linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Linux List Kernel Mailing <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>,
	Changbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2 v2] kprobe: Do not use uaccess functions to access kernel memory that can fault
Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 15:52:40 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190225145240.GB32534@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190225083309.GI32477@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>

On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 09:33:09AM +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Sun, Feb 24, 2019 at 09:26:45AM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> > PeterZ, do you remember the particular use case that triggered that
> > commit 7c4788950ba5 ("x86/uaccess, sched/preempt: Verify access_ok()
> > context")?
> 
> This one, if I'm not mistaken.
> 
> ---
> 
> commit ae31fe51a3cceaa0cabdb3058f69669ecb47f12e
> Author: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
> Date:   Tue Nov 22 10:57:42 2016 +0100
> 
>     perf/x86: Restore TASK_SIZE check on frame pointer
>     
>     The following commit:
>     
>       75925e1ad7f5 ("perf/x86: Optimize stack walk user accesses")
>     
>     ... switched from copy_from_user_nmi() to __copy_from_user_nmi() with a manual
>     access_ok() check.
>     
>     Unfortunately, copy_from_user_nmi() does an explicit check against TASK_SIZE,
>     whereas the access_ok() uses whatever the current address limit of the task is.
>     
>     We are getting NMIs when __probe_kernel_read() has switched to KERNEL_DS, and
>     then see vmalloc faults when we access what looks like pointers into vmalloc
>     space:

Also note that this was before we did:

commit 88b0193d9418c00340e45e0a913a0813bc6c8c96
Author: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Date:   Tue May 9 18:00:04 2017 +0100

    perf/callchain: Force USER_DS when invoking perf_callchain_user()
    
    Perf can generate and record a user callchain in response to a synchronous
    request, such as a tracepoint firing. If this happens under set_fs(KERNEL_DS),
    then we can end up walking the user stack (and dereferencing/saving whatever we
    find there) without the protections usually afforded by checks such as
    access_ok.
    
    Rather than play whack-a-mole with each architecture's stack unwinding
    implementation, fix the root of the problem by ensuring that we force USER_DS
    when invoking perf_callchain_user from the perf core.
    
    Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
    Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
    Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
    Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
    Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
    Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
    Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
    Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

diff --git a/kernel/events/callchain.c b/kernel/events/callchain.c
index c04917cad1bf..1b2be63c8528 100644
--- a/kernel/events/callchain.c
+++ b/kernel/events/callchain.c
@@ -229,12 +229,18 @@ get_perf_callchain(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 init_nr, bool kernel, bool user,
 		}
 
 		if (regs) {
+			mm_segment_t fs;
+
 			if (crosstask)
 				goto exit_put;
 
 			if (add_mark)
 				perf_callchain_store_context(&ctx, PERF_CONTEXT_USER);
+
+			fs = get_fs();
+			set_fs(USER_DS);
 			perf_callchain_user(&ctx, regs);
+			set_fs(fs);
 		}
 	}
 

  reply	other threads:[~2019-02-25 14:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 85+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-02-15 17:47 [PATCH 0/2 v2] [GIT PULL (take two)] tracing: Two more fixes Steven Rostedt
2019-02-15 17:47 ` [PATCH 1/2 v2] kprobe: Do not use uaccess functions to access kernel memory that can fault Steven Rostedt
2019-02-15 17:55   ` Linus Torvalds
2019-02-15 22:15     ` Steven Rostedt
2019-02-15 23:49       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-16  0:19         ` Steven Rostedt
2019-02-16  1:32           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-16  2:08             ` Steven Rostedt
2019-02-16  2:14               ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-16  2:21                 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-02-18 17:58           ` Linus Torvalds
2019-02-18 18:23             ` Linus Torvalds
2019-02-19 16:18               ` Steven Rostedt
2019-02-19 18:43                 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-02-19 19:03                   ` Steven Rostedt
2019-02-20  8:10                     ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-20 13:57                       ` Jann Horn
2019-02-20 14:47                         ` Steven Rostedt
2019-02-20 15:08                         ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-20 14:49                       ` Steven Rostedt
2019-02-20 16:04                         ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-20 16:42                           ` Steven Rostedt
2019-02-21  7:37                             ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-22  8:27                         ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-22  8:35                           ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-22 17:43                             ` Linus Torvalds
2019-02-22 17:48                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-22 18:28                                 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-02-22 19:52                                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-22 19:27                               ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-02-22 19:30                                 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-02-22 19:34                                   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-02-22 19:39                                     ` Steven Rostedt
2019-02-22 19:55                                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-22 21:43                                       ` Jann Horn
2019-02-22 22:08                                         ` Nadav Amit
2019-02-22 22:17                                           ` Jann Horn
2019-02-22 22:21                                             ` Nadav Amit
2019-02-22 22:39                                               ` Nadav Amit
2019-02-22 23:02                                                 ` Jann Horn
2019-02-22 23:22                                                   ` Nadav Amit
2019-02-22 23:59                                                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-23  0:03                                                     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-02-23  0:15                                                     ` Nadav Amit
2019-02-24 19:35                                                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-25 13:36                                                     ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-22 21:20                                 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-02-22 21:38                                   ` David Miller
2019-02-22 21:59                                     ` Linus Torvalds
2019-02-22 22:51                                       ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-02-22 23:11                                         ` Jann Horn
2019-02-22 23:16                                           ` David Miller
2019-02-22 23:16                                         ` Linus Torvalds
2019-02-22 23:56                                           ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-02-23  0:08                                             ` Linus Torvalds
2019-02-23  2:28                                               ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-02-23  2:32                                                 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-02-23  3:02                                                 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-02-23  4:51                                             ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-26  3:57                                       ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-02-26 15:24                                 ` Joel Fernandes
2019-02-28 12:29                                   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-28 15:18                                     ` Joel Fernandes
2019-02-23  3:47                               ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-24  0:44                                 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-02-24  4:38                                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-24 15:17                                     ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-24 17:26                                       ` Linus Torvalds
2019-02-25  2:40                                         ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-25  4:49                                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-25  8:09                                             ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-25 16:40                                               ` Steven Rostedt
2019-02-26  1:35                                                 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-25  8:33                                         ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-02-25 14:52                                           ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2019-02-25 16:48                                     ` Kees Cook
2019-02-25 16:58                                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-25 17:07                                         ` Kees Cook
2019-02-21  7:52   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-21 14:36     ` Steven Rostedt
2019-02-21 15:58       ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-21 16:16         ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-21 16:32           ` Steven Rostedt
2019-02-23 14:48     ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-02-15 17:47 ` [PATCH 2/2 v2] tracing: Fix number of entries in trace header Steven Rostedt

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20190225145240.GB32534@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net \
    --to=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=changbin.du@gmail.com \
    --cc=jannh@google.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=mhiramat@kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@kernel.org \
    --cc=rostedt@goodmis.org \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).