval = -EINTR;
-
+err:
+ mutex_unlock(&proc->files_lock);
return retval;
}
@@ -2946,7 +2958,9 @@ static int binder_mmap(struct file *filp
binder_insert_free_buffer(proc, buffer);
proc->free_async_space = proc->buffer_size / 2;
barrier();
+ mutex_lock(&proc->files_lock);
proc->files = get_files_struct(current);
+ mutex_unlock(&proc->files_lock);
proc->vma = vma;
proc->vma_vm_mm = vma->vm_mm;
@@ -2982,6 +2996,7 @@ static int binder_open(struct inode *nod
return -ENOMEM;
get_task_struct(current->group_leader);
proc->tsk = current->group_leader;
+ mutex_init(&proc->files_lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&proc->todo);
init_waitqueue_head(&proc->wait);
proc->default_priority = task_nice(current);
@@ -3220,9 +3235,11 @@ static void binder_deferred_func(struct
files = NULL;
if (defer & BINDER_DEFERRED_PUT_FILES) {
+ mutex_lock(&proc->files_lock);
files = proc->files;
if (files)
proc->files = NULL;
+ mutex_unlock(&proc->files_lock);
}
if (defer & BINDER_DEFERRED_FLUSH)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 026/101] svm: Add mutex_lock to protect apic_access_page_done on AMD systems
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (24 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 025/101] binder: fix proc->files use-after-free Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 027/101] drm/mediatek: fix OF sibling-node lookup Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (79 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Wei Wang, Amadeusz Juskowiak,
Julian Stecklina, Suravee Suthikulpanit, Joerg Roedel,
Paolo Bonzini
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wei Wang <wawei@amazon.de>
commit 30510387a5e45bfcf8190e03ec7aa15b295828e2 upstream.
There is a race condition when accessing kvm->arch.apic_access_page_done.
Due to it, x86_set_memory_region will fail when creating the second vcpu
for a svm guest.
Add a mutex_lock to serialize the accesses to apic_access_page_done.
This lock is also used by vmx for the same purpose.
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <wawei@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Amadeusz Juskowiak <ajusk@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Julian Stecklina <jsteckli@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 19 +++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -1333,20 +1333,23 @@ static u64 *avic_get_physical_id_entry(s
static int avic_init_access_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
- int ret;
+ int ret = 0;
+ mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
if (kvm->arch.apic_access_page_done)
- return 0;
+ goto out;
- ret = x86_set_memory_region(kvm,
- APIC_ACCESS_PAGE_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT,
- APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE,
- PAGE_SIZE);
+ ret = __x86_set_memory_region(kvm,
+ APIC_ACCESS_PAGE_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT,
+ APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE,
+ PAGE_SIZE);
if (ret)
- return ret;
+ goto out;
kvm->arch.apic_access_page_done = true;
- return 0;
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+ return ret;
}
static int avic_init_backing_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 027/101] drm/mediatek: fix OF sibling-node lookup
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (25 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 026/101] svm: Add mutex_lock to protect apic_access_page_done on AMD systems Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 028/101] Input: xpad - quirk all PDP Xbox One gamepads Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (78 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Junzhi Zhao, Philipp Zabel, CK Hu,
David Airlie, Johan Hovold, Rob Herring
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
commit ceff2f4dcd44abf35864d9a99f85ac619e89a01d upstream.
Use the new of_get_compatible_child() helper to lookup the sibling
instead of using of_find_compatible_node(), which searches the entire
tree from a given start node and thus can return an unrelated (i.e.
non-sibling) node.
This also addresses a potential use-after-free (e.g. after probe
deferral) as the tree-wide helper drops a reference to its first
argument (i.e. the parent device node).
While at it, also fix the related cec-node reference leak.
Fixes: 8f83f26891e1 ("drm/mediatek: Add HDMI support")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.8
Cc: Junzhi Zhao <junzhi.zhao@mediatek.com>
Cc: Philipp Zabel <p.zabel@pengutronix.de>
Cc: CK Hu <ck.hu@mediatek.com>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
[ johan: backport to 4.9 ]
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_hdmi.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_hdmi.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_hdmi.c
@@ -1446,8 +1446,7 @@ static int mtk_hdmi_dt_parse_pdata(struc
}
/* The CEC module handles HDMI hotplug detection */
- cec_np = of_find_compatible_node(np->parent, NULL,
- "mediatek,mt8173-cec");
+ cec_np = of_get_compatible_child(np->parent, "mediatek,mt8173-cec");
if (!cec_np) {
dev_err(dev, "Failed to find CEC node\n");
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1457,8 +1456,10 @@ static int mtk_hdmi_dt_parse_pdata(struc
if (!cec_pdev) {
dev_err(hdmi->dev, "Waiting for CEC device %s\n",
cec_np->full_name);
+ of_node_put(cec_np);
return -EPROBE_DEFER;
}
+ of_node_put(cec_np);
hdmi->cec_dev = &cec_pdev->dev;
/*
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 028/101] Input: xpad - quirk all PDP Xbox One gamepads
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (26 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 027/101] drm/mediatek: fix OF sibling-node lookup Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 029/101] Input: matrix_keypad - check for errors from of_get_named_gpio() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (77 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Cameron Gutman, Dmitry Torokhov
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cameron Gutman <aicommander@gmail.com>
commit a6754fae1e66e9a40fed406290d7ca3f2b4d227c upstream.
Since we continue to find tons of new variants [0,1,2,3,4,5,6] that
need the PDP quirk, let's just quirk all devices from PDP.
[0]: https://github.com/paroj/xpad/pull/104
[1]: https://github.com/paroj/xpad/pull/105
[2]: https://github.com/paroj/xpad/pull/108
[3]: https://github.com/paroj/xpad/pull/109
[4]: https://github.com/paroj/xpad/pull/112
[5]: https://github.com/paroj/xpad/pull/115
[6]: https://github.com/paroj/xpad/pull/116
Fixes: e5c9c6a885fa ("Input: xpad - add support for PDP Xbox One controllers")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Cameron Gutman <aicommander@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c | 16 ++++++----------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c
+++ b/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c
@@ -483,18 +483,18 @@ static const u8 xboxone_hori_init[] = {
};
/*
- * This packet is required for some of the PDP pads to start
+ * This packet is required for most (all?) of the PDP pads to start
* sending input reports. These pads include: (0x0e6f:0x02ab),
- * (0x0e6f:0x02a4).
+ * (0x0e6f:0x02a4), (0x0e6f:0x02a6).
*/
static const u8 xboxone_pdp_init1[] = {
0x0a, 0x20, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x01, 0x14
};
/*
- * This packet is required for some of the PDP pads to start
+ * This packet is required for most (all?) of the PDP pads to start
* sending input reports. These pads include: (0x0e6f:0x02ab),
- * (0x0e6f:0x02a4).
+ * (0x0e6f:0x02a4), (0x0e6f:0x02a6).
*/
static const u8 xboxone_pdp_init2[] = {
0x06, 0x20, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00
@@ -530,12 +530,8 @@ static const struct xboxone_init_packet
XBOXONE_INIT_PKT(0x0e6f, 0x0165, xboxone_hori_init),
XBOXONE_INIT_PKT(0x0f0d, 0x0067, xboxone_hori_init),
XBOXONE_INIT_PKT(0x0000, 0x0000, xboxone_fw2015_init),
- XBOXONE_INIT_PKT(0x0e6f, 0x02ab, xboxone_pdp_init1),
- XBOXONE_INIT_PKT(0x0e6f, 0x02ab, xboxone_pdp_init2),
- XBOXONE_INIT_PKT(0x0e6f, 0x02a4, xboxone_pdp_init1),
- XBOXONE_INIT_PKT(0x0e6f, 0x02a4, xboxone_pdp_init2),
- XBOXONE_INIT_PKT(0x0e6f, 0x02a6, xboxone_pdp_init1),
- XBOXONE_INIT_PKT(0x0e6f, 0x02a6, xboxone_pdp_init2),
+ XBOXONE_INIT_PKT(0x0e6f, 0x0000, xboxone_pdp_init1),
+ XBOXONE_INIT_PKT(0x0e6f, 0x0000, xboxone_pdp_init2),
XBOXONE_INIT_PKT(0x24c6, 0x541a, xboxone_rumblebegin_init),
XBOXONE_INIT_PKT(0x24c6, 0x542a, xboxone_rumblebegin_init),
XBOXONE_INIT_PKT(0x24c6, 0x543a, xboxone_rumblebegin_init),
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 029/101] Input: matrix_keypad - check for errors from of_get_named_gpio()
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (27 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 028/101] Input: xpad - quirk all PDP Xbox One gamepads Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 030/101] Input: elan_i2c - add ELAN0620 to the ACPI table Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (76 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Christian Hoff, Sebastian Reichel,
Dmitry Torokhov
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christian Hoff <christian_hoff@gmx.net>
commit d55bda1b3e7c5a87f10da54fdda866a9a9cef30b upstream.
"of_get_named_gpio()" returns a negative error value if it fails
and drivers should check for this. This missing check was now
added to the matrix_keypad driver.
In my case "of_get_named_gpio()" returned -EPROBE_DEFER because
the referenced GPIOs belong to an I/O expander, which was not yet
probed at the point in time when the matrix_keypad driver was
loading. Because the driver did not check for errors from the
"of_get_named_gpio()" routine, it was assuming that "-EPROBE_DEFER"
is actually a GPIO number and continued as usual, which led to further
errors like this later on:
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 167 at drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c:114
gpio_to_desc+0xc8/0xd0
invalid GPIO -517
Note that the "GPIO number" -517 in the error message above is
actually "-EPROBE_DEFER".
As part of the patch a misleading error message "no platform data defined"
was also removed. This does not lead to information loss because the other
error paths in matrix_keypad_parse_dt() already print an error.
Signed-off-by: Christian Hoff <christian_hoff@gmx.net>
Suggested-by: Sebastian Reichel <sre@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sebastian Reichel <sre@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/input/keyboard/matrix_keypad.c | 23 ++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/input/keyboard/matrix_keypad.c
+++ b/drivers/input/keyboard/matrix_keypad.c
@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ matrix_keypad_parse_dt(struct device *de
struct matrix_keypad_platform_data *pdata;
struct device_node *np = dev->of_node;
unsigned int *gpios;
- int i, nrow, ncol;
+ int ret, i, nrow, ncol;
if (!np) {
dev_err(dev, "device lacks DT data\n");
@@ -447,12 +447,19 @@ matrix_keypad_parse_dt(struct device *de
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
- for (i = 0; i < pdata->num_row_gpios; i++)
- gpios[i] = of_get_named_gpio(np, "row-gpios", i);
+ for (i = 0; i < nrow; i++) {
+ ret = of_get_named_gpio(np, "row-gpios", i);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+ gpios[i] = ret;
+ }
- for (i = 0; i < pdata->num_col_gpios; i++)
- gpios[pdata->num_row_gpios + i] =
- of_get_named_gpio(np, "col-gpios", i);
+ for (i = 0; i < ncol; i++) {
+ ret = of_get_named_gpio(np, "col-gpios", i);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+ gpios[nrow + i] = ret;
+ }
pdata->row_gpios = gpios;
pdata->col_gpios = &gpios[pdata->num_row_gpios];
@@ -479,10 +486,8 @@ static int matrix_keypad_probe(struct pl
pdata = dev_get_platdata(&pdev->dev);
if (!pdata) {
pdata = matrix_keypad_parse_dt(&pdev->dev);
- if (IS_ERR(pdata)) {
- dev_err(&pdev->dev, "no platform data defined\n");
+ if (IS_ERR(pdata))
return PTR_ERR(pdata);
- }
} else if (!pdata->keymap_data) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "no keymap data defined\n");
return -EINVAL;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 030/101] Input: elan_i2c - add ELAN0620 to the ACPI table
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (28 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 029/101] Input: matrix_keypad - check for errors from of_get_named_gpio() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 031/101] Input: elan_i2c - add ACPI ID for Lenovo IdeaPad 330-15ARR Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (75 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Patrick Gaskin, Dmitry Torokhov
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Patrick Gaskin <patrick@pgaskin.net>
commit 3ed64da3b790be7c63601e8ca6341b7dff74a660 upstream.
Add ELAN0620 to the ACPI table to support the elan touchpad in
the Lenovo IdeaPad 130-15IKB.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Gaskin <patrick@pgaskin.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/input/mouse/elan_i2c_core.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/input/mouse/elan_i2c_core.c
+++ b/drivers/input/mouse/elan_i2c_core.c
@@ -1253,6 +1253,7 @@ static const struct acpi_device_id elan_
{ "ELAN0618", 0 },
{ "ELAN061C", 0 },
{ "ELAN061D", 0 },
+ { "ELAN0620", 0 },
{ "ELAN0622", 0 },
{ "ELAN1000", 0 },
{ }
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 031/101] Input: elan_i2c - add ACPI ID for Lenovo IdeaPad 330-15ARR
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (29 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 030/101] Input: elan_i2c - add ELAN0620 to the ACPI table Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 032/101] Input: elan_i2c - add support for ELAN0621 touchpad Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (74 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Noah Westervelt, Dmitry Torokhov
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Noah Westervelt <nwestervelt@outlook.com>
commit ad33429cd02565c28404bb16ae7a4c2bdfda6626 upstream.
Add ELAN061E to the ACPI table to support Elan touchpad found in Lenovo
IdeaPad 330-15ARR.
Signed-off-by: Noah Westervelt <nwestervelt@outlook.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/input/mouse/elan_i2c_core.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/input/mouse/elan_i2c_core.c
+++ b/drivers/input/mouse/elan_i2c_core.c
@@ -1253,6 +1253,7 @@ static const struct acpi_device_id elan_
{ "ELAN0618", 0 },
{ "ELAN061C", 0 },
{ "ELAN061D", 0 },
+ { "ELAN061E", 0 },
{ "ELAN0620", 0 },
{ "ELAN0622", 0 },
{ "ELAN1000", 0 },
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 032/101] Input: elan_i2c - add support for ELAN0621 touchpad
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (30 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 031/101] Input: elan_i2c - add ACPI ID for Lenovo IdeaPad 330-15ARR Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 033/101] btrfs: Always try all copies when reading extent buffers Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (73 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Adam Wong, Dmitry Torokhov
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Adam Wong <adam@adamwong.me>
commit bf87ade0dd7f8cf19dac4d3161d5e86abe0c062b upstream.
Added the ability to detect the ELAN0621 touchpad found in some Lenovo
laptops.
Signed-off-by: Adam Wong <adam@adamwong.me>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/input/mouse/elan_i2c_core.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/input/mouse/elan_i2c_core.c
+++ b/drivers/input/mouse/elan_i2c_core.c
@@ -1255,6 +1255,7 @@ static const struct acpi_device_id elan_
{ "ELAN061D", 0 },
{ "ELAN061E", 0 },
{ "ELAN0620", 0 },
+ { "ELAN0621", 0 },
{ "ELAN0622", 0 },
{ "ELAN1000", 0 },
{ }
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 033/101] btrfs: Always try all copies when reading extent buffers
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (31 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 032/101] Input: elan_i2c - add support for ELAN0621 touchpad Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 034/101] Btrfs: fix use-after-free when dumping free space Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (72 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Qu Wenruo, Nikolay Borisov, David Sterba
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
commit f8397d69daef06d358430d3054662fb597e37c00 upstream.
When a metadata read is served the endio routine btree_readpage_end_io_hook
is called which eventually runs the tree-checker. If tree-checker fails
to validate the read eb then it sets EXTENT_BUFFER_CORRUPT flag. This
leads to btree_read_extent_buffer_pages wrongly assuming that all
available copies of this extent buffer are wrong and failing prematurely.
Fix this modify btree_read_extent_buffer_pages to read all copies of
the data.
This failure was exhibitted in xfstests btrfs/124 which would
spuriously fail its balance operations. The reason was that when balance
was run following re-introduction of the missing raid1 disk
__btrfs_map_block would map the read request to stripe 0, which
corresponded to devid 2 (the disk which is being removed in the test):
item 2 key (FIRST_CHUNK_TREE CHUNK_ITEM 3553624064) itemoff 15975 itemsize 112
length 1073741824 owner 2 stripe_len 65536 type DATA|RAID1
io_align 65536 io_width 65536 sector_size 4096
num_stripes 2 sub_stripes 1
stripe 0 devid 2 offset 2156920832
dev_uuid 8466c350-ed0c-4c3b-b17d-6379b445d5c8
stripe 1 devid 1 offset 3553624064
dev_uuid 1265d8db-5596-477e-af03-df08eb38d2ca
This caused read requests for a checksum item that to be routed to the
stale disk which triggered the aforementioned logic involving
EXTENT_BUFFER_CORRUPT flag. This then triggered cascading failures of
the balance operation.
Fixes: a826d6dcb32d ("Btrfs: check items for correctness as we search")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Suggested-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 10 +---------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
@@ -452,9 +452,9 @@ static int btree_read_extent_buffer_page
int mirror_num = 0;
int failed_mirror = 0;
- clear_bit(EXTENT_BUFFER_CORRUPT, &eb->bflags);
io_tree = &BTRFS_I(root->fs_info->btree_inode)->io_tree;
while (1) {
+ clear_bit(EXTENT_BUFFER_CORRUPT, &eb->bflags);
ret = read_extent_buffer_pages(io_tree, eb, WAIT_COMPLETE,
btree_get_extent, mirror_num);
if (!ret) {
@@ -465,14 +465,6 @@ static int btree_read_extent_buffer_page
ret = -EIO;
}
- /*
- * This buffer's crc is fine, but its contents are corrupted, so
- * there is no reason to read the other copies, they won't be
- * any less wrong.
- */
- if (test_bit(EXTENT_BUFFER_CORRUPT, &eb->bflags))
- break;
-
num_copies = btrfs_num_copies(root->fs_info,
eb->start, eb->len);
if (num_copies == 1)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 034/101] Btrfs: fix use-after-free when dumping free space
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (32 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 033/101] btrfs: Always try all copies when reading extent buffers Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 035/101] ARC: change defconfig defaults to ARCv2 Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (71 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Nikolay Borisov, Josef Bacik,
Filipe Manana, David Sterba
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
commit 9084cb6a24bf5838a665af92ded1af8363f9e563 upstream.
We were iterating a block group's free space cache rbtree without locking
first the lock that protects it (the free_space_ctl->free_space_offset
rbtree is protected by the free_space_ctl->tree_lock spinlock).
KASAN reported an use-after-free problem when iterating such a rbtree due
to a concurrent rbtree delete:
[ 9520.359168] ==================================================================
[ 9520.359656] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rb_next+0x13/0x90
[ 9520.359949] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8800b7ada500 by task btrfs-transacti/1721
[ 9520.360357]
[ 9520.360530] CPU: 4 PID: 1721 Comm: btrfs-transacti Tainted: G L 4.19.0-rc8-nbor #555
[ 9520.360990] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 9520.362682] Call Trace:
[ 9520.362887] dump_stack+0xa4/0xf5
[ 9520.363146] print_address_description+0x78/0x280
[ 9520.363412] kasan_report+0x263/0x390
[ 9520.363650] ? rb_next+0x13/0x90
[ 9520.363873] __asan_load8+0x54/0x90
[ 9520.364102] rb_next+0x13/0x90
[ 9520.364380] btrfs_dump_free_space+0x146/0x160 [btrfs]
[ 9520.364697] dump_space_info+0x2cd/0x310 [btrfs]
[ 9520.364997] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x1ee/0x1f0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.365310] __btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x1cc/0x620 [btrfs]
[ 9520.365646] ? btrfs_update_time+0x180/0x180 [btrfs]
[ 9520.365923] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40
[ 9520.366204] ? btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x2c0/0x5c0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.366549] btrfs_prealloc_file_range_trans+0x23/0x30 [btrfs]
[ 9520.366880] cache_save_setup+0x42e/0x580 [btrfs]
[ 9520.367220] ? btrfs_check_data_free_space+0xd0/0xd0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.367518] ? lock_downgrade+0x2f0/0x2f0
[ 9520.367799] ? btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups+0x11f/0x6e0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.368104] ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ 9520.368349] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa8/0x140
[ 9520.368638] btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups+0x2af/0x6e0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.368978] ? btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x870/0x870 [btrfs]
[ 9520.369282] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa8/0x140
[ 9520.369534] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40
[ 9520.369811] ? btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x1b8/0x230 [btrfs]
[ 9520.370137] commit_cowonly_roots+0x4b9/0x610 [btrfs]
[ 9520.370560] ? commit_fs_roots+0x350/0x350 [btrfs]
[ 9520.370926] ? btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x1b8/0x230 [btrfs]
[ 9520.371285] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x5e5/0x10e0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.371612] ? btrfs_apply_pending_changes+0x90/0x90 [btrfs]
[ 9520.371943] ? start_transaction+0x168/0x6c0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.372257] transaction_kthread+0x21c/0x240 [btrfs]
[ 9520.372537] kthread+0x1d2/0x1f0
[ 9520.372793] ? btrfs_cleanup_transaction+0xb50/0xb50 [btrfs]
[ 9520.373090] ? kthread_park+0xb0/0xb0
[ 9520.373329] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[ 9520.373567]
[ 9520.373738] Allocated by task 1804:
[ 9520.373974] kasan_kmalloc+0xff/0x180
[ 9520.374208] kasan_slab_alloc+0x11/0x20
[ 9520.374447] kmem_cache_alloc+0xfc/0x2d0
[ 9520.374731] __btrfs_add_free_space+0x40/0x580 [btrfs]
[ 9520.375044] unpin_extent_range+0x4f7/0x7a0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.375383] btrfs_finish_extent_commit+0x15f/0x4d0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.375707] btrfs_commit_transaction+0xb06/0x10e0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.376027] btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x237/0x5c0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.376365] btrfs_check_data_free_space+0x81/0xd0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.376689] btrfs_delalloc_reserve_space+0x25/0x80 [btrfs]
[ 9520.377018] btrfs_direct_IO+0x42e/0x6d0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.377284] generic_file_direct_write+0x11e/0x220
[ 9520.377587] btrfs_file_write_iter+0x472/0xac0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.377875] aio_write+0x25c/0x360
[ 9520.378106] io_submit_one+0xaa0/0xdc0
[ 9520.378343] __se_sys_io_submit+0xfa/0x2f0
[ 9520.378589] __x64_sys_io_submit+0x43/0x50
[ 9520.378840] do_syscall_64+0x7d/0x240
[ 9520.379081] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 9520.379387]
[ 9520.379557] Freed by task 1802:
[ 9520.379782] __kasan_slab_free+0x173/0x260
[ 9520.380028] kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10
[ 9520.380262] kmem_cache_free+0xc1/0x2c0
[ 9520.380544] btrfs_find_space_for_alloc+0x4cd/0x4e0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.380866] find_free_extent+0xa99/0x17e0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.381166] btrfs_reserve_extent+0xd5/0x1f0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.381474] btrfs_get_blocks_direct+0x60b/0xbd0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.381761] __blockdev_direct_IO+0x10ee/0x58a1
[ 9520.382059] btrfs_direct_IO+0x25a/0x6d0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.382321] generic_file_direct_write+0x11e/0x220
[ 9520.382623] btrfs_file_write_iter+0x472/0xac0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.382904] aio_write+0x25c/0x360
[ 9520.383172] io_submit_one+0xaa0/0xdc0
[ 9520.383416] __se_sys_io_submit+0xfa/0x2f0
[ 9520.383678] __x64_sys_io_submit+0x43/0x50
[ 9520.383927] do_syscall_64+0x7d/0x240
[ 9520.384165] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 9520.384439]
[ 9520.384610] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8800b7ada500
which belongs to the cache btrfs_free_space of size 72
[ 9520.385175] The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
72-byte region [ffff8800b7ada500, ffff8800b7ada548)
[ 9520.385691] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 9520.385957] page:ffffea0002deb680 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff880108a1d700 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 9520.388030] flags: 0x8100(slab|head)
[ 9520.388281] raw: 0000000000008100 ffffea0002deb608 ffffea0002728808 ffff880108a1d700
[ 9520.388722] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000130013 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 9520.389169] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 9520.389473]
[ 9520.389658] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 9520.389943] ffff8800b7ada400: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 9520.390368] ffff8800b7ada480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 9520.390796] >ffff8800b7ada500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 9520.391223] ^
[ 9520.391461] ffff8800b7ada580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 9520.391885] ffff8800b7ada600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 9520.392313] ==================================================================
[ 9520.392772] BTRFS critical (device vdc): entry offset 2258497536, bytes 131072, bitmap no
[ 9520.393247] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000011
[ 9520.393705] PGD 800000010dbab067 P4D 800000010dbab067 PUD 107551067 PMD 0
[ 9520.394059] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI
[ 9520.394378] CPU: 4 PID: 1721 Comm: btrfs-transacti Tainted: G B L 4.19.0-rc8-nbor #555
[ 9520.394858] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 9520.395350] RIP: 0010:rb_next+0x3c/0x90
[ 9520.396461] RSP: 0018:ffff8801074ff780 EFLAGS: 00010292
[ 9520.396762] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffffff81b5ac4c
[ 9520.397115] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0000000000000011
[ 9520.397468] RBP: ffff8801074ff7a0 R08: ffffed0021d64ccc R09: ffffed0021d64ccc
[ 9520.397821] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0021d64ccb R12: ffff8800b91e0000
[ 9520.398188] R13: ffff8800a3ceba48 R14: ffff8800b627bf80 R15: 0000000000020000
[ 9520.398555] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88010eb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 9520.399007] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 9520.399335] CR2: 0000000000000011 CR3: 0000000106b52000 CR4: 00000000000006a0
[ 9520.399679] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 9520.400023] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 9520.400400] Call Trace:
[ 9520.400648] btrfs_dump_free_space+0x146/0x160 [btrfs]
[ 9520.400974] dump_space_info+0x2cd/0x310 [btrfs]
[ 9520.401287] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x1ee/0x1f0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.401609] __btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x1cc/0x620 [btrfs]
[ 9520.401952] ? btrfs_update_time+0x180/0x180 [btrfs]
[ 9520.402232] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40
[ 9520.402522] ? btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x2c0/0x5c0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.402882] btrfs_prealloc_file_range_trans+0x23/0x30 [btrfs]
[ 9520.403261] cache_save_setup+0x42e/0x580 [btrfs]
[ 9520.403570] ? btrfs_check_data_free_space+0xd0/0xd0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.403871] ? lock_downgrade+0x2f0/0x2f0
[ 9520.404161] ? btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups+0x11f/0x6e0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.404481] ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ 9520.404732] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa8/0x140
[ 9520.405026] btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups+0x2af/0x6e0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.405375] ? btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x870/0x870 [btrfs]
[ 9520.405694] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa8/0x140
[ 9520.405958] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40
[ 9520.406243] ? btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x1b8/0x230 [btrfs]
[ 9520.406574] commit_cowonly_roots+0x4b9/0x610 [btrfs]
[ 9520.406899] ? commit_fs_roots+0x350/0x350 [btrfs]
[ 9520.407253] ? btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x1b8/0x230 [btrfs]
[ 9520.407589] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x5e5/0x10e0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.407925] ? btrfs_apply_pending_changes+0x90/0x90 [btrfs]
[ 9520.408262] ? start_transaction+0x168/0x6c0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.408582] transaction_kthread+0x21c/0x240 [btrfs]
[ 9520.408870] kthread+0x1d2/0x1f0
[ 9520.409138] ? btrfs_cleanup_transaction+0xb50/0xb50 [btrfs]
[ 9520.409440] ? kthread_park+0xb0/0xb0
[ 9520.409682] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[ 9520.410508] Dumping ftrace buffer:
[ 9520.410764] (ftrace buffer empty)
[ 9520.411007] CR2: 0000000000000011
[ 9520.411297] ---[ end trace 01a0863445cf360a ]---
[ 9520.411568] RIP: 0010:rb_next+0x3c/0x90
[ 9520.412644] RSP: 0018:ffff8801074ff780 EFLAGS: 00010292
[ 9520.412932] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffffff81b5ac4c
[ 9520.413274] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0000000000000011
[ 9520.413616] RBP: ffff8801074ff7a0 R08: ffffed0021d64ccc R09: ffffed0021d64ccc
[ 9520.414007] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0021d64ccb R12: ffff8800b91e0000
[ 9520.414349] R13: ffff8800a3ceba48 R14: ffff8800b627bf80 R15: 0000000000020000
[ 9520.416074] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88010eb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 9520.416536] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 9520.416848] CR2: 0000000000000011 CR3: 0000000106b52000 CR4: 00000000000006a0
[ 9520.418477] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 9520.418846] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 9520.419204] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 9520.419666] Dumping ftrace buffer:
[ 9520.419930] (ftrace buffer empty)
[ 9520.420168] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 9520.420406] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]---
Fix this by acquiring the respective lock before iterating the rbtree.
Reported-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Cc: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c
@@ -2464,6 +2464,7 @@ void btrfs_dump_free_space(struct btrfs_
struct rb_node *n;
int count = 0;
+ spin_lock(&ctl->tree_lock);
for (n = rb_first(&ctl->free_space_offset); n; n = rb_next(n)) {
info = rb_entry(n, struct btrfs_free_space, offset_index);
if (info->bytes >= bytes && !block_group->ro)
@@ -2473,6 +2474,7 @@ void btrfs_dump_free_space(struct btrfs_
info->offset, info->bytes,
(info->bitmap) ? "yes" : "no");
}
+ spin_unlock(&ctl->tree_lock);
btrfs_info(block_group->fs_info, "block group has cluster?: %s",
list_empty(&block_group->cluster_list) ? "no" : "yes");
btrfs_info(block_group->fs_info,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 035/101] ARC: change defconfig defaults to ARCv2
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (33 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 034/101] Btrfs: fix use-after-free when dumping free space Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 036/101] arc: [devboards] Add support of NFSv3 ACL Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (70 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Kevin Hilman, Alexey Brodkin, Vineet Gupta
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kevin Hilman <khilman@baylibre.com>
commit b7cc40c32a8bfa6f2581a71747f6a7d491fe43ba upstream.
Change the default defconfig (used with 'make defconfig') to the ARCv2
nsim_hs_defconfig, and also switch the default Kconfig ISA selection to
ARCv2.
This allows several default defconfigs (e.g. make defconfig, make
allnoconfig, make tinyconfig) to all work with ARCv2 by default.
Note since we change default architecture from ARCompact to ARCv2
it's required to explicitly mention architecture type in ARCompact
defconfigs otherwise ARCv2 will be implied and binaries will be
generated for ARCv2.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.4.x
Signed-off-by: Kevin Hilman <khilman@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Brodkin <abrodkin@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/arc/Kconfig | 2 +-
arch/arc/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/arc/configs/axs101_defconfig | 1 +
arch/arc/configs/nps_defconfig | 1 +
arch/arc/configs/nsim_700_defconfig | 1 +
arch/arc/configs/nsimosci_defconfig | 1 +
arch/arc/configs/tb10x_defconfig | 1 +
7 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arc/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arc/Kconfig
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ endmenu
choice
prompt "ARC Instruction Set"
- default ISA_ARCOMPACT
+ default ISA_ARCV2
config ISA_ARCOMPACT
bool "ARCompact ISA"
--- a/arch/arc/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arc/Makefile
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
UTS_MACHINE := arc
-KBUILD_DEFCONFIG := nsim_700_defconfig
+KBUILD_DEFCONFIG := nsim_hs_defconfig
cflags-y += -fno-common -pipe -fno-builtin -mmedium-calls -D__linux__
cflags-$(CONFIG_ISA_ARCOMPACT) += -mA7
--- a/arch/arc/configs/axs101_defconfig
+++ b/arch/arc/configs/axs101_defconfig
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS=y
# CONFIG_VM_EVENT_COUNTERS is not set
# CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG is not set
# CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK is not set
+CONFIG_ISA_ARCOMPACT=y
CONFIG_MODULES=y
CONFIG_MODULE_FORCE_LOAD=y
CONFIG_MODULE_UNLOAD=y
--- a/arch/arc/configs/nps_defconfig
+++ b/arch/arc/configs/nps_defconfig
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ CONFIG_SYSCTL_SYSCALL=y
CONFIG_EMBEDDED=y
CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS=y
# CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK is not set
+CONFIG_ISA_ARCOMPACT=y
CONFIG_KPROBES=y
CONFIG_MODULES=y
CONFIG_MODULE_FORCE_LOAD=y
--- a/arch/arc/configs/nsim_700_defconfig
+++ b/arch/arc/configs/nsim_700_defconfig
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ CONFIG_EMBEDDED=y
CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS=y
# CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG is not set
# CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK is not set
+CONFIG_ISA_ARCOMPACT=y
CONFIG_KPROBES=y
CONFIG_MODULES=y
# CONFIG_LBDAF is not set
--- a/arch/arc/configs/nsimosci_defconfig
+++ b/arch/arc/configs/nsimosci_defconfig
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ CONFIG_EMBEDDED=y
CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS=y
# CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG is not set
# CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK is not set
+CONFIG_ISA_ARCOMPACT=y
CONFIG_KPROBES=y
CONFIG_MODULES=y
# CONFIG_LBDAF is not set
--- a/arch/arc/configs/tb10x_defconfig
+++ b/arch/arc/configs/tb10x_defconfig
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ CONFIG_KALLSYMS_ALL=y
# CONFIG_AIO is not set
CONFIG_EMBEDDED=y
# CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK is not set
+CONFIG_ISA_ARCOMPACT=y
CONFIG_SLAB=y
CONFIG_MODULES=y
CONFIG_MODULE_FORCE_LOAD=y
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 036/101] arc: [devboards] Add support of NFSv3 ACL
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (34 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 035/101] ARC: change defconfig defaults to ARCv2 Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 037/101] udf: Allow mounting volumes with incorrect identification strings Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (69 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Alexey Brodkin, Cupertino Miranda,
Vineet Gupta
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alexey Brodkin <abrodkin@synopsys.com>
commit 6b04114f6fae5e84d33404c2970b1949c032546e upstream.
By default NFSv3 doesn't support ACL (Access Control Lists)
which might be quite convenient to have so that
mounted NFS behaves exactly as any other local file-system.
In particular missing support of ACL makes umask useless.
This among other thigs fixes Glibc's "nptl/tst-umask1".
Signed-off-by: Alexey Brodkin <abrodkin@synopsys.com>
Cc: Cupertino Miranda <cmiranda@synopsys.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org #4.14+
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/arc/configs/axs101_defconfig | 1 +
arch/arc/configs/axs103_defconfig | 1 +
arch/arc/configs/axs103_smp_defconfig | 1 +
arch/arc/configs/nps_defconfig | 1 +
arch/arc/configs/nsimosci_defconfig | 1 +
arch/arc/configs/nsimosci_hs_defconfig | 1 +
arch/arc/configs/nsimosci_hs_smp_defconfig | 1 +
arch/arc/configs/vdk_hs38_defconfig | 1 +
arch/arc/configs/vdk_hs38_smp_defconfig | 1 +
9 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/arc/configs/axs101_defconfig
+++ b/arch/arc/configs/axs101_defconfig
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ CONFIG_VFAT_FS=y
CONFIG_NTFS_FS=y
CONFIG_TMPFS=y
CONFIG_NFS_FS=y
+CONFIG_NFS_V3_ACL=y
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_437=y
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=y
# CONFIG_ENABLE_WARN_DEPRECATED is not set
--- a/arch/arc/configs/axs103_defconfig
+++ b/arch/arc/configs/axs103_defconfig
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ CONFIG_VFAT_FS=y
CONFIG_NTFS_FS=y
CONFIG_TMPFS=y
CONFIG_NFS_FS=y
+CONFIG_NFS_V3_ACL=y
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_437=y
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=y
# CONFIG_ENABLE_WARN_DEPRECATED is not set
--- a/arch/arc/configs/axs103_smp_defconfig
+++ b/arch/arc/configs/axs103_smp_defconfig
@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ CONFIG_VFAT_FS=y
CONFIG_NTFS_FS=y
CONFIG_TMPFS=y
CONFIG_NFS_FS=y
+CONFIG_NFS_V3_ACL=y
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_437=y
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=y
# CONFIG_ENABLE_WARN_DEPRECATED is not set
--- a/arch/arc/configs/nps_defconfig
+++ b/arch/arc/configs/nps_defconfig
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ CONFIG_PROC_KCORE=y
CONFIG_TMPFS=y
# CONFIG_MISC_FILESYSTEMS is not set
CONFIG_NFS_FS=y
+CONFIG_NFS_V3_ACL=y
CONFIG_ROOT_NFS=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO=y
# CONFIG_ENABLE_WARN_DEPRECATED is not set
--- a/arch/arc/configs/nsimosci_defconfig
+++ b/arch/arc/configs/nsimosci_defconfig
@@ -71,5 +71,6 @@ CONFIG_EXT2_FS_XATTR=y
CONFIG_TMPFS=y
# CONFIG_MISC_FILESYSTEMS is not set
CONFIG_NFS_FS=y
+CONFIG_NFS_V3_ACL=y
# CONFIG_ENABLE_WARN_DEPRECATED is not set
# CONFIG_ENABLE_MUST_CHECK is not set
--- a/arch/arc/configs/nsimosci_hs_defconfig
+++ b/arch/arc/configs/nsimosci_hs_defconfig
@@ -69,5 +69,6 @@ CONFIG_EXT2_FS_XATTR=y
CONFIG_TMPFS=y
# CONFIG_MISC_FILESYSTEMS is not set
CONFIG_NFS_FS=y
+CONFIG_NFS_V3_ACL=y
# CONFIG_ENABLE_WARN_DEPRECATED is not set
# CONFIG_ENABLE_MUST_CHECK is not set
--- a/arch/arc/configs/nsimosci_hs_smp_defconfig
+++ b/arch/arc/configs/nsimosci_hs_smp_defconfig
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ CONFIG_EXT2_FS_XATTR=y
CONFIG_TMPFS=y
# CONFIG_MISC_FILESYSTEMS is not set
CONFIG_NFS_FS=y
+CONFIG_NFS_V3_ACL=y
# CONFIG_ENABLE_WARN_DEPRECATED is not set
# CONFIG_ENABLE_MUST_CHECK is not set
CONFIG_FTRACE=y
--- a/arch/arc/configs/vdk_hs38_defconfig
+++ b/arch/arc/configs/vdk_hs38_defconfig
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ CONFIG_NTFS_FS=y
CONFIG_TMPFS=y
CONFIG_JFFS2_FS=y
CONFIG_NFS_FS=y
+CONFIG_NFS_V3_ACL=y
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_437=y
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=y
# CONFIG_ENABLE_WARN_DEPRECATED is not set
--- a/arch/arc/configs/vdk_hs38_smp_defconfig
+++ b/arch/arc/configs/vdk_hs38_smp_defconfig
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ CONFIG_NTFS_FS=y
CONFIG_TMPFS=y
CONFIG_JFFS2_FS=y
CONFIG_NFS_FS=y
+CONFIG_NFS_V3_ACL=y
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_437=y
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=y
# CONFIG_ENABLE_WARN_DEPRECATED is not set
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 037/101] udf: Allow mounting volumes with incorrect identification strings
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (35 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 036/101] arc: [devboards] Add support of NFSv3 ACL Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 038/101] reset: make optional functions really optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (68 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jan Kara, Sudip Mukherjee
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
commit b54e41f5efcb4316b2f30b30c2535cc194270373 upstream.
Commit c26f6c615788 ("udf: Fix conversion of 'dstring' fields to UTF8")
started to be more strict when checking whether converted strings are
properly formatted. Sudip reports that there are DVDs where the volume
identification string is actually too long - UDF reports:
[ 632.309320] UDF-fs: incorrect dstring lengths (32/32)
during mount and fails the mount. This is mostly harmless failure as we
don't need volume identification (and even less volume set
identification) for anything. So just truncate the volume identification
string if it is too long and replace it with 'Invalid' if we just cannot
convert it for other reasons. This keeps slightly incorrect media still
mountable.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c26f6c615788 ("udf: Fix conversion of 'dstring' fields to UTF8")
Reported-and-tested-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/udf/super.c | 16 ++++++++++------
fs/udf/unicode.c | 14 +++++++++++---
2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/udf/super.c
+++ b/fs/udf/super.c
@@ -929,16 +929,20 @@ static int udf_load_pvoldesc(struct supe
}
ret = udf_dstrCS0toUTF8(outstr, 31, pvoldesc->volIdent, 32);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto out_bh;
-
- strncpy(UDF_SB(sb)->s_volume_ident, outstr, ret);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ strcpy(UDF_SB(sb)->s_volume_ident, "InvalidName");
+ pr_warn("incorrect volume identification, setting to "
+ "'InvalidName'\n");
+ } else {
+ strncpy(UDF_SB(sb)->s_volume_ident, outstr, ret);
+ }
udf_debug("volIdent[] = '%s'\n", UDF_SB(sb)->s_volume_ident);
ret = udf_dstrCS0toUTF8(outstr, 127, pvoldesc->volSetIdent, 128);
- if (ret < 0)
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ ret = 0;
goto out_bh;
-
+ }
outstr[ret] = 0;
udf_debug("volSetIdent[] = '%s'\n", outstr);
--- a/fs/udf/unicode.c
+++ b/fs/udf/unicode.c
@@ -341,6 +341,11 @@ try_again:
return u_len;
}
+/*
+ * Convert CS0 dstring to output charset. Warning: This function may truncate
+ * input string if it is too long as it is used for informational strings only
+ * and it is better to truncate the string than to refuse mounting a media.
+ */
int udf_dstrCS0toUTF8(uint8_t *utf_o, int o_len,
const uint8_t *ocu_i, int i_len)
{
@@ -349,9 +354,12 @@ int udf_dstrCS0toUTF8(uint8_t *utf_o, in
if (i_len > 0) {
s_len = ocu_i[i_len - 1];
if (s_len >= i_len) {
- pr_err("incorrect dstring lengths (%d/%d)\n",
- s_len, i_len);
- return -EINVAL;
+ pr_warn("incorrect dstring lengths (%d/%d),"
+ " truncating\n", s_len, i_len);
+ s_len = i_len - 1;
+ /* 2-byte encoding? Need to round properly... */
+ if (ocu_i[0] == 16)
+ s_len -= (s_len - 1) & 2;
}
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 038/101] reset: make optional functions really optional
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (36 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 037/101] udf: Allow mounting volumes with incorrect identification strings Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 039/101] reset: core: fix reset_control_put Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (67 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Ramiro Oliveira, Philipp Zabel, Dinh Nguyen
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ramiro Oliveira <Ramiro.Oliveira@synopsys.com>
commit bb475230b8e59a547ab66ac3b02572df21a580e9 upstream.
The *_get_optional_* functions weren't really optional so this patch
makes them really optional.
These *_get_optional_* functions will now return NULL instead of an error
if no matching reset phandle is found in the DT, and all the
reset_control_* functions now accept NULL rstc pointers.
Signed-off-by: Ramiro Oliveira <Ramiro.Oliveira@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Philipp Zabel <p.zabel@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/reset/core.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
include/linux/reset.h | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
2 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/reset/core.c
+++ b/drivers/reset/core.c
@@ -135,11 +135,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(devm_reset_controller_
* @rstc: reset controller
*
* Calling this on a shared reset controller is an error.
+ *
+ * If rstc is NULL it is an optional reset and the function will just
+ * return 0.
*/
int reset_control_reset(struct reset_control *rstc)
{
- if (WARN_ON(IS_ERR_OR_NULL(rstc)) ||
- WARN_ON(rstc->shared))
+ if (!rstc)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (WARN_ON(IS_ERR(rstc)))
return -EINVAL;
if (rstc->rcdev->ops->reset)
@@ -159,10 +164,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(reset_control_reset);
*
* For shared reset controls a driver cannot expect the hw's registers and
* internal state to be reset, but must be prepared for this to happen.
+ *
+ * If rstc is NULL it is an optional reset and the function will just
+ * return 0.
*/
int reset_control_assert(struct reset_control *rstc)
{
- if (WARN_ON(IS_ERR_OR_NULL(rstc)))
+ if (!rstc)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (WARN_ON(IS_ERR(rstc)))
return -EINVAL;
if (!rstc->rcdev->ops->assert)
@@ -185,10 +196,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(reset_control_assert);
* @rstc: reset controller
*
* After calling this function, the reset is guaranteed to be deasserted.
+ *
+ * If rstc is NULL it is an optional reset and the function will just
+ * return 0.
*/
int reset_control_deassert(struct reset_control *rstc)
{
- if (WARN_ON(IS_ERR_OR_NULL(rstc)))
+ if (!rstc)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (WARN_ON(IS_ERR(rstc)))
return -EINVAL;
if (!rstc->rcdev->ops->deassert)
@@ -206,12 +223,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(reset_control_deassert
/**
* reset_control_status - returns a negative errno if not supported, a
* positive value if the reset line is asserted, or zero if the reset
- * line is not asserted.
+ * line is not asserted or if the desc is NULL (optional reset).
* @rstc: reset controller
*/
int reset_control_status(struct reset_control *rstc)
{
- if (WARN_ON(IS_ERR_OR_NULL(rstc)))
+ if (!rstc)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (WARN_ON(IS_ERR(rstc)))
return -EINVAL;
if (rstc->rcdev->ops->status)
@@ -268,7 +288,8 @@ static void __reset_control_put(struct r
}
struct reset_control *__of_reset_control_get(struct device_node *node,
- const char *id, int index, int shared)
+ const char *id, int index, bool shared,
+ bool optional)
{
struct reset_control *rstc;
struct reset_controller_dev *r, *rcdev;
@@ -282,14 +303,18 @@ struct reset_control *__of_reset_control
if (id) {
index = of_property_match_string(node,
"reset-names", id);
+ if (index == -EILSEQ)
+ return ERR_PTR(index);
if (index < 0)
- return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
+ return optional ? NULL : ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
}
ret = of_parse_phandle_with_args(node, "resets", "#reset-cells",
index, &args);
- if (ret)
+ if (ret == -EINVAL)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
+ if (ret)
+ return optional ? NULL : ERR_PTR(ret);
mutex_lock(&reset_list_mutex);
rcdev = NULL;
@@ -348,7 +373,8 @@ static void devm_reset_control_release(s
}
struct reset_control *__devm_reset_control_get(struct device *dev,
- const char *id, int index, int shared)
+ const char *id, int index, bool shared,
+ bool optional)
{
struct reset_control **ptr, *rstc;
@@ -358,7 +384,7 @@ struct reset_control *__devm_reset_contr
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
rstc = __of_reset_control_get(dev ? dev->of_node : NULL,
- id, index, shared);
+ id, index, shared, optional);
if (!IS_ERR(rstc)) {
*ptr = rstc;
devres_add(dev, ptr);
--- a/include/linux/reset.h
+++ b/include/linux/reset.h
@@ -13,10 +13,12 @@ int reset_control_deassert(struct reset_
int reset_control_status(struct reset_control *rstc);
struct reset_control *__of_reset_control_get(struct device_node *node,
- const char *id, int index, int shared);
+ const char *id, int index, bool shared,
+ bool optional);
void reset_control_put(struct reset_control *rstc);
struct reset_control *__devm_reset_control_get(struct device *dev,
- const char *id, int index, int shared);
+ const char *id, int index, bool shared,
+ bool optional);
int __must_check device_reset(struct device *dev);
@@ -69,14 +71,15 @@ static inline int device_reset_optional(
static inline struct reset_control *__of_reset_control_get(
struct device_node *node,
- const char *id, int index, int shared)
+ const char *id, int index, bool shared,
+ bool optional)
{
return ERR_PTR(-ENOTSUPP);
}
static inline struct reset_control *__devm_reset_control_get(
- struct device *dev,
- const char *id, int index, int shared)
+ struct device *dev, const char *id,
+ int index, bool shared, bool optional)
{
return ERR_PTR(-ENOTSUPP);
}
@@ -104,7 +107,8 @@ __must_check reset_control_get_exclusive
#ifndef CONFIG_RESET_CONTROLLER
WARN_ON(1);
#endif
- return __of_reset_control_get(dev ? dev->of_node : NULL, id, 0, 0);
+ return __of_reset_control_get(dev ? dev->of_node : NULL, id, 0, false,
+ false);
}
/**
@@ -132,19 +136,22 @@ __must_check reset_control_get_exclusive
static inline struct reset_control *reset_control_get_shared(
struct device *dev, const char *id)
{
- return __of_reset_control_get(dev ? dev->of_node : NULL, id, 0, 1);
+ return __of_reset_control_get(dev ? dev->of_node : NULL, id, 0, true,
+ false);
}
static inline struct reset_control *reset_control_get_optional_exclusive(
struct device *dev, const char *id)
{
- return __of_reset_control_get(dev ? dev->of_node : NULL, id, 0, 0);
+ return __of_reset_control_get(dev ? dev->of_node : NULL, id, 0, false,
+ true);
}
static inline struct reset_control *reset_control_get_optional_shared(
struct device *dev, const char *id)
{
- return __of_reset_control_get(dev ? dev->of_node : NULL, id, 0, 1);
+ return __of_reset_control_get(dev ? dev->of_node : NULL, id, 0, true,
+ true);
}
/**
@@ -160,7 +167,7 @@ static inline struct reset_control *rese
static inline struct reset_control *of_reset_control_get_exclusive(
struct device_node *node, const char *id)
{
- return __of_reset_control_get(node, id, 0, 0);
+ return __of_reset_control_get(node, id, 0, false, false);
}
/**
@@ -185,7 +192,7 @@ static inline struct reset_control *of_r
static inline struct reset_control *of_reset_control_get_shared(
struct device_node *node, const char *id)
{
- return __of_reset_control_get(node, id, 0, 1);
+ return __of_reset_control_get(node, id, 0, true, false);
}
/**
@@ -202,7 +209,7 @@ static inline struct reset_control *of_r
static inline struct reset_control *of_reset_control_get_exclusive_by_index(
struct device_node *node, int index)
{
- return __of_reset_control_get(node, NULL, index, 0);
+ return __of_reset_control_get(node, NULL, index, false, false);
}
/**
@@ -230,7 +237,7 @@ static inline struct reset_control *of_r
static inline struct reset_control *of_reset_control_get_shared_by_index(
struct device_node *node, int index)
{
- return __of_reset_control_get(node, NULL, index, 1);
+ return __of_reset_control_get(node, NULL, index, true, false);
}
/**
@@ -252,7 +259,7 @@ __must_check devm_reset_control_get_excl
#ifndef CONFIG_RESET_CONTROLLER
WARN_ON(1);
#endif
- return __devm_reset_control_get(dev, id, 0, 0);
+ return __devm_reset_control_get(dev, id, 0, false, false);
}
/**
@@ -267,19 +274,19 @@ __must_check devm_reset_control_get_excl
static inline struct reset_control *devm_reset_control_get_shared(
struct device *dev, const char *id)
{
- return __devm_reset_control_get(dev, id, 0, 1);
+ return __devm_reset_control_get(dev, id, 0, true, false);
}
static inline struct reset_control *devm_reset_control_get_optional_exclusive(
struct device *dev, const char *id)
{
- return __devm_reset_control_get(dev, id, 0, 0);
+ return __devm_reset_control_get(dev, id, 0, false, true);
}
static inline struct reset_control *devm_reset_control_get_optional_shared(
struct device *dev, const char *id)
{
- return __devm_reset_control_get(dev, id, 0, 1);
+ return __devm_reset_control_get(dev, id, 0, true, true);
}
/**
@@ -297,7 +304,7 @@ static inline struct reset_control *devm
static inline struct reset_control *
devm_reset_control_get_exclusive_by_index(struct device *dev, int index)
{
- return __devm_reset_control_get(dev, NULL, index, 0);
+ return __devm_reset_control_get(dev, NULL, index, false, false);
}
/**
@@ -313,7 +320,7 @@ devm_reset_control_get_exclusive_by_inde
static inline struct reset_control *
devm_reset_control_get_shared_by_index(struct device *dev, int index)
{
- return __devm_reset_control_get(dev, NULL, index, 1);
+ return __devm_reset_control_get(dev, NULL, index, true, false);
}
/*
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 039/101] reset: core: fix reset_control_put
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (37 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 038/101] reset: make optional functions really optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 040/101] reset: fix optional reset_control_get stubs to return NULL Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (66 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Heiner Kallweit, Philipp Zabel, Dinh Nguyen
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
commit 4891486fb2c80eaf3bb0f9eb065d15ecd357702f upstream.
Commit "reset: make optional functions really optional" missed to
adjust one check in reset_control_put, causing a NULL pointer
access for optional resets.
Fixes: bb475230b8e5 "reset: make optional functions really optional"
Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Philipp Zabel <p.zabel@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/reset/core.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/reset/core.c
+++ b/drivers/reset/core.c
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__of_reset_control_get
void reset_control_put(struct reset_control *rstc)
{
- if (IS_ERR(rstc))
+ if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(rstc))
return;
mutex_lock(&reset_list_mutex);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 040/101] reset: fix optional reset_control_get stubs to return NULL
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (38 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 039/101] reset: core: fix reset_control_put Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 041/101] reset: add exported __reset_control_get, return NULL if optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (65 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Andrzej Hajda, Ramiro Oliveira,
Philipp Zabel, Dinh Nguyen
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Philipp Zabel <p.zabel@pengutronix.de>
commit 0ca10b60ceeb5372da01798ca68c116ae45a6eb6 upstream.
When RESET_CONTROLLER is not enabled, the optional reset_control_get
stubs should now also return NULL.
Since it is now valid for reset_control_assert/deassert/reset/status/put
to be called unconditionally, with NULL as an argument for optional
resets, the stubs are not allowed to warn anymore.
Fixes: bb475230b8e5 ("reset: make optional functions really optional")
Reported-by: Andrzej Hajda <a.hajda@samsung.com>
Tested-by: Andrzej Hajda <a.hajda@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrzej Hajda <a.hajda@samsung.com>
Cc: Ramiro Oliveira <Ramiro.Oliveira@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Philipp Zabel <p.zabel@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
include/linux/reset.h | 9 ++-------
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/reset.h
+++ b/include/linux/reset.h
@@ -31,31 +31,26 @@ static inline int device_reset_optional(
static inline int reset_control_reset(struct reset_control *rstc)
{
- WARN_ON(1);
return 0;
}
static inline int reset_control_assert(struct reset_control *rstc)
{
- WARN_ON(1);
return 0;
}
static inline int reset_control_deassert(struct reset_control *rstc)
{
- WARN_ON(1);
return 0;
}
static inline int reset_control_status(struct reset_control *rstc)
{
- WARN_ON(1);
return 0;
}
static inline void reset_control_put(struct reset_control *rstc)
{
- WARN_ON(1);
}
static inline int __must_check device_reset(struct device *dev)
@@ -74,14 +69,14 @@ static inline struct reset_control *__of
const char *id, int index, bool shared,
bool optional)
{
- return ERR_PTR(-ENOTSUPP);
+ return optional ? NULL : ERR_PTR(-ENOTSUPP);
}
static inline struct reset_control *__devm_reset_control_get(
struct device *dev, const char *id,
int index, bool shared, bool optional)
{
- return ERR_PTR(-ENOTSUPP);
+ return optional ? NULL : ERR_PTR(-ENOTSUPP);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_RESET_CONTROLLER */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 041/101] reset: add exported __reset_control_get, return NULL if optional
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (39 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 040/101] reset: fix optional reset_control_get stubs to return NULL Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 042/101] reset: make device_reset_optional() really optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (64 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Andy Shevchenko, Ramiro Oliveira,
Philipp Zabel, Dinh Nguyen
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Philipp Zabel <p.zabel@pengutronix.de>
commit 62e24c5775ecb387a3eb33701378ccfa6dbc98ee upstream.
Rename the internal __reset_control_get/put functions to
__reset_control_get/put_internal and add an exported
__reset_control_get equivalent to __of_reset_control_get
that takes a struct device parameter.
This avoids the confusing call to __of_reset_control_get in
the non-DT case and fixes the devm_reset_control_get_optional
function to return NULL if RESET_CONTROLLER is enabled but
dev->of_node == NULL.
Fixes: bb475230b8e5 ("reset: make optional functions really optional")
Reported-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ramiro Oliveira <Ramiro.Oliveira@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Philipp Zabel <p.zabel@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/reset/core.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++------
include/linux/reset.h | 22 ++++++++++++++--------
2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/reset/core.c
+++ b/drivers/reset/core.c
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ int reset_control_status(struct reset_co
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(reset_control_status);
-static struct reset_control *__reset_control_get(
+static struct reset_control *__reset_control_get_internal(
struct reset_controller_dev *rcdev,
unsigned int index, int shared)
{
@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static struct reset_control *__reset_con
return rstc;
}
-static void __reset_control_put(struct reset_control *rstc)
+static void __reset_control_put_internal(struct reset_control *rstc)
{
lockdep_assert_held(&reset_list_mutex);
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ struct reset_control *__of_reset_control
}
/* reset_list_mutex also protects the rcdev's reset_control list */
- rstc = __reset_control_get(rcdev, rstc_id, shared);
+ rstc = __reset_control_get_internal(rcdev, rstc_id, shared);
mutex_unlock(&reset_list_mutex);
@@ -351,6 +351,17 @@ struct reset_control *__of_reset_control
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__of_reset_control_get);
+struct reset_control *__reset_control_get(struct device *dev, const char *id,
+ int index, bool shared, bool optional)
+{
+ if (dev->of_node)
+ return __of_reset_control_get(dev->of_node, id, index, shared,
+ optional);
+
+ return optional ? NULL : ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__reset_control_get);
+
/**
* reset_control_put - free the reset controller
* @rstc: reset controller
@@ -362,7 +373,7 @@ void reset_control_put(struct reset_cont
return;
mutex_lock(&reset_list_mutex);
- __reset_control_put(rstc);
+ __reset_control_put_internal(rstc);
mutex_unlock(&reset_list_mutex);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(reset_control_put);
@@ -383,8 +394,7 @@ struct reset_control *__devm_reset_contr
if (!ptr)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- rstc = __of_reset_control_get(dev ? dev->of_node : NULL,
- id, index, shared, optional);
+ rstc = __reset_control_get(dev, id, index, shared, optional);
if (!IS_ERR(rstc)) {
*ptr = rstc;
devres_add(dev, ptr);
--- a/include/linux/reset.h
+++ b/include/linux/reset.h
@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ int reset_control_status(struct reset_co
struct reset_control *__of_reset_control_get(struct device_node *node,
const char *id, int index, bool shared,
bool optional);
+struct reset_control *__reset_control_get(struct device *dev, const char *id,
+ int index, bool shared,
+ bool optional);
void reset_control_put(struct reset_control *rstc);
struct reset_control *__devm_reset_control_get(struct device *dev,
const char *id, int index, bool shared,
@@ -72,6 +75,13 @@ static inline struct reset_control *__of
return optional ? NULL : ERR_PTR(-ENOTSUPP);
}
+static inline struct reset_control *__reset_control_get(
+ struct device *dev, const char *id,
+ int index, bool shared, bool optional)
+{
+ return optional ? NULL : ERR_PTR(-ENOTSUPP);
+}
+
static inline struct reset_control *__devm_reset_control_get(
struct device *dev, const char *id,
int index, bool shared, bool optional)
@@ -102,8 +112,7 @@ __must_check reset_control_get_exclusive
#ifndef CONFIG_RESET_CONTROLLER
WARN_ON(1);
#endif
- return __of_reset_control_get(dev ? dev->of_node : NULL, id, 0, false,
- false);
+ return __reset_control_get(dev, id, 0, false, false);
}
/**
@@ -131,22 +140,19 @@ __must_check reset_control_get_exclusive
static inline struct reset_control *reset_control_get_shared(
struct device *dev, const char *id)
{
- return __of_reset_control_get(dev ? dev->of_node : NULL, id, 0, true,
- false);
+ return __reset_control_get(dev, id, 0, true, false);
}
static inline struct reset_control *reset_control_get_optional_exclusive(
struct device *dev, const char *id)
{
- return __of_reset_control_get(dev ? dev->of_node : NULL, id, 0, false,
- true);
+ return __reset_control_get(dev, id, 0, false, true);
}
static inline struct reset_control *reset_control_get_optional_shared(
struct device *dev, const char *id)
{
- return __of_reset_control_get(dev ? dev->of_node : NULL, id, 0, true,
- true);
+ return __reset_control_get(dev, id, 0, true, true);
}
/**
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 042/101] reset: make device_reset_optional() really optional
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (40 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 041/101] reset: add exported __reset_control_get, return NULL if optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 043/101] reset: remove remaining WARN_ON() in <linux/reset.h> Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (63 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Masahiro Yamada, Philipp Zabel, Dinh Nguyen
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
commit 1554bbd4ad401b7f0f916c0891874111c10befe5 upstream.
Commit bb475230b8e5 ("reset: make optional functions really optional")
converted *_get_optional* functions, but device_reset_optional() was
left behind. Convert it in the same way.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Philipp Zabel <p.zabel@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/reset/core.c | 9 +++++----
include/linux/reset.h | 28 +++++++++++++---------------
2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/reset/core.c
+++ b/drivers/reset/core.c
@@ -410,17 +410,18 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__devm_reset_control_g
* device_reset - find reset controller associated with the device
* and perform reset
* @dev: device to be reset by the controller
+ * @optional: whether it is optional to reset the device
*
- * Convenience wrapper for reset_control_get() and reset_control_reset().
+ * Convenience wrapper for __reset_control_get() and reset_control_reset().
* This is useful for the common case of devices with single, dedicated reset
* lines.
*/
-int device_reset(struct device *dev)
+int __device_reset(struct device *dev, bool optional)
{
struct reset_control *rstc;
int ret;
- rstc = reset_control_get(dev, NULL);
+ rstc = __reset_control_get(dev, NULL, 0, 0, optional);
if (IS_ERR(rstc))
return PTR_ERR(rstc);
@@ -430,4 +431,4 @@ int device_reset(struct device *dev)
return ret;
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(device_reset);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__device_reset);
--- a/include/linux/reset.h
+++ b/include/linux/reset.h
@@ -19,17 +19,11 @@ struct reset_control *__reset_control_ge
int index, bool shared,
bool optional);
void reset_control_put(struct reset_control *rstc);
+int __device_reset(struct device *dev, bool optional);
struct reset_control *__devm_reset_control_get(struct device *dev,
const char *id, int index, bool shared,
bool optional);
-int __must_check device_reset(struct device *dev);
-
-static inline int device_reset_optional(struct device *dev)
-{
- return device_reset(dev);
-}
-
#else
static inline int reset_control_reset(struct reset_control *rstc)
@@ -56,15 +50,9 @@ static inline void reset_control_put(str
{
}
-static inline int __must_check device_reset(struct device *dev)
-{
- WARN_ON(1);
- return -ENOTSUPP;
-}
-
-static inline int device_reset_optional(struct device *dev)
+static inline int __device_reset(struct device *dev, bool optional)
{
- return -ENOTSUPP;
+ return optional ? 0 : -ENOTSUPP;
}
static inline struct reset_control *__of_reset_control_get(
@@ -91,6 +79,16 @@ static inline struct reset_control *__de
#endif /* CONFIG_RESET_CONTROLLER */
+static inline int __must_check device_reset(struct device *dev)
+{
+ return __device_reset(dev, false);
+}
+
+static inline int device_reset_optional(struct device *dev)
+{
+ return __device_reset(dev, true);
+}
+
/**
* reset_control_get_exclusive - Lookup and obtain an exclusive reference
* to a reset controller.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 043/101] reset: remove remaining WARN_ON() in <linux/reset.h>
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (41 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 042/101] reset: make device_reset_optional() really optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 044/101] mm: cleancache: fix corruption on missed inode invalidation Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (62 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Masahiro Yamada, Philipp Zabel, Dinh Nguyen
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
commit bb6c7768385b200063a14d6615cc1246c3d00760 upstream.
Commit bb475230b8e5 ("reset: make optional functions really optional")
gave a new meaning to _get_optional variants.
The differentiation by WARN_ON() is not needed any more. We already
have inconsistency about this; (devm_)reset_control_get_exclusive()
has WARN_ON() check, but of_reset_control_get_exclusive() does not.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Philipp Zabel <p.zabel@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
include/linux/reset.h | 6 ------
1 file changed, 6 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/reset.h
+++ b/include/linux/reset.h
@@ -107,9 +107,6 @@ static inline int device_reset_optional(
static inline struct reset_control *
__must_check reset_control_get_exclusive(struct device *dev, const char *id)
{
-#ifndef CONFIG_RESET_CONTROLLER
- WARN_ON(1);
-#endif
return __reset_control_get(dev, id, 0, false, false);
}
@@ -255,9 +252,6 @@ static inline struct reset_control *
__must_check devm_reset_control_get_exclusive(struct device *dev,
const char *id)
{
-#ifndef CONFIG_RESET_CONTROLLER
- WARN_ON(1);
-#endif
return __devm_reset_control_get(dev, id, 0, false, false);
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 044/101] mm: cleancache: fix corruption on missed inode invalidation
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (42 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 043/101] reset: remove remaining WARN_ON() in <linux/reset.h> Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 045/101] usb: gadget: dummy: fix nonsensical comparisons Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (61 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Pavel Tikhomirov, Vasily Averin,
Andrey Ryabinin, Jan Kara, Johannes Weiner, Mel Gorman,
Matthew Wilcox, Andi Kleen, Andrew Morton, Linus Torvalds
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
commit 6ff38bd40230af35e446239396e5fc8ebd6a5248 upstream.
If all pages are deleted from the mapping by memory reclaim and also
moved to the cleancache:
__delete_from_page_cache
(no shadow case)
unaccount_page_cache_page
cleancache_put_page
page_cache_delete
mapping->nrpages -= nr
(nrpages becomes 0)
We don't clean the cleancache for an inode after final file truncation
(removal).
truncate_inode_pages_final
check (nrpages || nrexceptional) is false
no truncate_inode_pages
no cleancache_invalidate_inode(mapping)
These way when reading the new file created with same inode we may get
these trash leftover pages from cleancache and see wrong data instead of
the contents of the new file.
Fix it by always doing truncate_inode_pages which is already ready for
nrpages == 0 && nrexceptional == 0 case and just invalidates inode.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add comment, per Jan]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181112095734.17979-1-ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com
Fixes: commit 91b0abe36a7b ("mm + fs: store shadow entries in page cache")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
mm/truncate.c | 8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/truncate.c
+++ b/mm/truncate.c
@@ -443,9 +443,13 @@ void truncate_inode_pages_final(struct a
*/
spin_lock_irq(&mapping->tree_lock);
spin_unlock_irq(&mapping->tree_lock);
-
- truncate_inode_pages(mapping, 0);
}
+
+ /*
+ * Cleancache needs notification even if there are no pages or shadow
+ * entries.
+ */
+ truncate_inode_pages(mapping, 0);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(truncate_inode_pages_final);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 045/101] usb: gadget: dummy: fix nonsensical comparisons
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (43 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 044/101] mm: cleancache: fix corruption on missed inode invalidation Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 046/101] net: qed: use correct strncpy() size Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (60 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Tatyana Brokhman, Felipe Balbi,
Alan Stern, Arnd Bergmann, Felipe Balbi
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
commit 7661ca09b2ff98f48693f431bb01fed62830e433 upstream.
gcc-8 points out two comparisons that are clearly bogus
and almost certainly not what the author intended to write:
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c: In function 'set_link_state_by_speed':
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:379:31: error: bitwise comparison always evaluates to false [-Werror=tautological-compare]
USB_PORT_STAT_ENABLE) == 1 &&
^~
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:381:25: error: bitwise comparison always evaluates to false [-Werror=tautological-compare]
USB_SS_PORT_LS_U0) == 1 &&
^~
I looked at the code for a bit and came up with a change that makes
it look like what the author probably meant here. This makes it
look reasonable to me and to gcc, shutting up the warning.
It does of course change behavior as the two conditions are actually
evaluated rather than being hardcoded to false, and I have made no
attempt at verifying that the changed logic makes sense in the context
of a USB HCD, so that part needs to be reviewed carefully.
Fixes: 1cd8fd2887e1 ("usb: gadget: dummy_hcd: add SuperSpeed support")
Cc: Tatyana Brokhman <tlinder@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c | 9 ++++-----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c
@@ -379,11 +379,10 @@ static void set_link_state_by_speed(stru
USB_PORT_STAT_CONNECTION) == 0)
dum_hcd->port_status |=
(USB_PORT_STAT_C_CONNECTION << 16);
- if ((dum_hcd->port_status &
- USB_PORT_STAT_ENABLE) == 1 &&
- (dum_hcd->port_status &
- USB_SS_PORT_LS_U0) == 1 &&
- dum_hcd->rh_state != DUMMY_RH_SUSPENDED)
+ if ((dum_hcd->port_status & USB_PORT_STAT_ENABLE) &&
+ (dum_hcd->port_status &
+ USB_PORT_STAT_LINK_STATE) == USB_SS_PORT_LS_U0 &&
+ dum_hcd->rh_state != DUMMY_RH_SUSPENDED)
dum_hcd->active = 1;
}
} else {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 046/101] net: qed: use correct strncpy() size
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (44 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 045/101] usb: gadget: dummy: fix nonsensical comparisons Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 047/101] tipc: use destination length for copy string Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (59 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Arnd Bergmann, David S. Miller
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
commit 11f711081af0eb54190dc0de96ba4a9cd494666b upstream.
passing the strlen() of the source string as the destination
length is pointless, and gcc-8 now warns about it:
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_debug.c: In function 'qed_grc_dump':
include/linux/string.h:253: error: 'strncpy' specified bound depends on the length of the source argument [-Werror=stringop-overflow=]
This changes qed_grc_dump_big_ram() to instead uses the length of
the destination buffer, and use strscpy() to guarantee nul-termination.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_debug.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_debug.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_debug.c
@@ -3039,10 +3039,10 @@ static u32 qed_grc_dump_big_ram(struct q
s_big_ram_defs[big_ram_id].num_of_blocks[dev_data->chip_id];
ram_size = total_blocks * BIG_RAM_BLOCK_SIZE_DWORDS;
- strncpy(type_name, s_big_ram_defs[big_ram_id].instance_name,
- strlen(s_big_ram_defs[big_ram_id].instance_name));
- strncpy(mem_name, s_big_ram_defs[big_ram_id].instance_name,
- strlen(s_big_ram_defs[big_ram_id].instance_name));
+ strscpy(type_name, s_big_ram_defs[big_ram_id].instance_name,
+ sizeof(type_name));
+ strscpy(mem_name, s_big_ram_defs[big_ram_id].instance_name,
+ sizeof(mem_name));
/* Dump memory header */
offset += qed_grc_dump_mem_hdr(p_hwfn,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 047/101] tipc: use destination length for copy string
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (45 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 046/101] net: qed: use correct strncpy() size Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 048/101] libceph: drop len argument of *verify_authorizer_reply() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (58 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Guoqing Jiang, Ying Xue, David S. Miller
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guoqing Jiang <gqjiang@suse.com>
commit 29e270fc32192e7729057963ae7120663856c93e upstream.
Got below warning with gcc 8.2 compiler.
net/tipc/topsrv.c: In function ‘tipc_topsrv_start’:
net/tipc/topsrv.c:660:2: warning: ‘strncpy’ specified bound depends on the length of the source argument [-Wstringop-overflow=]
strncpy(srv->name, name, strlen(name) + 1);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
net/tipc/topsrv.c:660:27: note: length computed here
strncpy(srv->name, name, strlen(name) + 1);
^~~~~~~~~~~~
So change it to correct length and use strscpy.
Signed-off-by: Guoqing Jiang <gqjiang@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/tipc/subscr.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/tipc/subscr.c
+++ b/net/tipc/subscr.c
@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ int tipc_topsrv_start(struct net *net)
topsrv->tipc_conn_new = tipc_subscrb_connect_cb;
topsrv->tipc_conn_release = tipc_subscrb_release_cb;
- strncpy(topsrv->name, name, strlen(name) + 1);
+ strscpy(topsrv->name, name, sizeof(topsrv->name));
tn->topsrv = topsrv;
atomic_set(&tn->subscription_count, 0);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 048/101] libceph: drop len argument of *verify_authorizer_reply()
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (46 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 047/101] tipc: use destination length for copy string Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 049/101] libceph: no need to drop con->mutex for ->get_authorizer() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (57 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Ilya Dryomov, Sage Weil, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
commit 0dde584882ade13dc9708d611fbf69b0ae8a9e48 upstream.
The length of the reply is protocol-dependent - for cephx it's
ceph_x_authorize_reply. Nothing sensible can be passed from the
messenger layer anyway.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 4 ++--
include/linux/ceph/auth.h | 5 ++---
include/linux/ceph/messenger.h | 2 +-
net/ceph/auth.c | 4 ++--
net/ceph/auth_x.c | 2 +-
net/ceph/messenger.c | 2 +-
net/ceph/osd_client.c | 4 ++--
7 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
@@ -3984,13 +3984,13 @@ static struct ceph_auth_handshake *get_a
}
-static int verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_connection *con, int len)
+static int verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_connection *con)
{
struct ceph_mds_session *s = con->private;
struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc = s->s_mdsc;
struct ceph_auth_client *ac = mdsc->fsc->client->monc.auth;
- return ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply(ac, s->s_auth.authorizer, len);
+ return ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply(ac, s->s_auth.authorizer);
}
static int invalidate_authorizer(struct ceph_connection *con)
--- a/include/linux/ceph/auth.h
+++ b/include/linux/ceph/auth.h
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ struct ceph_auth_client_ops {
int (*update_authorizer)(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, int peer_type,
struct ceph_auth_handshake *auth);
int (*verify_authorizer_reply)(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
- struct ceph_authorizer *a, size_t len);
+ struct ceph_authorizer *a);
void (*invalidate_authorizer)(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
int peer_type);
@@ -118,8 +118,7 @@ extern int ceph_auth_update_authorizer(s
int peer_type,
struct ceph_auth_handshake *a);
extern int ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
- struct ceph_authorizer *a,
- size_t len);
+ struct ceph_authorizer *a);
extern void ceph_auth_invalidate_authorizer(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
int peer_type);
--- a/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h
+++ b/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ struct ceph_connection_operations {
struct ceph_auth_handshake *(*get_authorizer) (
struct ceph_connection *con,
int *proto, int force_new);
- int (*verify_authorizer_reply) (struct ceph_connection *con, int len);
+ int (*verify_authorizer_reply) (struct ceph_connection *con);
int (*invalidate_authorizer)(struct ceph_connection *con);
/* there was some error on the socket (disconnect, whatever) */
--- a/net/ceph/auth.c
+++ b/net/ceph/auth.c
@@ -315,13 +315,13 @@ int ceph_auth_update_authorizer(struct c
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_auth_update_authorizer);
int ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
- struct ceph_authorizer *a, size_t len)
+ struct ceph_authorizer *a)
{
int ret = 0;
mutex_lock(&ac->mutex);
if (ac->ops && ac->ops->verify_authorizer_reply)
- ret = ac->ops->verify_authorizer_reply(ac, a, len);
+ ret = ac->ops->verify_authorizer_reply(ac, a);
mutex_unlock(&ac->mutex);
return ret;
}
--- a/net/ceph/auth_x.c
+++ b/net/ceph/auth_x.c
@@ -623,7 +623,7 @@ static int ceph_x_update_authorizer(
}
static int ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
- struct ceph_authorizer *a, size_t len)
+ struct ceph_authorizer *a)
{
struct ceph_x_authorizer *au = (void *)a;
void *p = au->enc_buf;
--- a/net/ceph/messenger.c
+++ b/net/ceph/messenger.c
@@ -2045,7 +2045,7 @@ static int process_connect(struct ceph_c
* should also define ->verify_authorizer_reply().
* See get_connect_authorizer().
*/
- ret = con->ops->verify_authorizer_reply(con, 0);
+ ret = con->ops->verify_authorizer_reply(con);
if (ret < 0) {
con->error_msg = "bad authorize reply";
return ret;
--- a/net/ceph/osd_client.c
+++ b/net/ceph/osd_client.c
@@ -4479,13 +4479,13 @@ static struct ceph_auth_handshake *get_a
}
-static int verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_connection *con, int len)
+static int verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_connection *con)
{
struct ceph_osd *o = con->private;
struct ceph_osd_client *osdc = o->o_osdc;
struct ceph_auth_client *ac = osdc->client->monc.auth;
- return ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply(ac, o->o_auth.authorizer, len);
+ return ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply(ac, o->o_auth.authorizer);
}
static int invalidate_authorizer(struct ceph_connection *con)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 049/101] libceph: no need to drop con->mutex for ->get_authorizer()
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (47 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 048/101] libceph: drop len argument of *verify_authorizer_reply() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 050/101] libceph: store ceph_auth_handshake pointer in ceph_connection Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (56 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Ilya Dryomov, Sage Weil, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
commit b3bbd3f2ab19c8ca319003b4b51ce4c4ca74da06 upstream.
->get_authorizer(), ->verify_authorizer_reply(), ->sign_message() and
->check_message_signature() shouldn't be doing anything with or on the
connection (like closing it or sending messages).
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/ceph/messenger.c | 6 ------
1 file changed, 6 deletions(-)
--- a/net/ceph/messenger.c
+++ b/net/ceph/messenger.c
@@ -1405,15 +1405,9 @@ static struct ceph_auth_handshake *get_c
return NULL;
}
- /* Can't hold the mutex while getting authorizer */
- mutex_unlock(&con->mutex);
auth = con->ops->get_authorizer(con, auth_proto, con->auth_retry);
- mutex_lock(&con->mutex);
-
if (IS_ERR(auth))
return auth;
- if (con->state != CON_STATE_NEGOTIATING)
- return ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
con->auth_reply_buf = auth->authorizer_reply_buf;
con->auth_reply_buf_len = auth->authorizer_reply_buf_len;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 050/101] libceph: store ceph_auth_handshake pointer in ceph_connection
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (48 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 049/101] libceph: no need to drop con->mutex for ->get_authorizer() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 051/101] libceph: factor out __prepare_write_connect() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (55 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Ilya Dryomov, Sage Weil, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
commit 262614c4294d33b1f19e0d18c0091d9c329b544a upstream.
We already copy authorizer_reply_buf and authorizer_reply_buf_len into
ceph_connection. Factoring out __prepare_write_connect() requires two
more: authorizer_buf and authorizer_buf_len. Store the pointer to the
handshake in con->auth rather than piling on.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
include/linux/ceph/messenger.h | 3 --
net/ceph/messenger.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++----------------------
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h
+++ b/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h
@@ -200,9 +200,8 @@ struct ceph_connection {
attempt for this connection, client */
u32 peer_global_seq; /* peer's global seq for this connection */
+ struct ceph_auth_handshake *auth;
int auth_retry; /* true if we need a newer authorizer */
- void *auth_reply_buf; /* where to put the authorizer reply */
- int auth_reply_buf_len;
struct mutex mutex;
--- a/net/ceph/messenger.c
+++ b/net/ceph/messenger.c
@@ -1394,24 +1394,26 @@ static void prepare_write_keepalive(stru
* Connection negotiation.
*/
-static struct ceph_auth_handshake *get_connect_authorizer(struct ceph_connection *con,
- int *auth_proto)
+static int get_connect_authorizer(struct ceph_connection *con)
{
struct ceph_auth_handshake *auth;
+ int auth_proto;
if (!con->ops->get_authorizer) {
+ con->auth = NULL;
con->out_connect.authorizer_protocol = CEPH_AUTH_UNKNOWN;
con->out_connect.authorizer_len = 0;
- return NULL;
+ return 0;
}
- auth = con->ops->get_authorizer(con, auth_proto, con->auth_retry);
+ auth = con->ops->get_authorizer(con, &auth_proto, con->auth_retry);
if (IS_ERR(auth))
- return auth;
+ return PTR_ERR(auth);
- con->auth_reply_buf = auth->authorizer_reply_buf;
- con->auth_reply_buf_len = auth->authorizer_reply_buf_len;
- return auth;
+ con->auth = auth;
+ con->out_connect.authorizer_protocol = cpu_to_le32(auth_proto);
+ con->out_connect.authorizer_len = cpu_to_le32(auth->authorizer_buf_len);
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -1431,8 +1433,7 @@ static int prepare_write_connect(struct
{
unsigned int global_seq = get_global_seq(con->msgr, 0);
int proto;
- int auth_proto;
- struct ceph_auth_handshake *auth;
+ int ret;
switch (con->peer_name.type) {
case CEPH_ENTITY_TYPE_MON:
@@ -1459,20 +1460,15 @@ static int prepare_write_connect(struct
con->out_connect.protocol_version = cpu_to_le32(proto);
con->out_connect.flags = 0;
- auth_proto = CEPH_AUTH_UNKNOWN;
- auth = get_connect_authorizer(con, &auth_proto);
- if (IS_ERR(auth))
- return PTR_ERR(auth);
-
- con->out_connect.authorizer_protocol = cpu_to_le32(auth_proto);
- con->out_connect.authorizer_len = auth ?
- cpu_to_le32(auth->authorizer_buf_len) : 0;
+ ret = get_connect_authorizer(con);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
con_out_kvec_add(con, sizeof (con->out_connect),
&con->out_connect);
- if (auth && auth->authorizer_buf_len)
- con_out_kvec_add(con, auth->authorizer_buf_len,
- auth->authorizer_buf);
+ if (con->auth)
+ con_out_kvec_add(con, con->auth->authorizer_buf_len,
+ con->auth->authorizer_buf);
con->out_more = 0;
con_flag_set(con, CON_FLAG_WRITE_PENDING);
@@ -1737,11 +1733,14 @@ static int read_partial_connect(struct c
if (ret <= 0)
goto out;
- size = le32_to_cpu(con->in_reply.authorizer_len);
- end += size;
- ret = read_partial(con, end, size, con->auth_reply_buf);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto out;
+ if (con->auth) {
+ size = le32_to_cpu(con->in_reply.authorizer_len);
+ end += size;
+ ret = read_partial(con, end, size,
+ con->auth->authorizer_reply_buf);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
dout("read_partial_connect %p tag %d, con_seq = %u, g_seq = %u\n",
con, (int)con->in_reply.tag,
@@ -1749,7 +1748,6 @@ static int read_partial_connect(struct c
le32_to_cpu(con->in_reply.global_seq));
out:
return ret;
-
}
/*
@@ -2033,7 +2031,7 @@ static int process_connect(struct ceph_c
dout("process_connect on %p tag %d\n", con, (int)con->in_tag);
- if (con->auth_reply_buf) {
+ if (con->auth) {
/*
* Any connection that defines ->get_authorizer()
* should also define ->verify_authorizer_reply().
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 051/101] libceph: factor out __prepare_write_connect()
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (49 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 050/101] libceph: store ceph_auth_handshake pointer in ceph_connection Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 052/101] libceph: factor out __ceph_x_decrypt() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (54 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Ilya Dryomov, Sage Weil, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
commit c0f56b483aa09c99bfe97409a43ad786f33b8a5a upstream.
Will be used for sending ceph_msg_connect with an updated authorizer,
after the server challenges the initial authorizer.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/ceph/messenger.c | 21 ++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/net/ceph/messenger.c
+++ b/net/ceph/messenger.c
@@ -1429,6 +1429,17 @@ static void prepare_write_banner(struct
con_flag_set(con, CON_FLAG_WRITE_PENDING);
}
+static void __prepare_write_connect(struct ceph_connection *con)
+{
+ con_out_kvec_add(con, sizeof(con->out_connect), &con->out_connect);
+ if (con->auth)
+ con_out_kvec_add(con, con->auth->authorizer_buf_len,
+ con->auth->authorizer_buf);
+
+ con->out_more = 0;
+ con_flag_set(con, CON_FLAG_WRITE_PENDING);
+}
+
static int prepare_write_connect(struct ceph_connection *con)
{
unsigned int global_seq = get_global_seq(con->msgr, 0);
@@ -1464,15 +1475,7 @@ static int prepare_write_connect(struct
if (ret)
return ret;
- con_out_kvec_add(con, sizeof (con->out_connect),
- &con->out_connect);
- if (con->auth)
- con_out_kvec_add(con, con->auth->authorizer_buf_len,
- con->auth->authorizer_buf);
-
- con->out_more = 0;
- con_flag_set(con, CON_FLAG_WRITE_PENDING);
-
+ __prepare_write_connect(con);
return 0;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 052/101] libceph: factor out __ceph_x_decrypt()
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (50 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 051/101] libceph: factor out __prepare_write_connect() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 053/101] libceph: factor out encrypt_authorizer() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (53 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Ilya Dryomov, Sage Weil, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
commit c571fe24d243bfe7017f0e67fe800b3cc2a1d1f7 upstream.
Will be used for decrypting the server challenge which is only preceded
by ceph_x_encrypt_header.
Drop struct_v check to allow for extending ceph_x_encrypt_header in the
future.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/ceph/auth_x.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/net/ceph/auth_x.c
+++ b/net/ceph/auth_x.c
@@ -69,25 +69,40 @@ static int ceph_x_encrypt(struct ceph_cr
return sizeof(u32) + ciphertext_len;
}
+static int __ceph_x_decrypt(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, void *p,
+ int ciphertext_len)
+{
+ struct ceph_x_encrypt_header *hdr = p;
+ int plaintext_len;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = ceph_crypt(secret, false, p, ciphertext_len, ciphertext_len,
+ &plaintext_len);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (le64_to_cpu(hdr->magic) != CEPHX_ENC_MAGIC) {
+ pr_err("%s bad magic\n", __func__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return plaintext_len - sizeof(*hdr);
+}
+
static int ceph_x_decrypt(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, void **p, void *end)
{
- struct ceph_x_encrypt_header *hdr = *p + sizeof(u32);
- int ciphertext_len, plaintext_len;
+ int ciphertext_len;
int ret;
ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, ciphertext_len, e_inval);
ceph_decode_need(p, end, ciphertext_len, e_inval);
- ret = ceph_crypt(secret, false, *p, end - *p, ciphertext_len,
- &plaintext_len);
- if (ret)
+ ret = __ceph_x_decrypt(secret, *p, ciphertext_len);
+ if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- if (hdr->struct_v != 1 || le64_to_cpu(hdr->magic) != CEPHX_ENC_MAGIC)
- return -EPERM;
-
*p += ciphertext_len;
- return plaintext_len - sizeof(struct ceph_x_encrypt_header);
+ return ret;
e_inval:
return -EINVAL;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 053/101] libceph: factor out encrypt_authorizer()
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (51 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 052/101] libceph: factor out __ceph_x_decrypt() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 054/101] libceph: add authorizer challenge Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (52 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Ilya Dryomov, Sage Weil, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
commit 149cac4a50b0b4081b38b2f38de6ef71c27eaa85 upstream.
Will be used for encrypting both the initial and updated authorizers.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/ceph/auth_x.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--- a/net/ceph/auth_x.c
+++ b/net/ceph/auth_x.c
@@ -286,6 +286,38 @@ bad:
return -EINVAL;
}
+/*
+ * Encode and encrypt the second part (ceph_x_authorize_b) of the
+ * authorizer. The first part (ceph_x_authorize_a) should already be
+ * encoded.
+ */
+static int encrypt_authorizer(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au)
+{
+ struct ceph_x_authorize_a *msg_a;
+ struct ceph_x_authorize_b *msg_b;
+ void *p, *end;
+ int ret;
+
+ msg_a = au->buf->vec.iov_base;
+ WARN_ON(msg_a->ticket_blob.secret_id != cpu_to_le64(au->secret_id));
+ p = (void *)(msg_a + 1) + le32_to_cpu(msg_a->ticket_blob.blob_len);
+ end = au->buf->vec.iov_base + au->buf->vec.iov_len;
+
+ msg_b = p + ceph_x_encrypt_offset();
+ msg_b->struct_v = 1;
+ msg_b->nonce = cpu_to_le64(au->nonce);
+
+ ret = ceph_x_encrypt(&au->session_key, p, end - p, sizeof(*msg_b));
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ p += ret;
+ WARN_ON(p > end);
+ au->buf->vec.iov_len = p - au->buf->vec.iov_base;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static void ceph_x_authorizer_cleanup(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au)
{
ceph_crypto_key_destroy(&au->session_key);
@@ -302,7 +334,6 @@ static int ceph_x_build_authorizer(struc
int maxlen;
struct ceph_x_authorize_a *msg_a;
struct ceph_x_authorize_b *msg_b;
- void *p, *end;
int ret;
int ticket_blob_len =
(th->ticket_blob ? th->ticket_blob->vec.iov_len : 0);
@@ -346,21 +377,13 @@ static int ceph_x_build_authorizer(struc
dout(" th %p secret_id %lld %lld\n", th, th->secret_id,
le64_to_cpu(msg_a->ticket_blob.secret_id));
- p = msg_a + 1;
- p += ticket_blob_len;
- end = au->buf->vec.iov_base + au->buf->vec.iov_len;
-
- msg_b = p + ceph_x_encrypt_offset();
- msg_b->struct_v = 1;
get_random_bytes(&au->nonce, sizeof(au->nonce));
- msg_b->nonce = cpu_to_le64(au->nonce);
- ret = ceph_x_encrypt(&au->session_key, p, end - p, sizeof(*msg_b));
- if (ret < 0)
+ ret = encrypt_authorizer(au);
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_err("failed to encrypt authorizer: %d", ret);
goto out_au;
+ }
- p += ret;
- WARN_ON(p > end);
- au->buf->vec.iov_len = p - au->buf->vec.iov_base;
dout(" built authorizer nonce %llx len %d\n", au->nonce,
(int)au->buf->vec.iov_len);
return 0;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 054/101] libceph: add authorizer challenge
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (52 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 053/101] libceph: factor out encrypt_authorizer() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 055/101] libceph: implement CEPHX_V2 calculation mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (51 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Ilya Dryomov, Sage Weil, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
commit 6daca13d2e72bedaaacfc08f873114c9307d5aea upstream.
When a client authenticates with a service, an authorizer is sent with
a nonce to the service (ceph_x_authorize_[ab]) and the service responds
with a mutation of that nonce (ceph_x_authorize_reply). This lets the
client verify the service is who it says it is but it doesn't protect
against a replay: someone can trivially capture the exchange and reuse
the same authorizer to authenticate themselves.
Allow the service to reject an initial authorizer with a random
challenge (ceph_x_authorize_challenge). The client then has to respond
with an updated authorizer proving they are able to decrypt the
service's challenge and that the new authorizer was produced for this
specific connection instance.
The accepting side requires this challenge and response unconditionally
if the client side advertises they have CEPHX_V2 feature bit.
This addresses CVE-2018-1128.
Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/24836
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 11 ++++++
include/linux/ceph/auth.h | 8 ++++
include/linux/ceph/messenger.h | 3 +
include/linux/ceph/msgr.h | 2 -
net/ceph/auth.c | 16 +++++++++
net/ceph/auth_x.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
net/ceph/auth_x_protocol.h | 7 +++
net/ceph/messenger.c | 17 +++++++++
net/ceph/osd_client.c | 11 ++++++
9 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
@@ -3983,6 +3983,16 @@ static struct ceph_auth_handshake *get_a
return auth;
}
+static int add_authorizer_challenge(struct ceph_connection *con,
+ void *challenge_buf, int challenge_buf_len)
+{
+ struct ceph_mds_session *s = con->private;
+ struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc = s->s_mdsc;
+ struct ceph_auth_client *ac = mdsc->fsc->client->monc.auth;
+
+ return ceph_auth_add_authorizer_challenge(ac, s->s_auth.authorizer,
+ challenge_buf, challenge_buf_len);
+}
static int verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_connection *con)
{
@@ -4046,6 +4056,7 @@ static const struct ceph_connection_oper
.put = con_put,
.dispatch = dispatch,
.get_authorizer = get_authorizer,
+ .add_authorizer_challenge = add_authorizer_challenge,
.verify_authorizer_reply = verify_authorizer_reply,
.invalidate_authorizer = invalidate_authorizer,
.peer_reset = peer_reset,
--- a/include/linux/ceph/auth.h
+++ b/include/linux/ceph/auth.h
@@ -63,6 +63,10 @@ struct ceph_auth_client_ops {
/* ensure that an existing authorizer is up to date */
int (*update_authorizer)(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, int peer_type,
struct ceph_auth_handshake *auth);
+ int (*add_authorizer_challenge)(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
+ struct ceph_authorizer *a,
+ void *challenge_buf,
+ int challenge_buf_len);
int (*verify_authorizer_reply)(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
struct ceph_authorizer *a);
void (*invalidate_authorizer)(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
@@ -117,6 +121,10 @@ void ceph_auth_destroy_authorizer(struct
extern int ceph_auth_update_authorizer(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
int peer_type,
struct ceph_auth_handshake *a);
+int ceph_auth_add_authorizer_challenge(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
+ struct ceph_authorizer *a,
+ void *challenge_buf,
+ int challenge_buf_len);
extern int ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
struct ceph_authorizer *a);
extern void ceph_auth_invalidate_authorizer(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
--- a/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h
+++ b/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h
@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ struct ceph_connection_operations {
struct ceph_auth_handshake *(*get_authorizer) (
struct ceph_connection *con,
int *proto, int force_new);
+ int (*add_authorizer_challenge)(struct ceph_connection *con,
+ void *challenge_buf,
+ int challenge_buf_len);
int (*verify_authorizer_reply) (struct ceph_connection *con);
int (*invalidate_authorizer)(struct ceph_connection *con);
--- a/include/linux/ceph/msgr.h
+++ b/include/linux/ceph/msgr.h
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ struct ceph_entity_inst {
#define CEPH_MSGR_TAG_SEQ 13 /* 64-bit int follows with seen seq number */
#define CEPH_MSGR_TAG_KEEPALIVE2 14 /* keepalive2 byte + ceph_timespec */
#define CEPH_MSGR_TAG_KEEPALIVE2_ACK 15 /* keepalive2 reply */
-
+#define CEPH_MSGR_TAG_CHALLENGE_AUTHORIZER 16 /* cephx v2 doing server challenge */
/*
* connection negotiation
--- a/net/ceph/auth.c
+++ b/net/ceph/auth.c
@@ -314,6 +314,22 @@ int ceph_auth_update_authorizer(struct c
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_auth_update_authorizer);
+int ceph_auth_add_authorizer_challenge(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
+ struct ceph_authorizer *a,
+ void *challenge_buf,
+ int challenge_buf_len)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ mutex_lock(&ac->mutex);
+ if (ac->ops && ac->ops->add_authorizer_challenge)
+ ret = ac->ops->add_authorizer_challenge(ac, a, challenge_buf,
+ challenge_buf_len);
+ mutex_unlock(&ac->mutex);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_auth_add_authorizer_challenge);
+
int ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
struct ceph_authorizer *a)
{
--- a/net/ceph/auth_x.c
+++ b/net/ceph/auth_x.c
@@ -291,7 +291,8 @@ bad:
* authorizer. The first part (ceph_x_authorize_a) should already be
* encoded.
*/
-static int encrypt_authorizer(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au)
+static int encrypt_authorizer(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au,
+ u64 *server_challenge)
{
struct ceph_x_authorize_a *msg_a;
struct ceph_x_authorize_b *msg_b;
@@ -304,16 +305,28 @@ static int encrypt_authorizer(struct cep
end = au->buf->vec.iov_base + au->buf->vec.iov_len;
msg_b = p + ceph_x_encrypt_offset();
- msg_b->struct_v = 1;
+ msg_b->struct_v = 2;
msg_b->nonce = cpu_to_le64(au->nonce);
+ if (server_challenge) {
+ msg_b->have_challenge = 1;
+ msg_b->server_challenge_plus_one =
+ cpu_to_le64(*server_challenge + 1);
+ } else {
+ msg_b->have_challenge = 0;
+ msg_b->server_challenge_plus_one = 0;
+ }
ret = ceph_x_encrypt(&au->session_key, p, end - p, sizeof(*msg_b));
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
p += ret;
- WARN_ON(p > end);
- au->buf->vec.iov_len = p - au->buf->vec.iov_base;
+ if (server_challenge) {
+ WARN_ON(p != end);
+ } else {
+ WARN_ON(p > end);
+ au->buf->vec.iov_len = p - au->buf->vec.iov_base;
+ }
return 0;
}
@@ -378,7 +391,7 @@ static int ceph_x_build_authorizer(struc
le64_to_cpu(msg_a->ticket_blob.secret_id));
get_random_bytes(&au->nonce, sizeof(au->nonce));
- ret = encrypt_authorizer(au);
+ ret = encrypt_authorizer(au, NULL);
if (ret) {
pr_err("failed to encrypt authorizer: %d", ret);
goto out_au;
@@ -660,6 +673,54 @@ static int ceph_x_update_authorizer(
return 0;
}
+static int decrypt_authorize_challenge(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au,
+ void *challenge_buf,
+ int challenge_buf_len,
+ u64 *server_challenge)
+{
+ struct ceph_x_authorize_challenge *ch =
+ challenge_buf + sizeof(struct ceph_x_encrypt_header);
+ int ret;
+
+ /* no leading len */
+ ret = __ceph_x_decrypt(&au->session_key, challenge_buf,
+ challenge_buf_len);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ if (ret < sizeof(*ch)) {
+ pr_err("bad size %d for ceph_x_authorize_challenge\n", ret);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ *server_challenge = le64_to_cpu(ch->server_challenge);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ceph_x_add_authorizer_challenge(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
+ struct ceph_authorizer *a,
+ void *challenge_buf,
+ int challenge_buf_len)
+{
+ struct ceph_x_authorizer *au = (void *)a;
+ u64 server_challenge;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = decrypt_authorize_challenge(au, challenge_buf, challenge_buf_len,
+ &server_challenge);
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_err("failed to decrypt authorize challenge: %d", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = encrypt_authorizer(au, &server_challenge);
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_err("failed to encrypt authorizer w/ challenge: %d", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
struct ceph_authorizer *a)
{
@@ -812,6 +873,7 @@ static const struct ceph_auth_client_ops
.handle_reply = ceph_x_handle_reply,
.create_authorizer = ceph_x_create_authorizer,
.update_authorizer = ceph_x_update_authorizer,
+ .add_authorizer_challenge = ceph_x_add_authorizer_challenge,
.verify_authorizer_reply = ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply,
.invalidate_authorizer = ceph_x_invalidate_authorizer,
.reset = ceph_x_reset,
--- a/net/ceph/auth_x_protocol.h
+++ b/net/ceph/auth_x_protocol.h
@@ -69,6 +69,13 @@ struct ceph_x_authorize_a {
struct ceph_x_authorize_b {
__u8 struct_v;
__le64 nonce;
+ __u8 have_challenge;
+ __le64 server_challenge_plus_one;
+} __attribute__ ((packed));
+
+struct ceph_x_authorize_challenge {
+ __u8 struct_v;
+ __le64 server_challenge;
} __attribute__ ((packed));
struct ceph_x_authorize_reply {
--- a/net/ceph/messenger.c
+++ b/net/ceph/messenger.c
@@ -2037,9 +2037,24 @@ static int process_connect(struct ceph_c
if (con->auth) {
/*
* Any connection that defines ->get_authorizer()
- * should also define ->verify_authorizer_reply().
+ * should also define ->add_authorizer_challenge() and
+ * ->verify_authorizer_reply().
+ *
* See get_connect_authorizer().
*/
+ if (con->in_reply.tag == CEPH_MSGR_TAG_CHALLENGE_AUTHORIZER) {
+ ret = con->ops->add_authorizer_challenge(
+ con, con->auth->authorizer_reply_buf,
+ le32_to_cpu(con->in_reply.authorizer_len));
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ con_out_kvec_reset(con);
+ __prepare_write_connect(con);
+ prepare_read_connect(con);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
ret = con->ops->verify_authorizer_reply(con);
if (ret < 0) {
con->error_msg = "bad authorize reply";
--- a/net/ceph/osd_client.c
+++ b/net/ceph/osd_client.c
@@ -4478,6 +4478,16 @@ static struct ceph_auth_handshake *get_a
return auth;
}
+static int add_authorizer_challenge(struct ceph_connection *con,
+ void *challenge_buf, int challenge_buf_len)
+{
+ struct ceph_osd *o = con->private;
+ struct ceph_osd_client *osdc = o->o_osdc;
+ struct ceph_auth_client *ac = osdc->client->monc.auth;
+
+ return ceph_auth_add_authorizer_challenge(ac, o->o_auth.authorizer,
+ challenge_buf, challenge_buf_len);
+}
static int verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_connection *con)
{
@@ -4519,6 +4529,7 @@ static const struct ceph_connection_oper
.put = put_osd_con,
.dispatch = dispatch,
.get_authorizer = get_authorizer,
+ .add_authorizer_challenge = add_authorizer_challenge,
.verify_authorizer_reply = verify_authorizer_reply,
.invalidate_authorizer = invalidate_authorizer,
.alloc_msg = alloc_msg,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 055/101] libceph: implement CEPHX_V2 calculation mode
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (53 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 054/101] libceph: add authorizer challenge Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 056/101] libceph: weaken sizeof check in ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (50 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Ilya Dryomov, Sage Weil, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
commit cc255c76c70f7a87d97939621eae04b600d9f4a1 upstream.
Derive the signature from the entire buffer (both AES cipher blocks)
instead of using just the first half of the first block, leaving out
data_crc entirely.
This addresses CVE-2018-1129.
Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/24837
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9:
- Define and test the feature bit in the old way
- Don't change any other feature bits in ceph_features.h]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
include/linux/ceph/ceph_features.h | 4 +
net/ceph/auth_x.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
2 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/ceph/ceph_features.h
+++ b/include/linux/ceph/ceph_features.h
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
// duplicated since it was introduced at the same time as CEPH_FEATURE_CRUSH_TUNABLES5
#define CEPH_FEATURE_NEW_OSDOPREPLY_ENCODING (1ULL<<58) /* New, v7 encoding */
#define CEPH_FEATURE_FS_FILE_LAYOUT_V2 (1ULL<<58) /* file_layout_t */
+#define CEPH_FEATURE_CEPHX_V2 (1ULL<<61) // *do not share this bit*
/*
* The introduction of CEPH_FEATURE_OSD_SNAPMAPPER caused the feature
@@ -124,7 +125,8 @@ static inline u64 ceph_sanitize_features
CEPH_FEATURE_MSGR_KEEPALIVE2 | \
CEPH_FEATURE_CRUSH_V4 | \
CEPH_FEATURE_CRUSH_TUNABLES5 | \
- CEPH_FEATURE_NEW_OSDOPREPLY_ENCODING)
+ CEPH_FEATURE_NEW_OSDOPREPLY_ENCODING | \
+ CEPH_FEATURE_CEPHX_V2)
#define CEPH_FEATURES_REQUIRED_DEFAULT \
(CEPH_FEATURE_NOSRCADDR | \
--- a/net/ceph/auth_x.c
+++ b/net/ceph/auth_x.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <linux/ceph/decode.h>
#include <linux/ceph/auth.h>
+#include <linux/ceph/ceph_features.h>
#include <linux/ceph/libceph.h>
#include <linux/ceph/messenger.h>
@@ -799,26 +800,64 @@ static int calc_signature(struct ceph_x_
__le64 *psig)
{
void *enc_buf = au->enc_buf;
- struct {
- __le32 len;
- __le32 header_crc;
- __le32 front_crc;
- __le32 middle_crc;
- __le32 data_crc;
- } __packed *sigblock = enc_buf + ceph_x_encrypt_offset();
- int ret;
-
- sigblock->len = cpu_to_le32(4*sizeof(u32));
- sigblock->header_crc = msg->hdr.crc;
- sigblock->front_crc = msg->footer.front_crc;
- sigblock->middle_crc = msg->footer.middle_crc;
- sigblock->data_crc = msg->footer.data_crc;
- ret = ceph_x_encrypt(&au->session_key, enc_buf, CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN,
- sizeof(*sigblock));
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (msg->con->peer_features & CEPH_FEATURE_CEPHX_V2) {
+ struct {
+ __le32 len;
+ __le32 header_crc;
+ __le32 front_crc;
+ __le32 middle_crc;
+ __le32 data_crc;
+ } __packed *sigblock = enc_buf + ceph_x_encrypt_offset();
+
+ sigblock->len = cpu_to_le32(4*sizeof(u32));
+ sigblock->header_crc = msg->hdr.crc;
+ sigblock->front_crc = msg->footer.front_crc;
+ sigblock->middle_crc = msg->footer.middle_crc;
+ sigblock->data_crc = msg->footer.data_crc;
+
+ ret = ceph_x_encrypt(&au->session_key, enc_buf,
+ CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN, sizeof(*sigblock));
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ *psig = *(__le64 *)(enc_buf + sizeof(u32));
+ } else {
+ struct {
+ __le32 header_crc;
+ __le32 front_crc;
+ __le32 front_len;
+ __le32 middle_crc;
+ __le32 middle_len;
+ __le32 data_crc;
+ __le32 data_len;
+ __le32 seq_lower_word;
+ } __packed *sigblock = enc_buf;
+ struct {
+ __le64 a, b, c, d;
+ } __packed *penc = enc_buf;
+ int ciphertext_len;
+
+ sigblock->header_crc = msg->hdr.crc;
+ sigblock->front_crc = msg->footer.front_crc;
+ sigblock->front_len = msg->hdr.front_len;
+ sigblock->middle_crc = msg->footer.middle_crc;
+ sigblock->middle_len = msg->hdr.middle_len;
+ sigblock->data_crc = msg->footer.data_crc;
+ sigblock->data_len = msg->hdr.data_len;
+ sigblock->seq_lower_word = *(__le32 *)&msg->hdr.seq;
+
+ /* no leading len, no ceph_x_encrypt_header */
+ ret = ceph_crypt(&au->session_key, true, enc_buf,
+ CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN, sizeof(*sigblock),
+ &ciphertext_len);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ *psig = penc->a ^ penc->b ^ penc->c ^ penc->d;
+ }
- *psig = *(__le64 *)(enc_buf + sizeof(u32));
return 0;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 056/101] libceph: weaken sizeof check in ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply()
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (54 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 055/101] libceph: implement CEPHX_V2 calculation mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 057/101] libceph: check authorizer reply/challenge length before reading Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (49 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Ilya Dryomov, Sage Weil, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
commit f1d10e04637924f2b00a0fecdd2ca4565f5cfc3f upstream.
Allow for extending ceph_x_authorize_reply in the future.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/ceph/auth_x.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/ceph/auth_x.c
+++ b/net/ceph/auth_x.c
@@ -733,8 +733,10 @@ static int ceph_x_verify_authorizer_repl
ret = ceph_x_decrypt(&au->session_key, &p, p + CEPHX_AU_ENC_BUF_LEN);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- if (ret != sizeof(*reply))
- return -EPERM;
+ if (ret < sizeof(*reply)) {
+ pr_err("bad size %d for ceph_x_authorize_reply\n", ret);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
if (au->nonce + 1 != le64_to_cpu(reply->nonce_plus_one))
ret = -EPERM;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 057/101] libceph: check authorizer reply/challenge length before reading
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (55 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 056/101] libceph: weaken sizeof check in ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 058/101] bpf/verifier: Add spi variable to check_stack_write() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (48 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Ilya Dryomov, Sage Weil, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
commit 130f52f2b203aa0aec179341916ffb2e905f3afd upstream.
Avoid scribbling over memory if the received reply/challenge is larger
than the buffer supplied with the authorizer.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/ceph/messenger.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
--- a/net/ceph/messenger.c
+++ b/net/ceph/messenger.c
@@ -1738,6 +1738,13 @@ static int read_partial_connect(struct c
if (con->auth) {
size = le32_to_cpu(con->in_reply.authorizer_len);
+ if (size > con->auth->authorizer_reply_buf_len) {
+ pr_err("authorizer reply too big: %d > %zu\n", size,
+ con->auth->authorizer_reply_buf_len);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
end += size;
ret = read_partial(con, end, size,
con->auth->authorizer_reply_buf);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 058/101] bpf/verifier: Add spi variable to check_stack_write()
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (56 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 057/101] libceph: check authorizer reply/challenge length before reading Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 059/101] bpf/verifier: Pass instruction index to check_mem_access() and check_xadd() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (47 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Daniel Borkmann, Alexei Starovoitov,
Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Extracted from commit dc503a8ad984 "bpf/verifier: track liveness for
pruning".
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 8 +++-----
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -543,7 +543,7 @@ static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bp
static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off,
int size, int value_regno)
{
- int i;
+ int i, spi = (MAX_BPF_STACK + off) / BPF_REG_SIZE;
/* caller checked that off % size == 0 and -MAX_BPF_STACK <= off < 0,
* so it's aligned access and [off, off + size) are within stack limits
*/
@@ -558,15 +558,13 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_
}
/* save register state */
- state->spilled_regs[(MAX_BPF_STACK + off) / BPF_REG_SIZE] =
- state->regs[value_regno];
+ state->spilled_regs[spi] = state->regs[value_regno];
for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] = STACK_SPILL;
} else {
/* regular write of data into stack */
- state->spilled_regs[(MAX_BPF_STACK + off) / BPF_REG_SIZE] =
- (struct bpf_reg_state) {};
+ state->spilled_regs[spi] = (struct bpf_reg_state) {};
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] = STACK_MISC;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 059/101] bpf/verifier: Pass instruction index to check_mem_access() and check_xadd()
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (57 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 058/101] bpf/verifier: Add spi variable to check_stack_write() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 060/101] bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (46 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Daniel Borkmann, Alexei Starovoitov,
Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Extracted from commit 31fd85816dbe "bpf: permits narrower load from
bpf program context fields".
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 18 +++++++++---------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bp
* if t==write && value_regno==-1, some unknown value is stored into memory
* if t==read && value_regno==-1, don't care what we read from memory
*/
-static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
+static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regno, int off,
int bpf_size, enum bpf_access_type t,
int value_regno)
{
@@ -875,7 +875,7 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_v
return err;
}
-static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
+static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
int err;
@@ -908,13 +908,13 @@ static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifie
}
/* check whether atomic_add can read the memory */
- err = check_mem_access(env, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
+ err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1);
if (err)
return err;
/* check whether atomic_add can write into the same memory */
- return check_mem_access(env, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
+ return check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1);
}
@@ -1270,7 +1270,7 @@ static int check_call(struct bpf_verifie
* is inferred from register state.
*/
for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) {
- err = check_mem_access(env, meta.regno, i, BPF_B, BPF_WRITE, -1);
+ err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B, BPF_WRITE, -1);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -2936,7 +2936,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_
/* check that memory (src_reg + off) is readable,
* the state of dst_reg will be updated by this func
*/
- err = check_mem_access(env, insn->src_reg, insn->off,
+ err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->src_reg, insn->off,
BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ,
insn->dst_reg);
if (err)
@@ -2976,7 +2976,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_
enum bpf_reg_type *prev_dst_type, dst_reg_type;
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD) {
- err = check_xadd(env, insn);
+ err = check_xadd(env, insn_idx, insn);
if (err)
return err;
insn_idx++;
@@ -2995,7 +2995,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_
dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type;
/* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */
- err = check_mem_access(env, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
+ err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE,
insn->src_reg);
if (err)
@@ -3030,7 +3030,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_
}
/* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */
- err = check_mem_access(env, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
+ err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE,
-1);
if (err)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 060/101] bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (58 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 059/101] bpf/verifier: Pass instruction index to check_mem_access() and check_xadd() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 061/101] wil6210: missing length check in wmi_set_ie Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (45 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Alexei Starovoitov, Thomas Gleixner,
Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
commit af86ca4e3088fe5eacf2f7e58c01fa68ca067672 upstream.
Detect code patterns where malicious 'speculative store bypass' can be used
and sanitize such patterns.
39: (bf) r3 = r10
40: (07) r3 += -216
41: (79) r8 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0) // slow read
42: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -72) = 0 // verifier inserts this instruction
43: (7b) *(u64 *)(r8 +0) = r3 // this store becomes slow due to r8
44: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r6 +0) // cpu speculatively executes this load
45: (71) r2 = *(u8 *)(r1 +0) // speculatively arbitrary 'load byte'
// is now sanitized
Above code after x86 JIT becomes:
e5: mov %rbp,%rdx
e8: add $0xffffffffffffff28,%rdx
ef: mov 0x0(%r13),%r14
f3: movq $0x0,-0x48(%rbp)
fb: mov %rdx,0x0(%r14)
ff: mov 0x0(%rbx),%rdi
103: movzbq 0x0(%rdi),%rsi
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9:
- Add bpf_verifier_env parameter to check_stack_write()
- Look up stack slot_types with state->stack_slot_type[] rather than
state->stack[].slot_type[]
- Drop bpf_verifier_env argument to verbose()
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 1
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
2 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ struct bpf_insn_aux_data {
enum bpf_reg_type ptr_type; /* pointer type for load/store insns */
struct bpf_map *map_ptr; /* pointer for call insn into lookup_elem */
};
+ int sanitize_stack_off; /* stack slot to be cleared */
bool seen; /* this insn was processed by the verifier */
};
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -540,8 +540,9 @@ static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bp
/* check_stack_read/write functions track spill/fill of registers,
* stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access()
*/
-static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off,
- int size, int value_regno)
+static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off,
+ int size, int value_regno, int insn_idx)
{
int i, spi = (MAX_BPF_STACK + off) / BPF_REG_SIZE;
/* caller checked that off % size == 0 and -MAX_BPF_STACK <= off < 0,
@@ -560,8 +561,32 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_
/* save register state */
state->spilled_regs[spi] = state->regs[value_regno];
- for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
+ if (state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] == STACK_MISC &&
+ !env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
+ int *poff = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].sanitize_stack_off;
+ int soff = (-spi - 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE;
+
+ /* detected reuse of integer stack slot with a pointer
+ * which means either llvm is reusing stack slot or
+ * an attacker is trying to exploit CVE-2018-3639
+ * (speculative store bypass)
+ * Have to sanitize that slot with preemptive
+ * store of zero.
+ */
+ if (*poff && *poff != soff) {
+ /* disallow programs where single insn stores
+ * into two different stack slots, since verifier
+ * cannot sanitize them
+ */
+ verbose("insn %d cannot access two stack slots fp%d and fp%d",
+ insn_idx, *poff, soff);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ *poff = soff;
+ }
state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] = STACK_SPILL;
+ }
} else {
/* regular write of data into stack */
state->spilled_regs[spi] = (struct bpf_reg_state) {};
@@ -841,7 +866,8 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_v
verbose("attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack\n");
return -EACCES;
}
- err = check_stack_write(state, off, size, value_regno);
+ err = check_stack_write(env, state, off, size,
+ value_regno, insn_idx);
} else {
err = check_stack_read(state, off, size, value_regno);
}
@@ -3367,6 +3393,34 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct b
else
continue;
+ if (type == BPF_WRITE &&
+ env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_off) {
+ struct bpf_insn patch[] = {
+ /* Sanitize suspicious stack slot with zero.
+ * There are no memory dependencies for this store,
+ * since it's only using frame pointer and immediate
+ * constant of zero
+ */
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP,
+ env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_off,
+ 0),
+ /* the original STX instruction will immediately
+ * overwrite the same stack slot with appropriate value
+ */
+ *insn,
+ };
+
+ cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(patch);
+ new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patch, cnt);
+ if (!new_prog)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ delta += cnt - 1;
+ env->prog = new_prog;
+ insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
+ continue;
+ }
+
if (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type != PTR_TO_CTX)
continue;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 061/101] wil6210: missing length check in wmi_set_ie
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (59 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:38 ` [PATCH 4.9 060/101] bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 062/101] mm/hugetlb.c: dont call region_abort if region_chg fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (44 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Lior David, Maya Erez, Kalle Valo,
Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lior David <qca_liord@qca.qualcomm.com>
commit b5a8ffcae4103a9d823ea3aa3a761f65779fbe2a upstream.
Add a length check in wmi_set_ie to detect unsigned integer
overflow.
Signed-off-by: Lior David <qca_liord@qca.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Maya Erez <qca_merez@qca.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@qca.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/wireless/ath/wil6210/wmi.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/wil6210/wmi.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/wil6210/wmi.c
@@ -1302,8 +1302,14 @@ int wmi_set_ie(struct wil6210_priv *wil,
};
int rc;
u16 len = sizeof(struct wmi_set_appie_cmd) + ie_len;
- struct wmi_set_appie_cmd *cmd = kzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ struct wmi_set_appie_cmd *cmd;
+ if (len < ie_len) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ cmd = kzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cmd) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 062/101] mm/hugetlb.c: dont call region_abort if region_chg fails
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (60 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 061/101] wil6210: missing length check in wmi_set_ie Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 063/101] hugetlbfs: fix offset overflow in hugetlbfs mmap Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (43 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Mike Kravetz, Dmitry Vyukov,
Hillf Danton, Andrew Morton, Linus Torvalds, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
commit ff8c0c53c47530ffea82c22a0a6df6332b56c957 upstream.
Changes to hugetlbfs reservation maps is a two step process. The first
step is a call to region_chg to determine what needs to be changed, and
prepare that change. This should be followed by a call to call to
region_add to commit the change, or region_abort to abort the change.
The error path in hugetlb_reserve_pages called region_abort after a
failed call to region_chg. As a result, the adds_in_progress counter in
the reservation map is off by 1. This is caught by a VM_BUG_ON in
resv_map_release when the reservation map is freed.
syzkaller fuzzer (when using an injected kmalloc failure) found this
bug, that resulted in the following:
kernel BUG at mm/hugetlb.c:742!
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_evict_inode+0x7b/0xa0 fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:493
evict+0x481/0x920 fs/inode.c:553
iput_final fs/inode.c:1515 [inline]
iput+0x62b/0xa20 fs/inode.c:1542
hugetlb_file_setup+0x593/0x9f0 fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:1306
newseg+0x422/0xd30 ipc/shm.c:575
ipcget_new ipc/util.c:285 [inline]
ipcget+0x21e/0x580 ipc/util.c:639
SYSC_shmget ipc/shm.c:673 [inline]
SyS_shmget+0x158/0x230 ipc/shm.c:657
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
RIP: resv_map_release+0x265/0x330 mm/hugetlb.c:742
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1490821682-23228-1-git-send-email-mike.kravetz@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Hillf Danton <hillf.zj@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
mm/hugetlb.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/mm/hugetlb.c
+++ b/mm/hugetlb.c
@@ -4259,7 +4259,9 @@ int hugetlb_reserve_pages(struct inode *
return 0;
out_err:
if (!vma || vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE)
- region_abort(resv_map, from, to);
+ /* Don't call region_abort if region_chg failed */
+ if (chg >= 0)
+ region_abort(resv_map, from, to);
if (vma && is_vma_resv_set(vma, HPAGE_RESV_OWNER))
kref_put(&resv_map->refs, resv_map_release);
return ret;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 063/101] hugetlbfs: fix offset overflow in hugetlbfs mmap
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (61 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 062/101] mm/hugetlb.c: dont call region_abort if region_chg fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 064/101] hugetlbfs: check for pgoff value overflow Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (42 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Vegard Nossum, Mike Kravetz,
Hillf Danton, Dmitry Vyukov, Michal Hocko, Kirill A . Shutemov,
Andrey Ryabinin, Naoya Horiguchi, Andrew Morton, Linus Torvalds,
Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
commit 045c7a3f53d9403b62d396b6d051c4be5044cdb4 upstream.
If mmap() maps a file, it can be passed an offset into the file at which
the mapping is to start. Offset could be a negative value when
represented as a loff_t. The offset plus length will be used to update
the file size (i_size) which is also a loff_t.
Validate the value of offset and offset + length to make sure they do
not overflow and appear as negative.
Found by syzcaller with commit ff8c0c53c475 ("mm/hugetlb.c: don't call
region_abort if region_chg fails") applied. Prior to this commit, the
overflow would still occur but we would luckily return ENOMEM.
To reproduce:
mmap(0, 0x2000, 0, 0x40021, 0xffffffffffffffffULL, 0x8000000000000000ULL);
Resulted in,
kernel BUG at mm/hugetlb.c:742!
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_evict_inode+0x80/0xa0
evict+0x24a/0x620
iput+0x48f/0x8c0
dentry_unlink_inode+0x31f/0x4d0
__dentry_kill+0x292/0x5e0
dput+0x730/0x830
__fput+0x438/0x720
____fput+0x1a/0x20
task_work_run+0xfe/0x180
exit_to_usermode_loop+0x133/0x150
syscall_return_slowpath+0x184/0x1c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xab/0xad
Fixes: ff8c0c53c475 ("mm/hugetlb.c: don't call region_abort if region_chg fails")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1491951118-30678-1-git-send-email-mike.kravetz@oracle.com
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Hillf Danton <hillf.zj@alibaba-inc.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c
@@ -136,17 +136,26 @@ static int hugetlbfs_file_mmap(struct fi
vma->vm_flags |= VM_HUGETLB | VM_DONTEXPAND;
vma->vm_ops = &hugetlb_vm_ops;
+ /*
+ * Offset passed to mmap (before page shift) could have been
+ * negative when represented as a (l)off_t.
+ */
+ if (((loff_t)vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT) < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (vma->vm_pgoff & (~huge_page_mask(h) >> PAGE_SHIFT))
return -EINVAL;
vma_len = (loff_t)(vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start);
+ len = vma_len + ((loff_t)vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT);
+ /* check for overflow */
+ if (len < vma_len)
+ return -EINVAL;
inode_lock(inode);
file_accessed(file);
ret = -ENOMEM;
- len = vma_len + ((loff_t)vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT);
-
if (hugetlb_reserve_pages(inode,
vma->vm_pgoff >> huge_page_order(h),
len >> huge_page_shift(h), vma,
@@ -155,7 +164,7 @@ static int hugetlbfs_file_mmap(struct fi
ret = 0;
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE && inode->i_size < len)
- inode->i_size = len;
+ i_size_write(inode, len);
out:
inode_unlock(inode);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 064/101] hugetlbfs: check for pgoff value overflow
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (62 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 063/101] hugetlbfs: fix offset overflow in hugetlbfs mmap Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 065/101] btrfs: validate type when reading a chunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (41 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Mike Kravetz, Nic Losby,
Michal Hocko, Kirill A . Shutemov, Yisheng Xie, Andrew Morton,
Linus Torvalds, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
commit 63489f8e821144000e0bdca7e65a8d1cc23a7ee7 upstream.
A vma with vm_pgoff large enough to overflow a loff_t type when
converted to a byte offset can be passed via the remap_file_pages system
call. The hugetlbfs mmap routine uses the byte offset to calculate
reservations and file size.
A sequence such as:
mmap(0x20a00000, 0x600000, 0, 0x66033, -1, 0);
remap_file_pages(0x20a00000, 0x600000, 0, 0x20000000000000, 0);
will result in the following when task exits/file closed,
kernel BUG at mm/hugetlb.c:749!
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_evict_inode+0x2f/0x40
evict+0xcb/0x190
__dentry_kill+0xcb/0x150
__fput+0x164/0x1e0
task_work_run+0x84/0xa0
exit_to_usermode_loop+0x7d/0x80
do_syscall_64+0x18b/0x190
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
The overflowed pgoff value causes hugetlbfs to try to set up a mapping
with a negative range (end < start) that leaves invalid state which
causes the BUG.
The previous overflow fix to this code was incomplete and did not take
the remap_file_pages system call into account.
[mike.kravetz@oracle.com: v3]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180309002726.7248-1-mike.kravetz@oracle.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: include mmdebug.h]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix -ve left shift count on sh]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180308210502.15952-1-mike.kravetz@oracle.com
Fixes: 045c7a3f53d9 ("hugetlbfs: fix offset overflow in hugetlbfs mmap")
Signed-off-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Nic Losby <blurbdust@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Yisheng Xie <xieyisheng1@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c | 17 ++++++++++++++---
mm/hugetlb.c | 6 ++++++
2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c
@@ -118,6 +118,16 @@ static void huge_pagevec_release(struct
pagevec_reinit(pvec);
}
+/*
+ * Mask used when checking the page offset value passed in via system
+ * calls. This value will be converted to a loff_t which is signed.
+ * Therefore, we want to check the upper PAGE_SHIFT + 1 bits of the
+ * value. The extra bit (- 1 in the shift value) is to take the sign
+ * bit into account.
+ */
+#define PGOFF_LOFFT_MAX \
+ (((1UL << (PAGE_SHIFT + 1)) - 1) << (BITS_PER_LONG - (PAGE_SHIFT + 1)))
+
static int hugetlbfs_file_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
@@ -137,12 +147,13 @@ static int hugetlbfs_file_mmap(struct fi
vma->vm_ops = &hugetlb_vm_ops;
/*
- * Offset passed to mmap (before page shift) could have been
- * negative when represented as a (l)off_t.
+ * page based offset in vm_pgoff could be sufficiently large to
+ * overflow a (l)off_t when converted to byte offset.
*/
- if (((loff_t)vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT) < 0)
+ if (vma->vm_pgoff & PGOFF_LOFFT_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
+ /* must be huge page aligned */
if (vma->vm_pgoff & (~huge_page_mask(h) >> PAGE_SHIFT))
return -EINVAL;
--- a/mm/hugetlb.c
+++ b/mm/hugetlb.c
@@ -4170,6 +4170,12 @@ int hugetlb_reserve_pages(struct inode *
struct resv_map *resv_map;
long gbl_reserve;
+ /* This should never happen */
+ if (from > to) {
+ VM_WARN(1, "%s called with a negative range\n", __func__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
/*
* Only apply hugepage reservation if asked. At fault time, an
* attempt will be made for VM_NORESERVE to allocate a page
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 065/101] btrfs: validate type when reading a chunk
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (63 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 064/101] hugetlbfs: check for pgoff value overflow Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 066/101] btrfs: Verify that every chunk has corresponding block group at mount time Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (40 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Xu Wen, Qu Wenruo, Gu Jinxiang,
David Sterba, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Gu Jinxiang <gujx@cn.fujitsu.com>
commit 315409b0098fb2651d86553f0436b70502b29bb2 upstream.
Reported in https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199839, with an
image that has an invalid chunk type but does not return an error.
Add chunk type check in btrfs_check_chunk_valid, to detect the wrong
type combinations.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199839
Reported-by: Xu Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Gu Jinxiang <gujx@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: Use root->fs_info instead of fs_info]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/btrfs/volumes.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/btrfs/volumes.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/volumes.c
@@ -6370,6 +6370,8 @@ static int btrfs_check_chunk_valid(struc
u16 num_stripes;
u16 sub_stripes;
u64 type;
+ u64 features;
+ bool mixed = false;
length = btrfs_chunk_length(leaf, chunk);
stripe_len = btrfs_chunk_stripe_len(leaf, chunk);
@@ -6410,6 +6412,32 @@ static int btrfs_check_chunk_valid(struc
btrfs_chunk_type(leaf, chunk));
return -EIO;
}
+
+ if ((type & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_TYPE_MASK) == 0) {
+ btrfs_err(root->fs_info, "missing chunk type flag: 0x%llx", type);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ if ((type & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_SYSTEM) &&
+ (type & (BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_METADATA | BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_DATA))) {
+ btrfs_err(root->fs_info,
+ "system chunk with data or metadata type: 0x%llx", type);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ features = btrfs_super_incompat_flags(root->fs_info->super_copy);
+ if (features & BTRFS_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_MIXED_GROUPS)
+ mixed = true;
+
+ if (!mixed) {
+ if ((type & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_METADATA) &&
+ (type & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_DATA)) {
+ btrfs_err(root->fs_info,
+ "mixed chunk type in non-mixed mode: 0x%llx", type);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+ }
+
if ((type & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID10 && sub_stripes != 2) ||
(type & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID1 && num_stripes < 1) ||
(type & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID5 && num_stripes < 2) ||
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 066/101] btrfs: Verify that every chunk has corresponding block group at mount time
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (64 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 065/101] btrfs: validate type when reading a chunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 067/101] btrfs: Refactor check_leaf function for later expansion Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (39 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Xu Wen, Qu Wenruo, Gu Jinxiang,
David Sterba, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
commit 7ef49515fa6727cb4b6f2f5b0ffbc5fc20a9f8c6 upstream.
If a crafted image has missing block group items, it could cause
unexpected behavior and breaks the assumption of 1:1 chunk<->block group
mapping.
Although we have the block group -> chunk mapping check, we still need
chunk -> block group mapping check.
This patch will do extra check to ensure each chunk has its
corresponding block group.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199847
Reported-by: Xu Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Gu Jinxiang <gujx@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c
@@ -10159,6 +10159,62 @@ btrfs_create_block_group_cache(struct bt
return cache;
}
+
+/*
+ * Iterate all chunks and verify that each of them has the corresponding block
+ * group
+ */
+static int check_chunk_block_group_mappings(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info)
+{
+ struct btrfs_mapping_tree *map_tree = &fs_info->mapping_tree;
+ struct extent_map *em;
+ struct btrfs_block_group_cache *bg;
+ u64 start = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ while (1) {
+ read_lock(&map_tree->map_tree.lock);
+ /*
+ * lookup_extent_mapping will return the first extent map
+ * intersecting the range, so setting @len to 1 is enough to
+ * get the first chunk.
+ */
+ em = lookup_extent_mapping(&map_tree->map_tree, start, 1);
+ read_unlock(&map_tree->map_tree.lock);
+ if (!em)
+ break;
+
+ bg = btrfs_lookup_block_group(fs_info, em->start);
+ if (!bg) {
+ btrfs_err(fs_info,
+ "chunk start=%llu len=%llu doesn't have corresponding block group",
+ em->start, em->len);
+ ret = -EUCLEAN;
+ free_extent_map(em);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (bg->key.objectid != em->start ||
+ bg->key.offset != em->len ||
+ (bg->flags & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_TYPE_MASK) !=
+ (em->map_lookup->type & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_TYPE_MASK)) {
+ btrfs_err(fs_info,
+"chunk start=%llu len=%llu flags=0x%llx doesn't match block group start=%llu len=%llu flags=0x%llx",
+ em->start, em->len,
+ em->map_lookup->type & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_TYPE_MASK,
+ bg->key.objectid, bg->key.offset,
+ bg->flags & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_TYPE_MASK);
+ ret = -EUCLEAN;
+ free_extent_map(em);
+ btrfs_put_block_group(bg);
+ break;
+ }
+ start = em->start + em->len;
+ free_extent_map(em);
+ btrfs_put_block_group(bg);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
int btrfs_read_block_groups(struct btrfs_root *root)
{
struct btrfs_path *path;
@@ -10343,7 +10399,7 @@ int btrfs_read_block_groups(struct btrfs
}
init_global_block_rsv(info);
- ret = 0;
+ ret = check_chunk_block_group_mappings(info);
error:
btrfs_free_path(path);
return ret;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 067/101] btrfs: Refactor check_leaf function for later expansion
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (65 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 066/101] btrfs: Verify that every chunk has corresponding block group at mount time Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 068/101] btrfs: Check if item pointer overlaps with the item itself Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (38 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Qu Wenruo, Nikolay Borisov,
David Sterba, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo.btrfs@gmx.com>
commit c3267bbaa9cae09b62960eafe33ad19196803285 upstream.
Current check_leaf() function does a good job checking key order and
item offset/size.
However it only checks from slot 0 to the last but one slot, this is
good but makes later expansion hard.
So this refactoring iterates from slot 0 to the last slot.
For key comparison, it uses a key with all 0 as initial key, so all
valid keys should be larger than that.
And for item size/offset checks, it compares current item end with
previous item offset.
For slot 0, use leaf end as a special case.
This makes later item/key offset checks and item size checks easier to
be implemented.
Also, makes check_leaf() to return -EUCLEAN other than -EIO to indicate
error.
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo.btrfs@gmx.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9:
- BTRFS_LEAF_DATA_SIZE() takes a root rather than an fs_info
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
@@ -547,8 +547,9 @@ static int check_tree_block_fsid(struct
static noinline int check_leaf(struct btrfs_root *root,
struct extent_buffer *leaf)
{
+ /* No valid key type is 0, so all key should be larger than this key */
+ struct btrfs_key prev_key = {0, 0, 0};
struct btrfs_key key;
- struct btrfs_key leaf_key;
u32 nritems = btrfs_header_nritems(leaf);
int slot;
@@ -581,7 +582,7 @@ static noinline int check_leaf(struct bt
CORRUPT("non-root leaf's nritems is 0",
leaf, check_root, 0);
free_extent_buffer(eb);
- return -EIO;
+ return -EUCLEAN;
}
free_extent_buffer(eb);
}
@@ -591,28 +592,23 @@ static noinline int check_leaf(struct bt
if (nritems == 0)
return 0;
- /* Check the 0 item */
- if (btrfs_item_offset_nr(leaf, 0) + btrfs_item_size_nr(leaf, 0) !=
- BTRFS_LEAF_DATA_SIZE(root)) {
- CORRUPT("invalid item offset size pair", leaf, root, 0);
- return -EIO;
- }
-
/*
- * Check to make sure each items keys are in the correct order and their
- * offsets make sense. We only have to loop through nritems-1 because
- * we check the current slot against the next slot, which verifies the
- * next slot's offset+size makes sense and that the current's slot
- * offset is correct.
+ * Check the following things to make sure this is a good leaf, and
+ * leaf users won't need to bother with similar sanity checks:
+ *
+ * 1) key order
+ * 2) item offset and size
+ * No overlap, no hole, all inside the leaf.
*/
- for (slot = 0; slot < nritems - 1; slot++) {
- btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(leaf, &leaf_key, slot);
- btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(leaf, &key, slot + 1);
+ for (slot = 0; slot < nritems; slot++) {
+ u32 item_end_expected;
+
+ btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(leaf, &key, slot);
/* Make sure the keys are in the right order */
- if (btrfs_comp_cpu_keys(&leaf_key, &key) >= 0) {
+ if (btrfs_comp_cpu_keys(&prev_key, &key) >= 0) {
CORRUPT("bad key order", leaf, root, slot);
- return -EIO;
+ return -EUCLEAN;
}
/*
@@ -620,10 +616,14 @@ static noinline int check_leaf(struct bt
* item data starts at the end of the leaf and grows towards the
* front.
*/
- if (btrfs_item_offset_nr(leaf, slot) !=
- btrfs_item_end_nr(leaf, slot + 1)) {
+ if (slot == 0)
+ item_end_expected = BTRFS_LEAF_DATA_SIZE(root);
+ else
+ item_end_expected = btrfs_item_offset_nr(leaf,
+ slot - 1);
+ if (btrfs_item_end_nr(leaf, slot) != item_end_expected) {
CORRUPT("slot offset bad", leaf, root, slot);
- return -EIO;
+ return -EUCLEAN;
}
/*
@@ -634,8 +634,12 @@ static noinline int check_leaf(struct bt
if (btrfs_item_end_nr(leaf, slot) >
BTRFS_LEAF_DATA_SIZE(root)) {
CORRUPT("slot end outside of leaf", leaf, root, slot);
- return -EIO;
+ return -EUCLEAN;
}
+
+ prev_key.objectid = key.objectid;
+ prev_key.type = key.type;
+ prev_key.offset = key.offset;
}
return 0;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 068/101] btrfs: Check if item pointer overlaps with the item itself
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (66 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 067/101] btrfs: Refactor check_leaf function for later expansion Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 069/101] btrfs: Add sanity check for EXTENT_DATA when reading out leaf Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (37 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Qu Wenruo, Nikolay Borisov,
David Sterba, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo.btrfs@gmx.com>
commit 7f43d4affb2a254d421ab20b0cf65ac2569909fb upstream.
Function check_leaf() checks if any item pointer points outside of the
leaf, but it doesn't check if the pointer overlaps with the item itself.
Normally only the last item may be the victim, but adding such check is
never a bad idea anyway.
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo.btrfs@gmx.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
@@ -637,6 +637,13 @@ static noinline int check_leaf(struct bt
return -EUCLEAN;
}
+ /* Also check if the item pointer overlaps with btrfs item. */
+ if (btrfs_item_nr_offset(slot) + sizeof(struct btrfs_item) >
+ btrfs_item_ptr_offset(leaf, slot)) {
+ CORRUPT("slot overlap with its data", leaf, root, slot);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+
prev_key.objectid = key.objectid;
prev_key.type = key.type;
prev_key.offset = key.offset;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 069/101] btrfs: Add sanity check for EXTENT_DATA when reading out leaf
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (67 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 068/101] btrfs: Check if item pointer overlaps with the item itself Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 070/101] btrfs: Add checker for EXTENT_CSUM Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (36 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Qu Wenruo, Nikolay Borisov,
David Sterba, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo.btrfs@gmx.com>
commit 40c3c40947324d9f40bf47830c92c59a9bbadf4a upstream.
Add extra checks for item with EXTENT_DATA type. This checks the
following thing:
0) Key offset
All key offsets must be aligned to sectorsize.
Inline extent must have 0 for key offset.
1) Item size
Uncompressed inline file extent size must match item size.
(Compressed inline file extent has no information about its on-disk size.)
Regular/preallocated file extent size must be a fixed value.
2) Every member of regular file extent item
Including alignment for bytenr and offset, possible value for
compression/encryption/type.
3) Type/compression/encode must be one of the valid values.
This should be the most comprehensive and strict check in the context
of btrfs_item for EXTENT_DATA.
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo.btrfs@gmx.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ switch to BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_TYPES, similar to what
BTRFS_COMPRESS_TYPES does ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: Use root->sectorsize instead of
root->fs_info->sectorsize]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 103 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/uapi/linux/btrfs_tree.h | 1
2 files changed, 104 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
@@ -544,6 +544,100 @@ static int check_tree_block_fsid(struct
btrfs_header_level(eb) == 0 ? "leaf" : "node",\
reason, btrfs_header_bytenr(eb), root->objectid, slot)
+static int check_extent_data_item(struct btrfs_root *root,
+ struct extent_buffer *leaf,
+ struct btrfs_key *key, int slot)
+{
+ struct btrfs_file_extent_item *fi;
+ u32 sectorsize = root->sectorsize;
+ u32 item_size = btrfs_item_size_nr(leaf, slot);
+
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(key->offset, sectorsize)) {
+ CORRUPT("unaligned key offset for file extent",
+ leaf, root, slot);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+
+ fi = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot, struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
+
+ if (btrfs_file_extent_type(leaf, fi) > BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_TYPES) {
+ CORRUPT("invalid file extent type", leaf, root, slot);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Support for new compression/encrption must introduce incompat flag,
+ * and must be caught in open_ctree().
+ */
+ if (btrfs_file_extent_compression(leaf, fi) > BTRFS_COMPRESS_TYPES) {
+ CORRUPT("invalid file extent compression", leaf, root, slot);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+ if (btrfs_file_extent_encryption(leaf, fi)) {
+ CORRUPT("invalid file extent encryption", leaf, root, slot);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+ if (btrfs_file_extent_type(leaf, fi) == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
+ /* Inline extent must have 0 as key offset */
+ if (key->offset) {
+ CORRUPT("inline extent has non-zero key offset",
+ leaf, root, slot);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+
+ /* Compressed inline extent has no on-disk size, skip it */
+ if (btrfs_file_extent_compression(leaf, fi) !=
+ BTRFS_COMPRESS_NONE)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Uncompressed inline extent size must match item size */
+ if (item_size != BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE_DATA_START +
+ btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(leaf, fi)) {
+ CORRUPT("plaintext inline extent has invalid size",
+ leaf, root, slot);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Regular or preallocated extent has fixed item size */
+ if (item_size != sizeof(*fi)) {
+ CORRUPT(
+ "regluar or preallocated extent data item size is invalid",
+ leaf, root, slot);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(leaf, fi), sectorsize) ||
+ !IS_ALIGNED(btrfs_file_extent_disk_bytenr(leaf, fi), sectorsize) ||
+ !IS_ALIGNED(btrfs_file_extent_disk_num_bytes(leaf, fi), sectorsize) ||
+ !IS_ALIGNED(btrfs_file_extent_offset(leaf, fi), sectorsize) ||
+ !IS_ALIGNED(btrfs_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf, fi), sectorsize)) {
+ CORRUPT(
+ "regular or preallocated extent data item has unaligned value",
+ leaf, root, slot);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Common point to switch the item-specific validation.
+ */
+static int check_leaf_item(struct btrfs_root *root,
+ struct extent_buffer *leaf,
+ struct btrfs_key *key, int slot)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ switch (key->type) {
+ case BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY:
+ ret = check_extent_data_item(root, leaf, key, slot);
+ break;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
static noinline int check_leaf(struct btrfs_root *root,
struct extent_buffer *leaf)
{
@@ -599,9 +693,13 @@ static noinline int check_leaf(struct bt
* 1) key order
* 2) item offset and size
* No overlap, no hole, all inside the leaf.
+ * 3) item content
+ * If possible, do comprehensive sanity check.
+ * NOTE: All checks must only rely on the item data itself.
*/
for (slot = 0; slot < nritems; slot++) {
u32 item_end_expected;
+ int ret;
btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(leaf, &key, slot);
@@ -644,6 +742,11 @@ static noinline int check_leaf(struct bt
return -EUCLEAN;
}
+ /* Check if the item size and content meet other criteria */
+ ret = check_leaf_item(root, leaf, &key, slot);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
prev_key.objectid = key.objectid;
prev_key.type = key.type;
prev_key.offset = key.offset;
--- a/include/uapi/linux/btrfs_tree.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/btrfs_tree.h
@@ -730,6 +730,7 @@ struct btrfs_balance_item {
#define BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE 0
#define BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_REG 1
#define BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_PREALLOC 2
+#define BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_TYPES 2
struct btrfs_file_extent_item {
/*
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 070/101] btrfs: Add checker for EXTENT_CSUM
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (68 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 069/101] btrfs: Add sanity check for EXTENT_DATA when reading out leaf Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 071/101] btrfs: Move leaf and node validation checker to tree-checker.c Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (35 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Qu Wenruo, Nikolay Borisov,
David Sterba, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo.btrfs@gmx.com>
commit 4b865cab96fe2a30ed512cf667b354bd291b3b0a upstream.
EXTENT_CSUM checker is a relatively easy one, only needs to check:
1) Objectid
Fixed to BTRFS_EXTENT_CSUM_OBJECTID
2) Key offset alignment
Must be aligned to sectorsize
3) Item size alignedment
Must be aligned to csum size
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo.btrfs@gmx.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: Use root->sectorsize instead of
root->fs_info->sectorsize]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
@@ -621,6 +621,27 @@ static int check_extent_data_item(struct
return 0;
}
+static int check_csum_item(struct btrfs_root *root, struct extent_buffer *leaf,
+ struct btrfs_key *key, int slot)
+{
+ u32 sectorsize = root->sectorsize;
+ u32 csumsize = btrfs_super_csum_size(root->fs_info->super_copy);
+
+ if (key->objectid != BTRFS_EXTENT_CSUM_OBJECTID) {
+ CORRUPT("invalid objectid for csum item", leaf, root, slot);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(key->offset, sectorsize)) {
+ CORRUPT("unaligned key offset for csum item", leaf, root, slot);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(btrfs_item_size_nr(leaf, slot), csumsize)) {
+ CORRUPT("unaligned csum item size", leaf, root, slot);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Common point to switch the item-specific validation.
*/
@@ -634,6 +655,9 @@ static int check_leaf_item(struct btrfs_
case BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY:
ret = check_extent_data_item(root, leaf, key, slot);
break;
+ case BTRFS_EXTENT_CSUM_KEY:
+ ret = check_csum_item(root, leaf, key, slot);
+ break;
}
return ret;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 071/101] btrfs: Move leaf and node validation checker to tree-checker.c
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (69 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 070/101] btrfs: Add checker for EXTENT_CSUM Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 072/101] btrfs: struct-funcs, constify readers Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (34 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Qu Wenruo, David Sterba, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo.btrfs@gmx.com>
commit 557ea5dd003d371536f6b4e8f7c8209a2b6fd4e3 upstream.
It's no doubt the comprehensive tree block checker will become larger,
so moving them into their own files is quite reasonable.
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo.btrfs@gmx.com>
[ wording adjustments ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: The moved code is slightly different]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/btrfs/Makefile | 2
fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 284 --------------------------------------------
fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c | 309 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
fs/btrfs/tree-checker.h | 26 ++++
4 files changed, 340 insertions(+), 281 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c
create mode 100644 fs/btrfs/tree-checker.h
--- a/fs/btrfs/Makefile
+++ b/fs/btrfs/Makefile
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ btrfs-y += super.o ctree.o extent-tree.o
export.o tree-log.o free-space-cache.o zlib.o lzo.o \
compression.o delayed-ref.o relocation.o delayed-inode.o scrub.o \
reada.o backref.o ulist.o qgroup.o send.o dev-replace.o raid56.o \
- uuid-tree.o props.o hash.o free-space-tree.o
+ uuid-tree.o props.o hash.o free-space-tree.o tree-checker.o
btrfs-$(CONFIG_BTRFS_FS_POSIX_ACL) += acl.o
btrfs-$(CONFIG_BTRFS_FS_CHECK_INTEGRITY) += check-integrity.o
--- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
#include "sysfs.h"
#include "qgroup.h"
#include "compression.h"
+#include "tree-checker.h"
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
@@ -538,283 +539,6 @@ static int check_tree_block_fsid(struct
return ret;
}
-#define CORRUPT(reason, eb, root, slot) \
- btrfs_crit(root->fs_info, "corrupt %s, %s: block=%llu," \
- " root=%llu, slot=%d", \
- btrfs_header_level(eb) == 0 ? "leaf" : "node",\
- reason, btrfs_header_bytenr(eb), root->objectid, slot)
-
-static int check_extent_data_item(struct btrfs_root *root,
- struct extent_buffer *leaf,
- struct btrfs_key *key, int slot)
-{
- struct btrfs_file_extent_item *fi;
- u32 sectorsize = root->sectorsize;
- u32 item_size = btrfs_item_size_nr(leaf, slot);
-
- if (!IS_ALIGNED(key->offset, sectorsize)) {
- CORRUPT("unaligned key offset for file extent",
- leaf, root, slot);
- return -EUCLEAN;
- }
-
- fi = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot, struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
-
- if (btrfs_file_extent_type(leaf, fi) > BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_TYPES) {
- CORRUPT("invalid file extent type", leaf, root, slot);
- return -EUCLEAN;
- }
-
- /*
- * Support for new compression/encrption must introduce incompat flag,
- * and must be caught in open_ctree().
- */
- if (btrfs_file_extent_compression(leaf, fi) > BTRFS_COMPRESS_TYPES) {
- CORRUPT("invalid file extent compression", leaf, root, slot);
- return -EUCLEAN;
- }
- if (btrfs_file_extent_encryption(leaf, fi)) {
- CORRUPT("invalid file extent encryption", leaf, root, slot);
- return -EUCLEAN;
- }
- if (btrfs_file_extent_type(leaf, fi) == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
- /* Inline extent must have 0 as key offset */
- if (key->offset) {
- CORRUPT("inline extent has non-zero key offset",
- leaf, root, slot);
- return -EUCLEAN;
- }
-
- /* Compressed inline extent has no on-disk size, skip it */
- if (btrfs_file_extent_compression(leaf, fi) !=
- BTRFS_COMPRESS_NONE)
- return 0;
-
- /* Uncompressed inline extent size must match item size */
- if (item_size != BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE_DATA_START +
- btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(leaf, fi)) {
- CORRUPT("plaintext inline extent has invalid size",
- leaf, root, slot);
- return -EUCLEAN;
- }
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Regular or preallocated extent has fixed item size */
- if (item_size != sizeof(*fi)) {
- CORRUPT(
- "regluar or preallocated extent data item size is invalid",
- leaf, root, slot);
- return -EUCLEAN;
- }
- if (!IS_ALIGNED(btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(leaf, fi), sectorsize) ||
- !IS_ALIGNED(btrfs_file_extent_disk_bytenr(leaf, fi), sectorsize) ||
- !IS_ALIGNED(btrfs_file_extent_disk_num_bytes(leaf, fi), sectorsize) ||
- !IS_ALIGNED(btrfs_file_extent_offset(leaf, fi), sectorsize) ||
- !IS_ALIGNED(btrfs_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf, fi), sectorsize)) {
- CORRUPT(
- "regular or preallocated extent data item has unaligned value",
- leaf, root, slot);
- return -EUCLEAN;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int check_csum_item(struct btrfs_root *root, struct extent_buffer *leaf,
- struct btrfs_key *key, int slot)
-{
- u32 sectorsize = root->sectorsize;
- u32 csumsize = btrfs_super_csum_size(root->fs_info->super_copy);
-
- if (key->objectid != BTRFS_EXTENT_CSUM_OBJECTID) {
- CORRUPT("invalid objectid for csum item", leaf, root, slot);
- return -EUCLEAN;
- }
- if (!IS_ALIGNED(key->offset, sectorsize)) {
- CORRUPT("unaligned key offset for csum item", leaf, root, slot);
- return -EUCLEAN;
- }
- if (!IS_ALIGNED(btrfs_item_size_nr(leaf, slot), csumsize)) {
- CORRUPT("unaligned csum item size", leaf, root, slot);
- return -EUCLEAN;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Common point to switch the item-specific validation.
- */
-static int check_leaf_item(struct btrfs_root *root,
- struct extent_buffer *leaf,
- struct btrfs_key *key, int slot)
-{
- int ret = 0;
-
- switch (key->type) {
- case BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY:
- ret = check_extent_data_item(root, leaf, key, slot);
- break;
- case BTRFS_EXTENT_CSUM_KEY:
- ret = check_csum_item(root, leaf, key, slot);
- break;
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-static noinline int check_leaf(struct btrfs_root *root,
- struct extent_buffer *leaf)
-{
- /* No valid key type is 0, so all key should be larger than this key */
- struct btrfs_key prev_key = {0, 0, 0};
- struct btrfs_key key;
- u32 nritems = btrfs_header_nritems(leaf);
- int slot;
-
- /*
- * Extent buffers from a relocation tree have a owner field that
- * corresponds to the subvolume tree they are based on. So just from an
- * extent buffer alone we can not find out what is the id of the
- * corresponding subvolume tree, so we can not figure out if the extent
- * buffer corresponds to the root of the relocation tree or not. So skip
- * this check for relocation trees.
- */
- if (nritems == 0 && !btrfs_header_flag(leaf, BTRFS_HEADER_FLAG_RELOC)) {
- struct btrfs_root *check_root;
-
- key.objectid = btrfs_header_owner(leaf);
- key.type = BTRFS_ROOT_ITEM_KEY;
- key.offset = (u64)-1;
-
- check_root = btrfs_get_fs_root(root->fs_info, &key, false);
- /*
- * The only reason we also check NULL here is that during
- * open_ctree() some roots has not yet been set up.
- */
- if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(check_root)) {
- struct extent_buffer *eb;
-
- eb = btrfs_root_node(check_root);
- /* if leaf is the root, then it's fine */
- if (leaf != eb) {
- CORRUPT("non-root leaf's nritems is 0",
- leaf, check_root, 0);
- free_extent_buffer(eb);
- return -EUCLEAN;
- }
- free_extent_buffer(eb);
- }
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (nritems == 0)
- return 0;
-
- /*
- * Check the following things to make sure this is a good leaf, and
- * leaf users won't need to bother with similar sanity checks:
- *
- * 1) key order
- * 2) item offset and size
- * No overlap, no hole, all inside the leaf.
- * 3) item content
- * If possible, do comprehensive sanity check.
- * NOTE: All checks must only rely on the item data itself.
- */
- for (slot = 0; slot < nritems; slot++) {
- u32 item_end_expected;
- int ret;
-
- btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(leaf, &key, slot);
-
- /* Make sure the keys are in the right order */
- if (btrfs_comp_cpu_keys(&prev_key, &key) >= 0) {
- CORRUPT("bad key order", leaf, root, slot);
- return -EUCLEAN;
- }
-
- /*
- * Make sure the offset and ends are right, remember that the
- * item data starts at the end of the leaf and grows towards the
- * front.
- */
- if (slot == 0)
- item_end_expected = BTRFS_LEAF_DATA_SIZE(root);
- else
- item_end_expected = btrfs_item_offset_nr(leaf,
- slot - 1);
- if (btrfs_item_end_nr(leaf, slot) != item_end_expected) {
- CORRUPT("slot offset bad", leaf, root, slot);
- return -EUCLEAN;
- }
-
- /*
- * Check to make sure that we don't point outside of the leaf,
- * just in case all the items are consistent to each other, but
- * all point outside of the leaf.
- */
- if (btrfs_item_end_nr(leaf, slot) >
- BTRFS_LEAF_DATA_SIZE(root)) {
- CORRUPT("slot end outside of leaf", leaf, root, slot);
- return -EUCLEAN;
- }
-
- /* Also check if the item pointer overlaps with btrfs item. */
- if (btrfs_item_nr_offset(slot) + sizeof(struct btrfs_item) >
- btrfs_item_ptr_offset(leaf, slot)) {
- CORRUPT("slot overlap with its data", leaf, root, slot);
- return -EUCLEAN;
- }
-
- /* Check if the item size and content meet other criteria */
- ret = check_leaf_item(root, leaf, &key, slot);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
-
- prev_key.objectid = key.objectid;
- prev_key.type = key.type;
- prev_key.offset = key.offset;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int check_node(struct btrfs_root *root, struct extent_buffer *node)
-{
- unsigned long nr = btrfs_header_nritems(node);
- struct btrfs_key key, next_key;
- int slot;
- u64 bytenr;
- int ret = 0;
-
- if (nr == 0 || nr > BTRFS_NODEPTRS_PER_BLOCK(root)) {
- btrfs_crit(root->fs_info,
- "corrupt node: block %llu root %llu nritems %lu",
- node->start, root->objectid, nr);
- return -EIO;
- }
-
- for (slot = 0; slot < nr - 1; slot++) {
- bytenr = btrfs_node_blockptr(node, slot);
- btrfs_node_key_to_cpu(node, &key, slot);
- btrfs_node_key_to_cpu(node, &next_key, slot + 1);
-
- if (!bytenr) {
- CORRUPT("invalid item slot", node, root, slot);
- ret = -EIO;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (btrfs_comp_cpu_keys(&key, &next_key) >= 0) {
- CORRUPT("bad key order", node, root, slot);
- ret = -EIO;
- goto out;
- }
- }
-out:
- return ret;
-}
-
static int btree_readpage_end_io_hook(struct btrfs_io_bio *io_bio,
u64 phy_offset, struct page *page,
u64 start, u64 end, int mirror)
@@ -880,12 +604,12 @@ static int btree_readpage_end_io_hook(st
* that we don't try and read the other copies of this block, just
* return -EIO.
*/
- if (found_level == 0 && check_leaf(root, eb)) {
+ if (found_level == 0 && btrfs_check_leaf(root, eb)) {
set_bit(EXTENT_BUFFER_CORRUPT, &eb->bflags);
ret = -EIO;
}
- if (found_level > 0 && check_node(root, eb))
+ if (found_level > 0 && btrfs_check_node(root, eb))
ret = -EIO;
if (!ret)
@@ -4216,7 +3940,7 @@ void btrfs_mark_buffer_dirty(struct exte
buf->len,
root->fs_info->dirty_metadata_batch);
#ifdef CONFIG_BTRFS_FS_CHECK_INTEGRITY
- if (btrfs_header_level(buf) == 0 && check_leaf(root, buf)) {
+ if (btrfs_header_level(buf) == 0 && btrfs_check_leaf(root, buf)) {
btrfs_print_leaf(root, buf);
ASSERT(0);
}
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c
@@ -0,0 +1,309 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) Qu Wenruo 2017. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public
+ * License v2 as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ * General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public
+ * License along with this program.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * The module is used to catch unexpected/corrupted tree block data.
+ * Such behavior can be caused either by a fuzzed image or bugs.
+ *
+ * The objective is to do leaf/node validation checks when tree block is read
+ * from disk, and check *every* possible member, so other code won't
+ * need to checking them again.
+ *
+ * Due to the potential and unwanted damage, every checker needs to be
+ * carefully reviewed otherwise so it does not prevent mount of valid images.
+ */
+
+#include "ctree.h"
+#include "tree-checker.h"
+#include "disk-io.h"
+#include "compression.h"
+
+#define CORRUPT(reason, eb, root, slot) \
+ btrfs_crit(root->fs_info, \
+ "corrupt %s, %s: block=%llu, root=%llu, slot=%d", \
+ btrfs_header_level(eb) == 0 ? "leaf" : "node", \
+ reason, btrfs_header_bytenr(eb), root->objectid, slot)
+
+static int check_extent_data_item(struct btrfs_root *root,
+ struct extent_buffer *leaf,
+ struct btrfs_key *key, int slot)
+{
+ struct btrfs_file_extent_item *fi;
+ u32 sectorsize = root->sectorsize;
+ u32 item_size = btrfs_item_size_nr(leaf, slot);
+
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(key->offset, sectorsize)) {
+ CORRUPT("unaligned key offset for file extent",
+ leaf, root, slot);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+
+ fi = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot, struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
+
+ if (btrfs_file_extent_type(leaf, fi) > BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_TYPES) {
+ CORRUPT("invalid file extent type", leaf, root, slot);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Support for new compression/encrption must introduce incompat flag,
+ * and must be caught in open_ctree().
+ */
+ if (btrfs_file_extent_compression(leaf, fi) > BTRFS_COMPRESS_TYPES) {
+ CORRUPT("invalid file extent compression", leaf, root, slot);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+ if (btrfs_file_extent_encryption(leaf, fi)) {
+ CORRUPT("invalid file extent encryption", leaf, root, slot);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+ if (btrfs_file_extent_type(leaf, fi) == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
+ /* Inline extent must have 0 as key offset */
+ if (key->offset) {
+ CORRUPT("inline extent has non-zero key offset",
+ leaf, root, slot);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+
+ /* Compressed inline extent has no on-disk size, skip it */
+ if (btrfs_file_extent_compression(leaf, fi) !=
+ BTRFS_COMPRESS_NONE)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Uncompressed inline extent size must match item size */
+ if (item_size != BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE_DATA_START +
+ btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(leaf, fi)) {
+ CORRUPT("plaintext inline extent has invalid size",
+ leaf, root, slot);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Regular or preallocated extent has fixed item size */
+ if (item_size != sizeof(*fi)) {
+ CORRUPT(
+ "regluar or preallocated extent data item size is invalid",
+ leaf, root, slot);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(leaf, fi), sectorsize) ||
+ !IS_ALIGNED(btrfs_file_extent_disk_bytenr(leaf, fi), sectorsize) ||
+ !IS_ALIGNED(btrfs_file_extent_disk_num_bytes(leaf, fi), sectorsize) ||
+ !IS_ALIGNED(btrfs_file_extent_offset(leaf, fi), sectorsize) ||
+ !IS_ALIGNED(btrfs_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf, fi), sectorsize)) {
+ CORRUPT(
+ "regular or preallocated extent data item has unaligned value",
+ leaf, root, slot);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int check_csum_item(struct btrfs_root *root, struct extent_buffer *leaf,
+ struct btrfs_key *key, int slot)
+{
+ u32 sectorsize = root->sectorsize;
+ u32 csumsize = btrfs_super_csum_size(root->fs_info->super_copy);
+
+ if (key->objectid != BTRFS_EXTENT_CSUM_OBJECTID) {
+ CORRUPT("invalid objectid for csum item", leaf, root, slot);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(key->offset, sectorsize)) {
+ CORRUPT("unaligned key offset for csum item", leaf, root, slot);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(btrfs_item_size_nr(leaf, slot), csumsize)) {
+ CORRUPT("unaligned csum item size", leaf, root, slot);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Common point to switch the item-specific validation.
+ */
+static int check_leaf_item(struct btrfs_root *root,
+ struct extent_buffer *leaf,
+ struct btrfs_key *key, int slot)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ switch (key->type) {
+ case BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY:
+ ret = check_extent_data_item(root, leaf, key, slot);
+ break;
+ case BTRFS_EXTENT_CSUM_KEY:
+ ret = check_csum_item(root, leaf, key, slot);
+ break;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int btrfs_check_leaf(struct btrfs_root *root, struct extent_buffer *leaf)
+{
+ struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info = root->fs_info;
+ /* No valid key type is 0, so all key should be larger than this key */
+ struct btrfs_key prev_key = {0, 0, 0};
+ struct btrfs_key key;
+ u32 nritems = btrfs_header_nritems(leaf);
+ int slot;
+
+ /*
+ * Extent buffers from a relocation tree have a owner field that
+ * corresponds to the subvolume tree they are based on. So just from an
+ * extent buffer alone we can not find out what is the id of the
+ * corresponding subvolume tree, so we can not figure out if the extent
+ * buffer corresponds to the root of the relocation tree or not. So
+ * skip this check for relocation trees.
+ */
+ if (nritems == 0 && !btrfs_header_flag(leaf, BTRFS_HEADER_FLAG_RELOC)) {
+ struct btrfs_root *check_root;
+
+ key.objectid = btrfs_header_owner(leaf);
+ key.type = BTRFS_ROOT_ITEM_KEY;
+ key.offset = (u64)-1;
+
+ check_root = btrfs_get_fs_root(fs_info, &key, false);
+ /*
+ * The only reason we also check NULL here is that during
+ * open_ctree() some roots has not yet been set up.
+ */
+ if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(check_root)) {
+ struct extent_buffer *eb;
+
+ eb = btrfs_root_node(check_root);
+ /* if leaf is the root, then it's fine */
+ if (leaf != eb) {
+ CORRUPT("non-root leaf's nritems is 0",
+ leaf, check_root, 0);
+ free_extent_buffer(eb);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+ free_extent_buffer(eb);
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (nritems == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Check the following things to make sure this is a good leaf, and
+ * leaf users won't need to bother with similar sanity checks:
+ *
+ * 1) key ordering
+ * 2) item offset and size
+ * No overlap, no hole, all inside the leaf.
+ * 3) item content
+ * If possible, do comprehensive sanity check.
+ * NOTE: All checks must only rely on the item data itself.
+ */
+ for (slot = 0; slot < nritems; slot++) {
+ u32 item_end_expected;
+ int ret;
+
+ btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(leaf, &key, slot);
+
+ /* Make sure the keys are in the right order */
+ if (btrfs_comp_cpu_keys(&prev_key, &key) >= 0) {
+ CORRUPT("bad key order", leaf, root, slot);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure the offset and ends are right, remember that the
+ * item data starts at the end of the leaf and grows towards the
+ * front.
+ */
+ if (slot == 0)
+ item_end_expected = BTRFS_LEAF_DATA_SIZE(root);
+ else
+ item_end_expected = btrfs_item_offset_nr(leaf,
+ slot - 1);
+ if (btrfs_item_end_nr(leaf, slot) != item_end_expected) {
+ CORRUPT("slot offset bad", leaf, root, slot);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check to make sure that we don't point outside of the leaf,
+ * just in case all the items are consistent to each other, but
+ * all point outside of the leaf.
+ */
+ if (btrfs_item_end_nr(leaf, slot) >
+ BTRFS_LEAF_DATA_SIZE(root)) {
+ CORRUPT("slot end outside of leaf", leaf, root, slot);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+
+ /* Also check if the item pointer overlaps with btrfs item. */
+ if (btrfs_item_nr_offset(slot) + sizeof(struct btrfs_item) >
+ btrfs_item_ptr_offset(leaf, slot)) {
+ CORRUPT("slot overlap with its data", leaf, root, slot);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if the item size and content meet other criteria */
+ ret = check_leaf_item(root, leaf, &key, slot);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ prev_key.objectid = key.objectid;
+ prev_key.type = key.type;
+ prev_key.offset = key.offset;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int btrfs_check_node(struct btrfs_root *root, struct extent_buffer *node)
+{
+ unsigned long nr = btrfs_header_nritems(node);
+ struct btrfs_key key, next_key;
+ int slot;
+ u64 bytenr;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (nr == 0 || nr > BTRFS_NODEPTRS_PER_BLOCK(root)) {
+ btrfs_crit(root->fs_info,
+ "corrupt node: block %llu root %llu nritems %lu",
+ node->start, root->objectid, nr);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ for (slot = 0; slot < nr - 1; slot++) {
+ bytenr = btrfs_node_blockptr(node, slot);
+ btrfs_node_key_to_cpu(node, &key, slot);
+ btrfs_node_key_to_cpu(node, &next_key, slot + 1);
+
+ if (!bytenr) {
+ CORRUPT("invalid item slot", node, root, slot);
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (btrfs_comp_cpu_keys(&key, &next_key) >= 0) {
+ CORRUPT("bad key order", node, root, slot);
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/btrfs/tree-checker.h
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) Qu Wenruo 2017. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public
+ * License v2 as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ * General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public
+ * License along with this program.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __BTRFS_TREE_CHECKER__
+#define __BTRFS_TREE_CHECKER__
+
+#include "ctree.h"
+#include "extent_io.h"
+
+int btrfs_check_leaf(struct btrfs_root *root, struct extent_buffer *leaf);
+int btrfs_check_node(struct btrfs_root *root, struct extent_buffer *node);
+
+#endif
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 072/101] btrfs: struct-funcs, constify readers
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (70 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 071/101] btrfs: Move leaf and node validation checker to tree-checker.c Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 073/101] btrfs: tree-checker: Enhance btrfs_check_node output Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (33 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jeff Mahoney, David Sterba, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
commit 1cbb1f454e5321e47fc1e6b233066c7ccc979d15 upstream.
We have reader helpers for most of the on-disk structures that use
an extent_buffer and pointer as offset into the buffer that are
read-only. We should mark them as const and, in turn, allow consumers
of these interfaces to mark the buffers const as well.
No impact on code, but serves as documentation that a buffer is intended
not to be modified.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/btrfs/ctree.h | 128 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
fs/btrfs/extent_io.c | 24 ++++-----
fs/btrfs/extent_io.h | 19 +++----
fs/btrfs/struct-funcs.c | 9 +--
4 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 89 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/btrfs/ctree.h
+++ b/fs/btrfs/ctree.h
@@ -1415,7 +1415,7 @@ do {
#define BTRFS_INODE_ROOT_ITEM_INIT (1 << 31)
struct btrfs_map_token {
- struct extent_buffer *eb;
+ const struct extent_buffer *eb;
char *kaddr;
unsigned long offset;
};
@@ -1449,18 +1449,19 @@ static inline void btrfs_init_map_token
sizeof(((type *)0)->member)))
#define DECLARE_BTRFS_SETGET_BITS(bits) \
-u##bits btrfs_get_token_##bits(struct extent_buffer *eb, void *ptr, \
- unsigned long off, \
- struct btrfs_map_token *token); \
-void btrfs_set_token_##bits(struct extent_buffer *eb, void *ptr, \
+u##bits btrfs_get_token_##bits(const struct extent_buffer *eb, \
+ const void *ptr, unsigned long off, \
+ struct btrfs_map_token *token); \
+void btrfs_set_token_##bits(struct extent_buffer *eb, const void *ptr, \
unsigned long off, u##bits val, \
struct btrfs_map_token *token); \
-static inline u##bits btrfs_get_##bits(struct extent_buffer *eb, void *ptr, \
+static inline u##bits btrfs_get_##bits(const struct extent_buffer *eb, \
+ const void *ptr, \
unsigned long off) \
{ \
return btrfs_get_token_##bits(eb, ptr, off, NULL); \
} \
-static inline void btrfs_set_##bits(struct extent_buffer *eb, void *ptr, \
+static inline void btrfs_set_##bits(struct extent_buffer *eb, void *ptr,\
unsigned long off, u##bits val) \
{ \
btrfs_set_token_##bits(eb, ptr, off, val, NULL); \
@@ -1472,7 +1473,8 @@ DECLARE_BTRFS_SETGET_BITS(32)
DECLARE_BTRFS_SETGET_BITS(64)
#define BTRFS_SETGET_FUNCS(name, type, member, bits) \
-static inline u##bits btrfs_##name(struct extent_buffer *eb, type *s) \
+static inline u##bits btrfs_##name(const struct extent_buffer *eb, \
+ const type *s) \
{ \
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(u##bits) != sizeof(((type *)0))->member); \
return btrfs_get_##bits(eb, s, offsetof(type, member)); \
@@ -1483,7 +1485,8 @@ static inline void btrfs_set_##name(stru
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(u##bits) != sizeof(((type *)0))->member); \
btrfs_set_##bits(eb, s, offsetof(type, member), val); \
} \
-static inline u##bits btrfs_token_##name(struct extent_buffer *eb, type *s, \
+static inline u##bits btrfs_token_##name(const struct extent_buffer *eb,\
+ const type *s, \
struct btrfs_map_token *token) \
{ \
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(u##bits) != sizeof(((type *)0))->member); \
@@ -1498,9 +1501,9 @@ static inline void btrfs_set_token_##nam
}
#define BTRFS_SETGET_HEADER_FUNCS(name, type, member, bits) \
-static inline u##bits btrfs_##name(struct extent_buffer *eb) \
+static inline u##bits btrfs_##name(const struct extent_buffer *eb) \
{ \
- type *p = page_address(eb->pages[0]); \
+ const type *p = page_address(eb->pages[0]); \
u##bits res = le##bits##_to_cpu(p->member); \
return res; \
} \
@@ -1512,7 +1515,7 @@ static inline void btrfs_set_##name(stru
}
#define BTRFS_SETGET_STACK_FUNCS(name, type, member, bits) \
-static inline u##bits btrfs_##name(type *s) \
+static inline u##bits btrfs_##name(const type *s) \
{ \
return le##bits##_to_cpu(s->member); \
} \
@@ -1818,7 +1821,7 @@ static inline unsigned long btrfs_node_k
sizeof(struct btrfs_key_ptr) * nr;
}
-void btrfs_node_key(struct extent_buffer *eb,
+void btrfs_node_key(const struct extent_buffer *eb,
struct btrfs_disk_key *disk_key, int nr);
static inline void btrfs_set_node_key(struct extent_buffer *eb,
@@ -1847,28 +1850,28 @@ static inline struct btrfs_item *btrfs_i
return (struct btrfs_item *)btrfs_item_nr_offset(nr);
}
-static inline u32 btrfs_item_end(struct extent_buffer *eb,
+static inline u32 btrfs_item_end(const struct extent_buffer *eb,
struct btrfs_item *item)
{
return btrfs_item_offset(eb, item) + btrfs_item_size(eb, item);
}
-static inline u32 btrfs_item_end_nr(struct extent_buffer *eb, int nr)
+static inline u32 btrfs_item_end_nr(const struct extent_buffer *eb, int nr)
{
return btrfs_item_end(eb, btrfs_item_nr(nr));
}
-static inline u32 btrfs_item_offset_nr(struct extent_buffer *eb, int nr)
+static inline u32 btrfs_item_offset_nr(const struct extent_buffer *eb, int nr)
{
return btrfs_item_offset(eb, btrfs_item_nr(nr));
}
-static inline u32 btrfs_item_size_nr(struct extent_buffer *eb, int nr)
+static inline u32 btrfs_item_size_nr(const struct extent_buffer *eb, int nr)
{
return btrfs_item_size(eb, btrfs_item_nr(nr));
}
-static inline void btrfs_item_key(struct extent_buffer *eb,
+static inline void btrfs_item_key(const struct extent_buffer *eb,
struct btrfs_disk_key *disk_key, int nr)
{
struct btrfs_item *item = btrfs_item_nr(nr);
@@ -1904,8 +1907,8 @@ BTRFS_SETGET_STACK_FUNCS(stack_dir_name_
BTRFS_SETGET_STACK_FUNCS(stack_dir_transid, struct btrfs_dir_item,
transid, 64);
-static inline void btrfs_dir_item_key(struct extent_buffer *eb,
- struct btrfs_dir_item *item,
+static inline void btrfs_dir_item_key(const struct extent_buffer *eb,
+ const struct btrfs_dir_item *item,
struct btrfs_disk_key *key)
{
read_eb_member(eb, item, struct btrfs_dir_item, location, key);
@@ -1913,7 +1916,7 @@ static inline void btrfs_dir_item_key(st
static inline void btrfs_set_dir_item_key(struct extent_buffer *eb,
struct btrfs_dir_item *item,
- struct btrfs_disk_key *key)
+ const struct btrfs_disk_key *key)
{
write_eb_member(eb, item, struct btrfs_dir_item, location, key);
}
@@ -1925,8 +1928,8 @@ BTRFS_SETGET_FUNCS(free_space_bitmaps, s
BTRFS_SETGET_FUNCS(free_space_generation, struct btrfs_free_space_header,
generation, 64);
-static inline void btrfs_free_space_key(struct extent_buffer *eb,
- struct btrfs_free_space_header *h,
+static inline void btrfs_free_space_key(const struct extent_buffer *eb,
+ const struct btrfs_free_space_header *h,
struct btrfs_disk_key *key)
{
read_eb_member(eb, h, struct btrfs_free_space_header, location, key);
@@ -1934,7 +1937,7 @@ static inline void btrfs_free_space_key(
static inline void btrfs_set_free_space_key(struct extent_buffer *eb,
struct btrfs_free_space_header *h,
- struct btrfs_disk_key *key)
+ const struct btrfs_disk_key *key)
{
write_eb_member(eb, h, struct btrfs_free_space_header, location, key);
}
@@ -1961,25 +1964,25 @@ static inline void btrfs_cpu_key_to_disk
disk->objectid = cpu_to_le64(cpu->objectid);
}
-static inline void btrfs_node_key_to_cpu(struct extent_buffer *eb,
- struct btrfs_key *key, int nr)
+static inline void btrfs_node_key_to_cpu(const struct extent_buffer *eb,
+ struct btrfs_key *key, int nr)
{
struct btrfs_disk_key disk_key;
btrfs_node_key(eb, &disk_key, nr);
btrfs_disk_key_to_cpu(key, &disk_key);
}
-static inline void btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(struct extent_buffer *eb,
- struct btrfs_key *key, int nr)
+static inline void btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(const struct extent_buffer *eb,
+ struct btrfs_key *key, int nr)
{
struct btrfs_disk_key disk_key;
btrfs_item_key(eb, &disk_key, nr);
btrfs_disk_key_to_cpu(key, &disk_key);
}
-static inline void btrfs_dir_item_key_to_cpu(struct extent_buffer *eb,
- struct btrfs_dir_item *item,
- struct btrfs_key *key)
+static inline void btrfs_dir_item_key_to_cpu(const struct extent_buffer *eb,
+ const struct btrfs_dir_item *item,
+ struct btrfs_key *key)
{
struct btrfs_disk_key disk_key;
btrfs_dir_item_key(eb, item, &disk_key);
@@ -2012,7 +2015,7 @@ BTRFS_SETGET_STACK_FUNCS(stack_header_nr
nritems, 32);
BTRFS_SETGET_STACK_FUNCS(stack_header_bytenr, struct btrfs_header, bytenr, 64);
-static inline int btrfs_header_flag(struct extent_buffer *eb, u64 flag)
+static inline int btrfs_header_flag(const struct extent_buffer *eb, u64 flag)
{
return (btrfs_header_flags(eb) & flag) == flag;
}
@@ -2031,7 +2034,7 @@ static inline int btrfs_clear_header_fla
return (flags & flag) == flag;
}
-static inline int btrfs_header_backref_rev(struct extent_buffer *eb)
+static inline int btrfs_header_backref_rev(const struct extent_buffer *eb)
{
u64 flags = btrfs_header_flags(eb);
return flags >> BTRFS_BACKREF_REV_SHIFT;
@@ -2051,12 +2054,12 @@ static inline unsigned long btrfs_header
return offsetof(struct btrfs_header, fsid);
}
-static inline unsigned long btrfs_header_chunk_tree_uuid(struct extent_buffer *eb)
+static inline unsigned long btrfs_header_chunk_tree_uuid(const struct extent_buffer *eb)
{
return offsetof(struct btrfs_header, chunk_tree_uuid);
}
-static inline int btrfs_is_leaf(struct extent_buffer *eb)
+static inline int btrfs_is_leaf(const struct extent_buffer *eb)
{
return btrfs_header_level(eb) == 0;
}
@@ -2090,12 +2093,12 @@ BTRFS_SETGET_STACK_FUNCS(root_stransid,
BTRFS_SETGET_STACK_FUNCS(root_rtransid, struct btrfs_root_item,
rtransid, 64);
-static inline bool btrfs_root_readonly(struct btrfs_root *root)
+static inline bool btrfs_root_readonly(const struct btrfs_root *root)
{
return (root->root_item.flags & cpu_to_le64(BTRFS_ROOT_SUBVOL_RDONLY)) != 0;
}
-static inline bool btrfs_root_dead(struct btrfs_root *root)
+static inline bool btrfs_root_dead(const struct btrfs_root *root)
{
return (root->root_item.flags & cpu_to_le64(BTRFS_ROOT_SUBVOL_DEAD)) != 0;
}
@@ -2152,51 +2155,51 @@ BTRFS_SETGET_STACK_FUNCS(backup_num_devi
/* struct btrfs_balance_item */
BTRFS_SETGET_FUNCS(balance_flags, struct btrfs_balance_item, flags, 64);
-static inline void btrfs_balance_data(struct extent_buffer *eb,
- struct btrfs_balance_item *bi,
+static inline void btrfs_balance_data(const struct extent_buffer *eb,
+ const struct btrfs_balance_item *bi,
struct btrfs_disk_balance_args *ba)
{
read_eb_member(eb, bi, struct btrfs_balance_item, data, ba);
}
static inline void btrfs_set_balance_data(struct extent_buffer *eb,
- struct btrfs_balance_item *bi,
- struct btrfs_disk_balance_args *ba)
+ struct btrfs_balance_item *bi,
+ const struct btrfs_disk_balance_args *ba)
{
write_eb_member(eb, bi, struct btrfs_balance_item, data, ba);
}
-static inline void btrfs_balance_meta(struct extent_buffer *eb,
- struct btrfs_balance_item *bi,
+static inline void btrfs_balance_meta(const struct extent_buffer *eb,
+ const struct btrfs_balance_item *bi,
struct btrfs_disk_balance_args *ba)
{
read_eb_member(eb, bi, struct btrfs_balance_item, meta, ba);
}
static inline void btrfs_set_balance_meta(struct extent_buffer *eb,
- struct btrfs_balance_item *bi,
- struct btrfs_disk_balance_args *ba)
+ struct btrfs_balance_item *bi,
+ const struct btrfs_disk_balance_args *ba)
{
write_eb_member(eb, bi, struct btrfs_balance_item, meta, ba);
}
-static inline void btrfs_balance_sys(struct extent_buffer *eb,
- struct btrfs_balance_item *bi,
+static inline void btrfs_balance_sys(const struct extent_buffer *eb,
+ const struct btrfs_balance_item *bi,
struct btrfs_disk_balance_args *ba)
{
read_eb_member(eb, bi, struct btrfs_balance_item, sys, ba);
}
static inline void btrfs_set_balance_sys(struct extent_buffer *eb,
- struct btrfs_balance_item *bi,
- struct btrfs_disk_balance_args *ba)
+ struct btrfs_balance_item *bi,
+ const struct btrfs_disk_balance_args *ba)
{
write_eb_member(eb, bi, struct btrfs_balance_item, sys, ba);
}
static inline void
btrfs_disk_balance_args_to_cpu(struct btrfs_balance_args *cpu,
- struct btrfs_disk_balance_args *disk)
+ const struct btrfs_disk_balance_args *disk)
{
memset(cpu, 0, sizeof(*cpu));
@@ -2216,7 +2219,7 @@ btrfs_disk_balance_args_to_cpu(struct bt
static inline void
btrfs_cpu_balance_args_to_disk(struct btrfs_disk_balance_args *disk,
- struct btrfs_balance_args *cpu)
+ const struct btrfs_balance_args *cpu)
{
memset(disk, 0, sizeof(*disk));
@@ -2284,7 +2287,7 @@ BTRFS_SETGET_STACK_FUNCS(super_magic, st
BTRFS_SETGET_STACK_FUNCS(super_uuid_tree_generation, struct btrfs_super_block,
uuid_tree_generation, 64);
-static inline int btrfs_super_csum_size(struct btrfs_super_block *s)
+static inline int btrfs_super_csum_size(const struct btrfs_super_block *s)
{
u16 t = btrfs_super_csum_type(s);
/*
@@ -2303,8 +2306,8 @@ static inline unsigned long btrfs_leaf_d
* this returns the address of the start of the last item,
* which is the stop of the leaf data stack
*/
-static inline unsigned int leaf_data_end(struct btrfs_root *root,
- struct extent_buffer *leaf)
+static inline unsigned int leaf_data_end(const struct btrfs_root *root,
+ const struct extent_buffer *leaf)
{
u32 nr = btrfs_header_nritems(leaf);
@@ -2329,7 +2332,7 @@ BTRFS_SETGET_STACK_FUNCS(stack_file_exte
struct btrfs_file_extent_item, compression, 8);
static inline unsigned long
-btrfs_file_extent_inline_start(struct btrfs_file_extent_item *e)
+btrfs_file_extent_inline_start(const struct btrfs_file_extent_item *e)
{
return (unsigned long)e + BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE_DATA_START;
}
@@ -2363,8 +2366,9 @@ BTRFS_SETGET_FUNCS(file_extent_other_enc
* size of any extent headers. If a file is compressed on disk, this is
* the compressed size
*/
-static inline u32 btrfs_file_extent_inline_item_len(struct extent_buffer *eb,
- struct btrfs_item *e)
+static inline u32 btrfs_file_extent_inline_item_len(
+ const struct extent_buffer *eb,
+ struct btrfs_item *e)
{
return btrfs_item_size(eb, e) - BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE_DATA_START;
}
@@ -2372,9 +2376,9 @@ static inline u32 btrfs_file_extent_inli
/* this returns the number of file bytes represented by the inline item.
* If an item is compressed, this is the uncompressed size
*/
-static inline u32 btrfs_file_extent_inline_len(struct extent_buffer *eb,
- int slot,
- struct btrfs_file_extent_item *fi)
+static inline u32 btrfs_file_extent_inline_len(const struct extent_buffer *eb,
+ int slot,
+ const struct btrfs_file_extent_item *fi)
{
struct btrfs_map_token token;
@@ -2396,8 +2400,8 @@ static inline u32 btrfs_file_extent_inli
/* btrfs_dev_stats_item */
-static inline u64 btrfs_dev_stats_value(struct extent_buffer *eb,
- struct btrfs_dev_stats_item *ptr,
+static inline u64 btrfs_dev_stats_value(const struct extent_buffer *eb,
+ const struct btrfs_dev_stats_item *ptr,
int index)
{
u64 val;
--- a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c
@@ -5442,9 +5442,8 @@ unlock_exit:
return ret;
}
-void read_extent_buffer(struct extent_buffer *eb, void *dstv,
- unsigned long start,
- unsigned long len)
+void read_extent_buffer(const struct extent_buffer *eb, void *dstv,
+ unsigned long start, unsigned long len)
{
size_t cur;
size_t offset;
@@ -5473,9 +5472,9 @@ void read_extent_buffer(struct extent_bu
}
}
-int read_extent_buffer_to_user(struct extent_buffer *eb, void __user *dstv,
- unsigned long start,
- unsigned long len)
+int read_extent_buffer_to_user(const struct extent_buffer *eb,
+ void __user *dstv,
+ unsigned long start, unsigned long len)
{
size_t cur;
size_t offset;
@@ -5515,10 +5514,10 @@ int read_extent_buffer_to_user(struct ex
* return 1 if the item spans two pages.
* return -EINVAL otherwise.
*/
-int map_private_extent_buffer(struct extent_buffer *eb, unsigned long start,
- unsigned long min_len, char **map,
- unsigned long *map_start,
- unsigned long *map_len)
+int map_private_extent_buffer(const struct extent_buffer *eb,
+ unsigned long start, unsigned long min_len,
+ char **map, unsigned long *map_start,
+ unsigned long *map_len)
{
size_t offset = start & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
char *kaddr;
@@ -5552,9 +5551,8 @@ int map_private_extent_buffer(struct ext
return 0;
}
-int memcmp_extent_buffer(struct extent_buffer *eb, const void *ptrv,
- unsigned long start,
- unsigned long len)
+int memcmp_extent_buffer(const struct extent_buffer *eb, const void *ptrv,
+ unsigned long start, unsigned long len)
{
size_t cur;
size_t offset;
--- a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.h
+++ b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.h
@@ -396,14 +396,13 @@ static inline void extent_buffer_get(str
atomic_inc(&eb->refs);
}
-int memcmp_extent_buffer(struct extent_buffer *eb, const void *ptrv,
- unsigned long start,
- unsigned long len);
-void read_extent_buffer(struct extent_buffer *eb, void *dst,
+int memcmp_extent_buffer(const struct extent_buffer *eb, const void *ptrv,
+ unsigned long start, unsigned long len);
+void read_extent_buffer(const struct extent_buffer *eb, void *dst,
unsigned long start,
unsigned long len);
-int read_extent_buffer_to_user(struct extent_buffer *eb, void __user *dst,
- unsigned long start,
+int read_extent_buffer_to_user(const struct extent_buffer *eb,
+ void __user *dst, unsigned long start,
unsigned long len);
void write_extent_buffer(struct extent_buffer *eb, const void *src,
unsigned long start, unsigned long len);
@@ -428,10 +427,10 @@ void set_extent_buffer_uptodate(struct e
void clear_extent_buffer_uptodate(struct extent_buffer *eb);
int extent_buffer_uptodate(struct extent_buffer *eb);
int extent_buffer_under_io(struct extent_buffer *eb);
-int map_private_extent_buffer(struct extent_buffer *eb, unsigned long offset,
- unsigned long min_len, char **map,
- unsigned long *map_start,
- unsigned long *map_len);
+int map_private_extent_buffer(const struct extent_buffer *eb,
+ unsigned long offset, unsigned long min_len,
+ char **map, unsigned long *map_start,
+ unsigned long *map_len);
void extent_range_clear_dirty_for_io(struct inode *inode, u64 start, u64 end);
void extent_range_redirty_for_io(struct inode *inode, u64 start, u64 end);
void extent_clear_unlock_delalloc(struct inode *inode, u64 start, u64 end,
--- a/fs/btrfs/struct-funcs.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/struct-funcs.c
@@ -50,8 +50,8 @@ static inline void put_unaligned_le8(u8
*/
#define DEFINE_BTRFS_SETGET_BITS(bits) \
-u##bits btrfs_get_token_##bits(struct extent_buffer *eb, void *ptr, \
- unsigned long off, \
+u##bits btrfs_get_token_##bits(const struct extent_buffer *eb, \
+ const void *ptr, unsigned long off, \
struct btrfs_map_token *token) \
{ \
unsigned long part_offset = (unsigned long)ptr; \
@@ -90,7 +90,8 @@ u##bits btrfs_get_token_##bits(struct ex
return res; \
} \
void btrfs_set_token_##bits(struct extent_buffer *eb, \
- void *ptr, unsigned long off, u##bits val, \
+ const void *ptr, unsigned long off, \
+ u##bits val, \
struct btrfs_map_token *token) \
{ \
unsigned long part_offset = (unsigned long)ptr; \
@@ -133,7 +134,7 @@ DEFINE_BTRFS_SETGET_BITS(16)
DEFINE_BTRFS_SETGET_BITS(32)
DEFINE_BTRFS_SETGET_BITS(64)
-void btrfs_node_key(struct extent_buffer *eb,
+void btrfs_node_key(const struct extent_buffer *eb,
struct btrfs_disk_key *disk_key, int nr)
{
unsigned long ptr = btrfs_node_key_ptr_offset(nr);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 073/101] btrfs: tree-checker: Enhance btrfs_check_node output
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (71 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 072/101] btrfs: struct-funcs, constify readers Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 074/101] btrfs: tree-checker: Fix false panic for sanity test Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (32 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Qu Wenruo, David Sterba, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo.btrfs@gmx.com>
commit bba4f29896c986c4cec17bc0f19f2ce644fceae1 upstream.
Use inline function to replace macro since we don't need
stringification.
(Macro still exists until all callers get updated)
And add more info about the error, and replace EIO with EUCLEAN.
For nr_items error, report if it's too large or too small, and output
the valid value range.
For node block pointer, added a new alignment checker.
For key order, also output the next key to make the problem more
obvious.
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo.btrfs@gmx.com>
[ wording adjustments, unindented long strings ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9:
- Use root->sectorsize instead of root->fs_info->sectorsize
- BTRFS_NODEPTRS_PER_BLOCK() takes a root instead of an fs_info]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 61 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c
@@ -37,6 +37,46 @@
btrfs_header_level(eb) == 0 ? "leaf" : "node", \
reason, btrfs_header_bytenr(eb), root->objectid, slot)
+/*
+ * Error message should follow the following format:
+ * corrupt <type>: <identifier>, <reason>[, <bad_value>]
+ *
+ * @type: leaf or node
+ * @identifier: the necessary info to locate the leaf/node.
+ * It's recommened to decode key.objecitd/offset if it's
+ * meaningful.
+ * @reason: describe the error
+ * @bad_value: optional, it's recommened to output bad value and its
+ * expected value (range).
+ *
+ * Since comma is used to separate the components, only space is allowed
+ * inside each component.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Append generic "corrupt leaf/node root=%llu block=%llu slot=%d: " to @fmt.
+ * Allows callers to customize the output.
+ */
+__printf(4, 5)
+static void generic_err(const struct btrfs_root *root,
+ const struct extent_buffer *eb, int slot,
+ const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ struct va_format vaf;
+ va_list args;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+
+ vaf.fmt = fmt;
+ vaf.va = &args;
+
+ btrfs_crit(root->fs_info,
+ "corrupt %s: root=%llu block=%llu slot=%d, %pV",
+ btrfs_header_level(eb) == 0 ? "leaf" : "node",
+ root->objectid, btrfs_header_bytenr(eb), slot, &vaf);
+ va_end(args);
+}
+
static int check_extent_data_item(struct btrfs_root *root,
struct extent_buffer *leaf,
struct btrfs_key *key, int slot)
@@ -282,9 +322,11 @@ int btrfs_check_node(struct btrfs_root *
if (nr == 0 || nr > BTRFS_NODEPTRS_PER_BLOCK(root)) {
btrfs_crit(root->fs_info,
- "corrupt node: block %llu root %llu nritems %lu",
- node->start, root->objectid, nr);
- return -EIO;
+"corrupt node: root=%llu block=%llu, nritems too %s, have %lu expect range [1,%u]",
+ root->objectid, node->start,
+ nr == 0 ? "small" : "large", nr,
+ BTRFS_NODEPTRS_PER_BLOCK(root));
+ return -EUCLEAN;
}
for (slot = 0; slot < nr - 1; slot++) {
@@ -293,14 +335,26 @@ int btrfs_check_node(struct btrfs_root *
btrfs_node_key_to_cpu(node, &next_key, slot + 1);
if (!bytenr) {
- CORRUPT("invalid item slot", node, root, slot);
- ret = -EIO;
+ generic_err(root, node, slot,
+ "invalid NULL node pointer");
+ ret = -EUCLEAN;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(bytenr, root->sectorsize)) {
+ generic_err(root, node, slot,
+ "unaligned pointer, have %llu should be aligned to %u",
+ bytenr, root->sectorsize);
+ ret = -EUCLEAN;
goto out;
}
if (btrfs_comp_cpu_keys(&key, &next_key) >= 0) {
- CORRUPT("bad key order", node, root, slot);
- ret = -EIO;
+ generic_err(root, node, slot,
+ "bad key order, current (%llu %u %llu) next (%llu %u %llu)",
+ key.objectid, key.type, key.offset,
+ next_key.objectid, next_key.type,
+ next_key.offset);
+ ret = -EUCLEAN;
goto out;
}
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 074/101] btrfs: tree-checker: Fix false panic for sanity test
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (72 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 073/101] btrfs: tree-checker: Enhance btrfs_check_node output Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 075/101] btrfs: tree-checker: Add checker for dir item Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (31 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Filipe Manana, Lakshmipathi.G,
Qu Wenruo, Liu Bo, David Sterba, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
commit 69fc6cbbac542c349b3d350d10f6e394c253c81d upstream.
[BUG]
If we run btrfs with CONFIG_BTRFS_FS_RUN_SANITY_TESTS=y, it will
instantly cause kernel panic like:
------
...
assertion failed: 0, file: fs/btrfs/disk-io.c, line: 3853
...
Call Trace:
btrfs_mark_buffer_dirty+0x187/0x1f0 [btrfs]
setup_items_for_insert+0x385/0x650 [btrfs]
__btrfs_drop_extents+0x129a/0x1870 [btrfs]
...
-----
[Cause]
Btrfs will call btrfs_check_leaf() in btrfs_mark_buffer_dirty() to check
if the leaf is valid with CONFIG_BTRFS_FS_RUN_SANITY_TESTS=y.
However quite some btrfs_mark_buffer_dirty() callers(*) don't really
initialize its item data but only initialize its item pointers, leaving
item data uninitialized.
This makes tree-checker catch uninitialized data as error, causing
such panic.
*: These callers include but not limited to
setup_items_for_insert()
btrfs_split_item()
btrfs_expand_item()
[Fix]
Add a new parameter @check_item_data to btrfs_check_leaf().
With @check_item_data set to false, item data check will be skipped and
fallback to old btrfs_check_leaf() behavior.
So we can still get early warning if we screw up item pointers, and
avoid false panic.
Cc: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Lakshmipathi.G <lakshmipathi.g@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Liu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 10 ++++++++--
fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----
fs/btrfs/tree-checker.h | 14 +++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
@@ -604,7 +604,7 @@ static int btree_readpage_end_io_hook(st
* that we don't try and read the other copies of this block, just
* return -EIO.
*/
- if (found_level == 0 && btrfs_check_leaf(root, eb)) {
+ if (found_level == 0 && btrfs_check_leaf_full(root, eb)) {
set_bit(EXTENT_BUFFER_CORRUPT, &eb->bflags);
ret = -EIO;
}
@@ -3940,7 +3940,13 @@ void btrfs_mark_buffer_dirty(struct exte
buf->len,
root->fs_info->dirty_metadata_batch);
#ifdef CONFIG_BTRFS_FS_CHECK_INTEGRITY
- if (btrfs_header_level(buf) == 0 && btrfs_check_leaf(root, buf)) {
+ /*
+ * Since btrfs_mark_buffer_dirty() can be called with item pointer set
+ * but item data not updated.
+ * So here we should only check item pointers, not item data.
+ */
+ if (btrfs_header_level(buf) == 0 &&
+ btrfs_check_leaf_relaxed(root, buf)) {
btrfs_print_leaf(root, buf);
ASSERT(0);
}
--- a/fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c
@@ -195,7 +195,8 @@ static int check_leaf_item(struct btrfs_
return ret;
}
-int btrfs_check_leaf(struct btrfs_root *root, struct extent_buffer *leaf)
+static int check_leaf(struct btrfs_root *root, struct extent_buffer *leaf,
+ bool check_item_data)
{
struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info = root->fs_info;
/* No valid key type is 0, so all key should be larger than this key */
@@ -299,10 +300,15 @@ int btrfs_check_leaf(struct btrfs_root *
return -EUCLEAN;
}
- /* Check if the item size and content meet other criteria */
- ret = check_leaf_item(root, leaf, &key, slot);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
+ if (check_item_data) {
+ /*
+ * Check if the item size and content meet other
+ * criteria
+ */
+ ret = check_leaf_item(root, leaf, &key, slot);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ }
prev_key.objectid = key.objectid;
prev_key.type = key.type;
@@ -312,6 +318,17 @@ int btrfs_check_leaf(struct btrfs_root *
return 0;
}
+int btrfs_check_leaf_full(struct btrfs_root *root, struct extent_buffer *leaf)
+{
+ return check_leaf(root, leaf, true);
+}
+
+int btrfs_check_leaf_relaxed(struct btrfs_root *root,
+ struct extent_buffer *leaf)
+{
+ return check_leaf(root, leaf, false);
+}
+
int btrfs_check_node(struct btrfs_root *root, struct extent_buffer *node)
{
unsigned long nr = btrfs_header_nritems(node);
--- a/fs/btrfs/tree-checker.h
+++ b/fs/btrfs/tree-checker.h
@@ -20,7 +20,19 @@
#include "ctree.h"
#include "extent_io.h"
-int btrfs_check_leaf(struct btrfs_root *root, struct extent_buffer *leaf);
+/*
+ * Comprehensive leaf checker.
+ * Will check not only the item pointers, but also every possible member
+ * in item data.
+ */
+int btrfs_check_leaf_full(struct btrfs_root *root, struct extent_buffer *leaf);
+
+/*
+ * Less strict leaf checker.
+ * Will only check item pointers, not reading item data.
+ */
+int btrfs_check_leaf_relaxed(struct btrfs_root *root,
+ struct extent_buffer *leaf);
int btrfs_check_node(struct btrfs_root *root, struct extent_buffer *node);
#endif
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 075/101] btrfs: tree-checker: Add checker for dir item
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (73 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 074/101] btrfs: tree-checker: Fix false panic for sanity test Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 076/101] btrfs: tree-checker: use %zu format string for size_t Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (30 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Qu Wenruo, Nikolay Borisov, Su Yue,
David Sterba, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
commit ad7b0368f33cffe67fecd302028915926e50ef7e upstream.
Add checker for dir item, for key types DIR_ITEM, DIR_INDEX and
XATTR_ITEM.
This checker does comprehensive checks for:
1) dir_item header and its data size
Against item boundary and maximum name/xattr length.
This part is mostly the same as old verify_dir_item().
2) dir_type
Against maximum file types, and against key type.
Since XATTR key should only have FT_XATTR dir item, and normal dir
item type should not have XATTR key.
The check between key->type and dir_type is newly introduced by this
patch.
3) name hash
For XATTR and DIR_ITEM key, key->offset is name hash (crc32c).
Check the hash of the name against the key to ensure it's correct.
The name hash check is only found in btrfs-progs before this patch.
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Su Yue <suy.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: BTRFS_MAX_XATTR_SIZE() takes a root not an fs_info]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c | 141 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 141 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include "tree-checker.h"
#include "disk-io.h"
#include "compression.h"
+#include "hash.h"
#define CORRUPT(reason, eb, root, slot) \
btrfs_crit(root->fs_info, \
@@ -176,6 +177,141 @@ static int check_csum_item(struct btrfs_
}
/*
+ * Customized reported for dir_item, only important new info is key->objectid,
+ * which represents inode number
+ */
+__printf(4, 5)
+static void dir_item_err(const struct btrfs_root *root,
+ const struct extent_buffer *eb, int slot,
+ const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ struct btrfs_key key;
+ struct va_format vaf;
+ va_list args;
+
+ btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(eb, &key, slot);
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+
+ vaf.fmt = fmt;
+ vaf.va = &args;
+
+ btrfs_crit(root->fs_info,
+ "corrupt %s: root=%llu block=%llu slot=%d ino=%llu, %pV",
+ btrfs_header_level(eb) == 0 ? "leaf" : "node", root->objectid,
+ btrfs_header_bytenr(eb), slot, key.objectid, &vaf);
+ va_end(args);
+}
+
+static int check_dir_item(struct btrfs_root *root,
+ struct extent_buffer *leaf,
+ struct btrfs_key *key, int slot)
+{
+ struct btrfs_dir_item *di;
+ u32 item_size = btrfs_item_size_nr(leaf, slot);
+ u32 cur = 0;
+
+ di = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot, struct btrfs_dir_item);
+ while (cur < item_size) {
+ char namebuf[max(BTRFS_NAME_LEN, XATTR_NAME_MAX)];
+ u32 name_len;
+ u32 data_len;
+ u32 max_name_len;
+ u32 total_size;
+ u32 name_hash;
+ u8 dir_type;
+
+ /* header itself should not cross item boundary */
+ if (cur + sizeof(*di) > item_size) {
+ dir_item_err(root, leaf, slot,
+ "dir item header crosses item boundary, have %lu boundary %u",
+ cur + sizeof(*di), item_size);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+
+ /* dir type check */
+ dir_type = btrfs_dir_type(leaf, di);
+ if (dir_type >= BTRFS_FT_MAX) {
+ dir_item_err(root, leaf, slot,
+ "invalid dir item type, have %u expect [0, %u)",
+ dir_type, BTRFS_FT_MAX);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+
+ if (key->type == BTRFS_XATTR_ITEM_KEY &&
+ dir_type != BTRFS_FT_XATTR) {
+ dir_item_err(root, leaf, slot,
+ "invalid dir item type for XATTR key, have %u expect %u",
+ dir_type, BTRFS_FT_XATTR);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+ if (dir_type == BTRFS_FT_XATTR &&
+ key->type != BTRFS_XATTR_ITEM_KEY) {
+ dir_item_err(root, leaf, slot,
+ "xattr dir type found for non-XATTR key");
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+ if (dir_type == BTRFS_FT_XATTR)
+ max_name_len = XATTR_NAME_MAX;
+ else
+ max_name_len = BTRFS_NAME_LEN;
+
+ /* Name/data length check */
+ name_len = btrfs_dir_name_len(leaf, di);
+ data_len = btrfs_dir_data_len(leaf, di);
+ if (name_len > max_name_len) {
+ dir_item_err(root, leaf, slot,
+ "dir item name len too long, have %u max %u",
+ name_len, max_name_len);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+ if (name_len + data_len > BTRFS_MAX_XATTR_SIZE(root)) {
+ dir_item_err(root, leaf, slot,
+ "dir item name and data len too long, have %u max %u",
+ name_len + data_len,
+ BTRFS_MAX_XATTR_SIZE(root));
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+
+ if (data_len && dir_type != BTRFS_FT_XATTR) {
+ dir_item_err(root, leaf, slot,
+ "dir item with invalid data len, have %u expect 0",
+ data_len);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+
+ total_size = sizeof(*di) + name_len + data_len;
+
+ /* header and name/data should not cross item boundary */
+ if (cur + total_size > item_size) {
+ dir_item_err(root, leaf, slot,
+ "dir item data crosses item boundary, have %u boundary %u",
+ cur + total_size, item_size);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Special check for XATTR/DIR_ITEM, as key->offset is name
+ * hash, should match its name
+ */
+ if (key->type == BTRFS_DIR_ITEM_KEY ||
+ key->type == BTRFS_XATTR_ITEM_KEY) {
+ read_extent_buffer(leaf, namebuf,
+ (unsigned long)(di + 1), name_len);
+ name_hash = btrfs_name_hash(namebuf, name_len);
+ if (key->offset != name_hash) {
+ dir_item_err(root, leaf, slot,
+ "name hash mismatch with key, have 0x%016x expect 0x%016llx",
+ name_hash, key->offset);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+ }
+ cur += total_size;
+ di = (struct btrfs_dir_item *)((void *)di + total_size);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
* Common point to switch the item-specific validation.
*/
static int check_leaf_item(struct btrfs_root *root,
@@ -191,6 +327,11 @@ static int check_leaf_item(struct btrfs_
case BTRFS_EXTENT_CSUM_KEY:
ret = check_csum_item(root, leaf, key, slot);
break;
+ case BTRFS_DIR_ITEM_KEY:
+ case BTRFS_DIR_INDEX_KEY:
+ case BTRFS_XATTR_ITEM_KEY:
+ ret = check_dir_item(root, leaf, key, slot);
+ break;
}
return ret;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 076/101] btrfs: tree-checker: use %zu format string for size_t
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (74 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 075/101] btrfs: tree-checker: Add checker for dir item Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 077/101] btrfs: tree-check: reduce stack consumption in check_dir_item Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (29 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Arnd Bergmann, David Sterba, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
commit 7cfad65297bfe0aa2996cd72d21c898aa84436d9 upstream.
The return value of sizeof() is of type size_t, so we must print it
using the %z format modifier rather than %l to avoid this warning
on some architectures:
fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c: In function 'check_dir_item':
fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c:273:50: error: format '%lu' expects argument of type 'long unsigned int', but argument 5 has type 'u32' {aka 'unsigned int'} [-Werror=format=]
Fixes: 005887f2e3e0 ("btrfs: tree-checker: Add checker for dir item")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ static int check_dir_item(struct btrfs_r
/* header itself should not cross item boundary */
if (cur + sizeof(*di) > item_size) {
dir_item_err(root, leaf, slot,
- "dir item header crosses item boundary, have %lu boundary %u",
+ "dir item header crosses item boundary, have %zu boundary %u",
cur + sizeof(*di), item_size);
return -EUCLEAN;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 077/101] btrfs: tree-check: reduce stack consumption in check_dir_item
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (75 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 076/101] btrfs: tree-checker: use %zu format string for size_t Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 078/101] btrfs: tree-checker: Verify block_group_item Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (28 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Josef Bacik, Qu Wenruo, David Sterba,
Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
commit e2683fc9d219430f5b78889b50cde7f40efeba7b upstream.
I've noticed that the updated item checker stack consumption increased
dramatically in 542f5385e20cf97447 ("btrfs: tree-checker: Add checker
for dir item")
tree-checker.c:check_leaf +552 (176 -> 728)
The array is 255 bytes long, dynamic allocation would slow down the
sanity checks so it's more reasonable to keep it on-stack. Moving the
variable to the scope of use reduces the stack usage again
tree-checker.c:check_leaf -264 (728 -> 464)
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c
@@ -212,7 +212,6 @@ static int check_dir_item(struct btrfs_r
di = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot, struct btrfs_dir_item);
while (cur < item_size) {
- char namebuf[max(BTRFS_NAME_LEN, XATTR_NAME_MAX)];
u32 name_len;
u32 data_len;
u32 max_name_len;
@@ -295,6 +294,8 @@ static int check_dir_item(struct btrfs_r
*/
if (key->type == BTRFS_DIR_ITEM_KEY ||
key->type == BTRFS_XATTR_ITEM_KEY) {
+ char namebuf[max(BTRFS_NAME_LEN, XATTR_NAME_MAX)];
+
read_extent_buffer(leaf, namebuf,
(unsigned long)(di + 1), name_len);
name_hash = btrfs_name_hash(namebuf, name_len);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 078/101] btrfs: tree-checker: Verify block_group_item
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (76 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 077/101] btrfs: tree-check: reduce stack consumption in check_dir_item Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 079/101] btrfs: tree-checker: Detect invalid and empty essential trees Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (27 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Xu Wen, Qu Wenruo, Gu Jinxiang,
Nikolay Borisov, David Sterba, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
commit fce466eab7ac6baa9d2dcd88abcf945be3d4a089 upstream.
A crafted image with invalid block group items could make free space cache
code to cause panic.
We could detect such invalid block group item by checking:
1) Item size
Known fixed value.
2) Block group size (key.offset)
We have an upper limit on block group item (10G)
3) Chunk objectid
Known fixed value.
4) Type
Only 4 valid type values, DATA, METADATA, SYSTEM and DATA|METADATA.
No more than 1 bit set for profile type.
5) Used space
No more than the block group size.
This should allow btrfs to detect and refuse to mount the crafted image.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199849
Reported-by: Xu Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Gu Jinxiang <gujx@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Tested-by: Gu Jinxiang <gujx@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9:
- In check_leaf_item(), pass root->fs_info to check_block_group_item()
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c | 100 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
fs/btrfs/volumes.c | 2
fs/btrfs/volumes.h | 2
3 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include "disk-io.h"
#include "compression.h"
#include "hash.h"
+#include "volumes.h"
#define CORRUPT(reason, eb, root, slot) \
btrfs_crit(root->fs_info, \
@@ -312,6 +313,102 @@ static int check_dir_item(struct btrfs_r
return 0;
}
+__printf(4, 5)
+__cold
+static void block_group_err(const struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
+ const struct extent_buffer *eb, int slot,
+ const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ struct btrfs_key key;
+ struct va_format vaf;
+ va_list args;
+
+ btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(eb, &key, slot);
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+
+ vaf.fmt = fmt;
+ vaf.va = &args;
+
+ btrfs_crit(fs_info,
+ "corrupt %s: root=%llu block=%llu slot=%d bg_start=%llu bg_len=%llu, %pV",
+ btrfs_header_level(eb) == 0 ? "leaf" : "node",
+ btrfs_header_owner(eb), btrfs_header_bytenr(eb), slot,
+ key.objectid, key.offset, &vaf);
+ va_end(args);
+}
+
+static int check_block_group_item(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
+ struct extent_buffer *leaf,
+ struct btrfs_key *key, int slot)
+{
+ struct btrfs_block_group_item bgi;
+ u32 item_size = btrfs_item_size_nr(leaf, slot);
+ u64 flags;
+ u64 type;
+
+ /*
+ * Here we don't really care about alignment since extent allocator can
+ * handle it. We care more about the size, as if one block group is
+ * larger than maximum size, it's must be some obvious corruption.
+ */
+ if (key->offset > BTRFS_MAX_DATA_CHUNK_SIZE || key->offset == 0) {
+ block_group_err(fs_info, leaf, slot,
+ "invalid block group size, have %llu expect (0, %llu]",
+ key->offset, BTRFS_MAX_DATA_CHUNK_SIZE);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+
+ if (item_size != sizeof(bgi)) {
+ block_group_err(fs_info, leaf, slot,
+ "invalid item size, have %u expect %zu",
+ item_size, sizeof(bgi));
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+
+ read_extent_buffer(leaf, &bgi, btrfs_item_ptr_offset(leaf, slot),
+ sizeof(bgi));
+ if (btrfs_block_group_chunk_objectid(&bgi) !=
+ BTRFS_FIRST_CHUNK_TREE_OBJECTID) {
+ block_group_err(fs_info, leaf, slot,
+ "invalid block group chunk objectid, have %llu expect %llu",
+ btrfs_block_group_chunk_objectid(&bgi),
+ BTRFS_FIRST_CHUNK_TREE_OBJECTID);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+
+ if (btrfs_block_group_used(&bgi) > key->offset) {
+ block_group_err(fs_info, leaf, slot,
+ "invalid block group used, have %llu expect [0, %llu)",
+ btrfs_block_group_used(&bgi), key->offset);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+
+ flags = btrfs_block_group_flags(&bgi);
+ if (hweight64(flags & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_PROFILE_MASK) > 1) {
+ block_group_err(fs_info, leaf, slot,
+"invalid profile flags, have 0x%llx (%lu bits set) expect no more than 1 bit set",
+ flags & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_PROFILE_MASK,
+ hweight64(flags & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_PROFILE_MASK));
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+
+ type = flags & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_TYPE_MASK;
+ if (type != BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_DATA &&
+ type != BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_METADATA &&
+ type != BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_SYSTEM &&
+ type != (BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_METADATA |
+ BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_DATA)) {
+ block_group_err(fs_info, leaf, slot,
+"invalid type, have 0x%llx (%lu bits set) expect either 0x%llx, 0x%llx, 0x%llu or 0x%llx",
+ type, hweight64(type),
+ BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_DATA, BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_METADATA,
+ BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_SYSTEM,
+ BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_METADATA | BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_DATA);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Common point to switch the item-specific validation.
*/
@@ -333,6 +430,9 @@ static int check_leaf_item(struct btrfs_
case BTRFS_XATTR_ITEM_KEY:
ret = check_dir_item(root, leaf, key, slot);
break;
+ case BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_ITEM_KEY:
+ ret = check_block_group_item(root->fs_info, leaf, key, slot);
+ break;
}
return ret;
}
--- a/fs/btrfs/volumes.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/volumes.c
@@ -4656,7 +4656,7 @@ static int __btrfs_alloc_chunk(struct bt
if (type & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_DATA) {
max_stripe_size = SZ_1G;
- max_chunk_size = 10 * max_stripe_size;
+ max_chunk_size = BTRFS_MAX_DATA_CHUNK_SIZE;
if (!devs_max)
devs_max = BTRFS_MAX_DEVS(info->chunk_root);
} else if (type & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_METADATA) {
--- a/fs/btrfs/volumes.h
+++ b/fs/btrfs/volumes.h
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
#include <linux/btrfs.h>
#include "async-thread.h"
+#define BTRFS_MAX_DATA_CHUNK_SIZE (10ULL * SZ_1G)
+
extern struct mutex uuid_mutex;
#define BTRFS_STRIPE_LEN SZ_64K
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 079/101] btrfs: tree-checker: Detect invalid and empty essential trees
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (77 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 078/101] btrfs: tree-checker: Verify block_group_item Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 080/101] btrfs: Check that each block group has corresponding chunk at mount time Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (26 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Xu Wen, Qu Wenruo, Gu Jinxiang,
David Sterba, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
commit ba480dd4db9f1798541eb2d1c423fc95feee8d36 upstream.
A crafted image has empty root tree block, which will later cause NULL
pointer dereference.
The following trees should never be empty:
1) Tree root
Must contain at least root items for extent tree, device tree and fs
tree
2) Chunk tree
Or we can't even bootstrap as it contains the mapping.
3) Fs tree
At least inode item for top level inode (.).
4) Device tree
Dev extents for chunks
5) Extent tree
Must have corresponding extent for each chunk.
If any of them is empty, we are sure the fs is corrupted and no need to
mount it.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199847
Reported-by: Xu Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Tested-by: Gu Jinxiang <gujx@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: Pass root instead of fs_info to generic_err()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c
@@ -456,9 +456,22 @@ static int check_leaf(struct btrfs_root
* skip this check for relocation trees.
*/
if (nritems == 0 && !btrfs_header_flag(leaf, BTRFS_HEADER_FLAG_RELOC)) {
+ u64 owner = btrfs_header_owner(leaf);
struct btrfs_root *check_root;
- key.objectid = btrfs_header_owner(leaf);
+ /* These trees must never be empty */
+ if (owner == BTRFS_ROOT_TREE_OBJECTID ||
+ owner == BTRFS_CHUNK_TREE_OBJECTID ||
+ owner == BTRFS_EXTENT_TREE_OBJECTID ||
+ owner == BTRFS_DEV_TREE_OBJECTID ||
+ owner == BTRFS_FS_TREE_OBJECTID ||
+ owner == BTRFS_DATA_RELOC_TREE_OBJECTID) {
+ generic_err(root, leaf, 0,
+ "invalid root, root %llu must never be empty",
+ owner);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+ key.objectid = owner;
key.type = BTRFS_ROOT_ITEM_KEY;
key.offset = (u64)-1;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 080/101] btrfs: Check that each block group has corresponding chunk at mount time
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (78 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 079/101] btrfs: tree-checker: Detect invalid and empty essential trees Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 081/101] btrfs: tree-checker: Check level for leaves and nodes Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (25 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Xu Wen, Qu Wenruo, Su Yue,
David Sterba, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
commit 514c7dca85a0bf40be984dab0b477403a6db901f upstream.
A crafted btrfs image with incorrect chunk<->block group mapping will
trigger a lot of unexpected things as the mapping is essential.
Although the problem can be caught by block group item checker
added in "btrfs: tree-checker: Verify block_group_item", it's still not
sufficient. A sufficiently valid block group item can pass the check
added by the mentioned patch but could fail to match the existing chunk.
This patch will add extra block group -> chunk mapping check, to ensure
we have a completely matching (start, len, flags) chunk for each block
group at mount time.
Here we reuse the original helper find_first_block_group(), which is
already doing the basic bg -> chunk checks, adding further checks of the
start/len and type flags.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199837
Reported-by: Xu Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Su Yue <suy.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: Use root->fs_info instead of fs_info]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c
@@ -9896,6 +9896,8 @@ static int find_first_block_group(struct
int ret = 0;
struct btrfs_key found_key;
struct extent_buffer *leaf;
+ struct btrfs_block_group_item bg;
+ u64 flags;
int slot;
ret = btrfs_search_slot(NULL, root, key, path, 0, 0);
@@ -9930,8 +9932,32 @@ static int find_first_block_group(struct
"logical %llu len %llu found bg but no related chunk",
found_key.objectid, found_key.offset);
ret = -ENOENT;
+ } else if (em->start != found_key.objectid ||
+ em->len != found_key.offset) {
+ btrfs_err(root->fs_info,
+ "block group %llu len %llu mismatch with chunk %llu len %llu",
+ found_key.objectid, found_key.offset,
+ em->start, em->len);
+ ret = -EUCLEAN;
} else {
- ret = 0;
+ read_extent_buffer(leaf, &bg,
+ btrfs_item_ptr_offset(leaf, slot),
+ sizeof(bg));
+ flags = btrfs_block_group_flags(&bg) &
+ BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_TYPE_MASK;
+
+ if (flags != (em->map_lookup->type &
+ BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_TYPE_MASK)) {
+ btrfs_err(root->fs_info,
+"block group %llu len %llu type flags 0x%llx mismatch with chunk type flags 0x%llx",
+ found_key.objectid,
+ found_key.offset, flags,
+ (BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_TYPE_MASK &
+ em->map_lookup->type));
+ ret = -EUCLEAN;
+ } else {
+ ret = 0;
+ }
}
free_extent_map(em);
goto out;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 081/101] btrfs: tree-checker: Check level for leaves and nodes
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (79 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 080/101] btrfs: Check that each block group has corresponding chunk at mount time Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 082/101] btrfs: tree-checker: Fix misleading group system information Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (24 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Qu Wenruo, Su Yue, David Sterba,
Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
commit f556faa46eb4e96d0d0772e74ecf66781e132f72 upstream.
Although we have tree level check at tree read runtime, it's completely
based on its parent level.
We still need to do accurate level check to avoid invalid tree blocks
sneak into kernel space.
The check itself is simple, for leaf its level should always be 0.
For nodes its level should be in range [1, BTRFS_MAX_LEVEL - 1].
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Su Yue <suy.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9:
- Pass root instead of fs_info to generic_err()
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c
@@ -447,6 +447,13 @@ static int check_leaf(struct btrfs_root
u32 nritems = btrfs_header_nritems(leaf);
int slot;
+ if (btrfs_header_level(leaf) != 0) {
+ generic_err(root, leaf, 0,
+ "invalid level for leaf, have %d expect 0",
+ btrfs_header_level(leaf));
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
+
/*
* Extent buffers from a relocation tree have a owner field that
* corresponds to the subvolume tree they are based on. So just from an
@@ -589,9 +596,16 @@ int btrfs_check_node(struct btrfs_root *
unsigned long nr = btrfs_header_nritems(node);
struct btrfs_key key, next_key;
int slot;
+ int level = btrfs_header_level(node);
u64 bytenr;
int ret = 0;
+ if (level <= 0 || level >= BTRFS_MAX_LEVEL) {
+ generic_err(root, node, 0,
+ "invalid level for node, have %d expect [1, %d]",
+ level, BTRFS_MAX_LEVEL - 1);
+ return -EUCLEAN;
+ }
if (nr == 0 || nr > BTRFS_NODEPTRS_PER_BLOCK(root)) {
btrfs_crit(root->fs_info,
"corrupt node: root=%llu block=%llu, nritems too %s, have %lu expect range [1,%u]",
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 082/101] btrfs: tree-checker: Fix misleading group system information
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (80 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 081/101] btrfs: tree-checker: Check level for leaves and nodes Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 083/101] f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (23 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Nikolay Borisov, Qu Wenruo,
Shaokun Zhang, David Sterba, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shaokun Zhang <zhangshaokun@hisilicon.com>
commit 761333f2f50ccc887aa9957ae829300262c0d15b upstream.
block_group_err shows the group system as a decimal value with a '0x'
prefix, which is somewhat misleading.
Fix it to print hexadecimal, as was intended.
Fixes: fce466eab7ac6 ("btrfs: tree-checker: Verify block_group_item")
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Shaokun Zhang <zhangshaokun@hisilicon.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ static int check_block_group_item(struct
type != (BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_METADATA |
BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_DATA)) {
block_group_err(fs_info, leaf, slot,
-"invalid type, have 0x%llx (%lu bits set) expect either 0x%llx, 0x%llx, 0x%llu or 0x%llx",
+"invalid type, have 0x%llx (%lu bits set) expect either 0x%llx, 0x%llx, 0x%llx or 0x%llx",
type, hweight64(type),
BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_DATA, BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_METADATA,
BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_SYSTEM,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 083/101] f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (81 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 082/101] btrfs: tree-checker: Fix misleading group system information Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 084/101] f2fs: fix race condition in between free nid allocator/initializer Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (22 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Yunlei He, Jaegeuk Kim, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
commit d4fdf8ba0e5808ba9ad6b44337783bd9935e0982 upstream.
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/f2fs/segment.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/segment.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.c
@@ -493,6 +493,9 @@ int create_flush_cmd_control(struct f2fs
init_waitqueue_head(&fcc->flush_wait_queue);
init_llist_head(&fcc->issue_list);
SM_I(sbi)->cmd_control_info = fcc;
+ if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE))
+ return err;
+
fcc->f2fs_issue_flush = kthread_run(issue_flush_thread, sbi,
"f2fs_flush-%u:%u", MAJOR(dev), MINOR(dev));
if (IS_ERR(fcc->f2fs_issue_flush)) {
@@ -2539,7 +2542,7 @@ int build_segment_manager(struct f2fs_sb
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sm_info->sit_entry_set);
- if (test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE) && !f2fs_readonly(sbi->sb)) {
+ if (!f2fs_readonly(sbi->sb)) {
err = create_flush_cmd_control(sbi);
if (err)
return err;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 084/101] f2fs: fix race condition in between free nid allocator/initializer
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (82 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 083/101] f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 085/101] f2fs: detect wrong layout Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (21 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jaegeuk Kim, Chao Yu, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
commit 30a61ddf8117c26ac5b295e1233eaa9629a94ca3 upstream.
In below concurrent case, allocated nid can be loaded into free nid cache
and be allocated again.
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_create
- f2fs_new_inode
- alloc_nid
- __insert_nid_to_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- f2fs_balance_fs_bg
- build_free_nids
- __build_free_nids
- scan_nat_page
- add_free_nid
- __lookup_nat_cache
- f2fs_add_link
- init_inode_metadata
- new_inode_page
- new_node_page
- set_node_addr
- alloc_nid_done
- __remove_nid_from_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- __insert_nid_to_list(FREE_NID_LIST)
This patch makes nat cache lookup and free nid list operation being atomical
to avoid this race condition.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9:
- add_free_nid() returns 0 in case of any error (except low memory)
- Tree/list addition has not been moved into __insert_nid_to_list()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/f2fs/node.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/node.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/node.c
@@ -1704,8 +1704,9 @@ static void __del_from_free_nid_list(str
static int add_free_nid(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, nid_t nid, bool build)
{
struct f2fs_nm_info *nm_i = NM_I(sbi);
- struct free_nid *i;
+ struct free_nid *i, *e;
struct nat_entry *ne;
+ int err = -EINVAL;
if (!available_free_memory(sbi, FREE_NIDS))
return -1;
@@ -1714,35 +1715,58 @@ static int add_free_nid(struct f2fs_sb_i
if (unlikely(nid == 0))
return 0;
- if (build) {
- /* do not add allocated nids */
- ne = __lookup_nat_cache(nm_i, nid);
- if (ne && (!get_nat_flag(ne, IS_CHECKPOINTED) ||
- nat_get_blkaddr(ne) != NULL_ADDR))
- return 0;
- }
-
i = f2fs_kmem_cache_alloc(free_nid_slab, GFP_NOFS);
i->nid = nid;
i->state = NID_NEW;
- if (radix_tree_preload(GFP_NOFS)) {
- kmem_cache_free(free_nid_slab, i);
- return 0;
- }
+ if (radix_tree_preload(GFP_NOFS))
+ goto err;
spin_lock(&nm_i->free_nid_list_lock);
- if (radix_tree_insert(&nm_i->free_nid_root, i->nid, i)) {
- spin_unlock(&nm_i->free_nid_list_lock);
- radix_tree_preload_end();
- kmem_cache_free(free_nid_slab, i);
- return 0;
+
+ if (build) {
+ /*
+ * Thread A Thread B
+ * - f2fs_create
+ * - f2fs_new_inode
+ * - alloc_nid
+ * - __insert_nid_to_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
+ * - f2fs_balance_fs_bg
+ * - build_free_nids
+ * - __build_free_nids
+ * - scan_nat_page
+ * - add_free_nid
+ * - __lookup_nat_cache
+ * - f2fs_add_link
+ * - init_inode_metadata
+ * - new_inode_page
+ * - new_node_page
+ * - set_node_addr
+ * - alloc_nid_done
+ * - __remove_nid_from_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
+ * - __insert_nid_to_list(FREE_NID_LIST)
+ */
+ ne = __lookup_nat_cache(nm_i, nid);
+ if (ne && (!get_nat_flag(ne, IS_CHECKPOINTED) ||
+ nat_get_blkaddr(ne) != NULL_ADDR))
+ goto err_out;
+
+ e = __lookup_free_nid_list(nm_i, nid);
+ if (e)
+ goto err_out;
}
+ if (radix_tree_insert(&nm_i->free_nid_root, i->nid, i))
+ goto err_out;
+ err = 0;
list_add_tail(&i->list, &nm_i->free_nid_list);
nm_i->fcnt++;
+err_out:
spin_unlock(&nm_i->free_nid_list_lock);
radix_tree_preload_end();
- return 1;
+err:
+ if (err)
+ kmem_cache_free(free_nid_slab, i);
+ return !err;
}
static void remove_free_nid(struct f2fs_nm_info *nm_i, nid_t nid)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 085/101] f2fs: detect wrong layout
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (83 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 084/101] f2fs: fix race condition in between free nid allocator/initializer Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 086/101] f2fs: return error during fill_super Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (20 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jaegeuk Kim, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
commit 2040fce83fe17763b07c97c1f691da2bb85e4135 upstream.
Previous mkfs.f2fs allows small partition inappropriately, so f2fs should detect
that as well.
Refer this in f2fs-tools.
mkfs.f2fs: detect small partition by overprovision ratio and # of segments
Reported-and-Tested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/f2fs/segment.h | 2 ++
fs/f2fs/super.c | 11 +++++++++++
2 files changed, 13 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/f2fs/segment.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.h
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
#define DEF_RECLAIM_PREFREE_SEGMENTS 5 /* 5% over total segments */
#define DEF_MAX_RECLAIM_PREFREE_SEGMENTS 4096 /* 8GB in maximum */
+#define F2FS_MIN_SEGMENTS 9 /* SB + 2 (CP + SIT + NAT) + SSA + MAIN */
+
/* L: Logical segment # in volume, R: Relative segment # in main area */
#define GET_L2R_SEGNO(free_i, segno) (segno - free_i->start_segno)
#define GET_R2L_SEGNO(free_i, segno) (segno + free_i->start_segno)
--- a/fs/f2fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c
@@ -1424,6 +1424,7 @@ int sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_inf
unsigned int total, fsmeta;
struct f2fs_super_block *raw_super = F2FS_RAW_SUPER(sbi);
struct f2fs_checkpoint *ckpt = F2FS_CKPT(sbi);
+ unsigned int ovp_segments, reserved_segments;
unsigned int main_segs, blocks_per_seg;
unsigned int sit_segs, nat_segs;
unsigned int sit_bitmap_size, nat_bitmap_size;
@@ -1442,6 +1443,16 @@ int sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_inf
if (unlikely(fsmeta >= total))
return 1;
+ ovp_segments = le32_to_cpu(ckpt->overprov_segment_count);
+ reserved_segments = le32_to_cpu(ckpt->rsvd_segment_count);
+
+ if (unlikely(fsmeta < F2FS_MIN_SEGMENTS ||
+ ovp_segments == 0 || reserved_segments == 0)) {
+ f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR,
+ "Wrong layout: check mkfs.f2fs version");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
main_segs = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_main);
blocks_per_seg = sbi->blocks_per_seg;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 086/101] f2fs: return error during fill_super
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (84 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 085/101] f2fs: detect wrong layout Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 087/101] f2fs: check blkaddr more accuratly before issue a bio Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (19 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Chao Yu, Jaegeuk Kim,
Sudip Mukherjee, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
commit c39a1b348c4fe172729eff77c533dabc3c7cdaa7 upstream.
Let's avoid BUG_ON during fill_super, when on-disk was totall corrupted.
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/f2fs/segment.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
fs/f2fs/segment.h | 22 ++++++++++++++++++----
2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/segment.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.c
@@ -2322,7 +2322,7 @@ static int build_curseg(struct f2fs_sb_i
return restore_curseg_summaries(sbi);
}
-static void build_sit_entries(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
+static int build_sit_entries(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
struct sit_info *sit_i = SIT_I(sbi);
struct curseg_info *curseg = CURSEG_I(sbi, CURSEG_COLD_DATA);
@@ -2333,6 +2333,7 @@ static void build_sit_entries(struct f2f
unsigned int i, start, end;
unsigned int readed, start_blk = 0;
int nrpages = MAX_BIO_BLOCKS(sbi) * 8;
+ int err = 0;
do {
readed = ra_meta_pages(sbi, start_blk, nrpages, META_SIT, true);
@@ -2350,7 +2351,9 @@ static void build_sit_entries(struct f2f
sit = sit_blk->entries[SIT_ENTRY_OFFSET(sit_i, start)];
f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
- check_block_count(sbi, start, &sit);
+ err = check_block_count(sbi, start, &sit);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
seg_info_from_raw_sit(se, &sit);
/* build discard map only one time */
@@ -2378,7 +2381,9 @@ static void build_sit_entries(struct f2f
old_valid_blocks = se->valid_blocks;
- check_block_count(sbi, start, &sit);
+ err = check_block_count(sbi, start, &sit);
+ if (err)
+ break;
seg_info_from_raw_sit(se, &sit);
if (f2fs_discard_en(sbi)) {
@@ -2393,6 +2398,7 @@ static void build_sit_entries(struct f2f
se->valid_blocks - old_valid_blocks;
}
up_read(&curseg->journal_rwsem);
+ return err;
}
static void init_free_segmap(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
@@ -2559,7 +2565,9 @@ int build_segment_manager(struct f2fs_sb
return err;
/* reinit free segmap based on SIT */
- build_sit_entries(sbi);
+ err = build_sit_entries(sbi);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
init_free_segmap(sbi);
err = build_dirty_segmap(sbi);
--- a/fs/f2fs/segment.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.h
@@ -600,7 +600,7 @@ static inline void verify_block_addr(str
/*
* Summary block is always treated as an invalid block
*/
-static inline void check_block_count(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
+static inline int check_block_count(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
int segno, struct f2fs_sit_entry *raw_sit)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS
@@ -622,11 +622,25 @@ static inline void check_block_count(str
cur_pos = next_pos;
is_valid = !is_valid;
} while (cur_pos < sbi->blocks_per_seg);
- BUG_ON(GET_SIT_VBLOCKS(raw_sit) != valid_blocks);
+
+ if (unlikely(GET_SIT_VBLOCKS(raw_sit) != valid_blocks)) {
+ f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR,
+ "Mismatch valid blocks %d vs. %d",
+ GET_SIT_VBLOCKS(raw_sit), valid_blocks);
+ set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
#endif
/* check segment usage, and check boundary of a given segment number */
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, GET_SIT_VBLOCKS(raw_sit) > sbi->blocks_per_seg
- || segno > TOTAL_SEGS(sbi) - 1);
+ if (unlikely(GET_SIT_VBLOCKS(raw_sit) > sbi->blocks_per_seg
+ || segno > TOTAL_SEGS(sbi) - 1)) {
+ f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR,
+ "Wrong valid blocks %d or segno %u",
+ GET_SIT_VBLOCKS(raw_sit), segno);
+ set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
static inline pgoff_t current_sit_addr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 087/101] f2fs: check blkaddr more accuratly before issue a bio
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (85 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 086/101] f2fs: return error during fill_super Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 088/101] f2fs: sanity check on sit entry Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (18 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Yunlei He, Chao Yu, Jaegeuk Kim,
Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
commit 0833721ec3658a4e9d5e58b6fa82cf9edc431e59 upstream.
This patch check blkaddr more accuratly before issue a
write or read bio.
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c | 2 ++
fs/f2fs/data.c | 5 +++--
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 1 +
fs/f2fs/segment.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------
4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ static struct page *__get_meta_page(stru
.old_blkaddr = index,
.new_blkaddr = index,
.encrypted_page = NULL,
+ .is_meta = is_meta,
};
if (unlikely(!is_meta))
@@ -162,6 +163,7 @@ int ra_meta_pages(struct f2fs_sb_info *s
.op = REQ_OP_READ,
.op_flags = sync ? (READ_SYNC | REQ_META | REQ_PRIO) : REQ_RAHEAD,
.encrypted_page = NULL,
+ .is_meta = (type != META_POR),
};
struct blk_plug plug;
--- a/fs/f2fs/data.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/data.c
@@ -240,6 +240,7 @@ int f2fs_submit_page_bio(struct f2fs_io_
struct page *page = fio->encrypted_page ?
fio->encrypted_page : fio->page;
+ verify_block_addr(fio, fio->new_blkaddr);
trace_f2fs_submit_page_bio(page, fio);
f2fs_trace_ios(fio, 0);
@@ -267,8 +268,8 @@ void f2fs_submit_page_mbio(struct f2fs_i
io = is_read ? &sbi->read_io : &sbi->write_io[btype];
if (fio->old_blkaddr != NEW_ADDR)
- verify_block_addr(sbi, fio->old_blkaddr);
- verify_block_addr(sbi, fio->new_blkaddr);
+ verify_block_addr(fio, fio->old_blkaddr);
+ verify_block_addr(fio, fio->new_blkaddr);
down_write(&io->io_rwsem);
--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
@@ -694,6 +694,7 @@ struct f2fs_io_info {
block_t old_blkaddr; /* old block address before Cow */
struct page *page; /* page to be written */
struct page *encrypted_page; /* encrypted page */
+ bool is_meta; /* indicate borrow meta inode mapping or not */
};
#define is_read_io(rw) (rw == READ)
--- a/fs/f2fs/segment.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.h
@@ -49,13 +49,19 @@
(secno == CURSEG_I(sbi, CURSEG_COLD_NODE)->segno / \
sbi->segs_per_sec)) \
-#define MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi) (SM_I(sbi)->main_blkaddr)
-#define SEG0_BLKADDR(sbi) (SM_I(sbi)->seg0_blkaddr)
+#define MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi) \
+ (SM_I(sbi) ? SM_I(sbi)->main_blkaddr : \
+ le32_to_cpu(F2FS_RAW_SUPER(sbi)->main_blkaddr))
+#define SEG0_BLKADDR(sbi) \
+ (SM_I(sbi) ? SM_I(sbi)->seg0_blkaddr : \
+ le32_to_cpu(F2FS_RAW_SUPER(sbi)->segment0_blkaddr))
#define MAIN_SEGS(sbi) (SM_I(sbi)->main_segments)
#define MAIN_SECS(sbi) (sbi->total_sections)
-#define TOTAL_SEGS(sbi) (SM_I(sbi)->segment_count)
+#define TOTAL_SEGS(sbi) \
+ (SM_I(sbi) ? SM_I(sbi)->segment_count : \
+ le32_to_cpu(F2FS_RAW_SUPER(sbi)->segment_count))
#define TOTAL_BLKS(sbi) (TOTAL_SEGS(sbi) << sbi->log_blocks_per_seg)
#define MAX_BLKADDR(sbi) (SEG0_BLKADDR(sbi) + TOTAL_BLKS(sbi))
@@ -591,10 +597,17 @@ static inline void check_seg_range(struc
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, segno > TOTAL_SEGS(sbi) - 1);
}
-static inline void verify_block_addr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t blk_addr)
+static inline void verify_block_addr(struct f2fs_io_info *fio, block_t blk_addr)
{
- BUG_ON(blk_addr < SEG0_BLKADDR(sbi)
- || blk_addr >= MAX_BLKADDR(sbi));
+ struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = fio->sbi;
+
+ if (PAGE_TYPE_OF_BIO(fio->type) == META &&
+ (!is_read_io(fio->op) || fio->is_meta))
+ BUG_ON(blk_addr < SEG0_BLKADDR(sbi) ||
+ blk_addr >= MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi));
+ else
+ BUG_ON(blk_addr < MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi) ||
+ blk_addr >= MAX_BLKADDR(sbi));
}
/*
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 088/101] f2fs: sanity check on sit entry
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (86 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 087/101] f2fs: check blkaddr more accuratly before issue a bio Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 089/101] f2fs: enhance sanity_check_raw_super() to avoid potential overflow Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (17 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, syzbot+83699adeb2d13579c31e, Chao Yu,
Jaegeuk Kim, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
commit b2ca374f33bd33fd822eb871876e4888cf79dc97 upstream.
syzbot hit the following crash on upstream commit
87ef12027b9b1dd0e0b12cf311fbcb19f9d92539 (Wed Apr 18 19:48:17 2018 +0000)
Merge tag 'ceph-for-4.17-rc2' of git://github.com/ceph/ceph-client
syzbot dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=83699adeb2d13579c31e
C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?id=5805208181407744
syzkaller reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?id=6005073343676416
Raw console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?id=6555047731134464
Kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?id=1808800213120130118
compiler: gcc (GCC) 8.0.1 20180413 (experimental)
IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+83699adeb2d13579c31e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
It will help syzbot understand when the bug is fixed. See footer for details.
If you forward the report, please keep this part and the footer.
F2FS-fs (loop0): Magic Mismatch, valid(0xf2f52010) - read(0x0)
F2FS-fs (loop0): Can't find valid F2FS filesystem in 1th superblock
F2FS-fs (loop0): invalid crc value
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffed006b2a50c0
PGD 21ffee067 P4D 21ffee067 PUD 21fbeb067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 4514 Comm: syzkaller989480 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc1+ #8
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:build_sit_entries fs/f2fs/segment.c:3653 [inline]
RIP: 0010:build_segment_manager+0x7ef7/0xbf70 fs/f2fs/segment.c:3852
RSP: 0018:ffff8801b102e5b0 EFLAGS: 00010a06
RAX: 1ffff1006b2a50c0 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8801ac74243e
RBP: ffff8801b102f410 R08: ffff8801acbd46c0 R09: fffffbfff14d9af8
R10: fffffbfff14d9af8 R11: ffff8801acbd46c0 R12: ffff8801ac742a80
R13: ffff8801d9519100 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff880359528600
FS: 0000000001e04880(0000) GS:ffff8801dae00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffed006b2a50c0 CR3: 00000001ac6ac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
f2fs_fill_super+0x4095/0x7bf0 fs/f2fs/super.c:2803
mount_bdev+0x30c/0x3e0 fs/super.c:1165
f2fs_mount+0x34/0x40 fs/f2fs/super.c:3020
mount_fs+0xae/0x328 fs/super.c:1268
vfs_kern_mount.part.34+0xd4/0x4d0 fs/namespace.c:1037
vfs_kern_mount fs/namespace.c:1027 [inline]
do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2517 [inline]
do_mount+0x564/0x3070 fs/namespace.c:2847
ksys_mount+0x12d/0x140 fs/namespace.c:3063
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3077 [inline]
__se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3074 [inline]
__x64_sys_mount+0xbe/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3074
do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x443d6a
RSP: 002b:00007ffd312813c8 EFLAGS: 00000297 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020000c00 RCX: 0000000000443d6a
RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 00007ffd312813d0
RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000020016a00 R09: 000000000000000a
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000297 R12: 0000000000000004
R13: 0000000000402c60 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
RIP: build_sit_entries fs/f2fs/segment.c:3653 [inline] RSP: ffff8801b102e5b0
RIP: build_segment_manager+0x7ef7/0xbf70 fs/f2fs/segment.c:3852 RSP: ffff8801b102e5b0
CR2: ffffed006b2a50c0
---[ end trace a2034989e196ff17 ]---
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+83699adeb2d13579c31e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/f2fs/segment.c | 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/f2fs/segment.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.c
@@ -2376,6 +2376,15 @@ static int build_sit_entries(struct f2fs
unsigned int old_valid_blocks;
start = le32_to_cpu(segno_in_journal(journal, i));
+ if (start >= MAIN_SEGS(sbi)) {
+ f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR,
+ "Wrong journal entry on segno %u",
+ start);
+ set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK);
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+
se = &sit_i->sentries[start];
sit = sit_in_journal(journal, i);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 089/101] f2fs: enhance sanity_check_raw_super() to avoid potential overflow
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (87 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 088/101] f2fs: sanity check on sit entry Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 090/101] f2fs: clean up with is_valid_blkaddr() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (16 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Greg KH, Silvio Cesare,
Linus Torvalds, Chao Yu, Jaegeuk Kim, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
commit 0cfe75c5b011994651a4ca6d74f20aa997bfc69a upstream.
In order to avoid the below overflow issue, we should have checked the
boundaries in superblock before reaching out to allocation. As Linus suggested,
the right place should be sanity_check_raw_super().
Dr Silvio Cesare of InfoSect reported:
There are integer overflows with using the cp_payload superblock field in the
f2fs filesystem potentially leading to memory corruption.
include/linux/f2fs_fs.h
struct f2fs_super_block {
...
__le32 cp_payload;
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
typedef u32 block_t; /*
* should not change u32, since it is the on-disk block
* address format, __le32.
*/
...
static inline block_t __cp_payload(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
return le32_to_cpu(F2FS_RAW_SUPER(sbi)->cp_payload);
}
fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
block_t start_blk, orphan_blocks, i, j;
...
start_blk = __start_cp_addr(sbi) + 1 + __cp_payload(sbi);
orphan_blocks = __start_sum_addr(sbi) - 1 - __cp_payload(sbi);
+++ integer overflows
...
unsigned int cp_blks = 1 + __cp_payload(sbi);
...
sbi->ckpt = kzalloc(cp_blks * blk_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+++ integer overflow leading to incorrect heap allocation.
int cp_payload_blks = __cp_payload(sbi);
...
ckpt->cp_pack_start_sum = cpu_to_le32(1 + cp_payload_blks +
orphan_blocks);
+++ sign bug and integer overflow
...
for (i = 1; i < 1 + cp_payload_blks; i++)
+++ integer overflow
...
sbi->max_orphans = (sbi->blocks_per_seg - F2FS_CP_PACKS -
NR_CURSEG_TYPE - __cp_payload(sbi)) *
F2FS_ORPHANS_PER_BLOCK;
+++ integer overflow
Reported-by: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Reported-by: Silvio Cesare <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: No hot file extension support]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/f2fs/super.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 64 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c
@@ -1337,6 +1337,8 @@ static inline bool sanity_check_area_bou
static int sanity_check_raw_super(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
struct buffer_head *bh)
{
+ block_t segment_count, segs_per_sec, secs_per_zone;
+ block_t total_sections, blocks_per_seg;
struct f2fs_super_block *raw_super = (struct f2fs_super_block *)
(bh->b_data + F2FS_SUPER_OFFSET);
struct super_block *sb = sbi->sb;
@@ -1393,6 +1395,68 @@ static int sanity_check_raw_super(struct
return 1;
}
+ segment_count = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count);
+ segs_per_sec = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segs_per_sec);
+ secs_per_zone = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->secs_per_zone);
+ total_sections = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->section_count);
+
+ /* blocks_per_seg should be 512, given the above check */
+ blocks_per_seg = 1 << le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_blocks_per_seg);
+
+ if (segment_count > F2FS_MAX_SEGMENT ||
+ segment_count < F2FS_MIN_SEGMENTS) {
+ f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
+ "Invalid segment count (%u)",
+ segment_count);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (total_sections > segment_count ||
+ total_sections < F2FS_MIN_SEGMENTS ||
+ segs_per_sec > segment_count || !segs_per_sec) {
+ f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
+ "Invalid segment/section count (%u, %u x %u)",
+ segment_count, total_sections, segs_per_sec);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if ((segment_count / segs_per_sec) < total_sections) {
+ f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
+ "Small segment_count (%u < %u * %u)",
+ segment_count, segs_per_sec, total_sections);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (segment_count > (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->block_count) >> 9)) {
+ f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
+ "Wrong segment_count / block_count (%u > %u)",
+ segment_count, le32_to_cpu(raw_super->block_count));
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (secs_per_zone > total_sections) {
+ f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
+ "Wrong secs_per_zone (%u > %u)",
+ secs_per_zone, total_sections);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->extension_count) > F2FS_MAX_EXTENSION) {
+ f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
+ "Corrupted extension count (%u > %u)",
+ le32_to_cpu(raw_super->extension_count),
+ F2FS_MAX_EXTENSION);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->cp_payload) >
+ (blocks_per_seg - F2FS_CP_PACKS)) {
+ f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
+ "Insane cp_payload (%u > %u)",
+ le32_to_cpu(raw_super->cp_payload),
+ blocks_per_seg - F2FS_CP_PACKS);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
/* check reserved ino info */
if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->node_ino) != 1 ||
le32_to_cpu(raw_super->meta_ino) != 2 ||
@@ -1405,13 +1469,6 @@ static int sanity_check_raw_super(struct
return 1;
}
- if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count) > F2FS_MAX_SEGMENT) {
- f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
- "Invalid segment count (%u)",
- le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count));
- return 1;
- }
-
/* check CP/SIT/NAT/SSA/MAIN_AREA area boundary */
if (sanity_check_area_boundary(sbi, bh))
return 1;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 090/101] f2fs: clean up with is_valid_blkaddr()
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (88 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 089/101] f2fs: enhance sanity_check_raw_super() to avoid potential overflow Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 091/101] f2fs: introduce and spread verify_blkaddr Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (15 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Chao Yu, Jaegeuk Kim, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
commit 7b525dd01365c6764018e374d391c92466be1b7a upstream.
- rename is_valid_blkaddr() to is_valid_meta_blkaddr() for readability.
- introduce is_valid_blkaddr() for cleanup.
No logic change in this patch.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c | 4 ++--
fs/f2fs/data.c | 6 +++---
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 9 ++++++++-
fs/f2fs/file.c | 2 +-
fs/f2fs/inode.c | 2 +-
fs/f2fs/node.c | 5 ++---
fs/f2fs/recovery.c | 6 +++---
fs/f2fs/segment.c | 4 ++--
fs/f2fs/segment.h | 2 +-
9 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ struct page *get_tmp_page(struct f2fs_sb
return __get_meta_page(sbi, index, false);
}
-bool is_valid_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t blkaddr, int type)
+bool is_valid_meta_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t blkaddr, int type)
{
switch (type) {
case META_NAT:
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ int ra_meta_pages(struct f2fs_sb_info *s
blk_start_plug(&plug);
for (; nrpages-- > 0; blkno++) {
- if (!is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, blkno, type))
+ if (!is_valid_meta_blkaddr(sbi, blkno, type))
goto out;
switch (type) {
--- a/fs/f2fs/data.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/data.c
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ void f2fs_submit_page_mbio(struct f2fs_i
io = is_read ? &sbi->read_io : &sbi->write_io[btype];
- if (fio->old_blkaddr != NEW_ADDR)
+ if (is_valid_blkaddr(fio->old_blkaddr))
verify_block_addr(fio, fio->old_blkaddr);
verify_block_addr(fio, fio->new_blkaddr);
@@ -723,7 +723,7 @@ next_dnode:
next_block:
blkaddr = datablock_addr(dn.node_page, dn.ofs_in_node);
- if (blkaddr == NEW_ADDR || blkaddr == NULL_ADDR) {
+ if (!is_valid_blkaddr(blkaddr)) {
if (create) {
if (unlikely(f2fs_cp_error(sbi))) {
err = -EIO;
@@ -1217,7 +1217,7 @@ retry_encrypt:
* If current allocation needs SSR,
* it had better in-place writes for updated data.
*/
- if (unlikely(fio->old_blkaddr != NEW_ADDR &&
+ if (unlikely(is_valid_blkaddr(fio->old_blkaddr) &&
!is_cold_data(page) &&
!IS_ATOMIC_WRITTEN_PAGE(page) &&
need_inplace_update(inode))) {
--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
@@ -1930,6 +1930,13 @@ static inline void *f2fs_kvzalloc(size_t
(pgofs - ADDRS_PER_INODE(inode) + ADDRS_PER_BLOCK) / \
ADDRS_PER_BLOCK * ADDRS_PER_BLOCK + ADDRS_PER_INODE(inode))
+static inline bool is_valid_blkaddr(block_t blkaddr)
+{
+ if (blkaddr == NEW_ADDR || blkaddr == NULL_ADDR)
+ return false;
+ return true;
+}
+
/*
* file.c
*/
@@ -2115,7 +2122,7 @@ void f2fs_stop_checkpoint(struct f2fs_sb
struct page *grab_meta_page(struct f2fs_sb_info *, pgoff_t);
struct page *get_meta_page(struct f2fs_sb_info *, pgoff_t);
struct page *get_tmp_page(struct f2fs_sb_info *, pgoff_t);
-bool is_valid_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *, block_t, int);
+bool is_valid_meta_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t blkaddr, int type);
int ra_meta_pages(struct f2fs_sb_info *, block_t, int, int, bool);
void ra_meta_pages_cond(struct f2fs_sb_info *, pgoff_t);
long sync_meta_pages(struct f2fs_sb_info *, enum page_type, long);
--- a/fs/f2fs/file.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/file.c
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ static bool __found_offset(block_t blkad
switch (whence) {
case SEEK_DATA:
if ((blkaddr == NEW_ADDR && dirty == pgofs) ||
- (blkaddr != NEW_ADDR && blkaddr != NULL_ADDR))
+ is_valid_blkaddr(blkaddr))
return true;
break;
case SEEK_HOLE:
--- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ static bool __written_first_block(struct
{
block_t addr = le32_to_cpu(ri->i_addr[0]);
- if (addr != NEW_ADDR && addr != NULL_ADDR)
+ if (is_valid_blkaddr(addr))
return true;
return false;
}
--- a/fs/f2fs/node.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/node.c
@@ -304,8 +304,7 @@ static void set_node_addr(struct f2fs_sb
new_blkaddr == NULL_ADDR);
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, nat_get_blkaddr(e) == NEW_ADDR &&
new_blkaddr == NEW_ADDR);
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, nat_get_blkaddr(e) != NEW_ADDR &&
- nat_get_blkaddr(e) != NULL_ADDR &&
+ f2fs_bug_on(sbi, is_valid_blkaddr(nat_get_blkaddr(e)) &&
new_blkaddr == NEW_ADDR);
/* increment version no as node is removed */
@@ -320,7 +319,7 @@ static void set_node_addr(struct f2fs_sb
/* change address */
nat_set_blkaddr(e, new_blkaddr);
- if (new_blkaddr == NEW_ADDR || new_blkaddr == NULL_ADDR)
+ if (!is_valid_blkaddr(new_blkaddr))
set_nat_flag(e, IS_CHECKPOINTED, false);
__set_nat_cache_dirty(nm_i, e);
--- a/fs/f2fs/recovery.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/recovery.c
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ static int find_fsync_dnodes(struct f2fs
while (1) {
struct fsync_inode_entry *entry;
- if (!is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, META_POR))
+ if (!is_valid_meta_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, META_POR))
return 0;
page = get_tmp_page(sbi, blkaddr);
@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ retry_dn:
}
/* dest is valid block, try to recover from src to dest */
- if (is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, dest, META_POR)) {
+ if (is_valid_meta_blkaddr(sbi, dest, META_POR)) {
if (src == NULL_ADDR) {
err = reserve_new_block(&dn);
@@ -527,7 +527,7 @@ static int recover_data(struct f2fs_sb_i
while (1) {
struct fsync_inode_entry *entry;
- if (!is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, META_POR))
+ if (!is_valid_meta_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, META_POR))
break;
ra_meta_pages_cond(sbi, blkaddr);
--- a/fs/f2fs/segment.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.c
@@ -944,7 +944,7 @@ bool is_checkpointed_data(struct f2fs_sb
struct seg_entry *se;
bool is_cp = false;
- if (blkaddr == NEW_ADDR || blkaddr == NULL_ADDR)
+ if (!is_valid_blkaddr(blkaddr))
return true;
mutex_lock(&sit_i->sentry_lock);
@@ -1668,7 +1668,7 @@ void f2fs_wait_on_encrypted_page_writeba
{
struct page *cpage;
- if (blkaddr == NEW_ADDR || blkaddr == NULL_ADDR)
+ if (!is_valid_blkaddr(blkaddr))
return;
cpage = find_lock_page(META_MAPPING(sbi), blkaddr);
--- a/fs/f2fs/segment.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.h
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@
(GET_SEGOFF_FROM_SEG0(sbi, blk_addr) & (sbi->blocks_per_seg - 1))
#define GET_SEGNO(sbi, blk_addr) \
- (((blk_addr == NULL_ADDR) || (blk_addr == NEW_ADDR)) ? \
+ ((!is_valid_blkaddr(blk_addr)) ? \
NULL_SEGNO : GET_L2R_SEGNO(FREE_I(sbi), \
GET_SEGNO_FROM_SEG0(sbi, blk_addr)))
#define GET_SECNO(sbi, segno) \
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 091/101] f2fs: introduce and spread verify_blkaddr
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (89 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 090/101] f2fs: clean up with is_valid_blkaddr() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 092/101] f2fs: fix to do sanity check with secs_per_zone Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (14 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Chao Yu, Jaegeuk Kim, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
commit e1da7872f6eda977bd812346bf588c35e4495a1e upstream.
This patch introduces verify_blkaddr to check meta/data block address
with valid range to detect bug earlier.
In addition, once we encounter an invalid blkaddr, notice user to run
fsck to fix, and let the kernel panic.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9:
- I skipped an earlier renaming of is_valid_meta_blkaddr() to
f2fs_is_valid_meta_blkaddr()
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c | 11 +++++++++--
fs/f2fs/data.c | 6 +++---
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
fs/f2fs/file.c | 9 +++++----
fs/f2fs/inode.c | 7 ++++---
fs/f2fs/node.c | 4 ++--
fs/f2fs/recovery.c | 6 +++---
fs/f2fs/segment.c | 4 ++--
fs/f2fs/segment.h | 8 +++-----
9 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
@@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ struct page *get_tmp_page(struct f2fs_sb
return __get_meta_page(sbi, index, false);
}
-bool is_valid_meta_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t blkaddr, int type)
+bool f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
+ block_t blkaddr, int type)
{
switch (type) {
case META_NAT:
@@ -138,10 +139,16 @@ bool is_valid_meta_blkaddr(struct f2fs_s
return false;
break;
case META_POR:
+ case DATA_GENERIC:
if (unlikely(blkaddr >= MAX_BLKADDR(sbi) ||
blkaddr < MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi)))
return false;
break;
+ case META_GENERIC:
+ if (unlikely(blkaddr < SEG0_BLKADDR(sbi) ||
+ blkaddr >= MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi)))
+ return false;
+ break;
default:
BUG();
}
@@ -173,7 +180,7 @@ int ra_meta_pages(struct f2fs_sb_info *s
blk_start_plug(&plug);
for (; nrpages-- > 0; blkno++) {
- if (!is_valid_meta_blkaddr(sbi, blkno, type))
+ if (!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, blkno, type))
goto out;
switch (type) {
--- a/fs/f2fs/data.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/data.c
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ void f2fs_submit_page_mbio(struct f2fs_i
io = is_read ? &sbi->read_io : &sbi->write_io[btype];
- if (is_valid_blkaddr(fio->old_blkaddr))
+ if (__is_valid_data_blkaddr(fio->old_blkaddr))
verify_block_addr(fio, fio->old_blkaddr);
verify_block_addr(fio, fio->new_blkaddr);
@@ -723,7 +723,7 @@ next_dnode:
next_block:
blkaddr = datablock_addr(dn.node_page, dn.ofs_in_node);
- if (!is_valid_blkaddr(blkaddr)) {
+ if (!is_valid_data_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr)) {
if (create) {
if (unlikely(f2fs_cp_error(sbi))) {
err = -EIO;
@@ -1217,7 +1217,7 @@ retry_encrypt:
* If current allocation needs SSR,
* it had better in-place writes for updated data.
*/
- if (unlikely(is_valid_blkaddr(fio->old_blkaddr) &&
+ if (unlikely(is_valid_data_blkaddr(fio->sbi, fio->old_blkaddr) &&
!is_cold_data(page) &&
!IS_ATOMIC_WRITTEN_PAGE(page) &&
need_inplace_update(inode))) {
--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ struct cp_control {
};
/*
- * For CP/NAT/SIT/SSA readahead
+ * indicate meta/data type
*/
enum {
META_CP,
@@ -153,6 +153,8 @@ enum {
META_SIT,
META_SSA,
META_POR,
+ DATA_GENERIC,
+ META_GENERIC,
};
/* for the list of ino */
@@ -1930,13 +1932,36 @@ static inline void *f2fs_kvzalloc(size_t
(pgofs - ADDRS_PER_INODE(inode) + ADDRS_PER_BLOCK) / \
ADDRS_PER_BLOCK * ADDRS_PER_BLOCK + ADDRS_PER_INODE(inode))
-static inline bool is_valid_blkaddr(block_t blkaddr)
+bool f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
+ block_t blkaddr, int type);
+void f2fs_msg(struct super_block *sb, const char *level, const char *fmt, ...);
+static inline void verify_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
+ block_t blkaddr, int type)
+{
+ if (!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, type)) {
+ f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR,
+ "invalid blkaddr: %u, type: %d, run fsck to fix.",
+ blkaddr, type);
+ f2fs_bug_on(sbi, 1);
+ }
+}
+
+static inline bool __is_valid_data_blkaddr(block_t blkaddr)
{
if (blkaddr == NEW_ADDR || blkaddr == NULL_ADDR)
return false;
return true;
}
+static inline bool is_valid_data_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
+ block_t blkaddr)
+{
+ if (!__is_valid_data_blkaddr(blkaddr))
+ return false;
+ verify_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, DATA_GENERIC);
+ return true;
+}
+
/*
* file.c
*/
@@ -2122,7 +2147,8 @@ void f2fs_stop_checkpoint(struct f2fs_sb
struct page *grab_meta_page(struct f2fs_sb_info *, pgoff_t);
struct page *get_meta_page(struct f2fs_sb_info *, pgoff_t);
struct page *get_tmp_page(struct f2fs_sb_info *, pgoff_t);
-bool is_valid_meta_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t blkaddr, int type);
+bool f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
+ block_t blkaddr, int type);
int ra_meta_pages(struct f2fs_sb_info *, block_t, int, int, bool);
void ra_meta_pages_cond(struct f2fs_sb_info *, pgoff_t);
long sync_meta_pages(struct f2fs_sb_info *, enum page_type, long);
--- a/fs/f2fs/file.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/file.c
@@ -310,13 +310,13 @@ static pgoff_t __get_first_dirty_index(s
return pgofs;
}
-static bool __found_offset(block_t blkaddr, pgoff_t dirty, pgoff_t pgofs,
- int whence)
+static bool __found_offset(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t blkaddr,
+ pgoff_t dirty, pgoff_t pgofs, int whence)
{
switch (whence) {
case SEEK_DATA:
if ((blkaddr == NEW_ADDR && dirty == pgofs) ||
- is_valid_blkaddr(blkaddr))
+ is_valid_data_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr))
return true;
break;
case SEEK_HOLE:
@@ -378,7 +378,8 @@ static loff_t f2fs_seek_block(struct fil
block_t blkaddr;
blkaddr = datablock_addr(dn.node_page, dn.ofs_in_node);
- if (__found_offset(blkaddr, dirty, pgofs, whence)) {
+ if (__found_offset(F2FS_I_SB(inode), blkaddr, dirty,
+ pgofs, whence)) {
f2fs_put_dnode(&dn);
goto found;
}
--- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c
@@ -59,11 +59,12 @@ static void __get_inode_rdev(struct inod
}
}
-static bool __written_first_block(struct f2fs_inode *ri)
+static bool __written_first_block(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
+ struct f2fs_inode *ri)
{
block_t addr = le32_to_cpu(ri->i_addr[0]);
- if (is_valid_blkaddr(addr))
+ if (is_valid_data_blkaddr(sbi, addr))
return true;
return false;
}
@@ -159,7 +160,7 @@ static int do_read_inode(struct inode *i
/* get rdev by using inline_info */
__get_inode_rdev(inode, ri);
- if (__written_first_block(ri))
+ if (__written_first_block(sbi, ri))
set_inode_flag(inode, FI_FIRST_BLOCK_WRITTEN);
if (!need_inode_block_update(sbi, inode->i_ino))
--- a/fs/f2fs/node.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/node.c
@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ static void set_node_addr(struct f2fs_sb
new_blkaddr == NULL_ADDR);
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, nat_get_blkaddr(e) == NEW_ADDR &&
new_blkaddr == NEW_ADDR);
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, is_valid_blkaddr(nat_get_blkaddr(e)) &&
+ f2fs_bug_on(sbi, is_valid_data_blkaddr(sbi, nat_get_blkaddr(e)) &&
new_blkaddr == NEW_ADDR);
/* increment version no as node is removed */
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ static void set_node_addr(struct f2fs_sb
/* change address */
nat_set_blkaddr(e, new_blkaddr);
- if (!is_valid_blkaddr(new_blkaddr))
+ if (!is_valid_data_blkaddr(sbi, new_blkaddr))
set_nat_flag(e, IS_CHECKPOINTED, false);
__set_nat_cache_dirty(nm_i, e);
--- a/fs/f2fs/recovery.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/recovery.c
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ static int find_fsync_dnodes(struct f2fs
while (1) {
struct fsync_inode_entry *entry;
- if (!is_valid_meta_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, META_POR))
+ if (!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, META_POR))
return 0;
page = get_tmp_page(sbi, blkaddr);
@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ retry_dn:
}
/* dest is valid block, try to recover from src to dest */
- if (is_valid_meta_blkaddr(sbi, dest, META_POR)) {
+ if (f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, dest, META_POR)) {
if (src == NULL_ADDR) {
err = reserve_new_block(&dn);
@@ -527,7 +527,7 @@ static int recover_data(struct f2fs_sb_i
while (1) {
struct fsync_inode_entry *entry;
- if (!is_valid_meta_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, META_POR))
+ if (!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, META_POR))
break;
ra_meta_pages_cond(sbi, blkaddr);
--- a/fs/f2fs/segment.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.c
@@ -944,7 +944,7 @@ bool is_checkpointed_data(struct f2fs_sb
struct seg_entry *se;
bool is_cp = false;
- if (!is_valid_blkaddr(blkaddr))
+ if (!is_valid_data_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr))
return true;
mutex_lock(&sit_i->sentry_lock);
@@ -1668,7 +1668,7 @@ void f2fs_wait_on_encrypted_page_writeba
{
struct page *cpage;
- if (!is_valid_blkaddr(blkaddr))
+ if (!is_valid_data_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr))
return;
cpage = find_lock_page(META_MAPPING(sbi), blkaddr);
--- a/fs/f2fs/segment.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.h
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@
(GET_SEGOFF_FROM_SEG0(sbi, blk_addr) & (sbi->blocks_per_seg - 1))
#define GET_SEGNO(sbi, blk_addr) \
- ((!is_valid_blkaddr(blk_addr)) ? \
+ ((!is_valid_data_blkaddr(sbi, blk_addr)) ? \
NULL_SEGNO : GET_L2R_SEGNO(FREE_I(sbi), \
GET_SEGNO_FROM_SEG0(sbi, blk_addr)))
#define GET_SECNO(sbi, segno) \
@@ -603,11 +603,9 @@ static inline void verify_block_addr(str
if (PAGE_TYPE_OF_BIO(fio->type) == META &&
(!is_read_io(fio->op) || fio->is_meta))
- BUG_ON(blk_addr < SEG0_BLKADDR(sbi) ||
- blk_addr >= MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi));
+ verify_blkaddr(sbi, blk_addr, META_GENERIC);
else
- BUG_ON(blk_addr < MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi) ||
- blk_addr >= MAX_BLKADDR(sbi));
+ verify_blkaddr(sbi, blk_addr, DATA_GENERIC);
}
/*
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 092/101] f2fs: fix to do sanity check with secs_per_zone
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (90 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 091/101] f2fs: introduce and spread verify_blkaddr Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 093/101] f2fs: fix to do sanity check with user_block_count Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (13 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Chao Yu, Jaegeuk Kim, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
commit 42bf546c1fe3f3654bdf914e977acbc2b80a5be5 upstream.
As Wen Xu reported in below link:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200183
- Overview
Divide zero in reset_curseg() when mounting a crafted f2fs image
- Reproduce
- Kernel message
[ 588.281510] divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[ 588.282701] CPU: 0 PID: 1293 Comm: mount Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[ 588.284000] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 588.286178] RIP: 0010:reset_curseg+0x94/0x1a0
[ 588.298166] RSP: 0018:ffff8801e88d7940 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 588.299360] RAX: 0000000000000014 RBX: ffff8801e1d46d00 RCX: ffffffffb88bf60b
[ 588.300809] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8801e1d46d64
[ 588.305272] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000014 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 588.306822] FS: 00007fad85008840(0000) GS:ffff8801f6e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 588.308456] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 588.309623] CR2: 0000000001705078 CR3: 00000001f30f8000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 588.311085] Call Trace:
[ 588.311637] f2fs_build_segment_manager+0x103f/0x3410
[ 588.316136] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1b0/0x1b0
[ 588.317031] ? set_blocksize+0x90/0x140
[ 588.319473] f2fs_mount+0x15/0x20
[ 588.320166] mount_fs+0x60/0x1a0
[ 588.320847] ? alloc_vfsmnt+0x309/0x360
[ 588.321647] vfs_kern_mount+0x6b/0x1a0
[ 588.322432] do_mount+0x34a/0x18c0
[ 588.323175] ? strndup_user+0x46/0x70
[ 588.323937] ? copy_mount_string+0x20/0x20
[ 588.324793] ? memcg_kmem_put_cache+0x1b/0xa0
[ 588.325702] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 588.326562] ? _copy_from_user+0x6a/0x90
[ 588.327375] ? memdup_user+0x42/0x60
[ 588.328118] ksys_mount+0x83/0xd0
[ 588.328808] __x64_sys_mount+0x67/0x80
[ 588.329607] do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170
[ 588.330400] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 588.331461] RIP: 0033:0x7fad848e8b9a
[ 588.336022] RSP: 002b:00007ffd7c5b6be8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 588.337547] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000016f8030 RCX: 00007fad848e8b9a
[ 588.338999] RDX: 00000000016f8210 RSI: 00000000016f9f30 RDI: 0000000001700ec0
[ 588.340442] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000013
[ 588.341887] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000001700ec0
[ 588.343341] R13: 00000000016f8210 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003
[ 588.354891] ---[ end trace 4ce02f25ff7d3df5 ]---
[ 588.355862] RIP: 0010:reset_curseg+0x94/0x1a0
[ 588.360742] RSP: 0018:ffff8801e88d7940 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 588.361812] RAX: 0000000000000014 RBX: ffff8801e1d46d00 RCX: ffffffffb88bf60b
[ 588.363485] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8801e1d46d64
[ 588.365213] RBP: ffff8801e88d7968 R08: ffffed003c32266f R09: ffffed003c32266f
[ 588.366661] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003c32266e R12: ffff8801f0337700
[ 588.368110] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000014 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 588.370057] FS: 00007fad85008840(0000) GS:ffff8801f6e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 588.372099] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 588.373291] CR2: 0000000001705078 CR3: 00000001f30f8000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
- Location
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/fs/f2fs/segment.c#L2147
curseg->zone = GET_ZONE_FROM_SEG(sbi, curseg->segno);
If secs_per_zone is corrupted due to fuzzing test, it will cause divide
zero operation when using GET_ZONE_FROM_SEG macro, so we should do more
sanity check with secs_per_zone during mount to avoid this issue.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/f2fs/super.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c
@@ -1434,9 +1434,9 @@ static int sanity_check_raw_super(struct
return 1;
}
- if (secs_per_zone > total_sections) {
+ if (secs_per_zone > total_sections || !secs_per_zone) {
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
- "Wrong secs_per_zone (%u > %u)",
+ "Wrong secs_per_zone / total_sections (%u, %u)",
secs_per_zone, total_sections);
return 1;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 093/101] f2fs: fix to do sanity check with user_block_count
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (91 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 092/101] f2fs: fix to do sanity check with secs_per_zone Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 094/101] f2fs: Add sanity_check_inode() function Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (12 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Wen Xu, Chao Yu, Jaegeuk Kim, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
commit 9dc956b2c8523aed39d1e6508438be9fea28c8fc upstream.
This patch fixs to do sanity check with user_block_count.
- Overview
Divide zero in utilization when mount() a corrupted f2fs image
- Reproduce (4.18 upstream kernel)
- Kernel message
[ 564.099503] F2FS-fs (loop0): invalid crc value
[ 564.101991] divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[ 564.103103] CPU: 1 PID: 1298 Comm: f2fs_discard-7: Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[ 564.104584] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 564.106624] RIP: 0010:issue_discard_thread+0x248/0x5c0
[ 564.107692] Code: ff ff 48 8b bd e8 fe ff ff 41 8b 9d 4c 04 00 00 e8 cd b8 ad ff 41 8b 85 50 04 00 00 31 d2 48 8d 04 80 48 8d 04 80 48 c1 e0 02 <48> f7 f3 83 f8 50 7e 16 41 c7 86 7c ff ff ff 01 00 00 00 41 c7 86
[ 564.111686] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f3117dc0 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ 564.112775] RAX: 0000000000000384 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffffb88c1e03
[ 564.114250] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8801e3aa4850
[ 564.115706] RBP: ffff8801f3117f00 R08: 1ffffffff751a1d0 R09: fffffbfff751a1d0
[ 564.117177] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: fffffbfff751a1d0 R12: 00000000fffffffc
[ 564.118634] R13: ffff8801e3aa4400 R14: ffff8801f3117ed8 R15: ffff8801e2050000
[ 564.120094] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8801f6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 564.121748] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 564.122923] CR2: 000000000202b078 CR3: 00000001f11ac000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 564.124383] Call Trace:
[ 564.124924] ? __issue_discard_cmd+0x480/0x480
[ 564.125882] ? __sched_text_start+0x8/0x8
[ 564.126756] ? __kthread_parkme+0xcb/0x100
[ 564.127620] ? kthread_blkcg+0x70/0x70
[ 564.128412] kthread+0x180/0x1d0
[ 564.129105] ? __issue_discard_cmd+0x480/0x480
[ 564.130029] ? kthread_associate_blkcg+0x150/0x150
[ 564.131033] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[ 564.131794] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer snd mac_hid i2c_piix4 soundcore ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul qxl drm_kms_helper syscopyarea aesni_intel sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd 8139cp glue_helper mii pata_acpi floppy
[ 564.141798] ---[ end trace 4ce02f25ff7d3df5 ]---
[ 564.142773] RIP: 0010:issue_discard_thread+0x248/0x5c0
[ 564.143885] Code: ff ff 48 8b bd e8 fe ff ff 41 8b 9d 4c 04 00 00 e8 cd b8 ad ff 41 8b 85 50 04 00 00 31 d2 48 8d 04 80 48 8d 04 80 48 c1 e0 02 <48> f7 f3 83 f8 50 7e 16 41 c7 86 7c ff ff ff 01 00 00 00 41 c7 86
[ 564.147776] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f3117dc0 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ 564.148856] RAX: 0000000000000384 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffffb88c1e03
[ 564.150424] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8801e3aa4850
[ 564.151906] RBP: ffff8801f3117f00 R08: 1ffffffff751a1d0 R09: fffffbfff751a1d0
[ 564.153463] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: fffffbfff751a1d0 R12: 00000000fffffffc
[ 564.154915] R13: ffff8801e3aa4400 R14: ffff8801f3117ed8 R15: ffff8801e2050000
[ 564.156405] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8801f6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 564.158070] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 564.159279] CR2: 000000000202b078 CR3: 00000001f11ac000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 564.161043] ==================================================================
[ 564.162587] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in from_kuid_munged+0x1d/0x50
[ 564.163994] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8801f3117c84 by task f2fs_discard-7:/1298
[ 564.165852] CPU: 1 PID: 1298 Comm: f2fs_discard-7: Tainted: G D 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[ 564.167593] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 564.169522] Call Trace:
[ 564.170057] dump_stack+0x7b/0xb5
[ 564.170778] print_address_description+0x70/0x290
[ 564.171765] kasan_report+0x291/0x390
[ 564.172540] ? from_kuid_munged+0x1d/0x50
[ 564.173408] __asan_load4+0x78/0x80
[ 564.174148] from_kuid_munged+0x1d/0x50
[ 564.174962] do_notify_parent+0x1f5/0x4f0
[ 564.175808] ? send_sigqueue+0x390/0x390
[ 564.176639] ? css_set_move_task+0x152/0x340
[ 564.184197] do_exit+0x1290/0x1390
[ 564.184950] ? __issue_discard_cmd+0x480/0x480
[ 564.185884] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x380/0x380
[ 564.186829] ? __sched_text_start+0x8/0x8
[ 564.187672] ? __kthread_parkme+0xcb/0x100
[ 564.188528] ? kthread_blkcg+0x70/0x70
[ 564.189333] ? kthread+0x180/0x1d0
[ 564.190052] ? __issue_discard_cmd+0x480/0x480
[ 564.190983] rewind_stack_do_exit+0x17/0x20
[ 564.192190] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 564.193213] page:ffffea0007cc45c0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
[ 564.194856] flags: 0x2ffff0000000000()
[ 564.195644] raw: 02ffff0000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000200 0000000000000000
[ 564.197247] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 564.198826] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 564.200299] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 564.201306] ffff8801f3117b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 564.202779] ffff8801f3117c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3
[ 564.204252] >ffff8801f3117c80: f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1
[ 564.205742] ^
[ 564.206424] ffff8801f3117d00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 564.207908] ffff8801f3117d80: f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 564.209389] ==================================================================
[ 564.231795] F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 2
- Location
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.18-rc1/source/fs/f2fs/segment.h#L586
return div_u64((u64)valid_user_blocks(sbi) * 100,
sbi->user_block_count);
Missing checks on sbi->user_block_count.
Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/f2fs/super.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c
@@ -1486,6 +1486,8 @@ int sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_inf
unsigned int sit_segs, nat_segs;
unsigned int sit_bitmap_size, nat_bitmap_size;
unsigned int log_blocks_per_seg;
+ unsigned int segment_count_main;
+ block_t user_block_count;
int i;
total = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count);
@@ -1510,6 +1512,16 @@ int sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_inf
return 1;
}
+ user_block_count = le64_to_cpu(ckpt->user_block_count);
+ segment_count_main = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_main);
+ log_blocks_per_seg = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_blocks_per_seg);
+ if (!user_block_count || user_block_count >=
+ segment_count_main << log_blocks_per_seg) {
+ f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR,
+ "Wrong user_block_count: %u", user_block_count);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
main_segs = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_main);
blocks_per_seg = sbi->blocks_per_seg;
@@ -1526,7 +1538,6 @@ int sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_inf
sit_bitmap_size = le32_to_cpu(ckpt->sit_ver_bitmap_bytesize);
nat_bitmap_size = le32_to_cpu(ckpt->nat_ver_bitmap_bytesize);
- log_blocks_per_seg = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_blocks_per_seg);
if (sit_bitmap_size != ((sit_segs / 2) << log_blocks_per_seg) / 8 ||
nat_bitmap_size != ((nat_segs / 2) << log_blocks_per_seg) / 8) {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 094/101] f2fs: Add sanity_check_inode() function
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (92 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 093/101] f2fs: fix to do sanity check with user_block_count Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 095/101] f2fs: fix to do sanity check with node footer and iblocks Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (11 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jaegeuk Kim, Chao Yu, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
This was done as part of commits 5d64600d4f33 "f2fs: avoid bug_on on
corrupted inode" and 76d56d4ab4f2 "f2fs: fix to do sanity check with
extra_attr feature" upstream, but the specific checks they added are
not applicable to 4.9.
Cc: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Cc: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/f2fs/inode.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c
@@ -104,6 +104,13 @@ static void __recover_inline_status(stru
return;
}
+static bool sanity_check_inode(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
+
+ return true;
+}
+
static int do_read_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
@@ -153,6 +160,11 @@ static int do_read_inode(struct inode *i
get_inline_info(inode, ri);
+ if (!sanity_check_inode(inode)) {
+ f2fs_put_page(node_page, 1);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
/* check data exist */
if (f2fs_has_inline_data(inode) && !f2fs_exist_data(inode))
__recover_inline_status(inode, node_page);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 095/101] f2fs: fix to do sanity check with node footer and iblocks
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (93 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 094/101] f2fs: Add sanity_check_inode() function Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 096/101] f2fs: fix to do sanity check with block address in main area Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (10 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Chao Yu, Jaegeuk Kim, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
commit e34438c903b653daca2b2a7de95aed46226f8ed3 upstream.
This patch adds to do sanity check with below fields of inode to
avoid reported panic.
- node footer
- iblocks
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200223
- Overview
BUG() triggered in f2fs_truncate_inode_blocks() when un-mounting a mounted f2fs image after writing to it
- Reproduce
- POC (poc.c)
static void activity(char *mpoint) {
char *foo_bar_baz;
int err;
static int buf[8192];
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
err = asprintf(&foo_bar_baz, "%s/foo/bar/baz", mpoint);
// open / write / read
int fd = open(foo_bar_baz, O_RDWR | O_TRUNC, 0777);
if (fd >= 0) {
write(fd, (char *)buf, 517);
write(fd, (char *)buf, sizeof(buf));
close(fd);
}
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
activity(argv[1]);
return 0;
}
- Kernel meesage
[ 552.479723] F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 2
[ 556.451891] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 556.451899] kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/node.c:987!
[ 556.452920] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[ 556.453936] CPU: 1 PID: 1310 Comm: umount Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[ 556.455213] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 556.457140] RIP: 0010:f2fs_truncate_inode_blocks+0x4a7/0x6f0
[ 556.458280] Code: e8 ae ea ff ff 41 89 c7 c1 e8 1f 84 c0 74 0a 41 83 ff fe 0f 85 35 ff ff ff 81 85 b0 fe ff ff fb 03 00 00 e9 f7 fd ff ff 0f 0b <0f> 0b e8 62 b7 9a 00 48 8b bd a0 fe ff ff e8 56 54 ae ff 48 8b b5
[ 556.462015] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f292f808 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 556.463068] RAX: ffffed003e73242d RBX: ffff8801f292f958 RCX: ffffffffb88b81bc
[ 556.464479] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff8801f3992164
[ 556.465901] RBP: ffff8801f292f980 R08: ffffed003e73242d R09: ffffed003e73242d
[ 556.467311] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003e73242c R12: 00000000fffffc64
[ 556.468706] R13: ffff8801f3992000 R14: 0000000000000058 R15: 00000000ffff8801
[ 556.470117] FS: 00007f8029297840(0000) GS:ffff8801f6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 556.471702] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 556.472838] CR2: 000055f5f57305d8 CR3: 00000001f18b0000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 556.474265] Call Trace:
[ 556.474782] ? f2fs_alloc_nid_failed+0xf0/0xf0
[ 556.475686] ? truncate_nodes+0x980/0x980
[ 556.476516] ? pagecache_get_page+0x21f/0x2f0
[ 556.477412] ? __asan_loadN+0xf/0x20
[ 556.478153] ? __get_node_page+0x331/0x5b0
[ 556.478992] ? reweight_entity+0x1e6/0x3b0
[ 556.479826] f2fs_truncate_blocks+0x55e/0x740
[ 556.480709] ? f2fs_truncate_data_blocks+0x20/0x20
[ 556.481689] ? __radix_tree_lookup+0x34/0x160
[ 556.482630] ? radix_tree_lookup+0xd/0x10
[ 556.483445] f2fs_truncate+0xd4/0x1a0
[ 556.484206] f2fs_evict_inode+0x5ce/0x630
[ 556.485032] evict+0x16f/0x290
[ 556.485664] iput+0x280/0x300
[ 556.486300] dentry_unlink_inode+0x165/0x1e0
[ 556.487169] __dentry_kill+0x16a/0x260
[ 556.487936] dentry_kill+0x70/0x250
[ 556.488651] shrink_dentry_list+0x125/0x260
[ 556.489504] shrink_dcache_parent+0xc1/0x110
[ 556.490379] ? shrink_dcache_sb+0x200/0x200
[ 556.491231] ? bit_wait_timeout+0xc0/0xc0
[ 556.492047] do_one_tree+0x12/0x40
[ 556.492743] shrink_dcache_for_umount+0x3f/0xa0
[ 556.493656] generic_shutdown_super+0x43/0x1c0
[ 556.494561] kill_block_super+0x52/0x80
[ 556.495341] kill_f2fs_super+0x62/0x70
[ 556.496105] deactivate_locked_super+0x6f/0xa0
[ 556.497004] deactivate_super+0x5e/0x80
[ 556.497785] cleanup_mnt+0x61/0xa0
[ 556.498492] __cleanup_mnt+0x12/0x20
[ 556.499218] task_work_run+0xc8/0xf0
[ 556.499949] exit_to_usermode_loop+0x125/0x130
[ 556.500846] do_syscall_64+0x138/0x170
[ 556.501609] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 556.502659] RIP: 0033:0x7f8028b77487
[ 556.503384] Code: 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 31 f6 e9 09 00 00 00 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 a6 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d e1 c9 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 556.507137] RSP: 002b:00007fff9f2e3598 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6
[ 556.508637] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000ebd030 RCX: 00007f8028b77487
[ 556.510069] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000ec41e0
[ 556.511481] RBP: 0000000000ec41e0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000014
[ 556.512892] R10: 00000000000006b2 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f802908083c
[ 556.514320] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000ebd210 R15: 00007fff9f2e3820
[ 556.515745] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer snd mac_hid i2c_piix4 soundcore ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul qxl drm_kms_helper syscopyarea aesni_intel sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd 8139cp glue_helper mii pata_acpi floppy
[ 556.529276] ---[ end trace 4ce02f25ff7d3df5 ]---
[ 556.530340] RIP: 0010:f2fs_truncate_inode_blocks+0x4a7/0x6f0
[ 556.531513] Code: e8 ae ea ff ff 41 89 c7 c1 e8 1f 84 c0 74 0a 41 83 ff fe 0f 85 35 ff ff ff 81 85 b0 fe ff ff fb 03 00 00 e9 f7 fd ff ff 0f 0b <0f> 0b e8 62 b7 9a 00 48 8b bd a0 fe ff ff e8 56 54 ae ff 48 8b b5
[ 556.535330] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f292f808 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 556.536395] RAX: ffffed003e73242d RBX: ffff8801f292f958 RCX: ffffffffb88b81bc
[ 556.537824] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff8801f3992164
[ 556.539290] RBP: ffff8801f292f980 R08: ffffed003e73242d R09: ffffed003e73242d
[ 556.540709] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003e73242c R12: 00000000fffffc64
[ 556.542131] R13: ffff8801f3992000 R14: 0000000000000058 R15: 00000000ffff8801
[ 556.543579] FS: 00007f8029297840(0000) GS:ffff8801f6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 556.545180] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 556.546338] CR2: 000055f5f57305d8 CR3: 00000001f18b0000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 556.547809] ==================================================================
[ 556.549248] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in arch_tlb_gather_mmu+0x52/0x170
[ 556.550672] Write of size 8 at addr ffff8801f292fd10 by task umount/1310
[ 556.552338] CPU: 1 PID: 1310 Comm: umount Tainted: G D 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[ 556.553886] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 556.555756] Call Trace:
[ 556.556264] dump_stack+0x7b/0xb5
[ 556.556944] print_address_description+0x70/0x290
[ 556.557903] kasan_report+0x291/0x390
[ 556.558649] ? arch_tlb_gather_mmu+0x52/0x170
[ 556.559537] __asan_store8+0x57/0x90
[ 556.560268] arch_tlb_gather_mmu+0x52/0x170
[ 556.561110] tlb_gather_mmu+0x12/0x40
[ 556.561862] exit_mmap+0x123/0x2a0
[ 556.562555] ? __ia32_sys_munmap+0x50/0x50
[ 556.563384] ? exit_aio+0x98/0x230
[ 556.564079] ? __x32_compat_sys_io_submit+0x260/0x260
[ 556.565099] ? taskstats_exit+0x1f4/0x640
[ 556.565925] ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ 556.566739] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x322/0x380
[ 556.567652] mmput+0x8b/0x1d0
[ 556.568260] do_exit+0x43a/0x1390
[ 556.568937] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x380/0x380
[ 556.569855] ? deactivate_super+0x5e/0x80
[ 556.570668] ? cleanup_mnt+0x61/0xa0
[ 556.571395] ? __cleanup_mnt+0x12/0x20
[ 556.572156] ? task_work_run+0xc8/0xf0
[ 556.572917] ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0x125/0x130
[ 556.573861] rewind_stack_do_exit+0x17/0x20
[ 556.574707] RIP: 0033:0x7f8028b77487
[ 556.575428] Code: Bad RIP value.
[ 556.576106] RSP: 002b:00007fff9f2e3598 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6
[ 556.577599] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000ebd030 RCX: 00007f8028b77487
[ 556.579020] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000ec41e0
[ 556.580422] RBP: 0000000000ec41e0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000014
[ 556.581833] R10: 00000000000006b2 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f802908083c
[ 556.583252] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000ebd210 R15: 00007fff9f2e3820
[ 556.584983] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 556.585961] page:ffffea0007ca4bc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
[ 556.587540] flags: 0x2ffff0000000000()
[ 556.588296] raw: 02ffff0000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000200 0000000000000000
[ 556.589822] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 556.591359] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 556.592786] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 556.593753] ffff8801f292fc00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 556.595191] ffff8801f292fc80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00
[ 556.596613] >ffff8801f292fd00: 00 00 f3 00 00 00 00 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 f4 f4 f4
[ 556.598044] ^
[ 556.598797] ffff8801f292fd80: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 556.600225] ffff8801f292fe00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 f4 f4 f4
[ 556.601647] ==================================================================
- Location
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.18-rc1/source/fs/f2fs/node.c#L987
case NODE_DIND_BLOCK:
err = truncate_nodes(&dn, nofs, offset[1], 3);
cont = 0;
break;
default:
BUG(); <---
}
Reported-by Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/f2fs/inode.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c
@@ -104,9 +104,30 @@ static void __recover_inline_status(stru
return;
}
-static bool sanity_check_inode(struct inode *inode)
+static bool sanity_check_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *node_page)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
+ unsigned long long iblocks;
+
+ iblocks = le64_to_cpu(F2FS_INODE(node_page)->i_blocks);
+ if (!iblocks) {
+ set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK);
+ f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_WARNING,
+ "%s: corrupted inode i_blocks i_ino=%lx iblocks=%llu, "
+ "run fsck to fix.",
+ __func__, inode->i_ino, iblocks);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (ino_of_node(node_page) != nid_of_node(node_page)) {
+ set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK);
+ f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_WARNING,
+ "%s: corrupted inode footer i_ino=%lx, ino,nid: "
+ "[%u, %u] run fsck to fix.",
+ __func__, inode->i_ino,
+ ino_of_node(node_page), nid_of_node(node_page));
+ return false;
+ }
return true;
}
@@ -160,7 +181,7 @@ static int do_read_inode(struct inode *i
get_inline_info(inode, ri);
- if (!sanity_check_inode(inode)) {
+ if (!sanity_check_inode(inode, node_page)) {
f2fs_put_page(node_page, 1);
return -EINVAL;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 096/101] f2fs: fix to do sanity check with block address in main area
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (94 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 095/101] f2fs: fix to do sanity check with node footer and iblocks Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 097/101] f2fs: fix missing up_read Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (9 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Chao Yu, Jaegeuk Kim, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
commit c9b60788fc760d136211853f10ce73dc152d1f4a upstream.
This patch add to do sanity check with below field:
- cp_pack_total_block_count
- blkaddr of data/node
- extent info
- Overview
BUG() in verify_block_addr() when writing to a corrupted f2fs image
- Reproduce (4.18 upstream kernel)
- POC (poc.c)
static void activity(char *mpoint) {
char *foo_bar_baz;
int err;
static int buf[8192];
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
err = asprintf(&foo_bar_baz, "%s/foo/bar/baz", mpoint);
int fd = open(foo_bar_baz, O_RDWR | O_TRUNC, 0777);
if (fd >= 0) {
write(fd, (char *)buf, sizeof(buf));
fdatasync(fd);
close(fd);
}
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
activity(argv[1]);
return 0;
}
- Kernel message
[ 689.349473] F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 3
[ 699.728662] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1309 at fs/f2fs/segment.c:2860 f2fs_inplace_write_data+0x232/0x240
[ 699.728670] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer snd mac_hid i2c_piix4 soundcore ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul qxl drm_kms_helper syscopyarea aesni_intel sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd 8139cp glue_helper mii pata_acpi floppy
[ 699.729056] CPU: 0 PID: 1309 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[ 699.729064] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 699.729074] RIP: 0010:f2fs_inplace_write_data+0x232/0x240
[ 699.729076] Code: ff e9 cf fe ff ff 49 8d 7d 10 e8 39 45 ad ff 4d 8b 7d 10 be 04 00 00 00 49 8d 7f 48 e8 07 49 ad ff 45 8b 7f 48 e9 fb fe ff ff <0f> 0b f0 41 80 4d 48 04 e9 65 fe ff ff 90 66 66 66 66 90 55 48 8d
[ 699.729130] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f43af568 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 699.729139] RAX: 000000000000003f RBX: ffff8801f43af7b8 RCX: ffffffffb88c9113
[ 699.729142] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8802024e5540
[ 699.729144] RBP: ffff8801f43af590 R08: 0000000000000009 R09: ffffffffffffffe8
[ 699.729147] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0039b0596a R12: ffff8802024e5540
[ 699.729149] R13: ffff8801f0335500 R14: ffff8801e3e7a700 R15: ffff8801e1ee4450
[ 699.729154] FS: 00007f9bf97f5700(0000) GS:ffff8801f6e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 699.729156] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 699.729159] CR2: 00007f9bf925d170 CR3: 00000001f0c34000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 699.729171] Call Trace:
[ 699.729192] f2fs_do_write_data_page+0x2e2/0xe00
[ 699.729203] ? f2fs_should_update_outplace+0xd0/0xd0
[ 699.729238] ? memcg_drain_all_list_lrus+0x280/0x280
[ 699.729269] ? __radix_tree_replace+0xa3/0x120
[ 699.729276] __write_data_page+0x5c7/0xe30
[ 699.729291] ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ 699.729310] ? page_mapped+0x8a/0x110
[ 699.729321] ? page_mkclean+0xe9/0x160
[ 699.729327] ? f2fs_do_write_data_page+0xe00/0xe00
[ 699.729331] ? invalid_page_referenced_vma+0x130/0x130
[ 699.729345] ? clear_page_dirty_for_io+0x332/0x450
[ 699.729351] f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x4ca/0x860
[ 699.729358] ? __write_data_page+0xe30/0xe30
[ 699.729374] ? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x22/0xa0
[ 699.729380] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 699.729391] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x17/0x40
[ 699.729403] ? f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync.part.18+0x16/0x30
[ 699.729413] ? iov_iter_advance+0x113/0x640
[ 699.729418] ? f2fs_write_end+0x133/0x2e0
[ 699.729423] ? balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited+0x239/0x640
[ 699.729428] f2fs_write_data_pages+0x329/0x520
[ 699.729433] ? generic_perform_write+0x250/0x320
[ 699.729438] ? f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x860/0x860
[ 699.729454] ? current_time+0x110/0x110
[ 699.729459] ? f2fs_preallocate_blocks+0x1ef/0x370
[ 699.729464] do_writepages+0x37/0xb0
[ 699.729468] ? f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x860/0x860
[ 699.729472] ? do_writepages+0x37/0xb0
[ 699.729478] __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x19a/0x1f0
[ 699.729483] ? delete_from_page_cache_batch+0x4e0/0x4e0
[ 699.729496] ? __vfs_write+0x2b2/0x410
[ 699.729501] file_write_and_wait_range+0x66/0xb0
[ 699.729506] f2fs_do_sync_file+0x1f9/0xd90
[ 699.729511] ? truncate_partial_data_page+0x290/0x290
[ 699.729521] ? __sb_end_write+0x30/0x50
[ 699.729526] ? vfs_write+0x20f/0x260
[ 699.729530] f2fs_sync_file+0x9a/0xb0
[ 699.729534] ? f2fs_do_sync_file+0xd90/0xd90
[ 699.729548] vfs_fsync_range+0x68/0x100
[ 699.729554] ? __fget_light+0xc9/0xe0
[ 699.729558] do_fsync+0x3d/0x70
[ 699.729562] __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x24/0x30
[ 699.729585] do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170
[ 699.729595] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 699.729613] RIP: 0033:0x7f9bf930d800
[ 699.729615] Code: 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d 49 bf 2c 00 00 75 10 b8 4b 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 be 78 01 00 48 89 04 24
[ 699.729668] RSP: 002b:00007ffee3606c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004b
[ 699.729673] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f9bf930d800
[ 699.729675] RDX: 0000000000008000 RSI: 00000000006010a0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 699.729678] RBP: 00007ffee3606ca0 R08: 0000000001503010 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 699.729680] R10: 00000000000002e8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400610
[ 699.729683] R13: 00007ffee3606da0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 699.729687] ---[ end trace 4ce02f25ff7d3df5 ]---
[ 699.729782] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 699.729785] kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.h:654!
[ 699.731055] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[ 699.732104] CPU: 0 PID: 1309 Comm: a.out Tainted: G W 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[ 699.733684] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 699.735611] RIP: 0010:f2fs_submit_page_bio+0x29b/0x730
[ 699.736649] Code: 54 49 8d bd 18 04 00 00 e8 b2 59 af ff 41 8b 8d 18 04 00 00 8b 45 b8 41 d3 e6 44 01 f0 4c 8d 73 14 41 39 c7 0f 82 37 fe ff ff <0f> 0b 65 8b 05 2c 04 77 47 89 c0 48 0f a3 05 52 c1 d5 01 0f 92 c0
[ 699.740524] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f43af508 EFLAGS: 00010283
[ 699.741573] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8801f43af7b8 RCX: ffffffffb88a7cef
[ 699.743006] RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8801e3e7a64c
[ 699.744426] RBP: ffff8801f43af558 R08: ffffed003e066b55 R09: ffffed003e066b55
[ 699.745833] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003e066b54 R12: ffffea0007876940
[ 699.747256] R13: ffff8801f0335500 R14: ffff8801e3e7a600 R15: 0000000000000001
[ 699.748683] FS: 00007f9bf97f5700(0000) GS:ffff8801f6e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 699.750293] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 699.751462] CR2: 00007f9bf925d170 CR3: 00000001f0c34000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 699.752874] Call Trace:
[ 699.753386] ? f2fs_inplace_write_data+0x93/0x240
[ 699.754341] f2fs_inplace_write_data+0xd2/0x240
[ 699.755271] f2fs_do_write_data_page+0x2e2/0xe00
[ 699.756214] ? f2fs_should_update_outplace+0xd0/0xd0
[ 699.757215] ? memcg_drain_all_list_lrus+0x280/0x280
[ 699.758209] ? __radix_tree_replace+0xa3/0x120
[ 699.759164] __write_data_page+0x5c7/0xe30
[ 699.760002] ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ 699.760823] ? page_mapped+0x8a/0x110
[ 699.761573] ? page_mkclean+0xe9/0x160
[ 699.762345] ? f2fs_do_write_data_page+0xe00/0xe00
[ 699.763332] ? invalid_page_referenced_vma+0x130/0x130
[ 699.764374] ? clear_page_dirty_for_io+0x332/0x450
[ 699.765347] f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x4ca/0x860
[ 699.766276] ? __write_data_page+0xe30/0xe30
[ 699.767161] ? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x22/0xa0
[ 699.768112] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 699.768951] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x17/0x40
[ 699.769739] ? f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync.part.18+0x16/0x30
[ 699.770885] ? iov_iter_advance+0x113/0x640
[ 699.771743] ? f2fs_write_end+0x133/0x2e0
[ 699.772569] ? balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited+0x239/0x640
[ 699.773680] f2fs_write_data_pages+0x329/0x520
[ 699.774603] ? generic_perform_write+0x250/0x320
[ 699.775544] ? f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x860/0x860
[ 699.776510] ? current_time+0x110/0x110
[ 699.777299] ? f2fs_preallocate_blocks+0x1ef/0x370
[ 699.778279] do_writepages+0x37/0xb0
[ 699.779026] ? f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x860/0x860
[ 699.779978] ? do_writepages+0x37/0xb0
[ 699.780755] __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x19a/0x1f0
[ 699.781746] ? delete_from_page_cache_batch+0x4e0/0x4e0
[ 699.782820] ? __vfs_write+0x2b2/0x410
[ 699.783597] file_write_and_wait_range+0x66/0xb0
[ 699.784540] f2fs_do_sync_file+0x1f9/0xd90
[ 699.785381] ? truncate_partial_data_page+0x290/0x290
[ 699.786415] ? __sb_end_write+0x30/0x50
[ 699.787204] ? vfs_write+0x20f/0x260
[ 699.787941] f2fs_sync_file+0x9a/0xb0
[ 699.788694] ? f2fs_do_sync_file+0xd90/0xd90
[ 699.789572] vfs_fsync_range+0x68/0x100
[ 699.790360] ? __fget_light+0xc9/0xe0
[ 699.791128] do_fsync+0x3d/0x70
[ 699.791779] __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x24/0x30
[ 699.792614] do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170
[ 699.793371] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 699.794406] RIP: 0033:0x7f9bf930d800
[ 699.795134] Code: 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d 49 bf 2c 00 00 75 10 b8 4b 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 be 78 01 00 48 89 04 24
[ 699.798960] RSP: 002b:00007ffee3606c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004b
[ 699.800483] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f9bf930d800
[ 699.801923] RDX: 0000000000008000 RSI: 00000000006010a0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 699.803373] RBP: 00007ffee3606ca0 R08: 0000000001503010 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 699.804798] R10: 00000000000002e8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400610
[ 699.806233] R13: 00007ffee3606da0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 699.807667] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer snd mac_hid i2c_piix4 soundcore ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul qxl drm_kms_helper syscopyarea aesni_intel sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd 8139cp glue_helper mii pata_acpi floppy
[ 699.817079] ---[ end trace 4ce02f25ff7d3df6 ]---
[ 699.818068] RIP: 0010:f2fs_submit_page_bio+0x29b/0x730
[ 699.819114] Code: 54 49 8d bd 18 04 00 00 e8 b2 59 af ff 41 8b 8d 18 04 00 00 8b 45 b8 41 d3 e6 44 01 f0 4c 8d 73 14 41 39 c7 0f 82 37 fe ff ff <0f> 0b 65 8b 05 2c 04 77 47 89 c0 48 0f a3 05 52 c1 d5 01 0f 92 c0
[ 699.822919] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f43af508 EFLAGS: 00010283
[ 699.823977] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8801f43af7b8 RCX: ffffffffb88a7cef
[ 699.825436] RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8801e3e7a64c
[ 699.826881] RBP: ffff8801f43af558 R08: ffffed003e066b55 R09: ffffed003e066b55
[ 699.828292] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003e066b54 R12: ffffea0007876940
[ 699.829750] R13: ffff8801f0335500 R14: ffff8801e3e7a600 R15: 0000000000000001
[ 699.831192] FS: 00007f9bf97f5700(0000) GS:ffff8801f6e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 699.832793] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 699.833981] CR2: 00007f9bf925d170 CR3: 00000001f0c34000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 699.835556] ==================================================================
[ 699.837029] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in update_stack_state+0x38c/0x3e0
[ 699.838462] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8801f43af970 by task a.out/1309
[ 699.840086] CPU: 0 PID: 1309 Comm: a.out Tainted: G D W 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[ 699.841603] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 699.843475] Call Trace:
[ 699.843982] dump_stack+0x7b/0xb5
[ 699.844661] print_address_description+0x70/0x290
[ 699.845607] kasan_report+0x291/0x390
[ 699.846351] ? update_stack_state+0x38c/0x3e0
[ 699.853831] __asan_load8+0x54/0x90
[ 699.854569] update_stack_state+0x38c/0x3e0
[ 699.855428] ? __read_once_size_nocheck.constprop.7+0x20/0x20
[ 699.856601] ? __save_stack_trace+0x5e/0x100
[ 699.857476] unwind_next_frame.part.5+0x18e/0x490
[ 699.858448] ? unwind_dump+0x290/0x290
[ 699.859217] ? clear_page_dirty_for_io+0x332/0x450
[ 699.860185] __unwind_start+0x106/0x190
[ 699.860974] __save_stack_trace+0x5e/0x100
[ 699.861808] ? __save_stack_trace+0x5e/0x100
[ 699.862691] ? unlink_anon_vmas+0xba/0x2c0
[ 699.863525] save_stack_trace+0x1f/0x30
[ 699.864312] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 699.864993] ? __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x1420/0x1420
[ 699.865990] ? flush_tlb_mm_range+0x15e/0x220
[ 699.866889] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 699.867724] ? __dec_node_state+0x92/0xb0
[ 699.868543] ? lock_page_memcg+0x85/0xf0
[ 699.869350] ? unlock_page_memcg+0x16/0x80
[ 699.870185] ? page_remove_rmap+0x198/0x520
[ 699.871048] ? mark_page_accessed+0x133/0x200
[ 699.871930] ? _cond_resched+0x1a/0x50
[ 699.872700] ? unmap_page_range+0xcd4/0xe50
[ 699.873551] ? rb_next+0x58/0x80
[ 699.874217] ? rb_next+0x58/0x80
[ 699.874895] __kasan_slab_free+0x13c/0x1a0
[ 699.875734] ? unlink_anon_vmas+0xba/0x2c0
[ 699.876563] kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10
[ 699.877315] kmem_cache_free+0x89/0x1e0
[ 699.878095] unlink_anon_vmas+0xba/0x2c0
[ 699.878913] free_pgtables+0x101/0x1b0
[ 699.879677] exit_mmap+0x146/0x2a0
[ 699.880378] ? __ia32_sys_munmap+0x50/0x50
[ 699.881214] ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ 699.882052] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x322/0x380
[ 699.882985] mmput+0x8b/0x1d0
[ 699.883602] do_exit+0x43a/0x1390
[ 699.884288] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x380/0x380
[ 699.885212] ? f2fs_sync_file+0x9a/0xb0
[ 699.885995] ? f2fs_do_sync_file+0xd90/0xd90
[ 699.886877] ? vfs_fsync_range+0x68/0x100
[ 699.887694] ? __fget_light+0xc9/0xe0
[ 699.888442] ? do_fsync+0x3d/0x70
[ 699.889118] ? __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x24/0x30
[ 699.889996] rewind_stack_do_exit+0x17/0x20
[ 699.890860] RIP: 0033:0x7f9bf930d800
[ 699.891585] Code: Bad RIP value.
[ 699.892268] RSP: 002b:00007ffee3606c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004b
[ 699.893781] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f9bf930d800
[ 699.895220] RDX: 0000000000008000 RSI: 00000000006010a0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 699.896643] RBP: 00007ffee3606ca0 R08: 0000000001503010 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 699.898069] R10: 00000000000002e8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400610
[ 699.899505] R13: 00007ffee3606da0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 699.901241] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 699.902215] page:ffffea0007d0ebc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
[ 699.903811] flags: 0x2ffff0000000000()
[ 699.904585] raw: 02ffff0000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff07d00101 0000000000000000
[ 699.906125] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000240000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 699.907673] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 699.909108] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 699.910077] ffff8801f43af800: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 f4 f4 f4 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00
[ 699.911528] ffff8801f43af880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 699.912953] >ffff8801f43af900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 01 f4 f4 f4 f2 f2 f2
[ 699.914392] ^
[ 699.915758] ffff8801f43af980: f2 00 f4 f4 00 00 00 00 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 699.917193] ffff8801f43afa00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00
[ 699.918634] ==================================================================
- Location
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.18-rc1/source/fs/f2fs/segment.h#L644
Reported-by Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9:
- Error label is different in validate_checkpoint() due to the earlier
backport of "f2fs: fix invalid memory access"
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++---
fs/f2fs/data.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 3 +++
fs/f2fs/file.c | 12 ++++++++++++
fs/f2fs/inode.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
fs/f2fs/node.c | 4 ++++
fs/f2fs/segment.h | 3 +--
7 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
@@ -86,8 +86,10 @@ repeat:
fio.page = page;
if (f2fs_submit_page_bio(&fio)) {
- f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
- goto repeat;
+ memset(page_address(page), 0, PAGE_SIZE);
+ f2fs_stop_checkpoint(sbi, false);
+ f2fs_bug_on(sbi, 1);
+ return page;
}
lock_page(page);
@@ -141,8 +143,14 @@ bool f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(struct f2fs_s
case META_POR:
case DATA_GENERIC:
if (unlikely(blkaddr >= MAX_BLKADDR(sbi) ||
- blkaddr < MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi)))
+ blkaddr < MAIN_BLKADDR(sbi))) {
+ if (type == DATA_GENERIC) {
+ f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_WARNING,
+ "access invalid blkaddr:%u", blkaddr);
+ WARN_ON(1);
+ }
return false;
+ }
break;
case META_GENERIC:
if (unlikely(blkaddr < SEG0_BLKADDR(sbi) ||
@@ -715,6 +723,14 @@ static struct page *validate_checkpoint(
&cp_page_1, version);
if (err)
return NULL;
+
+ if (le32_to_cpu(cp_block->cp_pack_total_block_count) >
+ sbi->blocks_per_seg) {
+ f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_WARNING,
+ "invalid cp_pack_total_block_count:%u",
+ le32_to_cpu(cp_block->cp_pack_total_block_count));
+ goto invalid_cp;
+ }
pre_version = *version;
cp_addr += le32_to_cpu(cp_block->cp_pack_total_block_count) - 1;
--- a/fs/f2fs/data.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/data.c
@@ -240,7 +240,10 @@ int f2fs_submit_page_bio(struct f2fs_io_
struct page *page = fio->encrypted_page ?
fio->encrypted_page : fio->page;
- verify_block_addr(fio, fio->new_blkaddr);
+ if (!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(fio->sbi, fio->new_blkaddr,
+ __is_meta_io(fio) ? META_GENERIC : DATA_GENERIC))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
trace_f2fs_submit_page_bio(page, fio);
f2fs_trace_ios(fio, 0);
@@ -723,6 +726,12 @@ next_dnode:
next_block:
blkaddr = datablock_addr(dn.node_page, dn.ofs_in_node);
+ if (__is_valid_data_blkaddr(blkaddr) &&
+ !f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, DATA_GENERIC)) {
+ err = -EFAULT;
+ goto sync_out;
+ }
+
if (!is_valid_data_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr)) {
if (create) {
if (unlikely(f2fs_cp_error(sbi))) {
@@ -1085,6 +1094,10 @@ got_it:
SetPageUptodate(page);
goto confused;
}
+
+ if (!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(F2FS_I_SB(inode), block_nr,
+ DATA_GENERIC))
+ goto set_error_page;
} else {
zero_user_segment(page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
if (!PageUptodate(page))
@@ -1213,6 +1226,12 @@ retry_encrypt:
set_page_writeback(page);
+ if (__is_valid_data_blkaddr(fio->old_blkaddr) &&
+ !f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(fio->sbi, fio->old_blkaddr,
+ DATA_GENERIC)) {
+ err = -EFAULT;
+ goto out_writepage;
+ }
/*
* If current allocation needs SSR,
* it had better in-place writes for updated data.
--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
@@ -1932,6 +1932,9 @@ static inline void *f2fs_kvzalloc(size_t
(pgofs - ADDRS_PER_INODE(inode) + ADDRS_PER_BLOCK) / \
ADDRS_PER_BLOCK * ADDRS_PER_BLOCK + ADDRS_PER_INODE(inode))
+#define __is_meta_io(fio) (PAGE_TYPE_OF_BIO(fio->type) == META && \
+ (!is_read_io(fio->op) || fio->is_meta))
+
bool f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
block_t blkaddr, int type);
void f2fs_msg(struct super_block *sb, const char *level, const char *fmt, ...);
--- a/fs/f2fs/file.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/file.c
@@ -378,6 +378,13 @@ static loff_t f2fs_seek_block(struct fil
block_t blkaddr;
blkaddr = datablock_addr(dn.node_page, dn.ofs_in_node);
+ if (__is_valid_data_blkaddr(blkaddr) &&
+ !f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(F2FS_I_SB(inode),
+ blkaddr, DATA_GENERIC)) {
+ f2fs_put_dnode(&dn);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
if (__found_offset(F2FS_I_SB(inode), blkaddr, dirty,
pgofs, whence)) {
f2fs_put_dnode(&dn);
@@ -482,6 +489,11 @@ int truncate_data_blocks_range(struct dn
dn->data_blkaddr = NULL_ADDR;
set_data_blkaddr(dn);
+
+ if (__is_valid_data_blkaddr(blkaddr) &&
+ !f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, DATA_GENERIC))
+ continue;
+
invalidate_blocks(sbi, blkaddr);
if (dn->ofs_in_node == 0 && IS_INODE(dn->node_page))
clear_inode_flag(dn->inode, FI_FIRST_BLOCK_WRITTEN);
--- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c
@@ -129,6 +129,22 @@ static bool sanity_check_inode(struct in
return false;
}
+ if (F2FS_I(inode)->extent_tree) {
+ struct extent_info *ei = &F2FS_I(inode)->extent_tree->largest;
+
+ if (ei->len &&
+ (!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, ei->blk, DATA_GENERIC) ||
+ !f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, ei->blk + ei->len - 1,
+ DATA_GENERIC))) {
+ set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK);
+ f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_WARNING,
+ "%s: inode (ino=%lx) extent info [%u, %u, %u] "
+ "is incorrect, run fsck to fix",
+ __func__, inode->i_ino,
+ ei->blk, ei->fofs, ei->len);
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
return true;
}
--- a/fs/f2fs/node.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/node.c
@@ -1605,6 +1605,10 @@ static int f2fs_write_node_page(struct p
return 0;
}
+ if (__is_valid_data_blkaddr(ni.blk_addr) &&
+ !f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, ni.blk_addr, DATA_GENERIC))
+ goto redirty_out;
+
set_page_writeback(page);
fio.old_blkaddr = ni.blk_addr;
write_node_page(nid, &fio);
--- a/fs/f2fs/segment.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.h
@@ -601,8 +601,7 @@ static inline void verify_block_addr(str
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = fio->sbi;
- if (PAGE_TYPE_OF_BIO(fio->type) == META &&
- (!is_read_io(fio->op) || fio->is_meta))
+ if (__is_meta_io(fio))
verify_blkaddr(sbi, blk_addr, META_GENERIC);
else
verify_blkaddr(sbi, blk_addr, DATA_GENERIC);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 097/101] f2fs: fix missing up_read
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (95 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 096/101] f2fs: fix to do sanity check with block address in main area Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 098/101] f2fs: fix to do sanity check with block address in main area v2 Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (8 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Chao Yu, Jaegeuk Kim, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
commit 89d13c38501df730cbb2e02c4499da1b5187119d upstream.
This patch fixes missing up_read call.
Fixes: c9b60788fc76 ("f2fs: fix to do sanity check with block address in main area")
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/f2fs/node.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/node.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/node.c
@@ -1606,8 +1606,10 @@ static int f2fs_write_node_page(struct p
}
if (__is_valid_data_blkaddr(ni.blk_addr) &&
- !f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, ni.blk_addr, DATA_GENERIC))
+ !f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, ni.blk_addr, DATA_GENERIC)) {
+ up_read(&sbi->node_write);
goto redirty_out;
+ }
set_page_writeback(page);
fio.old_blkaddr = ni.blk_addr;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 098/101] f2fs: fix to do sanity check with block address in main area v2
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (96 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 097/101] f2fs: fix missing up_read Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 099/101] f2fs: free meta pages if sanity check for ckpt is failed Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (7 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Chao Yu, Jaegeuk Kim, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
commit 91291e9998d208370eb8156c760691b873bd7522 upstream.
This patch adds f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr() in below functions to do sanity
check with block address to avoid pentential panic:
- f2fs_grab_read_bio()
- __written_first_block()
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200465
- Reproduce
- POC (poc.c)
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/xattr.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <error.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <linux/falloc.h>
#include <linux/loop.h>
static void activity(char *mpoint) {
char *xattr;
int err;
err = asprintf(&xattr, "%s/foo/bar/xattr", mpoint);
char buf2[113];
memset(buf2, 0, sizeof(buf2));
listxattr(xattr, buf2, sizeof(buf2));
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
activity(argv[1]);
return 0;
}
- kernel message
[ 844.718738] F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 2
[ 846.430929] F2FS-fs (loop0): access invalid blkaddr:1024
[ 846.431058] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1249 at fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:154 f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x10f/0x160
[ 846.431059] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_timer snd input_leds joydev soundcore serio_raw i2c_piix4 mac_hid ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core configfs iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi autofs4 raid10 raid456 libcrc32c async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor xor async_tx raid6_pq raid1 raid0 multipath linear qxl ttm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul drm_kms_helper ghash_clmulni_intel syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops pcbc drm 8139too aesni_intel 8139cp floppy psmouse mii aes_x86_64 crypto_simd pata_acpi cryptd glue_helper
[ 846.431310] CPU: 1 PID: 1249 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.18.0-rc3+ #1
[ 846.431312] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 846.431315] RIP: 0010:f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x10f/0x160
[ 846.431316] Code: 00 eb ed 31 c0 83 fa 05 75 ae 48 83 ec 08 48 8b 3f 89 f1 48 c7 c2 fc 0b 0f 8b 48 c7 c6 8b d7 09 8b 88 44 24 07 e8 61 8b ff ff <0f> 0b 0f b6 44 24 07 48 83 c4 08 eb 81 4c 8b 47 10 8b 8f 38 04 00
[ 846.431347] RSP: 0018:ffff961c414a7bc0 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 846.431349] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc5f787b8ea80 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 846.431350] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff89dfffd165d8 RDI: ffff89dfffd165d8
[ 846.431351] RBP: ffff961c414a7c20 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000248
[ 846.431353] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000248 R12: 0000000000000007
[ 846.431369] R13: ffff89dff5492800 R14: ffff89dfae3aa000 R15: ffff89dff4ff88d0
[ 846.431372] FS: 00007f882e2fb700(0000) GS:ffff89dfffd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 846.431373] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 846.431374] CR2: 0000000001a88008 CR3: 00000001eb572000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 846.431384] Call Trace:
[ 846.431426] f2fs_iget+0x6f4/0xe70
[ 846.431430] ? f2fs_find_entry+0x71/0x90
[ 846.431432] f2fs_lookup+0x1aa/0x390
[ 846.431452] __lookup_slow+0x97/0x150
[ 846.431459] lookup_slow+0x35/0x50
[ 846.431462] walk_component+0x1c6/0x470
[ 846.431479] ? memcg_kmem_charge_memcg+0x70/0x90
[ 846.431488] ? page_add_file_rmap+0x13/0x200
[ 846.431491] path_lookupat+0x76/0x230
[ 846.431501] ? __alloc_pages_nodemask+0xfc/0x280
[ 846.431504] filename_lookup+0xb8/0x1a0
[ 846.431534] ? _cond_resched+0x16/0x40
[ 846.431541] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x160/0x1d0
[ 846.431549] ? path_listxattr+0x41/0xa0
[ 846.431551] path_listxattr+0x41/0xa0
[ 846.431570] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x100
[ 846.431583] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 846.431607] RIP: 0033:0x7f882de1c0d7
[ 846.431607] Code: f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d be dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 b8 c2 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 91 dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 846.431639] RSP: 002b:00007ffe8e66c238 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000c2
[ 846.431641] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f882de1c0d7
[ 846.431642] RDX: 0000000000000071 RSI: 00007ffe8e66c280 RDI: 0000000001a880c0
[ 846.431643] RBP: 00007ffe8e66c300 R08: 0000000001a88010 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 846.431645] R10: 00000000000001ab R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000400550
[ 846.431646] R13: 00007ffe8e66c400 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 846.431648] ---[ end trace abca54df39d14f5c ]---
[ 846.431651] F2FS-fs (loop0): invalid blkaddr: 1024, type: 5, run fsck to fix.
[ 846.431762] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1249 at fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2697 f2fs_iget+0xd17/0xe70
[ 846.431763] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_timer snd input_leds joydev soundcore serio_raw i2c_piix4 mac_hid ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core configfs iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi autofs4 raid10 raid456 libcrc32c async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor xor async_tx raid6_pq raid1 raid0 multipath linear qxl ttm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul drm_kms_helper ghash_clmulni_intel syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops pcbc drm 8139too aesni_intel 8139cp floppy psmouse mii aes_x86_64 crypto_simd pata_acpi cryptd glue_helper
[ 846.431797] CPU: 1 PID: 1249 Comm: a.out Tainted: G W 4.18.0-rc3+ #1
[ 846.431798] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 846.431800] RIP: 0010:f2fs_iget+0xd17/0xe70
[ 846.431801] Code: ff ff 48 63 d8 e9 e1 f6 ff ff 48 8b 45 c8 41 b8 05 00 00 00 48 c7 c2 d8 e8 0e 8b 48 c7 c6 1d b0 0a 8b 48 8b 38 e8 f9 b4 00 00 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 c8 f0 80 48 48 04 e9 d8 f9 ff ff 0f 0b 48 8b 43 18
[ 846.431832] RSP: 0018:ffff961c414a7bd0 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 846.431834] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc5f787b8ea80 RCX: 0000000000000006
[ 846.431835] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000096 RDI: ffff89dfffd165d0
[ 846.431836] RBP: ffff961c414a7c20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000273
[ 846.431837] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff89dfad50ca60 R12: 0000000000000007
[ 846.431838] R13: ffff89dff5492800 R14: ffff89dfae3aa000 R15: ffff89dff4ff88d0
[ 846.431840] FS: 00007f882e2fb700(0000) GS:ffff89dfffd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 846.431841] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 846.431842] CR2: 0000000001a88008 CR3: 00000001eb572000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 846.431846] Call Trace:
[ 846.431850] ? f2fs_find_entry+0x71/0x90
[ 846.431853] f2fs_lookup+0x1aa/0x390
[ 846.431856] __lookup_slow+0x97/0x150
[ 846.431858] lookup_slow+0x35/0x50
[ 846.431874] walk_component+0x1c6/0x470
[ 846.431878] ? memcg_kmem_charge_memcg+0x70/0x90
[ 846.431880] ? page_add_file_rmap+0x13/0x200
[ 846.431882] path_lookupat+0x76/0x230
[ 846.431884] ? __alloc_pages_nodemask+0xfc/0x280
[ 846.431886] filename_lookup+0xb8/0x1a0
[ 846.431890] ? _cond_resched+0x16/0x40
[ 846.431891] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x160/0x1d0
[ 846.431894] ? path_listxattr+0x41/0xa0
[ 846.431896] path_listxattr+0x41/0xa0
[ 846.431898] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x100
[ 846.431901] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 846.431902] RIP: 0033:0x7f882de1c0d7
[ 846.431903] Code: f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d be dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 b8 c2 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 91 dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 846.431934] RSP: 002b:00007ffe8e66c238 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000c2
[ 846.431936] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f882de1c0d7
[ 846.431937] RDX: 0000000000000071 RSI: 00007ffe8e66c280 RDI: 0000000001a880c0
[ 846.431939] RBP: 00007ffe8e66c300 R08: 0000000001a88010 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 846.431940] R10: 00000000000001ab R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000400550
[ 846.431941] R13: 00007ffe8e66c400 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 846.431943] ---[ end trace abca54df39d14f5d ]---
[ 846.432033] F2FS-fs (loop0): access invalid blkaddr:1024
[ 846.432051] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1249 at fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:154 f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x10f/0x160
[ 846.432051] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_timer snd input_leds joydev soundcore serio_raw i2c_piix4 mac_hid ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core configfs iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi autofs4 raid10 raid456 libcrc32c async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor xor async_tx raid6_pq raid1 raid0 multipath linear qxl ttm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul drm_kms_helper ghash_clmulni_intel syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops pcbc drm 8139too aesni_intel 8139cp floppy psmouse mii aes_x86_64 crypto_simd pata_acpi cryptd glue_helper
[ 846.432085] CPU: 1 PID: 1249 Comm: a.out Tainted: G W 4.18.0-rc3+ #1
[ 846.432086] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 846.432089] RIP: 0010:f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x10f/0x160
[ 846.432089] Code: 00 eb ed 31 c0 83 fa 05 75 ae 48 83 ec 08 48 8b 3f 89 f1 48 c7 c2 fc 0b 0f 8b 48 c7 c6 8b d7 09 8b 88 44 24 07 e8 61 8b ff ff <0f> 0b 0f b6 44 24 07 48 83 c4 08 eb 81 4c 8b 47 10 8b 8f 38 04 00
[ 846.432120] RSP: 0018:ffff961c414a7900 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 846.432122] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000400 RCX: 0000000000000006
[ 846.432123] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000096 RDI: ffff89dfffd165d0
[ 846.432124] RBP: ffff89dff5492800 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 000000000000029d
[ 846.432125] R10: ffff961c414a7820 R11: 000000000000029d R12: 0000000000000400
[ 846.432126] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff89dff4ff88d0 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 846.432128] FS: 00007f882e2fb700(0000) GS:ffff89dfffd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 846.432130] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 846.432131] CR2: 0000000001a88008 CR3: 00000001eb572000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 846.432135] Call Trace:
[ 846.432151] f2fs_wait_on_block_writeback+0x20/0x110
[ 846.432158] f2fs_grab_read_bio+0xbc/0xe0
[ 846.432161] f2fs_submit_page_read+0x21/0x280
[ 846.432163] f2fs_get_read_data_page+0xb7/0x3c0
[ 846.432165] f2fs_get_lock_data_page+0x29/0x1e0
[ 846.432167] f2fs_get_new_data_page+0x148/0x550
[ 846.432170] f2fs_add_regular_entry+0x1d2/0x550
[ 846.432178] ? __switch_to+0x12f/0x460
[ 846.432181] f2fs_add_dentry+0x6a/0xd0
[ 846.432184] f2fs_do_add_link+0xe9/0x140
[ 846.432186] __recover_dot_dentries+0x260/0x280
[ 846.432189] f2fs_lookup+0x343/0x390
[ 846.432193] __lookup_slow+0x97/0x150
[ 846.432195] lookup_slow+0x35/0x50
[ 846.432208] walk_component+0x1c6/0x470
[ 846.432212] ? memcg_kmem_charge_memcg+0x70/0x90
[ 846.432215] ? page_add_file_rmap+0x13/0x200
[ 846.432217] path_lookupat+0x76/0x230
[ 846.432219] ? __alloc_pages_nodemask+0xfc/0x280
[ 846.432221] filename_lookup+0xb8/0x1a0
[ 846.432224] ? _cond_resched+0x16/0x40
[ 846.432226] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x160/0x1d0
[ 846.432228] ? path_listxattr+0x41/0xa0
[ 846.432230] path_listxattr+0x41/0xa0
[ 846.432233] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x100
[ 846.432235] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 846.432237] RIP: 0033:0x7f882de1c0d7
[ 846.432237] Code: f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d be dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 b8 c2 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 91 dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 846.432269] RSP: 002b:00007ffe8e66c238 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000c2
[ 846.432271] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f882de1c0d7
[ 846.432272] RDX: 0000000000000071 RSI: 00007ffe8e66c280 RDI: 0000000001a880c0
[ 846.432273] RBP: 00007ffe8e66c300 R08: 0000000001a88010 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 846.432274] R10: 00000000000001ab R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000400550
[ 846.432275] R13: 00007ffe8e66c400 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 846.432277] ---[ end trace abca54df39d14f5e ]---
[ 846.432279] F2FS-fs (loop0): invalid blkaddr: 1024, type: 5, run fsck to fix.
[ 846.432376] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1249 at fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2697 f2fs_wait_on_block_writeback+0xb1/0x110
[ 846.432376] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_timer snd input_leds joydev soundcore serio_raw i2c_piix4 mac_hid ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core configfs iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi autofs4 raid10 raid456 libcrc32c async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor xor async_tx raid6_pq raid1 raid0 multipath linear qxl ttm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul drm_kms_helper ghash_clmulni_intel syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops pcbc drm 8139too aesni_intel 8139cp floppy psmouse mii aes_x86_64 crypto_simd pata_acpi cryptd glue_helper
[ 846.432410] CPU: 1 PID: 1249 Comm: a.out Tainted: G W 4.18.0-rc3+ #1
[ 846.432411] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 846.432413] RIP: 0010:f2fs_wait_on_block_writeback+0xb1/0x110
[ 846.432414] Code: 66 90 f0 ff 4b 34 74 59 5b 5d c3 48 8b 7d 00 41 b8 05 00 00 00 89 d9 48 c7 c2 d8 e8 0e 8b 48 c7 c6 1d b0 0a 8b e8 df bc fd ff <0f> 0b f0 80 4d 48 04 e9 67 ff ff ff 48 8b 03 48 c1 e8 37 83 e0 07
[ 846.432445] RSP: 0018:ffff961c414a7910 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 846.432447] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000400 RCX: 0000000000000006
[ 846.432448] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000092 RDI: ffff89dfffd165d0
[ 846.432449] RBP: ffff89dff5492800 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000000002d1
[ 846.432450] R10: ffff961c414a7820 R11: ffff89dfad50cf80 R12: 0000000000000400
[ 846.432451] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff89dff4ff88d0 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 846.432453] FS: 00007f882e2fb700(0000) GS:ffff89dfffd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 846.432454] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 846.432455] CR2: 0000000001a88008 CR3: 00000001eb572000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 846.432459] Call Trace:
[ 846.432463] f2fs_grab_read_bio+0xbc/0xe0
[ 846.432464] f2fs_submit_page_read+0x21/0x280
[ 846.432466] f2fs_get_read_data_page+0xb7/0x3c0
[ 846.432468] f2fs_get_lock_data_page+0x29/0x1e0
[ 846.432470] f2fs_get_new_data_page+0x148/0x550
[ 846.432473] f2fs_add_regular_entry+0x1d2/0x550
[ 846.432475] ? __switch_to+0x12f/0x460
[ 846.432477] f2fs_add_dentry+0x6a/0xd0
[ 846.432480] f2fs_do_add_link+0xe9/0x140
[ 846.432483] __recover_dot_dentries+0x260/0x280
[ 846.432485] f2fs_lookup+0x343/0x390
[ 846.432488] __lookup_slow+0x97/0x150
[ 846.432490] lookup_slow+0x35/0x50
[ 846.432505] walk_component+0x1c6/0x470
[ 846.432509] ? memcg_kmem_charge_memcg+0x70/0x90
[ 846.432511] ? page_add_file_rmap+0x13/0x200
[ 846.432513] path_lookupat+0x76/0x230
[ 846.432515] ? __alloc_pages_nodemask+0xfc/0x280
[ 846.432517] filename_lookup+0xb8/0x1a0
[ 846.432520] ? _cond_resched+0x16/0x40
[ 846.432522] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x160/0x1d0
[ 846.432525] ? path_listxattr+0x41/0xa0
[ 846.432526] path_listxattr+0x41/0xa0
[ 846.432529] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x100
[ 846.432531] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 846.432533] RIP: 0033:0x7f882de1c0d7
[ 846.432533] Code: f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d be dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 b8 c2 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 91 dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 846.432565] RSP: 002b:00007ffe8e66c238 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000c2
[ 846.432567] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f882de1c0d7
[ 846.432568] RDX: 0000000000000071 RSI: 00007ffe8e66c280 RDI: 0000000001a880c0
[ 846.432569] RBP: 00007ffe8e66c300 R08: 0000000001a88010 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 846.432570] R10: 00000000000001ab R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000400550
[ 846.432571] R13: 00007ffe8e66c400 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 846.432573] ---[ end trace abca54df39d14f5f ]---
[ 846.434280] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008
[ 846.434424] PGD 80000001ebd3a067 P4D 80000001ebd3a067 PUD 1eb1ae067 PMD 0
[ 846.434551] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[ 846.434697] CPU: 0 PID: 44 Comm: kworker/u5:0 Tainted: G W 4.18.0-rc3+ #1
[ 846.434805] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 846.435000] Workqueue: fscrypt_read_queue decrypt_work
[ 846.435174] RIP: 0010:fscrypt_do_page_crypto+0x6e/0x2d0
[ 846.435351] Code: 00 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 84 24 88 00 00 00 31 c0 e8 43 c2 e0 ff 49 8b 86 48 02 00 00 85 ed c7 44 24 70 00 00 00 00 <48> 8b 58 08 0f 84 14 02 00 00 48 8b 78 10 48 8b 0c 24 48 c7 84 24
[ 846.435696] RSP: 0018:ffff961c40f9bd60 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ 846.435870] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc5f787719b80 RCX: ffffc5f787719b80
[ 846.436051] RDX: ffffffff8b9f4b88 RSI: ffffffff8b0ae622 RDI: ffff961c40f9bdb8
[ 846.436261] RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: ffffc5f787719b80 R09: 0000000000001000
[ 846.436433] R10: 0000000000000018 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: ffffc5f787719b80
[ 846.436562] R13: ffffc5f787719b80 R14: ffff89dff4ff88d0 R15: 0ffff89dfaddee60
[ 846.436658] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff89dfffc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 846.436758] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 846.436898] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 00000001eddd0000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 846.437001] Call Trace:
[ 846.437181] ? check_preempt_wakeup+0xf2/0x230
[ 846.437276] ? check_preempt_curr+0x7c/0x90
[ 846.437370] fscrypt_decrypt_page+0x48/0x4d
[ 846.437466] __fscrypt_decrypt_bio+0x5b/0x90
[ 846.437542] decrypt_work+0x12/0x20
[ 846.437651] process_one_work+0x15e/0x3d0
[ 846.437740] worker_thread+0x4c/0x440
[ 846.437848] kthread+0xf8/0x130
[ 846.437938] ? rescuer_thread+0x350/0x350
[ 846.438022] ? kthread_associate_blkcg+0x90/0x90
[ 846.438117] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[ 846.438201] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_timer snd input_leds joydev soundcore serio_raw i2c_piix4 mac_hid ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core configfs iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi autofs4 raid10 raid456 libcrc32c async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor xor async_tx raid6_pq raid1 raid0 multipath linear qxl ttm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul drm_kms_helper ghash_clmulni_intel syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops pcbc drm 8139too aesni_intel 8139cp floppy psmouse mii aes_x86_64 crypto_simd pata_acpi cryptd glue_helper
[ 846.438653] CR2: 0000000000000008
[ 846.438713] ---[ end trace abca54df39d14f60 ]---
[ 846.438796] RIP: 0010:fscrypt_do_page_crypto+0x6e/0x2d0
[ 846.438844] Code: 00 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 84 24 88 00 00 00 31 c0 e8 43 c2 e0 ff 49 8b 86 48 02 00 00 85 ed c7 44 24 70 00 00 00 00 <48> 8b 58 08 0f 84 14 02 00 00 48 8b 78 10 48 8b 0c 24 48 c7 84 24
[ 846.439084] RSP: 0018:ffff961c40f9bd60 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ 846.439176] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc5f787719b80 RCX: ffffc5f787719b80
[ 846.440927] RDX: ffffffff8b9f4b88 RSI: ffffffff8b0ae622 RDI: ffff961c40f9bdb8
[ 846.442083] RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: ffffc5f787719b80 R09: 0000000000001000
[ 846.443284] R10: 0000000000000018 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: ffffc5f787719b80
[ 846.444448] R13: ffffc5f787719b80 R14: ffff89dff4ff88d0 R15: 0ffff89dfaddee60
[ 846.445558] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff89dfffc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 846.446687] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 846.447796] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 00000001eddd0000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
- Location
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.18-rc4/source/fs/crypto/crypto.c#L149
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = ci->ci_ctfm;
Here ci can be NULL
Note that this issue maybe require CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y to reproduce.
Reported-by Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/f2fs/data.c | 3 +++
fs/f2fs/inode.c | 18 +++++++++++++-----
2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/data.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/data.c
@@ -995,6 +995,9 @@ static struct bio *f2fs_grab_bio(struct
struct block_device *bdev = sbi->sb->s_bdev;
struct bio *bio;
+ if (!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, blkaddr, DATA_GENERIC))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+
if (f2fs_encrypted_inode(inode) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) {
ctx = fscrypt_get_ctx(inode, GFP_NOFS);
if (IS_ERR(ctx))
--- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c
@@ -59,14 +59,16 @@ static void __get_inode_rdev(struct inod
}
}
-static bool __written_first_block(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
+static int __written_first_block(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
struct f2fs_inode *ri)
{
block_t addr = le32_to_cpu(ri->i_addr[0]);
- if (is_valid_data_blkaddr(sbi, addr))
- return true;
- return false;
+ if (!__is_valid_data_blkaddr(addr))
+ return 1;
+ if (!f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, addr, DATA_GENERIC))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ return 0;
}
static void __set_inode_rdev(struct inode *inode, struct f2fs_inode *ri)
@@ -154,6 +156,7 @@ static int do_read_inode(struct inode *i
struct f2fs_inode_info *fi = F2FS_I(inode);
struct page *node_page;
struct f2fs_inode *ri;
+ int err;
/* Check if ino is within scope */
if (check_nid_range(sbi, inode->i_ino)) {
@@ -209,7 +212,12 @@ static int do_read_inode(struct inode *i
/* get rdev by using inline_info */
__get_inode_rdev(inode, ri);
- if (__written_first_block(sbi, ri))
+ err = __written_first_block(sbi, ri);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ f2fs_put_page(node_page, 1);
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (!err)
set_inode_flag(inode, FI_FIRST_BLOCK_WRITTEN);
if (!need_inode_block_update(sbi, inode->i_ino))
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 099/101] f2fs: free meta pages if sanity check for ckpt is failed
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (97 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 098/101] f2fs: fix to do sanity check with block address in main area v2 Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 100/101] f2fs: fix to do sanity check with cp_pack_start_sum Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (6 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Eric Biggers, Jaegeuk Kim, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
commit a2125ff7dd1ed3a2a53cdc1f8f9c9cec9cfaa7ab upstream.
This fixes missing freeing meta pages in the error case.
Tested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
@@ -796,7 +796,7 @@ int get_valid_checkpoint(struct f2fs_sb_
/* Sanity checking of checkpoint */
if (sanity_check_ckpt(sbi))
- goto fail_no_cp;
+ goto free_fail_no_cp;
if (cur_page == cp1)
sbi->cur_cp_pack = 1;
@@ -824,6 +824,9 @@ done:
f2fs_put_page(cp2, 1);
return 0;
+free_fail_no_cp:
+ f2fs_put_page(cp1, 1);
+ f2fs_put_page(cp2, 1);
fail_no_cp:
kfree(sbi->ckpt);
return -EINVAL;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.9 100/101] f2fs: fix to do sanity check with cp_pack_start_sum
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (98 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 099/101] f2fs: free meta pages if sanity check for ckpt is failed Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-07 18:12 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 101/101] xfs: dont fail when converting shortform attr to long form during ATTR_REPLACE Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (5 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 1 reply; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Chao Yu, Jaegeuk Kim, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
commit e494c2f995d6181d6e29c4927d68e0f295ecf75b upstream.
After fuzzing, cp_pack_start_sum could be corrupted, so current log's
summary info should be wrong due to loading incorrect summary block.
Then, if segment's type in current log is exceeded NR_CURSEG_TYPE, it
can lead accessing invalid dirty_i->dirty_segmap bitmap finally.
Add sanity check for cp_pack_start_sum to fix this issue.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200419
- Reproduce
- Kernel message (f2fs-dev w/ KASAN)
[ 3117.578432] F2FS-fs (loop0): Invalid log blocks per segment (8)
[ 3117.578445] F2FS-fs (loop0): Can't find valid F2FS filesystem in 2th superblock
[ 3117.581364] F2FS-fs (loop0): invalid crc_offset: 30716
[ 3117.583564] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1225 at fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:90 __get_meta_page+0x448/0x4b0
[ 3117.583570] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_timer joydev input_leds serio_raw snd soundcore mac_hid i2c_piix4 ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core configfs iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi btrfs zstd_decompress zstd_compress xxhash raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too qxl ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel psmouse aes_x86_64 8139cp crypto_simd cryptd mii glue_helper pata_acpi floppy
[ 3117.584014] CPU: 1 PID: 1225 Comm: mount Not tainted 4.17.0+ #1
[ 3117.584017] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 3117.584022] RIP: 0010:__get_meta_page+0x448/0x4b0
[ 3117.584023] Code: 00 49 8d bc 24 84 00 00 00 e8 74 54 da ff 41 83 8c 24 84 00 00 00 08 4c 89 f6 4c 89 ef e8 c0 d9 95 00 48 89 ef e8 18 e3 00 00 <0f> 0b f0 80 4d 48 04 e9 0f fe ff ff 0f 0b 48 89 c7 48 89 04 24 e8
[ 3117.584072] RSP: 0018:ffff88018eb678c0 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 3117.584082] RAX: ffff88018f0a6a78 RBX: ffffea0007a46600 RCX: ffffffff9314d1b2
[ 3117.584085] RDX: ffffffff00000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88018f0a6a98
[ 3117.584087] RBP: ffff88018ebe9980 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 3117.584090] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed00326e4450 R12: ffff880193722200
[ 3117.584092] R13: ffff88018ebe9afc R14: 0000000000000206 R15: ffff88018eb67900
[ 3117.584096] FS: 00007f5694636840(0000) GS:ffff8801f3b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 3117.584098] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 3117.584101] CR2: 00000000016f21b8 CR3: 0000000191c22000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 3117.584112] Call Trace:
[ 3117.584121] ? f2fs_set_meta_page_dirty+0x150/0x150
[ 3117.584127] ? f2fs_build_segment_manager+0xbf9/0x3190
[ 3117.584133] ? f2fs_npages_for_summary_flush+0x75/0x120
[ 3117.584145] f2fs_build_segment_manager+0xda8/0x3190
[ 3117.584151] ? f2fs_get_valid_checkpoint+0x298/0xa00
[ 3117.584156] ? f2fs_flush_sit_entries+0x10e0/0x10e0
[ 3117.584184] ? map_id_range_down+0x17c/0x1b0
[ 3117.584188] ? __put_user_ns+0x30/0x30
[ 3117.584206] ? find_next_bit+0x53/0x90
[ 3117.584237] ? cpumask_next+0x16/0x20
[ 3117.584249] f2fs_fill_super+0x1948/0x2b40
[ 3117.584258] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 3117.584279] ? sget_userns+0x65e/0x690
[ 3117.584296] ? set_blocksize+0x88/0x130
[ 3117.584302] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 3117.584305] mount_bdev+0x1c0/0x200
[ 3117.584310] mount_fs+0x5c/0x190
[ 3117.584320] vfs_kern_mount+0x64/0x190
[ 3117.584330] do_mount+0x2e4/0x1450
[ 3117.584343] ? lockref_put_return+0x130/0x130
[ 3117.584347] ? copy_mount_string+0x20/0x20
[ 3117.584357] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x31/0x40
[ 3117.584362] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0
[ 3117.584373] ? memcg_kmem_put_cache+0x16/0x90
[ 3117.584377] ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x196/0x210
[ 3117.584383] ? _copy_from_user+0x61/0x90
[ 3117.584396] ? memdup_user+0x3e/0x60
[ 3117.584401] ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
[ 3117.584405] __x64_sys_mount+0x62/0x70
[ 3117.584427] do_syscall_64+0x73/0x160
[ 3117.584440] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 3117.584455] RIP: 0033:0x7f5693f14b9a
[ 3117.584456] Code: 48 8b 0d 01 c3 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ce c2 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 3117.584505] RSP: 002b:00007fff27346488 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 3117.584510] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000016e2030 RCX: 00007f5693f14b9a
[ 3117.584512] RDX: 00000000016e2210 RSI: 00000000016e3f30 RDI: 00000000016ee040
[ 3117.584514] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000013
[ 3117.584516] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00000000016ee040
[ 3117.584519] R13: 00000000016e2210 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003
[ 3117.584523] ---[ end trace a8e0d899985faf31 ]---
[ 3117.685663] F2FS-fs (loop0): f2fs_check_nid_range: out-of-range nid=2, run fsck to fix.
[ 3117.685673] F2FS-fs (loop0): recover_data: ino = 2 (i_size: recover) recovered = 1, err = 0
[ 3117.685707] ==================================================================
[ 3117.685955] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __remove_dirty_segment+0xdd/0x1e0
[ 3117.686175] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88018f0a63d0 by task mount/1225
[ 3117.686477] CPU: 0 PID: 1225 Comm: mount Tainted: G W 4.17.0+ #1
[ 3117.686481] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 3117.686483] Call Trace:
[ 3117.686494] dump_stack+0x71/0xab
[ 3117.686512] print_address_description+0x6b/0x290
[ 3117.686517] kasan_report+0x28e/0x390
[ 3117.686522] ? __remove_dirty_segment+0xdd/0x1e0
[ 3117.686527] __remove_dirty_segment+0xdd/0x1e0
[ 3117.686532] locate_dirty_segment+0x189/0x190
[ 3117.686538] f2fs_allocate_new_segments+0xa9/0xe0
[ 3117.686543] recover_data+0x703/0x2c20
[ 3117.686547] ? f2fs_recover_fsync_data+0x48f/0xd50
[ 3117.686553] ? ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
[ 3117.686564] ? policy_nodemask+0x1a/0x90
[ 3117.686567] ? policy_node+0x56/0x70
[ 3117.686571] ? add_fsync_inode+0xf0/0xf0
[ 3117.686592] ? blk_finish_plug+0x44/0x60
[ 3117.686597] ? f2fs_ra_meta_pages+0x38b/0x5e0
[ 3117.686602] ? find_inode_fast+0xac/0xc0
[ 3117.686606] ? f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x320/0x320
[ 3117.686618] ? __radix_tree_lookup+0x150/0x150
[ 3117.686633] ? dqget+0x670/0x670
[ 3117.686648] ? pagecache_get_page+0x29/0x410
[ 3117.686656] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x176/0x1e0
[ 3117.686660] ? f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x11d/0x320
[ 3117.686664] f2fs_recover_fsync_data+0xc23/0xd50
[ 3117.686670] ? f2fs_space_for_roll_forward+0x60/0x60
[ 3117.686674] ? rb_insert_color+0x323/0x3d0
[ 3117.686678] ? f2fs_recover_orphan_inodes+0xa5/0x700
[ 3117.686683] ? proc_register+0x153/0x1d0
[ 3117.686686] ? f2fs_remove_orphan_inode+0x10/0x10
[ 3117.686695] ? f2fs_attr_store+0x50/0x50
[ 3117.686700] ? proc_create_single_data+0x52/0x60
[ 3117.686707] f2fs_fill_super+0x1d06/0x2b40
[ 3117.686728] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 3117.686735] ? sget_userns+0x65e/0x690
[ 3117.686740] ? set_blocksize+0x88/0x130
[ 3117.686745] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 3117.686748] mount_bdev+0x1c0/0x200
[ 3117.686753] mount_fs+0x5c/0x190
[ 3117.686758] vfs_kern_mount+0x64/0x190
[ 3117.686762] do_mount+0x2e4/0x1450
[ 3117.686769] ? lockref_put_return+0x130/0x130
[ 3117.686773] ? copy_mount_string+0x20/0x20
[ 3117.686777] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x31/0x40
[ 3117.686780] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0
[ 3117.686786] ? memcg_kmem_put_cache+0x16/0x90
[ 3117.686790] ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x196/0x210
[ 3117.686795] ? _copy_from_user+0x61/0x90
[ 3117.686801] ? memdup_user+0x3e/0x60
[ 3117.686804] ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
[ 3117.686809] __x64_sys_mount+0x62/0x70
[ 3117.686816] do_syscall_64+0x73/0x160
[ 3117.686824] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 3117.686829] RIP: 0033:0x7f5693f14b9a
[ 3117.686830] Code: 48 8b 0d 01 c3 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ce c2 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 3117.686887] RSP: 002b:00007fff27346488 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 3117.686892] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000016e2030 RCX: 00007f5693f14b9a
[ 3117.686894] RDX: 00000000016e2210 RSI: 00000000016e3f30 RDI: 00000000016ee040
[ 3117.686896] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000013
[ 3117.686899] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00000000016ee040
[ 3117.686901] R13: 00000000016e2210 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003
[ 3117.687005] Allocated by task 1225:
[ 3117.687152] kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0
[ 3117.687157] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xfd/0x200
[ 3117.687161] f2fs_build_segment_manager+0x2d09/0x3190
[ 3117.687165] f2fs_fill_super+0x1948/0x2b40
[ 3117.687168] mount_bdev+0x1c0/0x200
[ 3117.687171] mount_fs+0x5c/0x190
[ 3117.687174] vfs_kern_mount+0x64/0x190
[ 3117.687177] do_mount+0x2e4/0x1450
[ 3117.687180] ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
[ 3117.687182] __x64_sys_mount+0x62/0x70
[ 3117.687186] do_syscall_64+0x73/0x160
[ 3117.687190] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 3117.687285] Freed by task 19:
[ 3117.687412] __kasan_slab_free+0x137/0x190
[ 3117.687416] kfree+0x8b/0x1b0
[ 3117.687460] ttm_bo_man_put_node+0x61/0x80 [ttm]
[ 3117.687476] ttm_bo_cleanup_refs+0x15f/0x250 [ttm]
[ 3117.687492] ttm_bo_delayed_delete+0x2f0/0x300 [ttm]
[ 3117.687507] ttm_bo_delayed_workqueue+0x17/0x50 [ttm]
[ 3117.687528] process_one_work+0x2f9/0x740
[ 3117.687531] worker_thread+0x78/0x6b0
[ 3117.687541] kthread+0x177/0x1c0
[ 3117.687545] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[ 3117.687638] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88018f0a6300
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192
[ 3117.688014] The buggy address is located 16 bytes to the right of
192-byte region [ffff88018f0a6300, ffff88018f0a63c0)
[ 3117.688382] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 3117.688554] page:ffffea00063c2980 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801f3403180 index:0x0
[ 3117.688788] flags: 0x17fff8000000100(slab)
[ 3117.688944] raw: 017fff8000000100 ffffea00063c2840 0000000e0000000e ffff8801f3403180
[ 3117.689166] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 3117.689386] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 3117.689653] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 3117.689816] ffff88018f0a6280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 3117.690027] ffff88018f0a6300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 3117.690239] >ffff88018f0a6380: 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 3117.690448] ^
[ 3117.690644] ffff88018f0a6400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 3117.690868] ffff88018f0a6480: 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 3117.691077] ==================================================================
[ 3117.691290] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[ 3117.693893] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
[ 3117.694120] PGD 80000001f01bc067 P4D 80000001f01bc067 PUD 1d9638067 PMD 0
[ 3117.694338] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[ 3117.694490] CPU: 1 PID: 1225 Comm: mount Tainted: G B W 4.17.0+ #1
[ 3117.694703] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 3117.695073] RIP: 0010:__remove_dirty_segment+0xe2/0x1e0
[ 3117.695246] Code: c4 48 89 c7 e8 cf bb d7 ff 45 0f b6 24 24 41 83 e4 3f 44 88 64 24 07 41 83 e4 3f 4a 8d 7c e3 08 e8 b3 bc d7 ff 4a 8b 4c e3 08 <f0> 4c 0f b3 29 0f 82 94 00 00 00 48 8d bd 20 04 00 00 e8 97 bb d7
[ 3117.695793] RSP: 0018:ffff88018eb67638 EFLAGS: 00010292
[ 3117.695969] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88018f0a6300 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 3117.696182] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000297 RDI: 0000000000000297
[ 3117.696391] RBP: ffff88018ebe9980 R08: ffffed003e743ebb R09: ffffed003e743ebb
[ 3117.696604] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003e743eba R12: 0000000000000019
[ 3117.696813] R13: 0000000000000014 R14: 0000000000000320 R15: ffff88018ebe99e0
[ 3117.697032] FS: 00007f5694636840(0000) GS:ffff8801f3b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 3117.697280] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 3117.702357] CR2: 00007fe89bb1a000 CR3: 0000000191c22000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 3117.707235] Call Trace:
[ 3117.712077] locate_dirty_segment+0x189/0x190
[ 3117.716891] f2fs_allocate_new_segments+0xa9/0xe0
[ 3117.721617] recover_data+0x703/0x2c20
[ 3117.726316] ? f2fs_recover_fsync_data+0x48f/0xd50
[ 3117.730957] ? ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
[ 3117.735573] ? policy_nodemask+0x1a/0x90
[ 3117.740198] ? policy_node+0x56/0x70
[ 3117.744829] ? add_fsync_inode+0xf0/0xf0
[ 3117.749487] ? blk_finish_plug+0x44/0x60
[ 3117.754152] ? f2fs_ra_meta_pages+0x38b/0x5e0
[ 3117.758831] ? find_inode_fast+0xac/0xc0
[ 3117.763448] ? f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x320/0x320
[ 3117.768046] ? __radix_tree_lookup+0x150/0x150
[ 3117.772603] ? dqget+0x670/0x670
[ 3117.777159] ? pagecache_get_page+0x29/0x410
[ 3117.781648] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x176/0x1e0
[ 3117.786067] ? f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x11d/0x320
[ 3117.790476] f2fs_recover_fsync_data+0xc23/0xd50
[ 3117.794790] ? f2fs_space_for_roll_forward+0x60/0x60
[ 3117.799086] ? rb_insert_color+0x323/0x3d0
[ 3117.803304] ? f2fs_recover_orphan_inodes+0xa5/0x700
[ 3117.807563] ? proc_register+0x153/0x1d0
[ 3117.811766] ? f2fs_remove_orphan_inode+0x10/0x10
[ 3117.815947] ? f2fs_attr_store+0x50/0x50
[ 3117.820087] ? proc_create_single_data+0x52/0x60
[ 3117.824262] f2fs_fill_super+0x1d06/0x2b40
[ 3117.828367] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 3117.832432] ? sget_userns+0x65e/0x690
[ 3117.836500] ? set_blocksize+0x88/0x130
[ 3117.840501] ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 3117.844420] mount_bdev+0x1c0/0x200
[ 3117.848275] mount_fs+0x5c/0x190
[ 3117.852053] vfs_kern_mount+0x64/0x190
[ 3117.855810] do_mount+0x2e4/0x1450
[ 3117.859441] ? lockref_put_return+0x130/0x130
[ 3117.862996] ? copy_mount_string+0x20/0x20
[ 3117.866417] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x31/0x40
[ 3117.869719] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0
[ 3117.872948] ? memcg_kmem_put_cache+0x16/0x90
[ 3117.876121] ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x196/0x210
[ 3117.879333] ? _copy_from_user+0x61/0x90
[ 3117.882467] ? memdup_user+0x3e/0x60
[ 3117.885604] ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
[ 3117.888700] __x64_sys_mount+0x62/0x70
[ 3117.891742] do_syscall_64+0x73/0x160
[ 3117.894692] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 3117.897669] RIP: 0033:0x7f5693f14b9a
[ 3117.900563] Code: 48 8b 0d 01 c3 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ce c2 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 3117.906922] RSP: 002b:00007fff27346488 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 3117.910159] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000016e2030 RCX: 00007f5693f14b9a
[ 3117.913469] RDX: 00000000016e2210 RSI: 00000000016e3f30 RDI: 00000000016ee040
[ 3117.916764] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000013
[ 3117.920071] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00000000016ee040
[ 3117.923393] R13: 00000000016e2210 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003
[ 3117.926680] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_timer joydev input_leds serio_raw snd soundcore mac_hid i2c_piix4 ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core configfs iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi btrfs zstd_decompress zstd_compress xxhash raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too qxl ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel psmouse aes_x86_64 8139cp crypto_simd cryptd mii glue_helper pata_acpi floppy
[ 3117.949979] CR2: 0000000000000000
[ 3117.954283] ---[ end trace a8e0d899985faf32 ]---
[ 3117.958575] RIP: 0010:__remove_dirty_segment+0xe2/0x1e0
[ 3117.962810] Code: c4 48 89 c7 e8 cf bb d7 ff 45 0f b6 24 24 41 83 e4 3f 44 88 64 24 07 41 83 e4 3f 4a 8d 7c e3 08 e8 b3 bc d7 ff 4a 8b 4c e3 08 <f0> 4c 0f b3 29 0f 82 94 00 00 00 48 8d bd 20 04 00 00 e8 97 bb d7
[ 3117.971789] RSP: 0018:ffff88018eb67638 EFLAGS: 00010292
[ 3117.976333] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88018f0a6300 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 3117.980926] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000297 RDI: 0000000000000297
[ 3117.985497] RBP: ffff88018ebe9980 R08: ffffed003e743ebb R09: ffffed003e743ebb
[ 3117.990098] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003e743eba R12: 0000000000000019
[ 3117.994761] R13: 0000000000000014 R14: 0000000000000320 R15: ffff88018ebe99e0
[ 3117.999392] FS: 00007f5694636840(0000) GS:ffff8801f3b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 3118.004096] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 3118.008816] CR2: 00007fe89bb1a000 CR3: 0000000191c22000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
- Location
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.18-rc3/source/fs/f2fs/segment.c#L775
if (test_and_clear_bit(segno, dirty_i->dirty_segmap[t]))
dirty_i->nr_dirty[t]--;
Here dirty_i->dirty_segmap[t] can be NULL which leads to crash in test_and_clear_bit()
Reported-by Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: The function is called sanity_check_ckpt()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c | 8 ++++----
fs/f2fs/super.c | 12 ++++++++++++
2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
@@ -794,15 +794,15 @@ int get_valid_checkpoint(struct f2fs_sb_
cp_block = (struct f2fs_checkpoint *)page_address(cur_page);
memcpy(sbi->ckpt, cp_block, blk_size);
- /* Sanity checking of checkpoint */
- if (sanity_check_ckpt(sbi))
- goto free_fail_no_cp;
-
if (cur_page == cp1)
sbi->cur_cp_pack = 1;
else
sbi->cur_cp_pack = 2;
+ /* Sanity checking of checkpoint */
+ if (sanity_check_ckpt(sbi))
+ goto free_fail_no_cp;
+
if (cp_blks <= 1)
goto done;
--- a/fs/f2fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c
@@ -1487,6 +1487,7 @@ int sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_inf
unsigned int sit_bitmap_size, nat_bitmap_size;
unsigned int log_blocks_per_seg;
unsigned int segment_count_main;
+ unsigned int cp_pack_start_sum, cp_payload;
block_t user_block_count;
int i;
@@ -1547,6 +1548,17 @@ int sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_inf
return 1;
}
+ cp_pack_start_sum = __start_sum_addr(sbi);
+ cp_payload = __cp_payload(sbi);
+ if (cp_pack_start_sum < cp_payload + 1 ||
+ cp_pack_start_sum > blocks_per_seg - 1 -
+ NR_CURSEG_TYPE) {
+ f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR,
+ "Wrong cp_pack_start_sum: %u",
+ cp_pack_start_sum);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
if (unlikely(f2fs_cp_error(sbi))) {
f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR, "A bug case: need to run fsck");
return 1;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 4.9 100/101] f2fs: fix to do sanity check with cp_pack_start_sum
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 100/101] f2fs: fix to do sanity check with cp_pack_start_sum Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-07 18:12 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-12-08 9:01 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
0 siblings, 1 reply; 115+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2018-12-07 18:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-kernel; +Cc: stable, Chao Yu, Jaegeuk Kim
On Thu, 2018-12-06 at 15:39 +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> 4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
>
> ------------------
>
> From: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
>
> commit e494c2f995d6181d6e29c4927d68e0f295ecf75b upstream.
[...]
I accidentally reset the author for this while backporting it. The
correct author is: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Ben.
--
Ben Hutchings, Software Developer Codethink Ltd
https://www.codethink.co.uk/ Dale House, 35 Dale Street
Manchester, M1 2HF, United Kingdom
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 4.9 100/101] f2fs: fix to do sanity check with cp_pack_start_sum
2018-12-07 18:12 ` Ben Hutchings
@ 2018-12-08 9:01 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
0 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-08 9:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ben Hutchings; +Cc: linux-kernel, stable, Chao Yu, Jaegeuk Kim
On Fri, Dec 07, 2018 at 06:12:50PM +0000, Ben Hutchings wrote:
> On Thu, 2018-12-06 at 15:39 +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > 4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
> >
> > ------------------
> >
> > From: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
> >
> > commit e494c2f995d6181d6e29c4927d68e0f295ecf75b upstream.
> [...]
>
> I accidentally reset the author for this while backporting it. The
> correct author is: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Thanks for catching this, now fixed up.
greg k-h
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 4.9 101/101] xfs: dont fail when converting shortform attr to long form during ATTR_REPLACE
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (99 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 100/101] f2fs: fix to do sanity check with cp_pack_start_sum Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 14:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-06 20:12 ` [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review kernelci.org bot
` (4 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-06 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, kanda.motohiro, Dave Chinner,
Christoph Hellwig, Darrick J. Wong, Ben Hutchings
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Darrick J. Wong" <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
commit 7b38460dc8e4eafba06c78f8e37099d3b34d473c upstream.
Kanda Motohiro reported that expanding a tiny xattr into a large xattr
fails on XFS because we remove the tiny xattr from a shortform fork and
then try to re-add it after converting the fork to extents format having
not removed the ATTR_REPLACE flag. This fails because the attr is no
longer present, causing a fs shutdown.
This is derived from the patch in his bug report, but we really
shouldn't ignore a nonzero retval from the remove call.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199119
Reported-by: kanda.motohiro@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr.c
@@ -487,7 +487,14 @@ xfs_attr_shortform_addname(xfs_da_args_t
if (args->flags & ATTR_CREATE)
return retval;
retval = xfs_attr_shortform_remove(args);
- ASSERT(retval == 0);
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
+ /*
+ * Since we have removed the old attr, clear ATTR_REPLACE so
+ * that the leaf format add routine won't trip over the attr
+ * not being around.
+ */
+ args->flags &= ~ATTR_REPLACE;
}
if (args->namelen >= XFS_ATTR_SF_ENTSIZE_MAX ||
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (100 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 14:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 101/101] xfs: dont fail when converting shortform attr to long form during ATTR_REPLACE Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-06 20:12 ` kernelci.org bot
2018-12-06 22:08 ` shuah
` (3 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: kernelci.org bot @ 2018-12-06 20:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah, patches,
ben.hutchings, lkft-triage, stable
stable-rc/linux-4.9.y boot: 105 boots: 0 failed, 104 passed with 1 offline (v4.9.143-102-gcf137e4b4373)
Full Boot Summary: https://kernelci.org/boot/all/job/stable-rc/branch/linux-4.9.y/kernel/v4.9.143-102-gcf137e4b4373/
Full Build Summary: https://kernelci.org/build/stable-rc/branch/linux-4.9.y/kernel/v4.9.143-102-gcf137e4b4373/
Tree: stable-rc
Branch: linux-4.9.y
Git Describe: v4.9.143-102-gcf137e4b4373
Git Commit: cf137e4b43737b5c238350d3e22f031c616dd9f9
Git URL: http://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
Tested: 47 unique boards, 20 SoC families, 15 builds out of 193
Offline Platforms:
arm:
multi_v7_defconfig:
stih410-b2120: 1 offline lab
---
For more info write to <info@kernelci.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (101 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 20:12 ` [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review kernelci.org bot
@ 2018-12-06 22:08 ` shuah
2018-12-07 9:03 ` Jon Hunter
` (2 subsequent siblings)
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: shuah @ 2018-12-06 22:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-kernel
Cc: torvalds, akpm, linux, patches, ben.hutchings, lkft-triage,
stable, shuah
On 12/6/18 7:37 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.144 release.
> There are 101 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sat Dec 8 14:29:43 UTC 2018.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.144-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>
Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
thanks,
-- Shuah
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (102 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-06 22:08 ` shuah
@ 2018-12-07 9:03 ` Jon Hunter
2018-12-07 14:41 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-07 9:10 ` Naresh Kamboju
2018-12-07 23:38 ` Guenter Roeck
105 siblings, 1 reply; 115+ messages in thread
From: Jon Hunter @ 2018-12-07 9:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-kernel
Cc: torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah, patches, ben.hutchings,
lkft-triage, stable, linux-tegra
On 06/12/2018 14:37, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.144 release.
> There are 101 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sat Dec 8 14:29:43 UTC 2018.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.144-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
All tests are passing for Tegra ...
Test results for stable-v4.9:
8 builds: 8 pass, 0 fail
16 boots: 16 pass, 0 fail
14 tests: 14 pass, 0 fail
Linux version: 4.9.144-rc1-gcf137e4
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra20-ventana,
tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra30-cardhu-a04
Cheers
Jon
--
nvpublic
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review
2018-12-07 9:03 ` Jon Hunter
@ 2018-12-07 14:41 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
0 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-07 14:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jon Hunter
Cc: linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah, patches,
ben.hutchings, lkft-triage, stable, linux-tegra
On Fri, Dec 07, 2018 at 09:03:27AM +0000, Jon Hunter wrote:
>
> On 06/12/2018 14:37, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.144 release.
> > There are 101 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > let me know.
> >
> > Responses should be made by Sat Dec 8 14:29:43 UTC 2018.
> > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> >
> > The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> > https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.144-rc1.gz
> > or in the git tree and branch at:
> > git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> > and the diffstat can be found below.
> >
> > thanks,
> >
> > greg k-h
> All tests are passing for Tegra ...
>
> Test results for stable-v4.9:
> 8 builds: 8 pass, 0 fail
> 16 boots: 16 pass, 0 fail
> 14 tests: 14 pass, 0 fail
>
> Linux version: 4.9.144-rc1-gcf137e4
> Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra20-ventana,
> tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra30-cardhu-a04
>
Thanks for testing two of these and letting me know.
greg k-h
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (103 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-07 9:03 ` Jon Hunter
@ 2018-12-07 9:10 ` Naresh Kamboju
2018-12-07 14:41 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-07 23:38 ` Guenter Roeck
105 siblings, 1 reply; 115+ messages in thread
From: Naresh Kamboju @ 2018-12-07 9:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, mike.kravetz
Cc: open list, Linus Torvalds, Andrew Morton, Guenter Roeck,
Shuah Khan, patches, Ben Hutchings, lkft-triage, linux- stable,
Eric Munson
On Thu, 6 Dec 2018 at 20:15, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.144 release.
> There are 101 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sat Dec 8 14:29:43 UTC 2018.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.144-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>
> Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
> hugetlbfs: check for pgoff value overflow
>
> Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
> hugetlbfs: fix offset overflow in hugetlbfs mmap
>
> Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
> mm/hugetlb.c: don't call region_abort if region_chg fails
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
Regressions detected on arm32 and i386.
truncate_above_4GB (2M: 32): FAIL mmap() offset 4GB: Invalid argument
test case link:
https://github.com/libhugetlbfs/libhugetlbfs/blob/master/tests/truncate_above_4GB.c
Full test log links,
https://lkft.validation.linaro.org/scheduler/job/537897#L1373
Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------
kernel: 4.9.144-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.9.y
git commit: cf137e4b43737b5c238350d3e22f031c616dd9f9
git describe: v4.9.143-102-gcf137e4b4373
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.9-oe/build/v4.9.143-102-gcf137e4b4373
Regressions (compared to build v4.9.143)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
qemu_arm:
libhugetlbfs:
* truncate_above_4GB-2M-32
qemu_i386:
libhugetlbfs:
* truncate_above_4GB-4M-32
x15 - arm:
libhugetlbfs:
* truncate_above_4GB-2M-32
Test description:
----------------------
https://github.com/libhugetlbfs/libhugetlbfs/blob/master/tests/truncate_above_4GB.c
/*
* Test rationale:
*
* At one stage, a misconversion of hugetlb_vmtruncate_list to a
* prio_tree meant that on 32-bit machines, truncates at or above 4GB
* could truncate lower pages, resulting in BUG_ON()s.
*
* WARNING: The offsets and addresses used within are specifically
* calculated to trigger the bug as it existed. Don't mess with them
* unless you *really* know what you're doing.
*
* The kernel bug in question was fixed with commit
* 856fc29505556cf263f3dcda2533cf3766c14ab6.
*/
--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review
2018-12-07 9:10 ` Naresh Kamboju
@ 2018-12-07 14:41 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-07 15:34 ` Ben Hutchings
0 siblings, 1 reply; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-07 14:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Naresh Kamboju
Cc: mike.kravetz, open list, Linus Torvalds, Andrew Morton,
Guenter Roeck, Shuah Khan, patches, Ben Hutchings, lkft-triage,
linux- stable, Eric Munson
On Fri, Dec 07, 2018 at 02:40:26PM +0530, Naresh Kamboju wrote:
> On Thu, 6 Dec 2018 at 20:15, Greg Kroah-Hartman
> <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >
> > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.144 release.
> > There are 101 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > let me know.
> >
> > Responses should be made by Sat Dec 8 14:29:43 UTC 2018.
> > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> >
> > The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> > https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.144-rc1.gz
> > or in the git tree and branch at:
> > git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> > and the diffstat can be found below.
> >
> > thanks,
> >
> > greg k-h
> >
> > Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
> > hugetlbfs: check for pgoff value overflow
> >
> > Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
> > hugetlbfs: fix offset overflow in hugetlbfs mmap
> >
> > Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
> > mm/hugetlb.c: don't call region_abort if region_chg fails
>
> Results from Linaro’s test farm.
> Regressions detected on arm32 and i386.
>
> truncate_above_4GB (2M: 32): FAIL mmap() offset 4GB: Invalid argument
Can this be tracked down to a commit in this tree that caused this
regression?
thanks,
greg k-h
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review
2018-12-07 14:41 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-07 15:34 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-12-07 15:51 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
0 siblings, 1 reply; 115+ messages in thread
From: Ben Hutchings @ 2018-12-07 15:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, Naresh Kamboju
Cc: mike.kravetz, open list, Linus Torvalds, Andrew Morton,
Guenter Roeck, Shuah Khan, patches, lkft-triage, linux- stable,
Eric Munson
On Fri, 2018-12-07 at 15:41 +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 07, 2018 at 02:40:26PM +0530, Naresh Kamboju wrote:
> > On Thu, 6 Dec 2018 at 20:15, Greg Kroah-Hartman
> > <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.144 release.
> > > There are 101 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > > to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > > let me know.
> > >
> > > Responses should be made by Sat Dec 8 14:29:43 UTC 2018.
> > > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> > >
> > > The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> > > https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.144-rc1.gz
> > > or in the git tree and branch at:
> > > git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> > > and the diffstat can be found below.
> > >
> > > thanks,
> > >
> > > greg k-h
> > >
> > > Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
> > > hugetlbfs: check for pgoff value overflow
> > >
> > > Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
> > > hugetlbfs: fix offset overflow in hugetlbfs mmap
> > >
> > > Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
> > > mm/hugetlb.c: don't call region_abort if region_chg fails
> >
> > Results from Linaro’s test farm.
> > Regressions detected on arm32 and i386.
> >
> > truncate_above_4GB (2M: 32): FAIL mmap() offset 4GB: Invalid argument
>
> Can this be tracked down to a commit in this tree that caused this
> regression?
The test failure is part of a hugetlb test group, so one of the above
is responsible.
Ah, I missed this fix (it's already in 4.14-stable:
commit 5df63c2a149ae65a9ec239e7c2af44efa6f79beb
Author: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Date: Thu Apr 5 16:18:21 2018 -0700
hugetlbfs: fix bug in pgoff overflow checking
Ben.
--
Ben Hutchings, Software Developer Codethink Ltd
https://www.codethink.co.uk/ Dale House, 35 Dale Street
Manchester, M1 2HF, United Kingdom
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review
2018-12-07 15:34 ` Ben Hutchings
@ 2018-12-07 15:51 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-12-07 17:53 ` Naresh Kamboju
0 siblings, 1 reply; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-07 15:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ben Hutchings
Cc: Naresh Kamboju, mike.kravetz, open list, Linus Torvalds,
Andrew Morton, Guenter Roeck, Shuah Khan, patches, lkft-triage,
linux- stable, Eric Munson
On Fri, Dec 07, 2018 at 03:34:24PM +0000, Ben Hutchings wrote:
> On Fri, 2018-12-07 at 15:41 +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > On Fri, Dec 07, 2018 at 02:40:26PM +0530, Naresh Kamboju wrote:
> > > On Thu, 6 Dec 2018 at 20:15, Greg Kroah-Hartman
> > > <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.144 release.
> > > > There are 101 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > > > to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > > > let me know.
> > > >
> > > > Responses should be made by Sat Dec 8 14:29:43 UTC 2018.
> > > > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> > > >
> > > > The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> > > > https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.144-rc1.gz
> > > > or in the git tree and branch at:
> > > > git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> > > > and the diffstat can be found below.
> > > >
> > > > thanks,
> > > >
> > > > greg k-h
> > > >
> > > > Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
> > > > hugetlbfs: check for pgoff value overflow
> > > >
> > > > Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
> > > > hugetlbfs: fix offset overflow in hugetlbfs mmap
> > > >
> > > > Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
> > > > mm/hugetlb.c: don't call region_abort if region_chg fails
> > >
> > > Results from Linaro’s test farm.
> > > Regressions detected on arm32 and i386.
> > >
> > > truncate_above_4GB (2M: 32): FAIL mmap() offset 4GB: Invalid argument
> >
> > Can this be tracked down to a commit in this tree that caused this
> > regression?
>
> The test failure is part of a hugetlb test group, so one of the above
> is responsible.
>
> Ah, I missed this fix (it's already in 4.14-stable:
>
> commit 5df63c2a149ae65a9ec239e7c2af44efa6f79beb
> Author: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
> Date: Thu Apr 5 16:18:21 2018 -0700
>
> hugetlbfs: fix bug in pgoff overflow checking
>
> Ben.
Thanks for this, I've queued this up and pushed out a -rc2.
Naresh, can you see if this fixes the issue for you or not?
thanks,
greg k-h
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review
2018-12-07 15:51 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-12-07 17:53 ` Naresh Kamboju
2018-12-08 8:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
0 siblings, 1 reply; 115+ messages in thread
From: Naresh Kamboju @ 2018-12-07 17:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Cc: Ben Hutchings, mike.kravetz, open list, Linus Torvalds,
Andrew Morton, Guenter Roeck, Shuah Khan, patches, lkft-triage,
linux- stable, Eric Munson
On Fri, 7 Dec 2018 at 21:21, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Dec 07, 2018 at 03:34:24PM +0000, Ben Hutchings wrote:
> > On Fri, 2018-12-07 at 15:41 +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > > On Fri, Dec 07, 2018 at 02:40:26PM +0530, Naresh Kamboju wrote:
> > > > On Thu, 6 Dec 2018 at 20:15, Greg Kroah-Hartman
> > > > <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.144 release.
> > > > > There are 101 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > > > > to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > > > > let me know.
> > > > >
> > > > > Responses should be made by Sat Dec 8 14:29:43 UTC 2018.
> > > > > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> > > > >
> > > > > The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> > > > > https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.144-rc1.gz
> > > > > or in the git tree and branch at:
> > > > > git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> > > > > and the diffstat can be found below.
> > > > >
> > > > > thanks,
> > > > >
> > > > > greg k-h
> > > > >
> > > > > Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
> > > > > hugetlbfs: check for pgoff value overflow
> > > > >
> > > > > Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
> > > > > hugetlbfs: fix offset overflow in hugetlbfs mmap
> > > > >
> > > > > Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
> > > > > mm/hugetlb.c: don't call region_abort if region_chg fails
> > > >
> > > > Results from Linaro’s test farm.
> > > > Regressions detected on arm32 and i386.
> > > >
> > > > truncate_above_4GB (2M: 32): FAIL mmap() offset 4GB: Invalid argument
> > >
> > > Can this be tracked down to a commit in this tree that caused this
> > > regression?
> >
> > The test failure is part of a hugetlb test group, so one of the above
> > is responsible.
> >
> > Ah, I missed this fix (it's already in 4.14-stable:
> >
> > commit 5df63c2a149ae65a9ec239e7c2af44efa6f79beb
> > Author: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
> > Date: Thu Apr 5 16:18:21 2018 -0700
> >
> > hugetlbfs: fix bug in pgoff overflow checking
> >
> > Ben.
>
> Thanks for this, I've queued this up and pushed out a -rc2.
>
> Naresh, can you see if this fixes the issue for you or not?
Yes This test getting pass on -rc2 on all devices arm64, arm32, x86_64 and i386.
truncate_above_4GB (2M: 32): PASS
Thank you
- Naresh
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review
2018-12-07 17:53 ` Naresh Kamboju
@ 2018-12-08 8:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
0 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-12-08 8:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Naresh Kamboju
Cc: Ben Hutchings, mike.kravetz, open list, Linus Torvalds,
Andrew Morton, Guenter Roeck, Shuah Khan, patches, lkft-triage,
linux- stable, Eric Munson
On Fri, Dec 07, 2018 at 11:23:26PM +0530, Naresh Kamboju wrote:
> On Fri, 7 Dec 2018 at 21:21, Greg Kroah-Hartman
> <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Fri, Dec 07, 2018 at 03:34:24PM +0000, Ben Hutchings wrote:
> > > On Fri, 2018-12-07 at 15:41 +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > > > On Fri, Dec 07, 2018 at 02:40:26PM +0530, Naresh Kamboju wrote:
> > > > > On Thu, 6 Dec 2018 at 20:15, Greg Kroah-Hartman
> > > > > <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.144 release.
> > > > > > There are 101 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > > > > > to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > > > > > let me know.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Responses should be made by Sat Dec 8 14:29:43 UTC 2018.
> > > > > > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> > > > > > https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.144-rc1.gz
> > > > > > or in the git tree and branch at:
> > > > > > git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> > > > > > and the diffstat can be found below.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > thanks,
> > > > > >
> > > > > > greg k-h
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
> > > > > > hugetlbfs: check for pgoff value overflow
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
> > > > > > hugetlbfs: fix offset overflow in hugetlbfs mmap
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
> > > > > > mm/hugetlb.c: don't call region_abort if region_chg fails
> > > > >
> > > > > Results from Linaro’s test farm.
> > > > > Regressions detected on arm32 and i386.
> > > > >
> > > > > truncate_above_4GB (2M: 32): FAIL mmap() offset 4GB: Invalid argument
> > > >
> > > > Can this be tracked down to a commit in this tree that caused this
> > > > regression?
> > >
> > > The test failure is part of a hugetlb test group, so one of the above
> > > is responsible.
> > >
> > > Ah, I missed this fix (it's already in 4.14-stable:
> > >
> > > commit 5df63c2a149ae65a9ec239e7c2af44efa6f79beb
> > > Author: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
> > > Date: Thu Apr 5 16:18:21 2018 -0700
> > >
> > > hugetlbfs: fix bug in pgoff overflow checking
> > >
> > > Ben.
> >
> > Thanks for this, I've queued this up and pushed out a -rc2.
> >
> > Naresh, can you see if this fixes the issue for you or not?
>
> Yes This test getting pass on -rc2 on all devices arm64, arm32, x86_64 and i386.
> truncate_above_4GB (2M: 32): PASS
Wonderful, thanks for testing and catching this and letting me know.
greg k-h
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 115+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review
2018-12-06 14:37 [PATCH 4.9 000/101] 4.9.144-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (104 preceding siblings ...)
2018-12-07 9:10 ` Naresh Kamboju
@ 2018-12-07 23:38 ` Guenter Roeck
105 siblings, 0 replies; 115+ messages in thread
From: Guenter Roeck @ 2018-12-07 23:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Cc: linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, shuah, patches, ben.hutchings,
lkft-triage, stable
On Thu, Dec 06, 2018 at 03:37:59PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.144 release.
> There are 101 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sat Dec 8 14:29:43 UTC 2018.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
For v4.9.143-103-g2eb2c353eec4:
Build results:
total: 171 pass: 171 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
total: 311 pass: 311 fail: 0
Details are available at https://kerneltests.org/builders/.
Guenter
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