From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 22:30:22 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CACdnJuuEUBRABkfX_DhBg67CWr6zKAu_ZvWYq3kN52GTemrdCQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190325220954.29054-2-matthewgarrett@google.com>
Based on Andy's feedback, I'm going to rework this slightly and
re-send tomorrow.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-03-26 5:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-03-25 22:09 [PULL REQUEST] Lockdown patches for 5.2 Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 5:30 ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 02/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 03/27] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 04/27] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 05/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 06/27] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 08/27] hibernate: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 09/27] uswsusp: " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 10/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 11/27] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 23:40 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 13/27] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 14/27] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 15/27] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 16/27] acpi: Disable APEI error injection " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 17/27] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 18/27] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 19/27] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 20/27] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 23:35 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 21/27] Lock down /proc/kcore Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 22/27] Lock down kprobes Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 12:29 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-26 17:41 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 22:47 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 23/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 23:42 ` Stephen Hemminger
2019-03-25 23:59 ` Stephen Hemminger
2019-03-26 0:00 ` Daniel Borkmann
2019-03-26 13:54 ` Jordan Glover
2019-03-26 0:10 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-03-26 18:57 ` James Morris
2019-03-26 19:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-03-28 3:15 ` James Morris
2019-03-28 18:07 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-28 19:23 ` James Morris
2019-03-28 20:08 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 20:19 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 24/27] Lock down perf Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 25/27] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 0:31 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-03-26 0:38 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 0:43 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 26/27] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 27/27] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 15:33 ` Mimi Zohar
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2019-03-06 23:58 [PULL REQUEST] Kernel lockdown patches for 5.2 Matthew Garrett
2019-03-06 23:58 ` [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 21:28 [PULL REQUEST] Lock down patches Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 22:44 ` [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:10 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-02-28 23:11 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-10-19 14:50 [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-10-19 14:50 ` [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells
2017-10-20 23:19 ` James Morris
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