* Re: [PATCH] security: mark expected switch fall-throughs
2019-01-25 2:56 [PATCH] security: mark expected switch fall-throughs Gustavo A. R. Silva
@ 2019-01-25 3:13 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-01-25 3:29 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2019-01-25 6:55 ` John Johansen
2019-01-25 12:37 ` Mimi Zohar
2 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-01-25 3:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Gustavo A. R. Silva, John Johansen, James Morris,
Serge E. Hallyn, Mimi Zohar, Dmitry Kasatkin
Cc: linux-security-module, linux-kernel, linux-integrity
On 1/24/2019 6:56 PM, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
> In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch
> cases where we are expecting to fall through.
>
> This patch fixes the following warnings:
>
> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c:116:26: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
> security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c:85:10: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:940:18: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:943:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:972:21: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:974:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c:3391:9: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
> security/apparmor/domain.c:569:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
>
> Warning level 3 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=3
>
> This patch is part of the ongoing efforts to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough.
>
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Ug. It can't be part of a greater comment? Grumble.
> ---
> security/apparmor/domain.c | 2 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 1 +
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 ++++
> security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 1 +
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 3 +--
> 5 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
> index 726910bba84b..c7c619578095 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
> @@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile,
> stack = NULL;
> break;
> }
> - /* fall through to X_NAME */
> + /* fall through - to X_NAME */
> case AA_X_NAME:
> if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD)
> /* released by caller */
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> index a2baa85ea2f5..57daf30fb7d4 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> break;
> case CREDS_CHECK:
> iint->ima_creds_status = status;
> + /* fall through */
> case FILE_CHECK:
> case POST_SETATTR:
> iint->ima_file_status = status;
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 8bc8a1c8cb3f..122797023bdb 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -938,10 +938,12 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> case Opt_uid_gt:
> case Opt_euid_gt:
> entry->uid_op = &uid_gt;
> + /* fall through */
> case Opt_uid_lt:
> case Opt_euid_lt:
> if ((token == Opt_uid_lt) || (token == Opt_euid_lt))
> entry->uid_op = &uid_lt;
> + /* fall through */
> case Opt_uid_eq:
> case Opt_euid_eq:
> uid_token = (token == Opt_uid_eq) ||
> @@ -970,9 +972,11 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> break;
> case Opt_fowner_gt:
> entry->fowner_op = &uid_gt;
> + /* fall through */
> case Opt_fowner_lt:
> if (token == Opt_fowner_lt)
> entry->fowner_op = &uid_lt;
> + /* fall through */
> case Opt_fowner_eq:
> ima_log_string_op(ab, "fowner", args[0].from,
> entry->fowner_op);
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
> index 43752002c222..513b457ae900 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
> @@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ static void ima_show_template_data_ascii(struct seq_file *m,
> /* skip ':' and '\0' */
> buf_ptr += 2;
> buflen -= buf_ptr - field_data->data;
> + /* fall through */
> case DATA_FMT_DIGEST:
> case DATA_FMT_HEX:
> if (!buflen)
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index fa98394a40d0..127aa6c58e34 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -3391,13 +3391,12 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
> */
> final = &smack_known_star;
> /*
> - * Fall through.
> - *
> * If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
> * but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
> * to set mount options simulate setting the
> * superblock default.
> */
> + /* Fall through */
> default:
> /*
> * This isn't an understood special case.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] security: mark expected switch fall-throughs
2019-01-25 3:13 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-01-25 3:29 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2019-01-25 3:47 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread
From: Gustavo A. R. Silva @ 2019-01-25 3:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, John Johansen, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn,
Mimi Zohar, Dmitry Kasatkin
Cc: linux-security-module, linux-kernel, linux-integrity
On 1/24/19 9:13 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 1/24/2019 6:56 PM, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
>> In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch
>> cases where we are expecting to fall through.
>>
>> This patch fixes the following warnings:
>>
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c:116:26: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c:85:10: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:940:18: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:943:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:972:21: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:974:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
>> security/smack/smack_lsm.c:3391:9: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
>> security/apparmor/domain.c:569:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
>>
>> Warning level 3 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=3
>>
>> This patch is part of the ongoing efforts to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
>
> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>
> Ug. It can't be part of a greater comment? Grumble.
>
Not like the one in this case.
It can be part of a one line comment like this:
/* fall through - ... */
and it has to be placed at the bottom of the case.
I know... I'd be great if this can be improved.
>> ---
>> security/apparmor/domain.c | 2 +-
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 1 +
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 ++++
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 1 +
>> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 3 +--
>> 5 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
>> index 726910bba84b..c7c619578095 100644
>> --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
>> +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
>> @@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile,
>> stack = NULL;
>> break;
>> }
>> - /* fall through to X_NAME */
>> + /* fall through - to X_NAME */
>> case AA_X_NAME:
>> if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD)
>> /* released by caller */
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
>> index a2baa85ea2f5..57daf30fb7d4 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
>> @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
>> break;
>> case CREDS_CHECK:
>> iint->ima_creds_status = status;
>> + /* fall through */
>> case FILE_CHECK:
>> case POST_SETATTR:
>> iint->ima_file_status = status;
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> index 8bc8a1c8cb3f..122797023bdb 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> @@ -938,10 +938,12 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
>> case Opt_uid_gt:
>> case Opt_euid_gt:
>> entry->uid_op = &uid_gt;
>> + /* fall through */
>> case Opt_uid_lt:
>> case Opt_euid_lt:
>> if ((token == Opt_uid_lt) || (token == Opt_euid_lt))
>> entry->uid_op = &uid_lt;
>> + /* fall through */
>> case Opt_uid_eq:
>> case Opt_euid_eq:
>> uid_token = (token == Opt_uid_eq) ||
>> @@ -970,9 +972,11 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
>> break;
>> case Opt_fowner_gt:
>> entry->fowner_op = &uid_gt;
>> + /* fall through */
>> case Opt_fowner_lt:
>> if (token == Opt_fowner_lt)
>> entry->fowner_op = &uid_lt;
>> + /* fall through */
>> case Opt_fowner_eq:
>> ima_log_string_op(ab, "fowner", args[0].from,
>> entry->fowner_op);
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
>> index 43752002c222..513b457ae900 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
>> @@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ static void ima_show_template_data_ascii(struct seq_file *m,
>> /* skip ':' and '\0' */
>> buf_ptr += 2;
>> buflen -= buf_ptr - field_data->data;
>> + /* fall through */
>> case DATA_FMT_DIGEST:
>> case DATA_FMT_HEX:
>> if (!buflen)
>> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> index fa98394a40d0..127aa6c58e34 100644
>> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> @@ -3391,13 +3391,12 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
>> */
>> final = &smack_known_star;
>> /*
>> - * Fall through.
>> - *
>> * If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
>> * but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
>> * to set mount options simulate setting the
>> * superblock default.
>> */
>> + /* Fall through */
>> default:
>> /*
>> * This isn't an understood special case.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] security: mark expected switch fall-throughs
2019-01-25 3:29 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
@ 2019-01-25 3:47 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2019-01-31 19:58 ` Mimi Zohar
0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread
From: Gustavo A. R. Silva @ 2019-01-25 3:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, John Johansen, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn,
Mimi Zohar, Dmitry Kasatkin
Cc: linux-security-module, linux-kernel, linux-integrity
On 1/24/19 9:29 PM, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
>
>
> On 1/24/19 9:13 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 1/24/2019 6:56 PM, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
>>> In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch
>>> cases where we are expecting to fall through.
>>>
>>> This patch fixes the following warnings:
>>>
>>> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c:116:26: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
>>> security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c:85:10: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
>>> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:940:18: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
>>> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:943:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
>>> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:972:21: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
>>> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:974:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
>>> security/smack/smack_lsm.c:3391:9: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
>>> security/apparmor/domain.c:569:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
>>>
>>> Warning level 3 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=3
>>>
>>> This patch is part of the ongoing efforts to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
>>
>> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>>
BTW, thanks, Casey. I'll take this in my tree.
--
Gustavo
>> Ug. It can't be part of a greater comment? Grumble.
>>
>
> Not like the one in this case.
>
> It can be part of a one line comment like this:
>
> /* fall through - ... */
>
> and it has to be placed at the bottom of the case.
>
> I know... I'd be great if this can be improved.
>
>>> ---
>>> security/apparmor/domain.c | 2 +-
>>> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 1 +
>>> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 ++++
>>> security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 1 +
>>> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 3 +--
>>> 5 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
>>> index 726910bba84b..c7c619578095 100644
>>> --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
>>> +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
>>> @@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile,
>>> stack = NULL;
>>> break;
>>> }
>>> - /* fall through to X_NAME */
>>> + /* fall through - to X_NAME */
>>> case AA_X_NAME:
>>> if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD)
>>> /* released by caller */
>>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
>>> index a2baa85ea2f5..57daf30fb7d4 100644
>>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
>>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
>>> @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
>>> break;
>>> case CREDS_CHECK:
>>> iint->ima_creds_status = status;
>>> + /* fall through */
>>> case FILE_CHECK:
>>> case POST_SETATTR:
>>> iint->ima_file_status = status;
>>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>>> index 8bc8a1c8cb3f..122797023bdb 100644
>>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>>> @@ -938,10 +938,12 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
>>> case Opt_uid_gt:
>>> case Opt_euid_gt:
>>> entry->uid_op = &uid_gt;
>>> + /* fall through */
>>> case Opt_uid_lt:
>>> case Opt_euid_lt:
>>> if ((token == Opt_uid_lt) || (token == Opt_euid_lt))
>>> entry->uid_op = &uid_lt;
>>> + /* fall through */
>>> case Opt_uid_eq:
>>> case Opt_euid_eq:
>>> uid_token = (token == Opt_uid_eq) ||
>>> @@ -970,9 +972,11 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
>>> break;
>>> case Opt_fowner_gt:
>>> entry->fowner_op = &uid_gt;
>>> + /* fall through */
>>> case Opt_fowner_lt:
>>> if (token == Opt_fowner_lt)
>>> entry->fowner_op = &uid_lt;
>>> + /* fall through */
>>> case Opt_fowner_eq:
>>> ima_log_string_op(ab, "fowner", args[0].from,
>>> entry->fowner_op);
>>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
>>> index 43752002c222..513b457ae900 100644
>>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
>>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
>>> @@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ static void ima_show_template_data_ascii(struct seq_file *m,
>>> /* skip ':' and '\0' */
>>> buf_ptr += 2;
>>> buflen -= buf_ptr - field_data->data;
>>> + /* fall through */
>>> case DATA_FMT_DIGEST:
>>> case DATA_FMT_HEX:
>>> if (!buflen)
>>> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>>> index fa98394a40d0..127aa6c58e34 100644
>>> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>>> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>>> @@ -3391,13 +3391,12 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
>>> */
>>> final = &smack_known_star;
>>> /*
>>> - * Fall through.
>>> - *
>>> * If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
>>> * but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
>>> * to set mount options simulate setting the
>>> * superblock default.
>>> */
>>> + /* Fall through */
>>> default:
>>> /*
>>> * This isn't an understood special case.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] security: mark expected switch fall-throughs
2019-01-25 3:47 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
@ 2019-01-31 19:58 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-01-31 20:12 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2019-01-31 19:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Gustavo A. R. Silva, Casey Schaufler, John Johansen,
James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Dmitry Kasatkin, James Morris
Cc: linux-security-module, linux-kernel, linux-integrity
[Cc'ing James Morris]
On Thu, 2019-01-24 at 21:47 -0600, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
> >>> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
> >>
> >> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> >>
>
> BTW, thanks, Casey. I'll take this in my tree.
This patch touches multiple LSMs and IMA. As James has already picked
up similar patches, which are in his next-general branch, perhaps he
could also pick up an updated version of this one.
Mimi
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] security: mark expected switch fall-throughs
2019-01-31 19:58 ` Mimi Zohar
@ 2019-01-31 20:12 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2019-01-31 20:20 ` Mimi Zohar
0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread
From: Gustavo A. R. Silva @ 2019-01-31 20:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mimi Zohar, Casey Schaufler, John Johansen, James Morris,
Serge E. Hallyn, Dmitry Kasatkin
Cc: linux-security-module, linux-kernel, linux-integrity
Mimi,
On 1/31/19 1:58 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> [Cc'ing James Morris]
>
> On Thu, 2019-01-24 at 21:47 -0600, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
>>>>
>>>> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>>>>
>>
>> BTW, thanks, Casey. I'll take this in my tree.
>
> This patch touches multiple LSMs and IMA. As James has already picked
> up similar patches, which are in his next-general branch, perhaps he
> could also pick up an updated version of this one.
>
Yeah. I can either integrate your recent fix and respin if you don't mind,
or remove the fall-through comment and wait for James to take both patches,
yours and mine.
What do you prefer?
Thanks
--
Gustavo
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] security: mark expected switch fall-throughs
2019-01-31 20:12 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
@ 2019-01-31 20:20 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-01-31 20:30 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2019-01-31 20:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Gustavo A. R. Silva, Casey Schaufler, John Johansen,
James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Dmitry Kasatkin
Cc: linux-security-module, linux-kernel, linux-integrity
On Thu, 2019-01-31 at 14:12 -0600, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
> Mimi,
>
> On 1/31/19 1:58 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > [Cc'ing James Morris]
> >
> > On Thu, 2019-01-24 at 21:47 -0600, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
> >
> >>>>> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
> >>>>
> >>>> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> >>>>
> >>
> >> BTW, thanks, Casey. I'll take this in my tree.
> >
> > This patch touches multiple LSMs and IMA. As James has already picked
> > up similar patches, which are in his next-general branch, perhaps he
> > could also pick up an updated version of this one.
> >
>
> Yeah. I can either integrate your recent fix and respin if you don't mind,
> or remove the fall-through comment and wait for James to take both patches,
> yours and mine.
>
> What do you prefer?
Either way is fine.
Mimi
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] security: mark expected switch fall-throughs
2019-01-31 20:20 ` Mimi Zohar
@ 2019-01-31 20:30 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2019-02-01 23:28 ` James Morris
0 siblings, 1 reply; 11+ messages in thread
From: Gustavo A. R. Silva @ 2019-01-31 20:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mimi Zohar, Casey Schaufler, John Johansen, James Morris,
Serge E. Hallyn, Dmitry Kasatkin
Cc: linux-security-module, linux-kernel, linux-integrity
On 1/31/19 2:20 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>>>
>>> This patch touches multiple LSMs and IMA. As James has already picked
>>> up similar patches, which are in his next-general branch, perhaps he
>>> could also pick up an updated version of this one.
>>>
>>
>> Yeah. I can either integrate your recent fix and respin if you don't mind,
>> or remove the fall-through comment and wait for James to take both patches,
>> yours and mine.
>>
>> What do you prefer?
>
> Either way is fine.
>
OK. Well, I think in this case less is more, so I will integrate our changes
into a single patch.
Thanks for your feedback.
--
Gustavo
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] security: mark expected switch fall-throughs
2019-01-31 20:30 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
@ 2019-02-01 23:28 ` James Morris
0 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2019-02-01 23:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Gustavo A. R. Silva
Cc: Mimi Zohar, Casey Schaufler, John Johansen, Serge E. Hallyn,
Dmitry Kasatkin, linux-security-module, linux-kernel,
linux-integrity
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 721 bytes --]
On Thu, 31 Jan 2019, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
>
>
> On 1/31/19 2:20 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>
> >>>
> >>> This patch touches multiple LSMs and IMA. As James has already picked
> >>> up similar patches, which are in his next-general branch, perhaps he
> >>> could also pick up an updated version of this one.
> >>>
> >>
> >> Yeah. I can either integrate your recent fix and respin if you don't mind,
> >> or remove the fall-through comment and wait for James to take both patches,
> >> yours and mine.
> >>
> >> What do you prefer?
> >
> > Either way is fine.
> >
>
> OK. Well, I think in this case less is more, so I will integrate our changes
> into a single patch.
WFM
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] security: mark expected switch fall-throughs
2019-01-25 2:56 [PATCH] security: mark expected switch fall-throughs Gustavo A. R. Silva
2019-01-25 3:13 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-01-25 6:55 ` John Johansen
2019-01-25 12:37 ` Mimi Zohar
2 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2019-01-25 6:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Gustavo A. R. Silva, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Mimi Zohar,
Dmitry Kasatkin, Casey Schaufler
Cc: linux-security-module, linux-kernel, linux-integrity
On 1/24/19 6:56 PM, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
> In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch
> cases where we are expecting to fall through.
>
> This patch fixes the following warnings:
>
> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c:116:26: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
> security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c:85:10: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:940:18: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:943:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:972:21: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:974:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c:3391:9: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
> security/apparmor/domain.c:569:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
>
> Warning level 3 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=3
>
> This patch is part of the ongoing efforts to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough.
>
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
looks good to me
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> ---
> security/apparmor/domain.c | 2 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 1 +
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 ++++
> security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 1 +
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 3 +--
> 5 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
> index 726910bba84b..c7c619578095 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
> @@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile,
> stack = NULL;
> break;
> }
> - /* fall through to X_NAME */
> + /* fall through - to X_NAME */
> case AA_X_NAME:
> if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD)
> /* released by caller */
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> index a2baa85ea2f5..57daf30fb7d4 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> break;
> case CREDS_CHECK:
> iint->ima_creds_status = status;
> + /* fall through */
> case FILE_CHECK:
> case POST_SETATTR:
> iint->ima_file_status = status;
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 8bc8a1c8cb3f..122797023bdb 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -938,10 +938,12 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> case Opt_uid_gt:
> case Opt_euid_gt:
> entry->uid_op = &uid_gt;
> + /* fall through */
> case Opt_uid_lt:
> case Opt_euid_lt:
> if ((token == Opt_uid_lt) || (token == Opt_euid_lt))
> entry->uid_op = &uid_lt;
> + /* fall through */
> case Opt_uid_eq:
> case Opt_euid_eq:
> uid_token = (token == Opt_uid_eq) ||
> @@ -970,9 +972,11 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> break;
> case Opt_fowner_gt:
> entry->fowner_op = &uid_gt;
> + /* fall through */
> case Opt_fowner_lt:
> if (token == Opt_fowner_lt)
> entry->fowner_op = &uid_lt;
> + /* fall through */
> case Opt_fowner_eq:
> ima_log_string_op(ab, "fowner", args[0].from,
> entry->fowner_op);
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
> index 43752002c222..513b457ae900 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
> @@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ static void ima_show_template_data_ascii(struct seq_file *m,
> /* skip ':' and '\0' */
> buf_ptr += 2;
> buflen -= buf_ptr - field_data->data;
> + /* fall through */
> case DATA_FMT_DIGEST:
> case DATA_FMT_HEX:
> if (!buflen)
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index fa98394a40d0..127aa6c58e34 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -3391,13 +3391,12 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
> */
> final = &smack_known_star;
> /*
> - * Fall through.
> - *
> * If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
> * but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
> * to set mount options simulate setting the
> * superblock default.
> */
> + /* Fall through */
> default:
> /*
> * This isn't an understood special case.
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] security: mark expected switch fall-throughs
2019-01-25 2:56 [PATCH] security: mark expected switch fall-throughs Gustavo A. R. Silva
2019-01-25 3:13 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-01-25 6:55 ` John Johansen
@ 2019-01-25 12:37 ` Mimi Zohar
2 siblings, 0 replies; 11+ messages in thread
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2019-01-25 12:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Gustavo A. R. Silva, John Johansen, James Morris,
Serge E. Hallyn, Dmitry Kasatkin, Casey Schaufler,
Matthew Garrett
Cc: linux-security-module, linux-kernel, linux-integrity
On Thu, 2019-01-24 at 20:56 -0600, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
> In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch
> cases where we are expecting to fall through.
>
> This patch fixes the following warnings:
>
> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c:116:26: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
> security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c:85:10: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:940:18: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:943:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:972:21: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:974:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c:3391:9: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
> security/apparmor/domain.c:569:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
>
> Warning level 3 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=3
>
> This patch is part of the ongoing efforts to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough.
>
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Other than the one question in ima_appraise.c, the rest of the IMA
changes are fine.
Mimi
> ---
> security/apparmor/domain.c | 2 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 1 +
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 ++++
> security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 1 +
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 3 +--
> 5 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
> index 726910bba84b..c7c619578095 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
> @@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile,
> stack = NULL;
> break;
> }
> - /* fall through to X_NAME */
> + /* fall through - to X_NAME */
> case AA_X_NAME:
> if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD)
> /* released by caller */
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> index a2baa85ea2f5..57daf30fb7d4 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> break;
> case CREDS_CHECK:
> iint->ima_creds_status = status;
> + /* fall through */
Matthew, is this right?
> case FILE_CHECK:
> case POST_SETATTR:
> iint->ima_file_status = status;
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 8bc8a1c8cb3f..122797023bdb 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -938,10 +938,12 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> case Opt_uid_gt:
> case Opt_euid_gt:
> entry->uid_op = &uid_gt;
> + /* fall through */
> case Opt_uid_lt:
> case Opt_euid_lt:
> if ((token == Opt_uid_lt) || (token == Opt_euid_lt))
> entry->uid_op = &uid_lt;
> + /* fall through */
> case Opt_uid_eq:
> case Opt_euid_eq:
> uid_token = (token == Opt_uid_eq) ||
> @@ -970,9 +972,11 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> break;
> case Opt_fowner_gt:
> entry->fowner_op = &uid_gt;
> + /* fall through */
> case Opt_fowner_lt:
> if (token == Opt_fowner_lt)
> entry->fowner_op = &uid_lt;
> + /* fall through */
> case Opt_fowner_eq:
> ima_log_string_op(ab, "fowner", args[0].from,
> entry->fowner_op);
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
> index 43752002c222..513b457ae900 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
> @@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ static void ima_show_template_data_ascii(struct seq_file *m,
> /* skip ':' and '\0' */
> buf_ptr += 2;
> buflen -= buf_ptr - field_data->data;
> + /* fall through */
> case DATA_FMT_DIGEST:
> case DATA_FMT_HEX:
> if (!buflen)
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index fa98394a40d0..127aa6c58e34 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -3391,13 +3391,12 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
> */
> final = &smack_known_star;
> /*
> - * Fall through.
> - *
> * If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
> * but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
> * to set mount options simulate setting the
> * superblock default.
> */
> + /* Fall through */
> default:
> /*
> * This isn't an understood special case.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 11+ messages in thread