From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] security/keys/trusted: Allow operation without hardware TPM
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 15:26:38 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <809e827b-fdbe-fbb8-8acf-2878ae9f7777@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190321135451.GD4603@linux.intel.com>
On 3/21/2019 2:54 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 04:45:13PM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
>> Rather than fail initialization of the trusted.ko module, arrange for
>> the module to load, but rely on trusted_instantiate() to fail
>> trusted-key operations.
>>
>> Fixes: 240730437deb ("KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure...")
>> Cc: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
>> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
>> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
>> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
>> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
>> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
>
> It should check for chip in each function that uses TPM now that
> the code does not rely on default chip. Otherwise, the semantics
> are kind of inconsistent.
If no other TPM function can be used before a successful key
instantiate, checking for a chip only in trusted_instantiate() seems
sufficient. Then, the same chip will be used by all TPM functions until
module unloading, since we incremented the reference count.
I would suggest to move the tpm_default_chip() and init_digests() calls
to trusted_instantiate() to restore the old behavior of init_trusted().
trusted_instantiate() should look like:
---
if (!chip) {
chip = tpm_default_chip();
if (!chip)
return -ENODEV;
}
if (!digests) {
ret = init_digests();
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
---
Roberto
> /Jarkko
>
--
HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Duesseldorf GmbH, HRB 56063
Managing Director: Bo PENG, Jian LI, Yanli SHI
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-03-21 14:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-03-18 23:45 [PATCH] security/keys/trusted: Allow operation without hardware TPM Dan Williams
2019-03-19 0:24 ` James Bottomley
2019-03-19 0:30 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-19 0:56 ` James Bottomley
2019-03-19 1:34 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-20 1:55 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-20 2:19 ` James Bottomley
2019-03-19 22:56 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-19 23:01 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-21 13:54 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-21 14:26 ` Roberto Sassu [this message]
2019-03-21 16:30 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-21 17:45 ` Roberto Sassu
2019-03-22 10:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-22 15:24 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-25 14:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-25 14:50 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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