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From: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
To: jmorris@namei.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com,
	Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>,
	linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org,
	Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH 16/27] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 15:09:43 -0700
Message-ID: <20190325220954.29054-17-matthewgarrett@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190325220954.29054-1-matthewgarrett@google.com>

From: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>

ACPI provides an error injection mechanism, EINJ, for debugging and testing
the ACPI Platform Error Interface (APEI) and other RAS features.  If
supported by the firmware, ACPI specification 5.0 and later provide for a
way to specify a physical memory address to which to inject the error.

Injecting errors through EINJ can produce errors which to the platform are
indistinguishable from real hardware errors.  This can have undesirable
side-effects, such as causing the platform to mark hardware as needing
replacement.

While it does not provide a method to load unauthenticated privileged code,
the effect of these errors may persist across reboots and affect trust in
the underlying hardware, so disable error injection through EINJ if
the kernel is locked down.

Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
---
 drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c
index fcccbfdbdd1a..9fe6bbab2e7d 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c
@@ -518,6 +518,9 @@ static int einj_error_inject(u32 type, u32 flags, u64 param1, u64 param2,
 	int rc;
 	u64 base_addr, size;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down("ACPI error injection"))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	/* If user manually set "flags", make sure it is legal */
 	if (flags && (flags &
 		~(SETWA_FLAGS_APICID|SETWA_FLAGS_MEM|SETWA_FLAGS_PCIE_SBDF)))
-- 
2.21.0.392.gf8f6787159e-goog


  parent reply index

Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-03-25 22:09 [PULL REQUEST] Lockdown patches for 5.2 Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26  5:30   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 02/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 03/27] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 04/27] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 05/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 06/27] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 08/27] hibernate: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 09/27] uswsusp: " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 10/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 11/27] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 23:40   ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 13/27] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 14/27] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 15/27] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 17/27] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 18/27] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 19/27] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 20/27] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 23:35   ` Steven Rostedt
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 21/27] Lock down /proc/kcore Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 22/27] Lock down kprobes Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 12:29   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-26 17:41     ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 22:47       ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 23/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 23:42   ` Stephen Hemminger
2019-03-25 23:59     ` Stephen Hemminger
2019-03-26  0:00     ` Daniel Borkmann
2019-03-26 13:54       ` Jordan Glover
2019-03-26  0:10     ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-03-26 18:57       ` James Morris
2019-03-26 19:22         ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-03-28  3:15           ` James Morris
2019-03-28 18:07             ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-28 19:23               ` James Morris
2019-03-28 20:08                 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 20:19         ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 24/27] Lock down perf Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 25/27] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26  0:31   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-03-26  0:38     ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26  0:43       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 26/27] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 27/27] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 15:33   ` Mimi Zohar

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