From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] security/keys/trusted: Allow operation without hardware TPM
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 15:54:51 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190321135451.GD4603@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <155295271345.1945351.6465460744078693578.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>
On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 04:45:13PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> Rather than fail initialization of the trusted.ko module, arrange for
> the module to load, but rely on trusted_instantiate() to fail
> trusted-key operations.
>
> Fixes: 240730437deb ("KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure...")
> Cc: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
It should check for chip in each function that uses TPM now that
the code does not rely on default chip. Otherwise, the semantics
are kind of inconsistent.
/Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-03-21 13:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-03-18 23:45 [PATCH] security/keys/trusted: Allow operation without hardware TPM Dan Williams
2019-03-19 0:24 ` James Bottomley
2019-03-19 0:30 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-19 0:56 ` James Bottomley
2019-03-19 1:34 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-20 1:55 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-20 2:19 ` James Bottomley
2019-03-19 22:56 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-19 23:01 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-21 13:54 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2019-03-21 14:26 ` Roberto Sassu
2019-03-21 16:30 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-21 17:45 ` Roberto Sassu
2019-03-22 10:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-22 15:24 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-25 14:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-25 14:50 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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