[PATCH 5.0 00/52] 5.0.5-stable review

[PATCH 5.0 00/52] 5.0.5-stable review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.0.5 release.
There are 52 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu Mar 28 04:26:38 UTC 2019.
Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.0.5-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.0.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    Linux 5.0.5-rc1

Hui Wang <hui.wang@canonical.com>
    ALSA: hda - Enforces runtime_resume after S3 and S4 for each codec

Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
    ALSA: hda - Record the current power state before suspend/resume calls

Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
    mm, mempolicy: fix uninit memory access

Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
    locking/lockdep: Add debug_locks check in __lock_downgrade()

Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
    x86/unwind: Add hardcoded ORC entry for NULL

Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
    x86/unwind: Handle NULL pointer calls better in frame unwinder

Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com>
    loop: access lo_backing_file only when the loop device is Lo_bound

Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
    netfilter: ebtables: remove BUGPRINT messages

Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
    aio: simplify - and fix - fget/fput for io_submit()

Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
    f2fs: fix to avoid deadlock of atomic file operations

Myungho Jung <mhjungk@gmail.com>
    RDMA/cma: Rollback source IP address if failing to acquire device

Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
    drm/vkms: Fix flush_work() without INIT_WORK().

Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
    Bluetooth: hci_ldisc: Postpone HCI_UART_PROTO_READY bit set in hci_uart_set_proto()

Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>
    Bluetooth: hci_ldisc: Initialize hci_dev before open()

Myungho Jung <mhjungk@gmail.com>
    Bluetooth: Fix decrementing reference count twice in releasing socket

Myungho Jung <mhjungk@gmail.com>
    Bluetooth: hci_uart: Check if socket buffer is ERR_PTR in h4_recv_buf()

Hans Verkuil <hverkuil@xs4all.nl>
    media: v4l2-ctrls.c/uvc: zero v4l2_event

zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
    ext4: brelse all indirect buffer in ext4_ind_remove_space()

Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
    ext4: fix data corruption caused by unaligned direct AIO

Jiufei Xue <jiufei.xue@linux.alibaba.com>
    ext4: fix NULL pointer dereference while journal is aborted

Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
    ALSA: ac97: Fix of-node refcount unbalance

Hui Wang <hui.wang@canonical.com>
    ALSA: hda - Don't trigger jackpoll_work in azx_resume

Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
    SMB3: Fix SMB3.1.1 guest mounts to Samba

Atish Patra <atish.patra@wdc.com>
    clocksource/drivers/riscv: Fix clocksource mask

Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
    irqchip/gic-v3-its: Fix comparison logic in lpi_range_cmp

Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
    objtool: Move objtool_file struct off the stack

Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
    perf probe: Fix getting the kernel map

Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
    cifs: allow guest mounts to work for smb3.11

Chen Jie <chenjie6@huawei.com>
    futex: Ensure that futex address is aligned in handle_futex_death()

Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
    scsi: ibmvscsi: Fix empty event pool access during host removal

Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
    scsi: ibmvscsi: Protect ibmvscsi_head from concurrent modificaiton

Quinn Tran <qtran@marvell.com>
    scsi: qla2xxx: Fix FC-AL connection target discovery

Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
    scsi: core: Avoid that a kernel warning appears during system resume

Yishai Hadas <yishaih@mellanox.com>
    net/mlx5: Fix DCT creation bad flow

Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
    powerpc/security: Fix spectre_v2 reporting

Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
    powerpc/vdso64: Fix CLOCK_MONOTONIC inconsistencies across Y2038

Archer Yan <ayan@wavecomp.com>
    MIPS: Fix kernel crash for R6 in jump label branch function

Yasha Cherikovsky <yasha.che3@gmail.com>
    MIPS: Ensure ELF appended dtb is relocated

Yifeng Li <tomli@tomli.me>
    mips: loongson64: lemote-2f: Add IRQF_NO_SUSPEND to "cascade" irqaction.

Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
    udf: Fix crash on IO error during truncate

Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
    libceph: wait for latest osdmap in ceph_monc_blacklist_add()

Robert Richter <rrichter@marvell.com>
    iommu/iova: Fix tracking of recently failed iova address

Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
    iommu/amd: fix sg->dma_address for sg->offset bigger than PAGE_SIZE

Deepak Rawat <drawat@vmware.com>
    drm/vmwgfx: Return 0 when gmrid::get_node runs out of ID's

Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
    drm/vmwgfx: Don't double-free the mode stored in par->set_mode

Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
    drm/amdgpu: fix invalid use of change_bit

Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
    mmc: renesas_sdhi: limit block count to 16 bit for old revisions

Alexander Shiyan <shc_work@mail.ru>
    mmc: mxcmmc: "Revert mmc: mxcmmc: handle highmem pages"

Daniel Drake <drake@endlessm.com>
    mmc: alcor: fix DMA reads

Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
    mmc: pxamci: fix enum type confusion

Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
    ALSA: firewire-motu: use 'version' field of unit directory to identify model

Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
    ALSA: hda - add Lenovo IdeaCentre B550 to the power_save_blacklist


-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                                      |   4 +-
 arch/mips/include/asm/jump_label.h            |   8 +-
 arch/mips/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S                |  12 ++-
 arch/mips/loongson64/lemote-2f/irq.c          |   2 +-
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/vdso_datapage.h      |   8 +-
 arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c                |  23 ++---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/vdso64/gettimeofday.S     |   4 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h                 |   6 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/unwind_frame.c                |  25 ++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c                  |  17 ++++
 drivers/block/loop.c                          |   2 +-
 drivers/bluetooth/h4_recv.h                   |   4 +
 drivers/bluetooth/hci_h4.c                    |   4 +
 drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c                 |  24 +++--
 drivers/clocksource/timer-riscv.c             |   5 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gmc_v9_0.c         |   2 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/vkms/vkms_crtc.c              |   1 +
 drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_fb.c            |  12 +--
 drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_gmrid_manager.c |   2 +-
 drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c                 |  13 ++-
 drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c                     |   7 +-
 drivers/iommu/iova.c                          |   5 +-
 drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c              |   2 +-
 drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_ctrl.c              |   2 +-
 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ctrls.c          |   2 +-
 drivers/mmc/host/alcor.c                      |  25 +++--
 drivers/mmc/host/mxcmmc.c                     |  16 +---
 drivers/mmc/host/pxamci.c                     |   2 +-
 drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_core.c          |   8 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/qp.c  |  66 +++++++------
 drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvscsi.c              |  23 ++++-
 drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_init.c               |   7 ++
 drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c                       |   6 +-
 fs/aio.c                                      |  72 ++++++--------
 fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c                             |  11 ++-
 fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.h                           |   2 +-
 fs/ext4/file.c                                |   2 +-
 fs/ext4/indirect.c                            |  12 ++-
 fs/f2fs/segment.c                             |  43 ++++++---
 fs/udf/truncate.c                             |   3 +
 include/linux/ceph/libceph.h                  |   2 +
 include/linux/fs.h                            |   8 +-
 kernel/futex.c                                |   4 +
 kernel/locking/lockdep.c                      |   3 +
 mm/mempolicy.c                                |   2 +-
 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c                      |   3 +-
 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c               | 131 ++++++++------------------
 net/ceph/ceph_common.c                        |  18 +++-
 net/ceph/mon_client.c                         |   9 ++
 sound/ac97/bus.c                              |   2 +-
 sound/firewire/motu/motu.c                    |  20 ++--
 sound/pci/hda/hda_codec.c                     |  57 ++++++++++-
 sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c                     |  14 +--
 tools/objtool/check.c                         |   3 +-
 tools/perf/util/probe-event.c                 |   6 +-
 55 files changed, 471 insertions(+), 305 deletions(-)

[PATCH 5.0 01/52] ALSA: hda - add Lenovo IdeaCentre B550 to the power_save_blacklist

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>

commit 721f1e6c1fd137e7e2053d8e103b666faaa2d50c upstream.

Another machine which does not like the power saving (noise):
  https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1689623

Also, reorder the Lenovo C50 entry to keep the table sorted.

Reported-by: hs.guimaraes@outlook.com
Signed-off-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c
+++ b/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c
@@ -2144,10 +2144,12 @@ static struct snd_pci_quirk power_save_b
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x8086, 0x2057, "Intel NUC5i7RYB", 0),
 	/* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1520902 */
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x8086, 0x2068, "Intel NUC7i3BNB", 0),
-	/* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1572975 */
-	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x36a7, "Lenovo C50 All in one", 0),
 	/* https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198611 */
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x2227, "Lenovo X1 Carbon 3rd Gen", 0),
+	/* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1689623 */
+	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x367b, "Lenovo IdeaCentre B550", 0),
+	/* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1572975 */
+	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x36a7, "Lenovo C50 All in one", 0),
 	{}
 };
 #endif /* CONFIG_PM */

[PATCH 5.0 02/52] ALSA: firewire-motu: use version field of unit directory to identify model

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>

commit 2d012c65a9ca26a0ef87ea0a42f1653dd37155f5 upstream.

Current ALSA firewire-motu driver uses the value of 'model' field
of unit directory in configuration ROM for modalias for MOTU
FireWire models. However, as long as I checked, Pre8 and
828mk3(Hybrid) have the same value for the field (=0x100800).

unit            | version   | model
--------------- | --------- | ----------
828mkII         | 0x000003  | 0x101800
Traveler        | 0x000009  | 0x107800
Pre8            | 0x00000f  | 0x100800 <-
828mk3(FW)      | 0x000015  | 0x106800
AudioExpress    | 0x000033  | 0x104800
828mk3(Hybrid)  | 0x000035  | 0x100800 <-

When updating firmware for MOTU 8pre FireWire from v1.0.0 to v1.0.3,
I got change of the value from 0x100800 to 0x103800. On the other
hand, the value of 'version' field is fixed to 0x00000f. As a quick
glance, the higher 12 bits of the value of 'version' field represent
firmware version, while the lower 12 bits is unknown.

By induction, the value of 'version' field represents actual model.

This commit changes modalias to match the value of 'version' field,
instead of 'model' field. For degug, long name of added sound card
includes hexadecimal value of 'model' field.

Fixes: 6c5e1ac0e144 ("ALSA: firewire-motu: add support for Motu Traveler")
Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 sound/firewire/motu/motu.c |   20 ++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/sound/firewire/motu/motu.c
+++ b/sound/firewire/motu/motu.c
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ static void name_card(struct snd_motu *m
 	fw_csr_iterator_init(&it, motu->unit->directory);
 	while (fw_csr_iterator_next(&it, &key, &val)) {
 		switch (key) {
-		case CSR_VERSION:
+		case CSR_MODEL:
 			version = val;
 			break;
 		}
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static void name_card(struct snd_motu *m
 	strcpy(motu->card->shortname, motu->spec->name);
 	strcpy(motu->card->mixername, motu->spec->name);
 	snprintf(motu->card->longname, sizeof(motu->card->longname),
-		 "MOTU %s (version:%d), GUID %08x%08x at %s, S%d",
+		 "MOTU %s (version:%06x), GUID %08x%08x at %s, S%d",
 		 motu->spec->name, version,
 		 fw_dev->config_rom[3], fw_dev->config_rom[4],
 		 dev_name(&motu->unit->device), 100 << fw_dev->max_speed);
@@ -237,20 +237,20 @@ static const struct snd_motu_spec motu_a
 #define SND_MOTU_DEV_ENTRY(model, data)			\
 {							\
 	.match_flags	= IEEE1394_MATCH_VENDOR_ID |	\
-			  IEEE1394_MATCH_MODEL_ID |	\
-			  IEEE1394_MATCH_SPECIFIER_ID,	\
+			  IEEE1394_MATCH_SPECIFIER_ID |	\
+			  IEEE1394_MATCH_VERSION,	\
 	.vendor_id	= OUI_MOTU,			\
-	.model_id	= model,			\
 	.specifier_id	= OUI_MOTU,			\
+	.version	= model,			\
 	.driver_data	= (kernel_ulong_t)data,		\
 }
 
 static const struct ieee1394_device_id motu_id_table[] = {
-	SND_MOTU_DEV_ENTRY(0x101800, &motu_828mk2),
-	SND_MOTU_DEV_ENTRY(0x107800, &snd_motu_spec_traveler),
-	SND_MOTU_DEV_ENTRY(0x106800, &motu_828mk3),	/* FireWire only. */
-	SND_MOTU_DEV_ENTRY(0x100800, &motu_828mk3),	/* Hybrid. */
-	SND_MOTU_DEV_ENTRY(0x104800, &motu_audio_express),
+	SND_MOTU_DEV_ENTRY(0x000003, &motu_828mk2),
+	SND_MOTU_DEV_ENTRY(0x000009, &snd_motu_spec_traveler),
+	SND_MOTU_DEV_ENTRY(0x000015, &motu_828mk3),	/* FireWire only. */
+	SND_MOTU_DEV_ENTRY(0x000035, &motu_828mk3),	/* Hybrid. */
+	SND_MOTU_DEV_ENTRY(0x000033, &motu_audio_express),
 	{ }
 };
 MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(ieee1394, motu_id_table);

[PATCH 5.0 03/52] mmc: pxamci: fix enum type confusion

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

commit e60a582bcde01158a64ff948fb799f21f5d31a11 upstream.

clang points out several instances of mismatched types in this drivers,
all coming from a single declaration:

drivers/mmc/host/pxamci.c:193:15: error: implicit conversion from enumeration type 'enum dma_transfer_direction' to
      different enumeration type 'enum dma_data_direction' [-Werror,-Wenum-conversion]
                direction = DMA_DEV_TO_MEM;
                          ~ ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/mmc/host/pxamci.c:212:62: error: implicit conversion from enumeration type 'enum dma_data_direction' to
      different enumeration type 'enum dma_transfer_direction' [-Werror,-Wenum-conversion]
        tx = dmaengine_prep_slave_sg(chan, data->sg, host->dma_len, direction,

The behavior is correct, so this must be a simply typo from
dma_data_direction and dma_transfer_direction being similarly named
types with a similar purpose.

Fixes: 6464b7140951 ("mmc: pxamci: switch over to dmaengine use")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Robert Jarzmik <robert.jarzmik@free.fr>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/mmc/host/pxamci.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/mmc/host/pxamci.c
+++ b/drivers/mmc/host/pxamci.c
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ static void pxamci_dma_irq(void *param);
 static void pxamci_setup_data(struct pxamci_host *host, struct mmc_data *data)
 {
 	struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tx;
-	enum dma_data_direction direction;
+	enum dma_transfer_direction direction;
 	struct dma_slave_config	config;
 	struct dma_chan *chan;
 	unsigned int nob = data->blocks;

[PATCH 5.0 04/52] mmc: alcor: fix DMA reads

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daniel Drake <drake@endlessm.com>

commit 5ea47691bd99e1100707ec63364aff72324e2af4 upstream.

Setting max_blk_count to 1 here was causing the mmc block layer
to always use the MMC_READ_SINGLE_BLOCK command here, which the
driver does not DMA-accelerate.

Drop the max_blk_ settings here. The mmc host defaults suffice,
along with the max_segs and max_seg_size settings, which I have
now documented in more detail.

Now each MMC command reads 4 512-byte blocks, using DMA instead of
PIO. On my SD card, this increases read performance (measured with dd)
from 167kb/sec to 4.6mb/sec.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAD8Lp47L5T3jnAjBiPs1cQ+yFA3L6LJtgFvMETnBrY63-Zdi2g@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Drake <drake@endlessm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleksij Rempel <linux@rempel-privat.de>
Fixes: c5413ad815a6 ("mmc: add new Alcor Micro Cardreader SD/MMC driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/mmc/host/alcor.c |   25 +++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/mmc/host/alcor.c
+++ b/drivers/mmc/host/alcor.c
@@ -1044,14 +1044,27 @@ static void alcor_init_mmc(struct alcor_
 	mmc->caps2 = MMC_CAP2_NO_SDIO;
 	mmc->ops = &alcor_sdc_ops;
 
-	/* Hardware cannot do scatter lists */
+	/* The hardware does DMA data transfer of 4096 bytes to/from a single
+	 * buffer address. Scatterlists are not supported, but upon DMA
+	 * completion (signalled via IRQ), the original vendor driver does
+	 * then immediately set up another DMA transfer of the next 4096
+	 * bytes.
+	 *
+	 * This means that we need to handle the I/O in 4096 byte chunks.
+	 * Lacking a way to limit the sglist entries to 4096 bytes, we instead
+	 * impose that only one segment is provided, with maximum size 4096,
+	 * which also happens to be the minimum size. This means that the
+	 * single-entry sglist handled by this driver can be handed directly
+	 * to the hardware, nice and simple.
+	 *
+	 * Unfortunately though, that means we only do 4096 bytes I/O per
+	 * MMC command. A future improvement would be to make the driver
+	 * accept sg lists and entries of any size, and simply iterate
+	 * through them 4096 bytes at a time.
+	 */
 	mmc->max_segs = AU6601_MAX_DMA_SEGMENTS;
 	mmc->max_seg_size = AU6601_MAX_DMA_BLOCK_SIZE;
-
-	mmc->max_blk_size = mmc->max_seg_size;
-	mmc->max_blk_count = mmc->max_segs;
-
-	mmc->max_req_size = mmc->max_seg_size * mmc->max_segs;
+	mmc->max_req_size = mmc->max_seg_size;
 }
 
 static int alcor_pci_sdmmc_drv_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)

[PATCH 5.0 05/52] mmc: mxcmmc: "Revert mmc: mxcmmc: handle highmem pages"

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alexander Shiyan <shc_work@mail.ru>

commit 2b77158ffa92b820a0c5da9a3c6ead7aa069c71c upstream.

This reverts commit b189e7589f6d3411e85c6b7ae6eef158f08f388f.

Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address c8358000
pgd = efa405c3
[c8358000] *pgd=00000000
Internal error: Oops: 805 [#1] PREEMPT ARM
CPU: 0 PID: 711 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 4.20.0+ #30
Hardware name: Freescale i.MX27 (Device Tree Support)
Workqueue: events mxcmci_datawork
PC is at mxcmci_datawork+0xbc/0x2ac
LR is at mxcmci_datawork+0xac/0x2ac
pc : [<c04e33c8>]    lr : [<c04e33b8>]    psr: 60000013
sp : c6c93f08  ip : 24004180  fp : 00000008
r10: c8358000  r9 : c78b3e24  r8 : c6c92000
r7 : 00000000  r6 : c7bb8680  r5 : c7bb86d4  r4 : c78b3de0
r3 : 00002502  r2 : c090b2e0  r1 : 00000880  r0 : 00000000
Flags: nZCv  IRQs on  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment user
Control: 0005317f  Table: a68a8000  DAC: 00000055
Process kworker/0:2 (pid: 711, stack limit = 0x389543bc)
Stack: (0xc6c93f08 to 0xc6c94000)
3f00:                   c7bb86d4 00000000 00000000 c6cbfde0 c7bb86d4 c7ee4200
3f20: 00000000 c0907ea8 00000000 c7bb86d8 c0907ea8 c012077c c6cbfde0 c7bb86d4
3f40: c6cbfde0 c6c92000 c6cbfdf4 c09280ba c0907ea8 c090b2e0 c0907ebc c0120c18
3f60: c6cbfde0 00000000 00000000 c6cbb580 c7ba7c40 c7837edc c6cbb598 00000000
3f80: c6cbfde0 c01208f8 00000000 c01254fc c7ba7c40 c0125400 00000000 00000000
3fa0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 c01010d0 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
3fc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
3fe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000 00000000 00000000
[<c04e33c8>] (mxcmci_datawork) from [<c012077c>] (process_one_work+0x1f0/0x338)
[<c012077c>] (process_one_work) from [<c0120c18>] (worker_thread+0x320/0x474)
[<c0120c18>] (worker_thread) from [<c01254fc>] (kthread+0xfc/0x118)
[<c01254fc>] (kthread) from [<c01010d0>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x24)
Exception stack(0xc6c93fb0 to 0xc6c93ff8)
3fa0:                                     00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
3fc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
3fe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000
Code: e3500000 1a000059 e5153050 e5933038 (e48a3004)
---[ end trace 54ca629b75f0e737 ]---
note: kworker/0:2[711] exited with preempt_count 1

Signed-off-by: Alexander Shiyan <shc_work@mail.ru>
Fixes: b189e7589f6d ("mmc: mxcmmc: handle highmem pages")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/mmc/host/mxcmmc.c |   16 ++++------------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/mmc/host/mxcmmc.c
+++ b/drivers/mmc/host/mxcmmc.c
@@ -292,11 +292,8 @@ static void mxcmci_swap_buffers(struct m
 	struct scatterlist *sg;
 	int i;
 
-	for_each_sg(data->sg, sg, data->sg_len, i) {
-		void *buf = kmap_atomic(sg_page(sg) + sg->offset);
-		buffer_swap32(buf, sg->length);
-		kunmap_atomic(buf);
-	}
+	for_each_sg(data->sg, sg, data->sg_len, i)
+		buffer_swap32(sg_virt(sg), sg->length);
 }
 #else
 static inline void mxcmci_swap_buffers(struct mmc_data *data) {}
@@ -613,7 +610,6 @@ static int mxcmci_transfer_data(struct m
 {
 	struct mmc_data *data = host->req->data;
 	struct scatterlist *sg;
-	void *buf;
 	int stat, i;
 
 	host->data = data;
@@ -621,18 +617,14 @@ static int mxcmci_transfer_data(struct m
 
 	if (data->flags & MMC_DATA_READ) {
 		for_each_sg(data->sg, sg, data->sg_len, i) {
-			buf = kmap_atomic(sg_page(sg) + sg->offset);
-			stat = mxcmci_pull(host, buf, sg->length);
-			kunmap(buf);
+			stat = mxcmci_pull(host, sg_virt(sg), sg->length);
 			if (stat)
 				return stat;
 			host->datasize += sg->length;
 		}
 	} else {
 		for_each_sg(data->sg, sg, data->sg_len, i) {
-			buf = kmap_atomic(sg_page(sg) + sg->offset);
-			stat = mxcmci_push(host, buf, sg->length);
-			kunmap(buf);
+			stat = mxcmci_push(host, sg_virt(sg), sg->length);
 			if (stat)
 				return stat;
 			host->datasize += sg->length;

[PATCH 5.0 06/52] mmc: renesas_sdhi: limit block count to 16 bit for old revisions

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>

commit c9a9497ccef205ed4ed2e247011382627876d831 upstream.

R-Car Gen2 has two different SDHI incarnations in the same chip. The
older one does not support the recently introduced 32 bit register
access to the block count register. Make sure we use this feature only
after the first known version.

Thanks to the Renesas Testing team for this bug report!

Fixes: 5603731a15ef ("mmc: tmio: fix access width of Block Count Register")
Reported-by: Yoshihiro Shimoda <yoshihiro.shimoda.uh@renesas.com>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms+renesas@verge.net.au>
Tested-by: Phong Hoang <phong.hoang.wz@renesas.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_core.c |    8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_core.c
+++ b/drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_core.c
@@ -634,6 +634,7 @@ int renesas_sdhi_probe(struct platform_d
 	struct renesas_sdhi *priv;
 	struct resource *res;
 	int irq, ret, i;
+	u16 ver;
 
 	of_data = of_device_get_match_data(&pdev->dev);
 
@@ -766,12 +767,17 @@ int renesas_sdhi_probe(struct platform_d
 	if (ret)
 		goto efree;
 
+	ver = sd_ctrl_read16(host, CTL_VERSION);
+	/* GEN2_SDR104 is first known SDHI to use 32bit block count */
+	if (ver < SDHI_VER_GEN2_SDR104 && mmc_data->max_blk_count > U16_MAX)
+		mmc_data->max_blk_count = U16_MAX;
+
 	ret = tmio_mmc_host_probe(host);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto edisclk;
 
 	/* One Gen2 SDHI incarnation does NOT have a CBSY bit */
-	if (sd_ctrl_read16(host, CTL_VERSION) == SDHI_VER_GEN2_SDR50)
+	if (ver == SDHI_VER_GEN2_SDR50)
 		mmc_data->flags &= ~TMIO_MMC_HAVE_CBSY;
 
 	/* Enable tuning iff we have an SCC and a supported mode */

[PATCH 5.0 07/52] drm/amdgpu: fix invalid use of change_bit

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>

commit 72464382fc2d3673eb51f21a57f2c0a320c1552f upstream.

We only need to clear the bit in a 32bit integer.

This fixes a crah on ARM64 and PPC64LE caused by
"drm/amdgpu: update the vm invalidation engine layout V2"

Signed-off-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gmc_v9_0.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gmc_v9_0.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gmc_v9_0.c
@@ -738,7 +738,7 @@ static int gmc_v9_0_allocate_vm_inv_eng(
 		}
 
 		ring->vm_inv_eng = inv_eng - 1;
-		change_bit(inv_eng - 1, (unsigned long *)(&vm_inv_engs[vmhub]));
+		vm_inv_engs[vmhub] &= ~(1 << ring->vm_inv_eng);
 
 		dev_info(adev->dev, "ring %s uses VM inv eng %u on hub %u\n",
 			 ring->name, ring->vm_inv_eng, ring->funcs->vmhub);

[PATCH 5.0 08/52] drm/vmwgfx: Dont double-free the mode stored in par->set_mode

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>

commit c2d311553855395764e2e5bf401d987ba65c2056 upstream.

When calling vmw_fb_set_par(), the mode stored in par->set_mode gets free'd
twice. The first free is in vmw_fb_kms_detach(), the second is near the
end of vmw_fb_set_par() under the name of 'old_mode'. The mode-setting code
only works correctly if the mode doesn't actually change. Removing
'old_mode' in favor of using par->set_mode directly fixes the problem.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: a278724aa23c ("drm/vmwgfx: Implement fbdev on kms v2")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Deepak Rawat <drawat@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_fb.c |   12 +++---------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_fb.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_fb.c
@@ -564,11 +564,9 @@ static int vmw_fb_set_par(struct fb_info
 		0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
 		DRM_MODE_FLAG_NHSYNC | DRM_MODE_FLAG_PVSYNC)
 	};
-	struct drm_display_mode *old_mode;
 	struct drm_display_mode *mode;
 	int ret;
 
-	old_mode = par->set_mode;
 	mode = drm_mode_duplicate(vmw_priv->dev, &new_mode);
 	if (!mode) {
 		DRM_ERROR("Could not create new fb mode.\n");
@@ -579,11 +577,7 @@ static int vmw_fb_set_par(struct fb_info
 	mode->vdisplay = var->yres;
 	vmw_guess_mode_timing(mode);
 
-	if (old_mode && drm_mode_equal(old_mode, mode)) {
-		drm_mode_destroy(vmw_priv->dev, mode);
-		mode = old_mode;
-		old_mode = NULL;
-	} else if (!vmw_kms_validate_mode_vram(vmw_priv,
+	if (!vmw_kms_validate_mode_vram(vmw_priv,
 					mode->hdisplay *
 					DIV_ROUND_UP(var->bits_per_pixel, 8),
 					mode->vdisplay)) {
@@ -620,8 +614,8 @@ static int vmw_fb_set_par(struct fb_info
 	schedule_delayed_work(&par->local_work, 0);
 
 out_unlock:
-	if (old_mode)
-		drm_mode_destroy(vmw_priv->dev, old_mode);
+	if (par->set_mode)
+		drm_mode_destroy(vmw_priv->dev, par->set_mode);
 	par->set_mode = mode;
 
 	mutex_unlock(&par->bo_mutex);

[PATCH 5.0 09/52] drm/vmwgfx: Return 0 when gmrid::get_node runs out of IDs

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Deepak Rawat <drawat@vmware.com>

commit 4b9ce3a651a37c60527101db4451a315a8b9588f upstream.

If it's not a system error and get_node implementation accommodate the
buffer object then it should return 0 with memm::mm_node set to NULL.

v2: Test for id != -ENOMEM instead of id == -ENOSPC.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 4eb085e42fde ("drm/vmwgfx: Convert to new IDA API")
Signed-off-by: Deepak Rawat <drawat@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_gmrid_manager.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_gmrid_manager.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_gmrid_manager.c
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ static int vmw_gmrid_man_get_node(struct
 
 	id = ida_alloc_max(&gman->gmr_ida, gman->max_gmr_ids - 1, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (id < 0)
-		return id;
+		return (id != -ENOMEM ? 0 : id);
 
 	spin_lock(&gman->lock);
 

[PATCH 5.0 10/52] iommu/amd: fix sg->dma_address for sg->offset bigger than PAGE_SIZE

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>

commit 4e50ce03976fbc8ae995a000c4b10c737467beaa upstream.

Take into account that sg->offset can be bigger than PAGE_SIZE when
setting segment sg->dma_address. Otherwise sg->dma_address will point
at diffrent page, what makes DMA not possible with erros like this:

xhci_hcd 0000:38:00.3: AMD-Vi: Event logged [IO_PAGE_FAULT domain=0x0000 address=0x00000000fdaa70c0 flags=0x0020]
xhci_hcd 0000:38:00.3: AMD-Vi: Event logged [IO_PAGE_FAULT domain=0x0000 address=0x00000000fdaa7040 flags=0x0020]
xhci_hcd 0000:38:00.3: AMD-Vi: Event logged [IO_PAGE_FAULT domain=0x0000 address=0x00000000fdaa7080 flags=0x0020]
xhci_hcd 0000:38:00.3: AMD-Vi: Event logged [IO_PAGE_FAULT domain=0x0000 address=0x00000000fdaa7100 flags=0x0020]
xhci_hcd 0000:38:00.3: AMD-Vi: Event logged [IO_PAGE_FAULT domain=0x0000 address=0x00000000fdaa7000 flags=0x0020]

Additinally with wrong sg->dma_address unmap_sg will free wrong pages,
what what can cause crashes like this:

Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel: BUG: Bad page state in process cinnamon  pfn:39e8b1
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel: Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel: flags: 0x2ffff0000000000()
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel: raw: 02ffff0000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff00000301 0000000000000000
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel: raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel: page dumped because: nonzero _refcount
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel: Modules linked in: ccm fuse arc4 nct6775 hwmon_vid amdgpu nls_iso8859_1 nls_cp437 edac_mce_amd vfat fat kvm_amd ccp rng_core kvm mt76x0u mt76x0_common mt76x02_usb irqbypass mt76_usb mt76x02_lib mt76 crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul chash mac80211 amd_iommu_v2 ghash_clmulni_intel gpu_sched i2c_algo_bit ttm wmi_bmof snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic drm_kms_helper snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel drm snd_hda_codec aesni_intel snd_hda_core snd_hwdep aes_x86_64 crypto_simd snd_pcm cfg80211 cryptd mousedev snd_timer glue_helper pcspkr r8169 input_leds realtek agpgart libphy rfkill snd syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops soundcore sp5100_tco k10temp i2c_piix4 wmi evdev gpio_amdpt pinctrl_amd mac_hid pcc_cpufreq acpi_cpufreq sg ip_tables x_tables ext4(E) crc32c_generic(E) crc16(E) mbcache(E) jbd2(E) fscrypto(E) sd_mod(E) hid_generic(E) usbhid(E) hid(E) dm_mod(E) serio_raw(E) atkbd(E) libps2(E) crc32c_intel(E) ahci(E) libahci(E) libata(E) xhci_pci(E) xhci_hcd(E)
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  scsi_mod(E) i8042(E) serio(E) bcache(E) crc64(E)
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel: CPU: 2 PID: 896 Comm: cinnamon Tainted: G    B   W   E     4.20.12-arch1-1-custom #1
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel: Hardware name: To Be Filled By O.E.M. To Be Filled By O.E.M./B450M Pro4, BIOS P1.20 06/26/2018
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel: Call Trace:
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  dump_stack+0x5c/0x80
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  bad_page.cold.29+0x7f/0xb2
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  __free_pages_ok+0x2c0/0x2d0
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  skb_release_data+0x96/0x180
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  __kfree_skb+0xe/0x20
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  tcp_recvmsg+0x894/0xc60
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  ? reuse_swap_page+0x120/0x340
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  ? ptep_set_access_flags+0x23/0x30
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  inet_recvmsg+0x5b/0x100
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  __sys_recvfrom+0xc3/0x180
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  ? handle_mm_fault+0x10a/0x250
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  ? syscall_trace_enter+0x1d3/0x2d0
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  ? __audit_syscall_exit+0x22a/0x290
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x24/0x30
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x170
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-and-tested-by: Jan Viktorin <jan.viktorin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Fixes: 80187fd39dcb ('iommu/amd: Optimize map_sg and unmap_sg')
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c
@@ -2605,7 +2605,12 @@ static int map_sg(struct device *dev, st
 
 	/* Everything is mapped - write the right values into s->dma_address */
 	for_each_sg(sglist, s, nelems, i) {
-		s->dma_address += address + s->offset;
+		/*
+		 * Add in the remaining piece of the scatter-gather offset that
+		 * was masked out when we were determining the physical address
+		 * via (sg_phys(s) & PAGE_MASK) earlier.
+		 */
+		s->dma_address += address + (s->offset & ~PAGE_MASK);
 		s->dma_length   = s->length;
 	}
 

[PATCH 5.0 11/52] iommu/iova: Fix tracking of recently failed iova address

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Robert Richter <rrichter@marvell.com>

commit 80ef4464d5e27408685e609d389663aad46644b9 upstream.

If a 32 bit allocation request is too big to possibly succeed, it
early exits with a failure and then should never update max32_alloc_
size. This patch fixes current code, now the size is only updated if
the slow path failed while walking the tree. Without the fix the
allocation may enter the slow path again even if there was a failure
before of a request with the same or a smaller size.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.20+
Fixes: bee60e94a1e2 ("iommu/iova: Optimise attempts to allocate iova from 32bit address range")
Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Robert Richter <rrichter@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/iommu/iova.c |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/iommu/iova.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/iova.c
@@ -207,8 +207,10 @@ static int __alloc_and_insert_iova_range
 		curr_iova = rb_entry(curr, struct iova, node);
 	} while (curr && new_pfn <= curr_iova->pfn_hi);
 
-	if (limit_pfn < size || new_pfn < iovad->start_pfn)
+	if (limit_pfn < size || new_pfn < iovad->start_pfn) {
+		iovad->max32_alloc_size = size;
 		goto iova32_full;
+	}
 
 	/* pfn_lo will point to size aligned address if size_aligned is set */
 	new->pfn_lo = new_pfn;
@@ -222,7 +224,6 @@ static int __alloc_and_insert_iova_range
 	return 0;
 
 iova32_full:
-	iovad->max32_alloc_size = size;
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&iovad->iova_rbtree_lock, flags);
 	return -ENOMEM;
 }

[PATCH 5.0 12/52] libceph: wait for latest osdmap in ceph_monc_blacklist_add()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

commit bb229bbb3bf63d23128e851a1f3b85c083178fa1 upstream.

Because map updates are distributed lazily, an OSD may not know about
the new blacklist for quite some time after "osd blacklist add" command
is completed.  This makes it possible for a blacklisted but still alive
client to overwrite a post-blacklist update, resulting in data
corruption.

Waiting for latest osdmap in ceph_monc_blacklist_add() and thus using
the post-blacklist epoch for all post-blacklist requests ensures that
all such requests "wait" for the blacklist to come into force on their
respective OSDs.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 6305a3b41515 ("libceph: support for blacklisting clients")
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Dillaman <dillaman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 include/linux/ceph/libceph.h |    2 ++
 net/ceph/ceph_common.c       |   18 +++++++++++++++++-
 net/ceph/mon_client.c        |    9 +++++++++
 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/include/linux/ceph/libceph.h
+++ b/include/linux/ceph/libceph.h
@@ -294,6 +294,8 @@ extern void ceph_destroy_client(struct c
 extern int __ceph_open_session(struct ceph_client *client,
 			       unsigned long started);
 extern int ceph_open_session(struct ceph_client *client);
+int ceph_wait_for_latest_osdmap(struct ceph_client *client,
+				unsigned long timeout);
 
 /* pagevec.c */
 extern void ceph_release_page_vector(struct page **pages, int num_pages);
--- a/net/ceph/ceph_common.c
+++ b/net/ceph/ceph_common.c
@@ -738,7 +738,6 @@ int __ceph_open_session(struct ceph_clie
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ceph_open_session);
 
-
 int ceph_open_session(struct ceph_client *client)
 {
 	int ret;
@@ -754,6 +753,23 @@ int ceph_open_session(struct ceph_client
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_open_session);
 
+int ceph_wait_for_latest_osdmap(struct ceph_client *client,
+				unsigned long timeout)
+{
+	u64 newest_epoch;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = ceph_monc_get_version(&client->monc, "osdmap", &newest_epoch);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (client->osdc.osdmap->epoch >= newest_epoch)
+		return 0;
+
+	ceph_osdc_maybe_request_map(&client->osdc);
+	return ceph_monc_wait_osdmap(&client->monc, newest_epoch, timeout);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_wait_for_latest_osdmap);
 
 static int __init init_ceph_lib(void)
 {
--- a/net/ceph/mon_client.c
+++ b/net/ceph/mon_client.c
@@ -922,6 +922,15 @@ int ceph_monc_blacklist_add(struct ceph_
 	mutex_unlock(&monc->mutex);
 
 	ret = wait_generic_request(req);
+	if (!ret)
+		/*
+		 * Make sure we have the osdmap that includes the blacklist
+		 * entry.  This is needed to ensure that the OSDs pick up the
+		 * new blacklist before processing any future requests from
+		 * this client.
+		 */
+		ret = ceph_wait_for_latest_osdmap(monc->client, 0);
+
 out:
 	put_generic_request(req);
 	return ret;

[PATCH 5.0 13/52] udf: Fix crash on IO error during truncate

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>

commit d3ca4651d05c0ff7259d087d8c949bcf3e14fb46 upstream.

When truncate(2) hits IO error when reading indirect extent block the
code just bugs with:

kernel BUG at linux-4.15.0/fs/udf/truncate.c:249!
...

Fix the problem by bailing out cleanly in case of IO error.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: jean-luc malet <jeanluc.malet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/udf/truncate.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/udf/truncate.c
+++ b/fs/udf/truncate.c
@@ -260,6 +260,9 @@ void udf_truncate_extents(struct inode *
 			epos.block = eloc;
 			epos.bh = udf_tread(sb,
 					udf_get_lb_pblock(sb, &eloc, 0));
+			/* Error reading indirect block? */
+			if (!epos.bh)
+				return;
 			if (elen)
 				indirect_ext_len =
 					(elen + sb->s_blocksize - 1) >>

[PATCH 5.0 14/52] mips: loongson64: lemote-2f: Add IRQF_NO_SUSPEND to "cascade" irqaction.

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yifeng Li <tomli@tomli.me>

commit 5f5f67da9781770df0403269bc57d7aae608fecd upstream.

Timekeeping IRQs from CS5536 MFGPT are routed to i8259, which then
triggers the "cascade" IRQ on MIPS CPU. Without IRQF_NO_SUSPEND in
cascade_irqaction, MFGPT interrupts will be masked in suspend mode,
and the machine would be unable to resume once suspended.

Previously, MIPS IRQs were not disabled properly, so the original
code appeared to work. Commit a3e6c1eff5 ("MIPS: IRQ: Fix disable_irq on
CPU IRQs") uncovers the bug. To fix it, add IRQF_NO_SUSPEND to
cascade_irqaction.

This commit is functionally identical to 0add9c2f1cff ("MIPS:
Loongson-3: Add IRQF_NO_SUSPEND to Cascade irqaction"), but it forgot
to apply the same fix to Loongson2.

Signed-off-by: Yifeng Li <tomli@tomli.me>
Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jiaxun Yang <jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com>
Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhc@lemote.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.19+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/mips/loongson64/lemote-2f/irq.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/mips/loongson64/lemote-2f/irq.c
+++ b/arch/mips/loongson64/lemote-2f/irq.c
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static struct irqaction ip6_irqaction =
 static struct irqaction cascade_irqaction = {
 	.handler = no_action,
 	.name = "cascade",
-	.flags = IRQF_NO_THREAD,
+	.flags = IRQF_NO_THREAD | IRQF_NO_SUSPEND,
 };
 
 void __init mach_init_irq(void)

[PATCH 5.0 15/52] MIPS: Ensure ELF appended dtb is relocated

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yasha Cherikovsky <yasha.che3@gmail.com>

commit 3f0a53bc6482fb09770982a8447981260ea258dc upstream.

This fixes booting with the combination of CONFIG_RELOCATABLE=y
and CONFIG_MIPS_ELF_APPENDED_DTB=y.

Sections that appear after the relocation table are not relocated
on system boot (except .bss, which has special handling).

With CONFIG_MIPS_ELF_APPENDED_DTB, the dtb is part of the
vmlinux ELF, so it must be relocated together with everything else.

Fixes: 069fd766271d ("MIPS: Reserve space for relocation table")
Signed-off-by: Yasha Cherikovsky <yasha.che3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/mips/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S |   12 +++++++-----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/mips/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -140,6 +140,13 @@ SECTIONS
 	PERCPU_SECTION(1 << CONFIG_MIPS_L1_CACHE_SHIFT)
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_MIPS_ELF_APPENDED_DTB
+	.appended_dtb : AT(ADDR(.appended_dtb) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
+		*(.appended_dtb)
+		KEEP(*(.appended_dtb))
+	}
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_RELOCATABLE
 	. = ALIGN(4);
 
@@ -164,11 +171,6 @@ SECTIONS
 	__appended_dtb = .;
 	/* leave space for appended DTB */
 	. += 0x100000;
-#elif defined(CONFIG_MIPS_ELF_APPENDED_DTB)
-	.appended_dtb : AT(ADDR(.appended_dtb) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
-		*(.appended_dtb)
-		KEEP(*(.appended_dtb))
-	}
 #endif
 	/*
 	 * Align to 64K in attempt to eliminate holes before the

[PATCH 5.0 16/52] MIPS: Fix kernel crash for R6 in jump label branch function

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Archer Yan <ayan@wavecomp.com>

commit 47c25036b60f27b86ab44b66a8861bcf81cde39b upstream.

Insert Branch instruction instead of NOP to make sure assembler don't
patch code in forbidden slot. In jump label function, it might
be possible to patch Control Transfer Instructions(CTIs) into
forbidden slot, which will generate Reserved Instruction exception
in MIPS release 6.

Signed-off-by: Archer Yan <ayan@wavecomp.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
[paul.burton@mips.com:
  - Add MIPS prefix to subject.
  - Mark for stable from v4.0, which introduced r6 support, onwards.]
Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.0+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/mips/include/asm/jump_label.h |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/mips/include/asm/jump_label.h
+++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/jump_label.h
@@ -21,15 +21,15 @@
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_MICROMIPS
-#define NOP_INSN "nop32"
+#define B_INSN "b32"
 #else
-#define NOP_INSN "nop"
+#define B_INSN "b"
 #endif
 
 static __always_inline bool arch_static_branch(struct static_key *key, bool branch)
 {
-	asm_volatile_goto("1:\t" NOP_INSN "\n\t"
-		"nop\n\t"
+	asm_volatile_goto("1:\t" B_INSN " 2f\n\t"
+		"2:\tnop\n\t"
 		".pushsection __jump_table,  \"aw\"\n\t"
 		WORD_INSN " 1b, %l[l_yes], %0\n\t"
 		".popsection\n\t"

[PATCH 5.0 17/52] powerpc/vdso64: Fix CLOCK_MONOTONIC inconsistencies across Y2038

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>

commit b5b4453e7912f056da1ca7572574cada32ecb60c upstream.

Jakub Drnec reported:
  Setting the realtime clock can sometimes make the monotonic clock go
  back by over a hundred years. Decreasing the realtime clock across
  the y2k38 threshold is one reliable way to reproduce. Allegedly this
  can also happen just by running ntpd, I have not managed to
  reproduce that other than booting with rtc at >2038 and then running
  ntp. When this happens, anything with timers (e.g. openjdk) breaks
  rather badly.

And included a test case (slightly edited for brevity):
  #define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 199309L
  #include <stdio.h>
  #include <time.h>
  #include <stdlib.h>
  #include <unistd.h>

  long get_time(void) {
    struct timespec tp;
    clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &tp);
    return tp.tv_sec + tp.tv_nsec / 1000000000;
  }

  int main(void) {
    long last = get_time();
    while(1) {
      long now = get_time();
      if (now < last) {
        printf("clock went backwards by %ld seconds!\n", last - now);
      }
      last = now;
      sleep(1);
    }
    return 0;
  }

Which when run concurrently with:
 # date -s 2040-1-1
 # date -s 2037-1-1

Will detect the clock going backward.

The root cause is that wtom_clock_sec in struct vdso_data is only a
32-bit signed value, even though we set its value to be equal to
tk->wall_to_monotonic.tv_sec which is 64-bits.

Because the monotonic clock starts at zero when the system boots the
wall_to_montonic.tv_sec offset is negative for current and future
dates. Currently on a freshly booted system the offset will be in the
vicinity of negative 1.5 billion seconds.

However if the wall clock is set past the Y2038 boundary, the offset
from wall to monotonic becomes less than negative 2^31, and no longer
fits in 32-bits. When that value is assigned to wtom_clock_sec it is
truncated and becomes positive, causing the VDSO assembly code to
calculate CLOCK_MONOTONIC incorrectly.

That causes CLOCK_MONOTONIC to jump ahead by ~4 billion seconds which
it is not meant to do. Worse, if the time is then set back before the
Y2038 boundary CLOCK_MONOTONIC will jump backward.

We can fix it simply by storing the full 64-bit offset in the
vdso_data, and using that in the VDSO assembly code. We also shuffle
some of the fields in vdso_data to avoid creating a hole.

The original commit that added the CLOCK_MONOTONIC support to the VDSO
did actually use a 64-bit value for wtom_clock_sec, see commit
a7f290dad32e ("[PATCH] powerpc: Merge vdso's and add vdso support to
32 bits kernel") (Nov 2005). However just 3 days later it was
converted to 32-bits in commit 0c37ec2aa88b ("[PATCH] powerpc: vdso
fixes (take #2)"), and the bug has existed since then AFAICS.

Fixes: 0c37ec2aa88b ("[PATCH] powerpc: vdso fixes (take #2)")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.15+
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/HaC.ZfES.62bwlnvAvMP.1STMMj@seznam.cz
Reported-by: Jakub Drnec <jaydee@email.cz>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/vdso_datapage.h  |    8 ++++----
 arch/powerpc/kernel/vdso64/gettimeofday.S |    4 ++--
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/vdso_datapage.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/vdso_datapage.h
@@ -82,10 +82,10 @@ struct vdso_data {
 	__u32 icache_block_size;		/* L1 i-cache block size     */
 	__u32 dcache_log_block_size;		/* L1 d-cache log block size */
 	__u32 icache_log_block_size;		/* L1 i-cache log block size */
-	__s32 wtom_clock_sec;			/* Wall to monotonic clock */
-	__s32 wtom_clock_nsec;
-	struct timespec stamp_xtime;	/* xtime as at tb_orig_stamp */
-	__u32 stamp_sec_fraction;	/* fractional seconds of stamp_xtime */
+	__u32 stamp_sec_fraction;		/* fractional seconds of stamp_xtime */
+	__s32 wtom_clock_nsec;			/* Wall to monotonic clock nsec */
+	__s64 wtom_clock_sec;			/* Wall to monotonic clock sec */
+	struct timespec stamp_xtime;		/* xtime as at tb_orig_stamp */
    	__u32 syscall_map_64[SYSCALL_MAP_SIZE]; /* map of syscalls  */
    	__u32 syscall_map_32[SYSCALL_MAP_SIZE]; /* map of syscalls */
 };
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/vdso64/gettimeofday.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/vdso64/gettimeofday.S
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ V_FUNCTION_BEGIN(__kernel_clock_gettime)
 	 * At this point, r4,r5 contain our sec/nsec values.
 	 */
 
-	lwa	r6,WTOM_CLOCK_SEC(r3)
+	ld	r6,WTOM_CLOCK_SEC(r3)
 	lwa	r9,WTOM_CLOCK_NSEC(r3)
 
 	/* We now have our result in r6,r9. We create a fake dependency
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ V_FUNCTION_BEGIN(__kernel_clock_gettime)
 	bne     cr6,75f
 
 	/* CLOCK_MONOTONIC_COARSE */
-	lwa     r6,WTOM_CLOCK_SEC(r3)
+	ld	r6,WTOM_CLOCK_SEC(r3)
 	lwa     r9,WTOM_CLOCK_NSEC(r3)
 
 	/* check if counter has updated */

[PATCH 5.0 18/52] powerpc/security: Fix spectre_v2 reporting

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>

commit 92edf8df0ff2ae86cc632eeca0e651fd8431d40d upstream.

When I updated the spectre_v2 reporting to handle software count cache
flush I got the logic wrong when there's no software count cache
enabled at all.

The result is that on systems with the software count cache flush
disabled we print:

  Mitigation: Indirect branch cache disabled, Software count cache flush

Which correctly indicates that the count cache is disabled, but
incorrectly says the software count cache flush is enabled.

The root of the problem is that we are trying to handle all
combinations of options. But we know now that we only expect to see
the software count cache flush enabled if the other options are false.

So split the two cases, which simplifies the logic and fixes the bug.
We were also missing a space before "(hardware accelerated)".

The result is we see one of:

  Mitigation: Indirect branch serialisation (kernel only)
  Mitigation: Indirect branch cache disabled
  Mitigation: Software count cache flush
  Mitigation: Software count cache flush (hardware accelerated)

Fixes: ee13cb249fab ("powerpc/64s: Add support for software count cache flush")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.19+
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Reviewed-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c |   23 ++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c
@@ -190,29 +190,22 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct devic
 	bcs = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED);
 	ccd = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED);
 
-	if (bcs || ccd || count_cache_flush_type != COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE) {
-		bool comma = false;
+	if (bcs || ccd) {
 		seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: ");
 
-		if (bcs) {
+		if (bcs)
 			seq_buf_printf(&s, "Indirect branch serialisation (kernel only)");
-			comma = true;
-		}
 
-		if (ccd) {
-			if (comma)
-				seq_buf_printf(&s, ", ");
-			seq_buf_printf(&s, "Indirect branch cache disabled");
-			comma = true;
-		}
-
-		if (comma)
+		if (bcs && ccd)
 			seq_buf_printf(&s, ", ");
 
-		seq_buf_printf(&s, "Software count cache flush");
+		if (ccd)
+			seq_buf_printf(&s, "Indirect branch cache disabled");
+	} else if (count_cache_flush_type != COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE) {
+		seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: Software count cache flush");
 
 		if (count_cache_flush_type == COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_HW)
-			seq_buf_printf(&s, "(hardware accelerated)");
+			seq_buf_printf(&s, " (hardware accelerated)");
 	} else if (btb_flush_enabled) {
 		seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: Branch predictor state flush");
 	} else {

[PATCH 5.0 19/52] net/mlx5: Fix DCT creation bad flow

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yishai Hadas <yishaih@mellanox.com>

commit f84b66b9cce78e8f9d38204fdaa75f07c75f4911 upstream.

In case the DCT creation command has succeeded a DRAIN must be issued
before calling DESTROY.

In addition, the original code used the wrong parameter for the DESTROY
command, 'in' instead of 'din', which caused another creation try instead
of destroying.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.15
Fixes: 57cda166bbe0 ("net/mlx5: Add DCT command interface")
Signed-off-by: Yishai Hadas <yishaih@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Artemy Kovalyov <artemyko@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/qp.c |   66 ++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/qp.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/qp.c
@@ -40,6 +40,9 @@
 #include "mlx5_core.h"
 #include "lib/eq.h"
 
+static int mlx5_core_drain_dct(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev,
+			       struct mlx5_core_dct *dct);
+
 static struct mlx5_core_rsc_common *
 mlx5_get_rsc(struct mlx5_qp_table *table, u32 rsn)
 {
@@ -227,13 +230,42 @@ static void destroy_resource_common(stru
 	wait_for_completion(&qp->common.free);
 }
 
+static int _mlx5_core_destroy_dct(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev,
+				  struct mlx5_core_dct *dct, bool need_cleanup)
+{
+	u32 out[MLX5_ST_SZ_DW(destroy_dct_out)] = {0};
+	u32 in[MLX5_ST_SZ_DW(destroy_dct_in)]   = {0};
+	struct mlx5_core_qp *qp = &dct->mqp;
+	int err;
+
+	err = mlx5_core_drain_dct(dev, dct);
+	if (err) {
+		if (dev->state == MLX5_DEVICE_STATE_INTERNAL_ERROR) {
+			goto destroy;
+		} else {
+			mlx5_core_warn(
+				dev, "failed drain DCT 0x%x with error 0x%x\n",
+				qp->qpn, err);
+			return err;
+		}
+	}
+	wait_for_completion(&dct->drained);
+destroy:
+	if (need_cleanup)
+		destroy_resource_common(dev, &dct->mqp);
+	MLX5_SET(destroy_dct_in, in, opcode, MLX5_CMD_OP_DESTROY_DCT);
+	MLX5_SET(destroy_dct_in, in, dctn, qp->qpn);
+	MLX5_SET(destroy_dct_in, in, uid, qp->uid);
+	err = mlx5_cmd_exec(dev, (void *)&in, sizeof(in),
+			    (void *)&out, sizeof(out));
+	return err;
+}
+
 int mlx5_core_create_dct(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev,
 			 struct mlx5_core_dct *dct,
 			 u32 *in, int inlen)
 {
 	u32 out[MLX5_ST_SZ_DW(create_dct_out)]   = {0};
-	u32 din[MLX5_ST_SZ_DW(destroy_dct_in)]   = {0};
-	u32 dout[MLX5_ST_SZ_DW(destroy_dct_out)] = {0};
 	struct mlx5_core_qp *qp = &dct->mqp;
 	int err;
 
@@ -254,11 +286,7 @@ int mlx5_core_create_dct(struct mlx5_cor
 
 	return 0;
 err_cmd:
-	MLX5_SET(destroy_dct_in, din, opcode, MLX5_CMD_OP_DESTROY_DCT);
-	MLX5_SET(destroy_dct_in, din, dctn, qp->qpn);
-	MLX5_SET(destroy_dct_in, din, uid, qp->uid);
-	mlx5_cmd_exec(dev, (void *)&in, sizeof(din),
-		      (void *)&out, sizeof(dout));
+	_mlx5_core_destroy_dct(dev, dct, false);
 	return err;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mlx5_core_create_dct);
@@ -323,29 +351,7 @@ static int mlx5_core_drain_dct(struct ml
 int mlx5_core_destroy_dct(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev,
 			  struct mlx5_core_dct *dct)
 {
-	u32 out[MLX5_ST_SZ_DW(destroy_dct_out)] = {0};
-	u32 in[MLX5_ST_SZ_DW(destroy_dct_in)]   = {0};
-	struct mlx5_core_qp *qp = &dct->mqp;
-	int err;
-
-	err = mlx5_core_drain_dct(dev, dct);
-	if (err) {
-		if (dev->state == MLX5_DEVICE_STATE_INTERNAL_ERROR) {
-			goto destroy;
-		} else {
-			mlx5_core_warn(dev, "failed drain DCT 0x%x with error 0x%x\n", qp->qpn, err);
-			return err;
-		}
-	}
-	wait_for_completion(&dct->drained);
-destroy:
-	destroy_resource_common(dev, &dct->mqp);
-	MLX5_SET(destroy_dct_in, in, opcode, MLX5_CMD_OP_DESTROY_DCT);
-	MLX5_SET(destroy_dct_in, in, dctn, qp->qpn);
-	MLX5_SET(destroy_dct_in, in, uid, qp->uid);
-	err = mlx5_cmd_exec(dev, (void *)&in, sizeof(in),
-			    (void *)&out, sizeof(out));
-	return err;
+	return _mlx5_core_destroy_dct(dev, dct, true);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mlx5_core_destroy_dct);
 

[PATCH 5.0 20/52] scsi: core: Avoid that a kernel warning appears during system resume

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>

commit 17605afaae825b0291f80c62a7f6565879edaa8a upstream.

Since scsi_device_quiesce() skips SCSI devices that have another state than
RUNNING, OFFLINE or TRANSPORT_OFFLINE, scsi_device_resume() should not
complain about SCSI devices that have been skipped. Hence this patch.  This
patch avoids that the following warning appears during resume:

WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1039 at blk_clear_pm_only+0x2a/0x30
CPU: 3 PID: 1039 Comm: kworker/u8:49 Not tainted 5.0.0+ #1
Hardware name: LENOVO 4180F42/4180F42, BIOS 83ET75WW (1.45 ) 05/10/2013
Workqueue: events_unbound async_run_entry_fn
RIP: 0010:blk_clear_pm_only+0x2a/0x30
Call Trace:
 ? scsi_device_resume+0x28/0x50
 ? scsi_dev_type_resume+0x2b/0x80
 ? async_run_entry_fn+0x2c/0xd0
 ? process_one_work+0x1f0/0x3f0
 ? worker_thread+0x28/0x3c0
 ? process_one_work+0x3f0/0x3f0
 ? kthread+0x10c/0x130
 ? __kthread_create_on_node+0x150/0x150
 ? ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Cc: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Cc: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name>
Cc: Martin Steigerwald <martin@lichtvoll.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Jisheng Zhang <Jisheng.Zhang@synaptics.com>
Tested-by: Jisheng Zhang <Jisheng.Zhang@synaptics.com>
Fixes: 3a0a529971ec ("block, scsi: Make SCSI quiesce and resume work reliably") # v4.15
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c
@@ -2598,8 +2598,10 @@ void scsi_device_resume(struct scsi_devi
 	 * device deleted during suspend)
 	 */
 	mutex_lock(&sdev->state_mutex);
-	sdev->quiesced_by = NULL;
-	blk_clear_pm_only(sdev->request_queue);
+	if (sdev->quiesced_by) {
+		sdev->quiesced_by = NULL;
+		blk_clear_pm_only(sdev->request_queue);
+	}
 	if (sdev->sdev_state == SDEV_QUIESCE)
 		scsi_device_set_state(sdev, SDEV_RUNNING);
 	mutex_unlock(&sdev->state_mutex);

[PATCH 5.0 21/52] scsi: qla2xxx: Fix FC-AL connection target discovery

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Quinn Tran <qtran@marvell.com>

commit 4705f10e82c63924bd84a9b31d15839ec9ba3d06 upstream.

Commit 7f147f9bfd44 ("scsi: qla2xxx: Fix N2N target discovery with Local
loop") fixed N2N target discovery for local loop.  However, same code is
used for FC-AL discovery as well. Added check to make sure we are bypassing
area and domain check only in N2N topology for target discovery.

Fixes: 7f147f9bfd44 ("scsi: qla2xxx: Fix N2N target discovery with Local loop")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.0+
Signed-off-by: Quinn Tran <qtran@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Madhani <hmadhani@marvell.com>
Reviewed-by: Ewan D. Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_init.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_init.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_init.c
@@ -4968,6 +4968,13 @@ qla2x00_configure_local_loop(scsi_qla_ho
 		    (area != vha->d_id.b.area || domain != vha->d_id.b.domain))
 			continue;
 
+		/* Bypass if not same domain and area of adapter. */
+		if (area && domain && ((area != vha->d_id.b.area) ||
+		    (domain != vha->d_id.b.domain)) &&
+		    (ha->current_topology == ISP_CFG_NL))
+			continue;
+
+
 		/* Bypass invalid local loop ID. */
 		if (loop_id > LAST_LOCAL_LOOP_ID)
 			continue;

[PATCH 5.0 22/52] scsi: ibmvscsi: Protect ibmvscsi_head from concurrent modificaiton

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

commit 7205981e045e752ccf96cf6ddd703a98c59d4339 upstream.

For each ibmvscsi host created during a probe or destroyed during a remove
we either add or remove that host to/from the global ibmvscsi_head
list. This runs the risk of concurrent modification.

This patch adds a simple spinlock around the list modification calls to
prevent concurrent updates as is done similarly in the ibmvfc driver and
ipr driver.

Fixes: 32d6e4b6e4ea ("scsi: ibmvscsi: add vscsi hosts to global list_head")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10+
Signed-off-by: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvscsi.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvscsi.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvscsi.c
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ static int client_reserve = 1;
 static char partition_name[96] = "UNKNOWN";
 static unsigned int partition_number = -1;
 static LIST_HEAD(ibmvscsi_head);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ibmvscsi_driver_lock);
 
 static struct scsi_transport_template *ibmvscsi_transport_template;
 
@@ -2270,7 +2271,9 @@ static int ibmvscsi_probe(struct vio_dev
 	}
 
 	dev_set_drvdata(&vdev->dev, hostdata);
+	spin_lock(&ibmvscsi_driver_lock);
 	list_add_tail(&hostdata->host_list, &ibmvscsi_head);
+	spin_unlock(&ibmvscsi_driver_lock);
 	return 0;
 
       add_srp_port_failed:
@@ -2292,7 +2295,9 @@ static int ibmvscsi_probe(struct vio_dev
 static int ibmvscsi_remove(struct vio_dev *vdev)
 {
 	struct ibmvscsi_host_data *hostdata = dev_get_drvdata(&vdev->dev);
+	spin_lock(&ibmvscsi_driver_lock);
 	list_del(&hostdata->host_list);
+	spin_unlock(&ibmvscsi_driver_lock);
 	unmap_persist_bufs(hostdata);
 	release_event_pool(&hostdata->pool, hostdata);
 	ibmvscsi_release_crq_queue(&hostdata->queue, hostdata,

[PATCH 5.0 23/52] scsi: ibmvscsi: Fix empty event pool access during host removal

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

commit 7f5203c13ba8a7b7f9f6ecfe5a4d5567188d7835 upstream.

The event pool used for queueing commands is destroyed fairly early in the
ibmvscsi_remove() code path. Since, this happens prior to the call so
scsi_remove_host() it is possible for further calls to queuecommand to be
processed which manifest as a panic due to a NULL pointer dereference as
seen here:

PANIC: "Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address
0x00000000"

Context process backtrace:

DSISR: 0000000042000000 ????Syscall Result: 0000000000000000
4 [c000000002cb3820] memcpy_power7 at c000000000064204
[Link Register] [c000000002cb3820] ibmvscsi_send_srp_event at d000000003ed14a4
5 [c000000002cb3920] ibmvscsi_send_srp_event at d000000003ed14a4 [ibmvscsi] ?(unreliable)
6 [c000000002cb39c0] ibmvscsi_queuecommand at d000000003ed2388 [ibmvscsi]
7 [c000000002cb3a70] scsi_dispatch_cmd at d00000000395c2d8 [scsi_mod]
8 [c000000002cb3af0] scsi_request_fn at d00000000395ef88 [scsi_mod]
9 [c000000002cb3be0] __blk_run_queue at c000000000429860
10 [c000000002cb3c10] blk_delay_work at c00000000042a0ec
11 [c000000002cb3c40] process_one_work at c0000000000dac30
12 [c000000002cb3cd0] worker_thread at c0000000000db110
13 [c000000002cb3d80] kthread at c0000000000e3378
14 [c000000002cb3e30] ret_from_kernel_thread at c00000000000982c

The kernel buffer log is overfilled with this log:

[11261.952732] ibmvscsi: found no event struct in pool!

This patch reorders the operations during host teardown. Start by calling
the SRP transport and Scsi_Host remove functions to flush any outstanding
work and set the host offline. LLDD teardown follows including destruction
of the event pool, freeing the Command Response Queue (CRQ), and unmapping
any persistent buffers. The event pool destruction is protected by the
scsi_host lock, and the pool is purged prior of any requests for which we
never received a response. Finally, move the removal of the scsi host from
our global list to the end so that the host is easily locatable for
debugging purposes during teardown.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.12+
Signed-off-by: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvscsi.c |   22 ++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvscsi.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvscsi.c
@@ -2295,17 +2295,27 @@ static int ibmvscsi_probe(struct vio_dev
 static int ibmvscsi_remove(struct vio_dev *vdev)
 {
 	struct ibmvscsi_host_data *hostdata = dev_get_drvdata(&vdev->dev);
-	spin_lock(&ibmvscsi_driver_lock);
-	list_del(&hostdata->host_list);
-	spin_unlock(&ibmvscsi_driver_lock);
-	unmap_persist_bufs(hostdata);
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	srp_remove_host(hostdata->host);
+	scsi_remove_host(hostdata->host);
+
+	purge_requests(hostdata, DID_ERROR);
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(hostdata->host->host_lock, flags);
 	release_event_pool(&hostdata->pool, hostdata);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(hostdata->host->host_lock, flags);
+
 	ibmvscsi_release_crq_queue(&hostdata->queue, hostdata,
 					max_events);
 
 	kthread_stop(hostdata->work_thread);
-	srp_remove_host(hostdata->host);
-	scsi_remove_host(hostdata->host);
+	unmap_persist_bufs(hostdata);
+
+	spin_lock(&ibmvscsi_driver_lock);
+	list_del(&hostdata->host_list);
+	spin_unlock(&ibmvscsi_driver_lock);
+
 	scsi_host_put(hostdata->host);
 
 	return 0;

[PATCH 5.0 24/52] futex: Ensure that futex address is aligned in handle_futex_death()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chen Jie <chenjie6@huawei.com>

commit 5a07168d8d89b00fe1760120714378175b3ef992 upstream.

The futex code requires that the user space addresses of futexes are 32bit
aligned. sys_futex() checks this in futex_get_keys() but the robust list
code has no alignment check in place.

As a consequence the kernel crashes on architectures with strict alignment
requirements in handle_futex_death() when trying to cmpxchg() on an
unaligned futex address which was retrieved from the robust list.

[ tglx: Rewrote changelog, proper sizeof() based alignement check and add
  	comment ]

Fixes: 0771dfefc9e5 ("[PATCH] lightweight robust futexes: core")
Signed-off-by: Chen Jie <chenjie6@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: <dvhart@infradead.org>
Cc: <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <zengweilin@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1552621478-119787-1-git-send-email-chenjie6@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 kernel/futex.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -3440,6 +3440,10 @@ static int handle_futex_death(u32 __user
 {
 	u32 uval, uninitialized_var(nval), mval;
 
+	/* Futex address must be 32bit aligned */
+	if ((((unsigned long)uaddr) % sizeof(*uaddr)) != 0)
+		return -1;
+
 retry:
 	if (get_user(uval, uaddr))
 		return -1;

[PATCH 5.0 25/52] cifs: allow guest mounts to work for smb3.11

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>

commit e71ab2aa06f731a944993120b0eef1556c63b81c upstream.

Fix Guest/Anonymous sessions so that they work with SMB 3.11.

The commit noted below tightened the conditions and forced signing for
the SMB2-TreeConnect commands as per MS-SMB2.
However, this should only apply to normal user sessions and not for
Guest/Anonumous sessions.

Fixes: 6188f28bf608 ("Tree connect for SMB3.1.1 must be signed for non-encrypted shares")

Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c |    8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c
@@ -1605,9 +1605,13 @@ SMB2_tcon(const unsigned int xid, struct
 	iov[1].iov_base = unc_path;
 	iov[1].iov_len = unc_path_len;
 
-	/* 3.11 tcon req must be signed if not encrypted. See MS-SMB2 3.2.4.1.1 */
+	/*
+	 * 3.11 tcon req must be signed if not encrypted. See MS-SMB2 3.2.4.1.1
+	 * unless it is guest or anonymous user. See MS-SMB2 3.2.5.3.1
+	 */
 	if ((ses->server->dialect == SMB311_PROT_ID) &&
-	    !smb3_encryption_required(tcon))
+	    !smb3_encryption_required(tcon) &&
+	    !(ses->session_flags & (SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_GUEST|SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_NULL)))
 		req->sync_hdr.Flags |= SMB2_FLAGS_SIGNED;
 
 	memset(&rqst, 0, sizeof(struct smb_rqst));

[PATCH 5.0 26/52] perf probe: Fix getting the kernel map

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>

commit eaeffeb9838a7c0dec981d258666bfcc0fa6a947 upstream.

Since commit 4d99e4136580 ("perf machine: Workaround missing maps for
x86 PTI entry trampolines"), perf tools has been creating more than one
kernel map, however 'perf probe' assumed there could be only one.

Fix by using machine__kernel_map() to get the main kernel map.

Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Tested-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Jiufei Xue <jiufei.xue@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Xu Yu <xuyu@linux.alibaba.com>
Fixes: 4d99e4136580 ("perf machine: Workaround missing maps for x86 PTI entry trampolines")
Fixes: d83212d5dd67 ("kallsyms, x86: Export addresses of PTI entry trampolines")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/2ed432de-e904-85d2-5c36-5897ddc5b23b@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 tools/perf/util/probe-event.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/tools/perf/util/probe-event.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/probe-event.c
@@ -157,8 +157,10 @@ static struct map *kernel_get_module_map
 	if (module && strchr(module, '/'))
 		return dso__new_map(module);
 
-	if (!module)
-		module = "kernel";
+	if (!module) {
+		pos = machine__kernel_map(host_machine);
+		return map__get(pos);
+	}
 
 	for (pos = maps__first(maps); pos; pos = map__next(pos)) {
 		/* short_name is "[module]" */

[PATCH 5.0 27/52] objtool: Move objtool_file struct off the stack

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>

commit 0c671812f152b628bd87c0af49da032cc2a2c319 upstream.

Objtool uses over 512k of stack, thanks to the hash table embedded in
the objtool_file struct.  This causes an unnecessarily large stack
allocation and breaks users with low stack limits.

Move the struct off the stack.

Fixes: 042ba73fe7eb ("objtool: Add several performance improvements")
Reported-by: Vassili Karpov <moosotc@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/df92dcbc4b84b02ffa252f46876df125fb56e2d7.1552954176.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 tools/objtool/check.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -2184,9 +2184,10 @@ static void cleanup(struct objtool_file
 	elf_close(file->elf);
 }
 
+static struct objtool_file file;
+
 int check(const char *_objname, bool orc)
 {
-	struct objtool_file file;
 	int ret, warnings = 0;
 
 	objname = _objname;

[PATCH 5.0 28/52] irqchip/gic-v3-its: Fix comparison logic in lpi_range_cmp

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>

commit 89dc891792c2e046b030f87600109c22209da32e upstream.

The lpi_range_list is supposed to be sorted in ascending order of
->base_id (at least if the range merging is to work), but the current
comparison function returns a positive value if rb->base_id >
ra->base_id, which means that list_sort() will put A after B in that
case - and vice versa, of course.

Fixes: 880cb3cddd16 (irqchip/gic-v3-its: Refactor LPI allocator)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v4.19+)
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c
+++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c
@@ -1482,7 +1482,7 @@ static int lpi_range_cmp(void *priv, str
 	ra = container_of(a, struct lpi_range, entry);
 	rb = container_of(b, struct lpi_range, entry);
 
-	return rb->base_id - ra->base_id;
+	return ra->base_id - rb->base_id;
 }
 
 static void merge_lpi_ranges(void)

[PATCH 5.0 29/52] clocksource/drivers/riscv: Fix clocksource mask

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Atish Patra <atish.patra@wdc.com>

commit 32d0be018f6f5ee2d5d19c4795304613560814cf upstream.

For all riscv architectures (RV32, RV64 and RV128), the clocksource
is a 64 bit incrementing counter.

Fix the clock source mask accordingly.

Tested on both 64bit and 32 bit virt machine in QEMU.

Fixes: 62b019436814 ("clocksource: new RISC-V SBI timer driver")
Signed-off-by: Atish Patra <atish.patra@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Cc: linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Cc: Anup Patel <Anup.Patel@wdc.com>
Cc: Damien Le Moal <Damien.LeMoal@wdc.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190322215411.19362-1-atish.patra@wdc.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/clocksource/timer-riscv.c |    5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/clocksource/timer-riscv.c
+++ b/drivers/clocksource/timer-riscv.c
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ static u64 riscv_sched_clock(void)
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct clocksource, riscv_clocksource) = {
 	.name		= "riscv_clocksource",
 	.rating		= 300,
-	.mask		= CLOCKSOURCE_MASK(BITS_PER_LONG),
+	.mask		= CLOCKSOURCE_MASK(64),
 	.flags		= CLOCK_SOURCE_IS_CONTINUOUS,
 	.read		= riscv_clocksource_rdtime,
 };
@@ -103,8 +103,7 @@ static int __init riscv_timer_init_dt(st
 	cs = per_cpu_ptr(&riscv_clocksource, cpuid);
 	clocksource_register_hz(cs, riscv_timebase);
 
-	sched_clock_register(riscv_sched_clock,
-			BITS_PER_LONG, riscv_timebase);
+	sched_clock_register(riscv_sched_clock, 64, riscv_timebase);
 
 	error = cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_RISCV_TIMER_STARTING,
 			 "clockevents/riscv/timer:starting",

[PATCH 5.0 30/52] SMB3: Fix SMB3.1.1 guest mounts to Samba

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>

commit 8c11a607d1d9cd6e7f01fd6b03923597fb0ef95a upstream.

Workaround problem with Samba responses to SMB3.1.1
null user (guest) mounts.  The server doesn't set the
expected flag in the session setup response so we have
to do a similar check to what is done in smb3_validate_negotiate
where we also check if the user is a null user (but not sec=krb5
since username might not be passed in on mount for Kerberos case).

Note that the commit below tightened the conditions and forced signing
for the SMB2-TreeConnect commands as per MS-SMB2.
However, this should only apply to normal user sessions and not for
cases where there is no user (even if server forgets to set the flag
in the response) since we don't have anything useful to sign with.
This is especially important now that the more secure SMB3.1.1 protocol
is in the default dialect list.

An earlier patch ("cifs: allow guest mounts to work for smb3.11") fixed
the guest mounts to Windows.

    Fixes: 6188f28bf608 ("Tree connect for SMB3.1.1 must be signed for non-encrypted shares")

Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c
@@ -1608,10 +1608,13 @@ SMB2_tcon(const unsigned int xid, struct
 	/*
 	 * 3.11 tcon req must be signed if not encrypted. See MS-SMB2 3.2.4.1.1
 	 * unless it is guest or anonymous user. See MS-SMB2 3.2.5.3.1
+	 * (Samba servers don't always set the flag so also check if null user)
 	 */
 	if ((ses->server->dialect == SMB311_PROT_ID) &&
 	    !smb3_encryption_required(tcon) &&
-	    !(ses->session_flags & (SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_GUEST|SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_NULL)))
+	    !(ses->session_flags &
+		    (SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_GUEST|SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_NULL)) &&
+	    ((ses->user_name != NULL) || (ses->sectype == Kerberos)))
 		req->sync_hdr.Flags |= SMB2_FLAGS_SIGNED;
 
 	memset(&rqst, 0, sizeof(struct smb_rqst));

[PATCH 5.0 31/52] ALSA: hda - Dont trigger jackpoll_work in azx_resume

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hui Wang <hui.wang@canonical.com>

commit 744c67ffeb06f2d2493f4049ba0bd19698ce0adf upstream.

The commit 3baffc4a84d7 (ALSA: hda/intel: Refactoring PM code) changed
the behaviour of azx_resume(), it triggers the jackpoll_work after
applying this commit.

This change introduced a new issue, all codecs are runtime active
after S3, and will not call runtime_suspend() automatically.

The root cause is the jackpoll_work calls snd_hda_power_up/down_pm,
and it calls up_pm before snd_hdac_enter_pm is called, while calls
the down_pm in the middle of enter_pm and leave_pm is called. This
makes the dev->power.usage_count unbalanced after S3.

To fix it, let azx_resume() don't trigger jackpoll_work as before
it did.

Fixes: 3baffc4a84d7 ("ALSA: hda/intel: Refactoring PM code")
Signed-off-by: Hui Wang <hui.wang@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c
+++ b/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c
@@ -947,7 +947,7 @@ static void __azx_runtime_suspend(struct
 	display_power(chip, false);
 }
 
-static void __azx_runtime_resume(struct azx *chip)
+static void __azx_runtime_resume(struct azx *chip, bool from_rt)
 {
 	struct hda_intel *hda = container_of(chip, struct hda_intel, chip);
 	struct hdac_bus *bus = azx_bus(chip);
@@ -964,7 +964,7 @@ static void __azx_runtime_resume(struct
 	azx_init_pci(chip);
 	hda_intel_init_chip(chip, true);
 
-	if (status) {
+	if (status && from_rt) {
 		list_for_each_codec(codec, &chip->bus)
 			if (status & (1 << codec->addr))
 				schedule_delayed_work(&codec->jackpoll_work,
@@ -1016,7 +1016,7 @@ static int azx_resume(struct device *dev
 			chip->msi = 0;
 	if (azx_acquire_irq(chip, 1) < 0)
 		return -EIO;
-	__azx_runtime_resume(chip);
+	__azx_runtime_resume(chip, false);
 	snd_power_change_state(card, SNDRV_CTL_POWER_D0);
 
 	trace_azx_resume(chip);
@@ -1081,7 +1081,7 @@ static int azx_runtime_resume(struct dev
 	chip = card->private_data;
 	if (!azx_has_pm_runtime(chip))
 		return 0;
-	__azx_runtime_resume(chip);
+	__azx_runtime_resume(chip, true);
 
 	/* disable controller Wake Up event*/
 	azx_writew(chip, WAKEEN, azx_readw(chip, WAKEEN) &

[PATCH 5.0 32/52] ALSA: ac97: Fix of-node refcount unbalance

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

commit 31d2350d602511efc9ef626b848fe521233b0387 upstream.

ac97_of_get_child_device() take the refcount of the node explicitly
via of_node_get(), but this leads to an unbalance.  The
for_each_child_of_node() loop itself takes the refcount for each
iteration node, hence you don't need to take the extra refcount
again.

Fixes: 2225a3e6af78 ("ALSA: ac97: add codecs devicetree binding")
Reviewed-by: Robert Jarzmik <robert.jarzmik@free.fr>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 sound/ac97/bus.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/sound/ac97/bus.c
+++ b/sound/ac97/bus.c
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ ac97_of_get_child_device(struct ac97_con
 		if ((idx != of_property_read_u32(node, "reg", &reg)) ||
 		    !of_device_is_compatible(node, compat))
 			continue;
-		return of_node_get(node);
+		return node;
 	}
 
 	return NULL;

[PATCH 5.0 33/52] ext4: fix NULL pointer dereference while journal is aborted

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jiufei Xue <jiufei.xue@linux.alibaba.com>

commit fa30dde38aa8628c73a6dded7cb0bba38c27b576 upstream.

We see the following NULL pointer dereference while running xfstests
generic/475:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008
PGD 8000000c84bad067 P4D 8000000c84bad067 PUD c84e62067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 7 PID: 9886 Comm: fsstress Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc8 #10
RIP: 0010:ext4_do_update_inode+0x4ec/0x760
...
Call Trace:
? jbd2_journal_get_write_access+0x42/0x50
? __ext4_journal_get_write_access+0x2c/0x70
? ext4_truncate+0x186/0x3f0
ext4_mark_iloc_dirty+0x61/0x80
ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x62/0x1b0
ext4_truncate+0x186/0x3f0
? unmap_mapping_pages+0x56/0x100
ext4_setattr+0x817/0x8b0
notify_change+0x1df/0x430
do_truncate+0x5e/0x90
? generic_permission+0x12b/0x1a0

This is triggered because the NULL pointer handle->h_transaction was
dereferenced in function ext4_update_inode_fsync_trans().
I found that the h_transaction was set to NULL in jbd2__journal_restart
but failed to attached to a new transaction while the journal is aborted.

Fix this by checking the handle before updating the inode.

Fixes: b436b9bef84d ("ext4: Wait for proper transaction commit on fsync")
Signed-off-by: Jiufei Xue <jiufei.xue@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.h |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.h
+++ b/fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.h
@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ static inline void ext4_update_inode_fsy
 {
 	struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
 
-	if (ext4_handle_valid(handle)) {
+	if (ext4_handle_valid(handle) && !is_handle_aborted(handle)) {
 		ei->i_sync_tid = handle->h_transaction->t_tid;
 		if (datasync)
 			ei->i_datasync_tid = handle->h_transaction->t_tid;

[PATCH 5.0 34/52] ext4: fix data corruption caused by unaligned direct AIO

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>

commit 372a03e01853f860560eade508794dd274e9b390 upstream.

Ext4 needs to serialize unaligned direct AIO because the zeroing of
partial blocks of two competing unaligned AIOs can result in data
corruption.

However it decides not to serialize if the potentially unaligned aio is
past i_size with the rationale that no pending writes are possible past
i_size. Unfortunately if the i_size is not block aligned and the second
unaligned write lands past i_size, but still into the same block, it has
the potential of corrupting the previous unaligned write to the same
block.

This is (very simplified) reproducer from Frank

    // 41472 = (10 * 4096) + 512
    // 37376 = 41472 - 4096

    ftruncate(fd, 41472);
    io_prep_pwrite(iocbs[0], fd, buf[0], 4096, 37376);
    io_prep_pwrite(iocbs[1], fd, buf[1], 4096, 41472);

    io_submit(io_ctx, 1, &iocbs[1]);
    io_submit(io_ctx, 1, &iocbs[2]);

    io_getevents(io_ctx, 2, 2, events, NULL);

Without this patch the 512B range from 40960 up to the start of the
second unaligned write (41472) is going to be zeroed overwriting the data
written by the first write. This is a data corruption.

00000000  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
*
00009200  30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30  30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
*
0000a000  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
*
0000a200  31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31  31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31

With this patch the data corruption is avoided because we will recognize
the unaligned_aio and wait for the unwritten extent conversion.

00000000  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
*
00009200  30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30  30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
*
0000a200  31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31  31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
*
0000b200

Reported-by: Frank Sorenson <fsorenso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Fixes: e9e3bcecf44c ("ext4: serialize unaligned asynchronous DIO")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/ext4/file.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/ext4/file.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/file.c
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ ext4_unaligned_aio(struct inode *inode,
 	struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
 	int blockmask = sb->s_blocksize - 1;
 
-	if (pos >= i_size_read(inode))
+	if (pos >= ALIGN(i_size_read(inode), sb->s_blocksize))
 		return 0;
 
 	if ((pos | iov_iter_alignment(from)) & blockmask)

[PATCH 5.0 35/52] ext4: brelse all indirect buffer in ext4_ind_remove_space()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>

commit 674a2b27234d1b7afcb0a9162e81b2e53aeef217 upstream.

All indirect buffers get by ext4_find_shared() should be released no
mater the branch should be freed or not. But now, we forget to release
the lower depth indirect buffers when removing space from the same
higher depth indirect block. It will lead to buffer leak and futher
more, it may lead to quota information corruption when using old quota,
consider the following case.

 - Create and mount an empty ext4 filesystem without extent and quota
   features,
 - quotacheck and enable the user & group quota,
 - Create some files and write some data to them, and then punch hole
   to some files of them, it may trigger the buffer leak problem
   mentioned above.
 - Disable quota and run quotacheck again, it will create two new
   aquota files and write the checked quota information to them, which
   probably may reuse the freed indirect block(the buffer and page
   cache was not freed) as data block.
 - Enable quota again, it will invoke
   vfs_load_quota_inode()->invalidate_bdev() to try to clean unused
   buffers and pagecache. Unfortunately, because of the buffer of quota
   data block is still referenced, quota code cannot read the up to date
   quota info from the device and lead to quota information corruption.

This problem can be reproduced by xfstests generic/231 on ext3 file
system or ext4 file system without extent and quota features.

This patch fix this problem by releasing the missing indirect buffers,
in ext4_ind_remove_space().

Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/ext4/indirect.c |   12 ++++++++----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/ext4/indirect.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/indirect.c
@@ -1387,10 +1387,14 @@ end_range:
 					   partial->p + 1,
 					   partial2->p,
 					   (chain+n-1) - partial);
-			BUFFER_TRACE(partial->bh, "call brelse");
-			brelse(partial->bh);
-			BUFFER_TRACE(partial2->bh, "call brelse");
-			brelse(partial2->bh);
+			while (partial > chain) {
+				BUFFER_TRACE(partial->bh, "call brelse");
+				brelse(partial->bh);
+			}
+			while (partial2 > chain2) {
+				BUFFER_TRACE(partial2->bh, "call brelse");
+				brelse(partial2->bh);
+			}
 			return 0;
 		}
 

[PATCH 5.0 36/52] media: v4l2-ctrls.c/uvc: zero v4l2_event

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil@xs4all.nl>

commit f45f3f753b0a3d739acda8e311b4f744d82dc52a upstream.

Control events can leak kernel memory since they do not fully zero the
event. The same code is present in both v4l2-ctrls.c and uvc_ctrl.c, so
fix both.

It appears that all other event code is properly zeroing the structure,
it's these two places.

Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Reported-by: syzbot+4f021cf3697781dbd9fb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_ctrl.c     |    2 +-
 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ctrls.c |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_ctrl.c
+++ b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_ctrl.c
@@ -1212,7 +1212,7 @@ static void uvc_ctrl_fill_event(struct u
 
 	__uvc_query_v4l2_ctrl(chain, ctrl, mapping, &v4l2_ctrl);
 
-	memset(ev->reserved, 0, sizeof(ev->reserved));
+	memset(ev, 0, sizeof(*ev));
 	ev->type = V4L2_EVENT_CTRL;
 	ev->id = v4l2_ctrl.id;
 	ev->u.ctrl.value = value;
--- a/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ctrls.c
+++ b/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ctrls.c
@@ -1387,7 +1387,7 @@ static u32 user_flags(const struct v4l2_
 
 static void fill_event(struct v4l2_event *ev, struct v4l2_ctrl *ctrl, u32 changes)
 {
-	memset(ev->reserved, 0, sizeof(ev->reserved));
+	memset(ev, 0, sizeof(*ev));
 	ev->type = V4L2_EVENT_CTRL;
 	ev->id = ctrl->id;
 	ev->u.ctrl.changes = changes;

[PATCH 5.0 37/52] Bluetooth: hci_uart: Check if socket buffer is ERR_PTR in h4_recv_buf()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Myungho Jung <mhjungk@gmail.com>

commit 1dc2d785156cbdc80806c32e8d2c7c735d0b4721 upstream.

h4_recv_buf() callers store the return value to socket buffer and
recursively pass the buffer to h4_recv_buf() without protection. So,
ERR_PTR returned from h4_recv_buf() can be dereferenced, if called again
before setting the socket buffer to NULL from previous error. Check if
skb is ERR_PTR in h4_recv_buf().

Reported-by: syzbot+017a32f149406df32703@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Myungho Jung <mhjungk@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/bluetooth/h4_recv.h |    4 ++++
 drivers/bluetooth/hci_h4.c  |    4 ++++
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/bluetooth/h4_recv.h
+++ b/drivers/bluetooth/h4_recv.h
@@ -60,6 +60,10 @@ static inline struct sk_buff *h4_recv_bu
 					  const struct h4_recv_pkt *pkts,
 					  int pkts_count)
 {
+	/* Check for error from previous call */
+	if (IS_ERR(skb))
+		skb = NULL;
+
 	while (count) {
 		int i, len;
 
--- a/drivers/bluetooth/hci_h4.c
+++ b/drivers/bluetooth/hci_h4.c
@@ -174,6 +174,10 @@ struct sk_buff *h4_recv_buf(struct hci_d
 	struct hci_uart *hu = hci_get_drvdata(hdev);
 	u8 alignment = hu->alignment ? hu->alignment : 1;
 
+	/* Check for error from previous call */
+	if (IS_ERR(skb))
+		skb = NULL;
+
 	while (count) {
 		int i, len;
 

[PATCH 5.0 38/52] Bluetooth: Fix decrementing reference count twice in releasing socket

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Myungho Jung <mhjungk@gmail.com>

commit e20a2e9c42c9e4002d9e338d74e7819e88d77162 upstream.

When releasing socket, it is possible to enter hci_sock_release() and
hci_sock_dev_event(HCI_DEV_UNREG) at the same time in different thread.
The reference count of hdev should be decremented only once from one of
them but if storing hdev to local variable in hci_sock_release() before
detached from socket and setting to NULL in hci_sock_dev_event(),
hci_dev_put(hdev) is unexpectedly called twice. This is resolved by
referencing hdev from socket after bt_sock_unlink() in
hci_sock_release().

Reported-by: syzbot+fdc00003f4efff43bc5b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Myungho Jung <mhjungk@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c
@@ -831,8 +831,6 @@ static int hci_sock_release(struct socke
 	if (!sk)
 		return 0;
 
-	hdev = hci_pi(sk)->hdev;
-
 	switch (hci_pi(sk)->channel) {
 	case HCI_CHANNEL_MONITOR:
 		atomic_dec(&monitor_promisc);
@@ -854,6 +852,7 @@ static int hci_sock_release(struct socke
 
 	bt_sock_unlink(&hci_sk_list, sk);
 
+	hdev = hci_pi(sk)->hdev;
 	if (hdev) {
 		if (hci_pi(sk)->channel == HCI_CHANNEL_USER) {
 			/* When releasing a user channel exclusive access,

[PATCH 5.0 39/52] Bluetooth: hci_ldisc: Initialize hci_dev before open()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>

commit 32a7b4cbe93b0a0ef7e63d31ca69ce54736c4412 upstream.

The hci_dev struct hdev is referenced in work queues and timers started
by open() in some protocols. This creates a race between the
initialization function and the work or timer which can result hdev
being dereferenced while it is still null.

The syzbot report contains a reliable reproducer which causes a null
pointer dereference of hdev in hci_uart_write_work() by making the
memory allocation for hdev fail.

To fix this, ensure hdev is valid from before calling a protocol's
open() until after calling a protocol's close().

Reported-by: syzbot+257790c15bcdef6fe00c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c |   21 ++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c
+++ b/drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c
@@ -207,11 +207,11 @@ void hci_uart_init_work(struct work_stru
 	err = hci_register_dev(hu->hdev);
 	if (err < 0) {
 		BT_ERR("Can't register HCI device");
+		clear_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
+		hu->proto->close(hu);
 		hdev = hu->hdev;
 		hu->hdev = NULL;
 		hci_free_dev(hdev);
-		clear_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
-		hu->proto->close(hu);
 		return;
 	}
 
@@ -616,6 +616,7 @@ static void hci_uart_tty_receive(struct
 static int hci_uart_register_dev(struct hci_uart *hu)
 {
 	struct hci_dev *hdev;
+	int err;
 
 	BT_DBG("");
 
@@ -659,11 +660,22 @@ static int hci_uart_register_dev(struct
 	else
 		hdev->dev_type = HCI_PRIMARY;
 
+	/* Only call open() for the protocol after hdev is fully initialized as
+	 * open() (or a timer/workqueue it starts) may attempt to reference it.
+	 */
+	err = hu->proto->open(hu);
+	if (err) {
+		hu->hdev = NULL;
+		hci_free_dev(hdev);
+		return err;
+	}
+
 	if (test_bit(HCI_UART_INIT_PENDING, &hu->hdev_flags))
 		return 0;
 
 	if (hci_register_dev(hdev) < 0) {
 		BT_ERR("Can't register HCI device");
+		hu->proto->close(hu);
 		hu->hdev = NULL;
 		hci_free_dev(hdev);
 		return -ENODEV;
@@ -683,17 +695,12 @@ static int hci_uart_set_proto(struct hci
 	if (!p)
 		return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
 
-	err = p->open(hu);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
 	hu->proto = p;
 	set_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
 
 	err = hci_uart_register_dev(hu);
 	if (err) {
 		clear_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
-		p->close(hu);
 		return err;
 	}
 

[PATCH 5.0 40/52] Bluetooth: hci_ldisc: Postpone HCI_UART_PROTO_READY bit set in hci_uart_set_proto()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>

commit 56897b217a1d0a91c9920cb418d6b3fe922f590a upstream.

task A:                                task B:
hci_uart_set_proto                     flush_to_ldisc
 - p->open(hu) -> h5_open  //alloc h5  - receive_buf
 - set_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY         - tty_port_default_receive_buf
 - hci_uart_register_dev                 - tty_ldisc_receive_buf
                                          - hci_uart_tty_receive
				           - test_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY
				            - h5_recv
 - clear_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY             while() {
 - p->open(hu) -> h5_close //free h5
				              - h5_rx_3wire_hdr
				               - h5_reset()  //use-after-free
                                              }

It could use ioctl to set hci uart proto, but there is
a use-after-free issue when hci_uart_register_dev() fail in
hci_uart_set_proto(), see stack above, fix this by setting
HCI_UART_PROTO_READY bit only when hci_uart_register_dev()
return success.

Reported-by: syzbot+899a33dc0fa0dbaf06a6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c
+++ b/drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c
@@ -696,14 +696,13 @@ static int hci_uart_set_proto(struct hci
 		return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
 
 	hu->proto = p;
-	set_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
 
 	err = hci_uart_register_dev(hu);
 	if (err) {
-		clear_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
 		return err;
 	}
 
+	set_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
 	return 0;
 }
 

[PATCH 5.0 41/52] drm/vkms: Fix flush_work() without INIT_WORK().

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>

commit b30b61ff6b1dc37f276cf56a8328b80086a3ffca upstream.

syzbot is hitting a lockdep warning [1] because flush_work() is called
without INIT_WORK() after kzalloc() at vkms_atomic_crtc_reset().

Commit 6c234fe37c57627a ("drm/vkms: Implement CRC debugfs API") added
INIT_WORK() to only vkms_atomic_crtc_duplicate_state() side. Assuming
that lifecycle of crc_work is appropriately managed, fix this problem
by adding INIT_WORK() to vkms_atomic_crtc_reset() side.

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a5954455fcfa51c29ca2ab55b203076337e1c770

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot <syzbot+12f1b031b6da017e34f8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Shayenne Moura <shayenneluzmoura@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/1547829823-9877-1-git-send-email-penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/vkms/vkms_crtc.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vkms/vkms_crtc.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vkms/vkms_crtc.c
@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ static void vkms_atomic_crtc_reset(struc
 	vkms_state = kzalloc(sizeof(*vkms_state), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!vkms_state)
 		return;
+	INIT_WORK(&vkms_state->crc_work, vkms_crc_work_handle);
 
 	crtc->state = &vkms_state->base;
 	crtc->state->crtc = crtc;

[PATCH 5.0 42/52] RDMA/cma: Rollback source IP address if failing to acquire device

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Myungho Jung <mhjungk@gmail.com>

commit 5fc01fb846bce8fa6d5f95e2625b8ce0f8e86810 upstream.

If cma_acquire_dev_by_src_ip() returns error in addr_handler(), the
device state changes back to RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND but the resolved source
IP address is still left. After that, if rdma_destroy_id() is called
after rdma_listen(), the device is freed without removed from
listen_any_list in cma_cancel_operation(). Revert to the previous IP
address if acquiring device fails.

Reported-by: syzbot+f3ce716af730c8f96637@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Myungho Jung <mhjungk@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c |   13 ++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c
@@ -2966,13 +2966,22 @@ static void addr_handler(int status, str
 {
 	struct rdma_id_private *id_priv = context;
 	struct rdma_cm_event event = {};
+	struct sockaddr *addr;
+	struct sockaddr_storage old_addr;
 
 	mutex_lock(&id_priv->handler_mutex);
 	if (!cma_comp_exch(id_priv, RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY,
 			   RDMA_CM_ADDR_RESOLVED))
 		goto out;
 
-	memcpy(cma_src_addr(id_priv), src_addr, rdma_addr_size(src_addr));
+	/*
+	 * Store the previous src address, so that if we fail to acquire
+	 * matching rdma device, old address can be restored back, which helps
+	 * to cancel the cma listen operation correctly.
+	 */
+	addr = cma_src_addr(id_priv);
+	memcpy(&old_addr, addr, rdma_addr_size(addr));
+	memcpy(addr, src_addr, rdma_addr_size(src_addr));
 	if (!status && !id_priv->cma_dev) {
 		status = cma_acquire_dev_by_src_ip(id_priv);
 		if (status)
@@ -2983,6 +2992,8 @@ static void addr_handler(int status, str
 	}
 
 	if (status) {
+		memcpy(addr, &old_addr,
+		       rdma_addr_size((struct sockaddr *)&old_addr));
 		if (!cma_comp_exch(id_priv, RDMA_CM_ADDR_RESOLVED,
 				   RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND))
 			goto out;

[PATCH 5.0 43/52] f2fs: fix to avoid deadlock of atomic file operations

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>

commit 48432984d718c95cf13e26d487c2d1b697c3c01f upstream.

Thread A				Thread B
- __fput
 - f2fs_release_file
  - drop_inmem_pages
   - mutex_lock(&fi->inmem_lock)
   - __revoke_inmem_pages
    - lock_page(page)
					- open
					- f2fs_setattr
					- truncate_setsize
					 - truncate_inode_pages_range
					  - lock_page(page)
					  - truncate_cleanup_page
					   - f2fs_invalidate_page
					    - drop_inmem_page
					    - mutex_lock(&fi->inmem_lock);

We may encounter above ABBA deadlock as reported by Kyungtae Kim:

I'm reporting a bug in linux-4.17.19: "INFO: task hung in
drop_inmem_page" (no reproducer)

I think this might be somehow related to the following:
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/syzkaller-bugs/INFO$3A$20task$20hung$20in$20%7Csort:date/syzkaller-bugs/c6soBTrdaIo/AjAzPeIzCgAJ

=========================================
INFO: task syz-executor7:10822 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
      Not tainted 4.17.19 #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
syz-executor7   D27024 10822   6346 0x00000004
Call Trace:
 context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:2867 [inline]
 __schedule+0x721/0x1e60 kernel/sched/core.c:3515
 schedule+0x88/0x1c0 kernel/sched/core.c:3559
 schedule_preempt_disabled+0x18/0x30 kernel/sched/core.c:3617
 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:833 [inline]
 __mutex_lock+0x5bd/0x1410 kernel/locking/mutex.c:893
 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:908
 drop_inmem_page+0xcb/0x810 fs/f2fs/segment.c:327
 f2fs_invalidate_page+0x337/0x5e0 fs/f2fs/data.c:2401
 do_invalidatepage mm/truncate.c:165 [inline]
 truncate_cleanup_page+0x261/0x330 mm/truncate.c:187
 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x552/0x1610 mm/truncate.c:367
 truncate_inode_pages mm/truncate.c:478 [inline]
 truncate_pagecache+0x6d/0x90 mm/truncate.c:801
 truncate_setsize+0x81/0xa0 mm/truncate.c:826
 f2fs_setattr+0x44f/0x1270 fs/f2fs/file.c:781
 notify_change+0xa62/0xe80 fs/attr.c:313
 do_truncate+0x12e/0x1e0 fs/open.c:63
 do_last fs/namei.c:2955 [inline]
 path_openat+0x2042/0x29f0 fs/namei.c:3505
 do_filp_open+0x1bd/0x2c0 fs/namei.c:3540
 do_sys_open+0x35e/0x4e0 fs/open.c:1101
 __do_sys_open fs/open.c:1119 [inline]
 __se_sys_open fs/open.c:1114 [inline]
 __x64_sys_open+0x89/0xc0 fs/open.c:1114
 do_syscall_64+0xc4/0x4e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x4497b9
RSP: 002b:00007f734e459c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000002
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f734e45a6cc RCX: 00000000004497b9
RDX: 0000000000000104 RSI: 00000000000a8280 RDI: 0000000020000080
RBP: 000000000071bea0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 0000000000007230 R14: 00000000006f02d0 R15: 00007f734e45a700
INFO: task syz-executor7:10858 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
      Not tainted 4.17.19 #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
syz-executor7   D28880 10858   6346 0x00000004
Call Trace:
 context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:2867 [inline]
 __schedule+0x721/0x1e60 kernel/sched/core.c:3515
 schedule+0x88/0x1c0 kernel/sched/core.c:3559
 __rwsem_down_write_failed_common kernel/locking/rwsem-xadd.c:565 [inline]
 rwsem_down_write_failed+0x5e6/0xc90 kernel/locking/rwsem-xadd.c:594
 call_rwsem_down_write_failed+0x17/0x30 arch/x86/lib/rwsem.S:117
 __down_write arch/x86/include/asm/rwsem.h:142 [inline]
 down_write+0x58/0xa0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:72
 inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:713 [inline]
 do_truncate+0x120/0x1e0 fs/open.c:61
 do_last fs/namei.c:2955 [inline]
 path_openat+0x2042/0x29f0 fs/namei.c:3505
 do_filp_open+0x1bd/0x2c0 fs/namei.c:3540
 do_sys_open+0x35e/0x4e0 fs/open.c:1101
 __do_sys_open fs/open.c:1119 [inline]
 __se_sys_open fs/open.c:1114 [inline]
 __x64_sys_open+0x89/0xc0 fs/open.c:1114
 do_syscall_64+0xc4/0x4e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x4497b9
RSP: 002b:00007f734e3b4c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000002
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f734e3b56cc RCX: 00000000004497b9
RDX: 0000000000000104 RSI: 00000000000a8280 RDI: 0000000020000080
RBP: 000000000071c238 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 0000000000007230 R14: 00000000006f02d0 R15: 00007f734e3b5700
INFO: task syz-executor5:10829 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
      Not tainted 4.17.19 #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
syz-executor5   D28760 10829   6308 0x80000002
Call Trace:
 context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:2867 [inline]
 __schedule+0x721/0x1e60 kernel/sched/core.c:3515
 schedule+0x88/0x1c0 kernel/sched/core.c:3559
 io_schedule+0x21/0x80 kernel/sched/core.c:5179
 wait_on_page_bit_common mm/filemap.c:1100 [inline]
 __lock_page+0x2b5/0x390 mm/filemap.c:1273
 lock_page include/linux/pagemap.h:483 [inline]
 __revoke_inmem_pages+0xb35/0x11c0 fs/f2fs/segment.c:231
 drop_inmem_pages+0xa3/0x3e0 fs/f2fs/segment.c:306
 f2fs_release_file+0x2c7/0x330 fs/f2fs/file.c:1556
 __fput+0x2c7/0x780 fs/file_table.c:209
 ____fput+0x1a/0x20 fs/file_table.c:243
 task_work_run+0x151/0x1d0 kernel/task_work.c:113
 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:22 [inline]
 do_exit+0x8ba/0x30a0 kernel/exit.c:865
 do_group_exit+0x13b/0x3a0 kernel/exit.c:968
 get_signal+0x6bb/0x1650 kernel/signal.c:2482
 do_signal+0x84/0x1b70 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:810
 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x155/0x190 arch/x86/entry/common.c:162
 prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:196 [inline]
 syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:265 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x445/0x4e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x4497b9
RSP: 002b:00007f1c68e74ce8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000ca
RAX: fffffffffffffe00 RBX: 000000000071bf80 RCX: 00000000004497b9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000000000071bf80
RBP: 000000000071bf80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000071bf58
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f1c68e759c0 R15: 00007f1c68e75700

This patch tries to use trylock_page to mitigate such deadlock condition
for fix.

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/f2fs/segment.c |   43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/f2fs/segment.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.c
@@ -215,7 +215,8 @@ void f2fs_register_inmem_page(struct ino
 }
 
 static int __revoke_inmem_pages(struct inode *inode,
-				struct list_head *head, bool drop, bool recover)
+				struct list_head *head, bool drop, bool recover,
+				bool trylock)
 {
 	struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
 	struct inmem_pages *cur, *tmp;
@@ -227,7 +228,16 @@ static int __revoke_inmem_pages(struct i
 		if (drop)
 			trace_f2fs_commit_inmem_page(page, INMEM_DROP);
 
-		lock_page(page);
+		if (trylock) {
+			/*
+			 * to avoid deadlock in between page lock and
+			 * inmem_lock.
+			 */
+			if (!trylock_page(page))
+				continue;
+		} else {
+			lock_page(page);
+		}
 
 		f2fs_wait_on_page_writeback(page, DATA, true, true);
 
@@ -318,13 +328,19 @@ void f2fs_drop_inmem_pages(struct inode
 	struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
 	struct f2fs_inode_info *fi = F2FS_I(inode);
 
-	mutex_lock(&fi->inmem_lock);
-	__revoke_inmem_pages(inode, &fi->inmem_pages, true, false);
-	spin_lock(&sbi->inode_lock[ATOMIC_FILE]);
-	if (!list_empty(&fi->inmem_ilist))
-		list_del_init(&fi->inmem_ilist);
-	spin_unlock(&sbi->inode_lock[ATOMIC_FILE]);
-	mutex_unlock(&fi->inmem_lock);
+	while (!list_empty(&fi->inmem_pages)) {
+		mutex_lock(&fi->inmem_lock);
+		__revoke_inmem_pages(inode, &fi->inmem_pages,
+						true, false, true);
+
+		if (list_empty(&fi->inmem_pages)) {
+			spin_lock(&sbi->inode_lock[ATOMIC_FILE]);
+			if (!list_empty(&fi->inmem_ilist))
+				list_del_init(&fi->inmem_ilist);
+			spin_unlock(&sbi->inode_lock[ATOMIC_FILE]);
+		}
+		mutex_unlock(&fi->inmem_lock);
+	}
 
 	clear_inode_flag(inode, FI_ATOMIC_FILE);
 	fi->i_gc_failures[GC_FAILURE_ATOMIC] = 0;
@@ -429,12 +445,15 @@ retry:
 		 * recovery or rewrite & commit last transaction. For other
 		 * error number, revoking was done by filesystem itself.
 		 */
-		err = __revoke_inmem_pages(inode, &revoke_list, false, true);
+		err = __revoke_inmem_pages(inode, &revoke_list,
+						false, true, false);
 
 		/* drop all uncommitted pages */
-		__revoke_inmem_pages(inode, &fi->inmem_pages, true, false);
+		__revoke_inmem_pages(inode, &fi->inmem_pages,
+						true, false, false);
 	} else {
-		__revoke_inmem_pages(inode, &revoke_list, false, false);
+		__revoke_inmem_pages(inode, &revoke_list,
+						false, false, false);
 	}
 
 	return err;

[PATCH 5.0 44/52] aio: simplify - and fix - fget/fput for io_submit()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

commit 84c4e1f89fefe70554da0ab33be72c9be7994379 upstream.

Al Viro root-caused a race where the IOCB_CMD_POLL handling of
fget/fput() could cause us to access the file pointer after it had
already been freed:

 "In more details - normally IOCB_CMD_POLL handling looks so:

   1) io_submit(2) allocates aio_kiocb instance and passes it to
      aio_poll()

   2) aio_poll() resolves the descriptor to struct file by req->file =
      fget(iocb->aio_fildes)

   3) aio_poll() sets ->woken to false and raises ->ki_refcnt of that
      aio_kiocb to 2 (bumps by 1, that is).

   4) aio_poll() calls vfs_poll(). After sanity checks (basically,
      "poll_wait() had been called and only once") it locks the queue.
      That's what the extra reference to iocb had been for - we know we
      can safely access it.

   5) With queue locked, we check if ->woken has already been set to
      true (by aio_poll_wake()) and, if it had been, we unlock the
      queue, drop a reference to aio_kiocb and bugger off - at that
      point it's a responsibility to aio_poll_wake() and the stuff
      called/scheduled by it. That code will drop the reference to file
      in req->file, along with the other reference to our aio_kiocb.

   6) otherwise, we see whether we need to wait. If we do, we unlock the
      queue, drop one reference to aio_kiocb and go away - eventual
      wakeup (or cancel) will deal with the reference to file and with
      the other reference to aio_kiocb

   7) otherwise we remove ourselves from waitqueue (still under the
      queue lock), so that wakeup won't get us. No async activity will
      be happening, so we can safely drop req->file and iocb ourselves.

  If wakeup happens while we are in vfs_poll(), we are fine - aio_kiocb
  won't get freed under us, so we can do all the checks and locking
  safely. And we don't touch ->file if we detect that case.

  However, vfs_poll() most certainly *does* touch the file it had been
  given. So wakeup coming while we are still in ->poll() might end up
  doing fput() on that file. That case is not too rare, and usually we
  are saved by the still present reference from descriptor table - that
  fput() is not the final one.

  But if another thread closes that descriptor right after our fget()
  and wakeup does happen before ->poll() returns, we are in trouble -
  final fput() done while we are in the middle of a method:

Al also wrote a patch to take an extra reference to the file descriptor
to fix this, but I instead suggested we just streamline the whole file
pointer handling by submit_io() so that the generic aio submission code
simply keeps the file pointer around until the aio has completed.

Fixes: bfe4037e722e ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL")
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Reported-by: syzbot+503d4cc169fcec1cb18c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/aio.c           |   72 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------------
 include/linux/fs.h |    8 +++++
 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/aio.c
+++ b/fs/aio.c
@@ -167,9 +167,13 @@ struct kioctx {
 	unsigned		id;
 };
 
+/*
+ * First field must be the file pointer in all the
+ * iocb unions! See also 'struct kiocb' in <linux/fs.h>
+ */
 struct fsync_iocb {
-	struct work_struct	work;
 	struct file		*file;
+	struct work_struct	work;
 	bool			datasync;
 };
 
@@ -183,8 +187,15 @@ struct poll_iocb {
 	struct work_struct	work;
 };
 
+/*
+ * NOTE! Each of the iocb union members has the file pointer
+ * as the first entry in their struct definition. So you can
+ * access the file pointer through any of the sub-structs,
+ * or directly as just 'ki_filp' in this struct.
+ */
 struct aio_kiocb {
 	union {
+		struct file		*ki_filp;
 		struct kiocb		rw;
 		struct fsync_iocb	fsync;
 		struct poll_iocb	poll;
@@ -1060,6 +1071,8 @@ static inline void iocb_put(struct aio_k
 {
 	if (refcount_read(&iocb->ki_refcnt) == 0 ||
 	    refcount_dec_and_test(&iocb->ki_refcnt)) {
+		if (iocb->ki_filp)
+			fput(iocb->ki_filp);
 		percpu_ref_put(&iocb->ki_ctx->reqs);
 		kmem_cache_free(kiocb_cachep, iocb);
 	}
@@ -1424,7 +1437,6 @@ static void aio_complete_rw(struct kiocb
 		file_end_write(kiocb->ki_filp);
 	}
 
-	fput(kiocb->ki_filp);
 	aio_complete(iocb, res, res2);
 }
 
@@ -1432,9 +1444,6 @@ static int aio_prep_rw(struct kiocb *req
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	req->ki_filp = fget(iocb->aio_fildes);
-	if (unlikely(!req->ki_filp))
-		return -EBADF;
 	req->ki_complete = aio_complete_rw;
 	req->private = NULL;
 	req->ki_pos = iocb->aio_offset;
@@ -1451,7 +1460,7 @@ static int aio_prep_rw(struct kiocb *req
 		ret = ioprio_check_cap(iocb->aio_reqprio);
 		if (ret) {
 			pr_debug("aio ioprio check cap error: %d\n", ret);
-			goto out_fput;
+			return ret;
 		}
 
 		req->ki_ioprio = iocb->aio_reqprio;
@@ -1460,14 +1469,10 @@ static int aio_prep_rw(struct kiocb *req
 
 	ret = kiocb_set_rw_flags(req, iocb->aio_rw_flags);
 	if (unlikely(ret))
-		goto out_fput;
+		return ret;
 
 	req->ki_flags &= ~IOCB_HIPRI; /* no one is going to poll for this I/O */
 	return 0;
-
-out_fput:
-	fput(req->ki_filp);
-	return ret;
 }
 
 static int aio_setup_rw(int rw, const struct iocb *iocb, struct iovec **iovec,
@@ -1521,24 +1526,19 @@ static ssize_t aio_read(struct kiocb *re
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 	file = req->ki_filp;
-
-	ret = -EBADF;
 	if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)))
-		goto out_fput;
+		return -EBADF;
 	ret = -EINVAL;
 	if (unlikely(!file->f_op->read_iter))
-		goto out_fput;
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	ret = aio_setup_rw(READ, iocb, &iovec, vectored, compat, &iter);
 	if (ret)
-		goto out_fput;
+		return ret;
 	ret = rw_verify_area(READ, file, &req->ki_pos, iov_iter_count(&iter));
 	if (!ret)
 		aio_rw_done(req, call_read_iter(file, req, &iter));
 	kfree(iovec);
-out_fput:
-	if (unlikely(ret))
-		fput(file);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -1555,16 +1555,14 @@ static ssize_t aio_write(struct kiocb *r
 		return ret;
 	file = req->ki_filp;
 
-	ret = -EBADF;
 	if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)))
-		goto out_fput;
-	ret = -EINVAL;
+		return -EBADF;
 	if (unlikely(!file->f_op->write_iter))
-		goto out_fput;
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	ret = aio_setup_rw(WRITE, iocb, &iovec, vectored, compat, &iter);
 	if (ret)
-		goto out_fput;
+		return ret;
 	ret = rw_verify_area(WRITE, file, &req->ki_pos, iov_iter_count(&iter));
 	if (!ret) {
 		/*
@@ -1582,9 +1580,6 @@ static ssize_t aio_write(struct kiocb *r
 		aio_rw_done(req, call_write_iter(file, req, &iter));
 	}
 	kfree(iovec);
-out_fput:
-	if (unlikely(ret))
-		fput(file);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -1594,7 +1589,6 @@ static void aio_fsync_work(struct work_s
 	int ret;
 
 	ret = vfs_fsync(req->file, req->datasync);
-	fput(req->file);
 	aio_complete(container_of(req, struct aio_kiocb, fsync), ret, 0);
 }
 
@@ -1605,13 +1599,8 @@ static int aio_fsync(struct fsync_iocb *
 			iocb->aio_rw_flags))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	req->file = fget(iocb->aio_fildes);
-	if (unlikely(!req->file))
-		return -EBADF;
-	if (unlikely(!req->file->f_op->fsync)) {
-		fput(req->file);
+	if (unlikely(!req->file->f_op->fsync))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	req->datasync = datasync;
 	INIT_WORK(&req->work, aio_fsync_work);
@@ -1621,10 +1610,7 @@ static int aio_fsync(struct fsync_iocb *
 
 static inline void aio_poll_complete(struct aio_kiocb *iocb, __poll_t mask)
 {
-	struct file *file = iocb->poll.file;
-
 	aio_complete(iocb, mangle_poll(mask), 0);
-	fput(file);
 }
 
 static void aio_poll_complete_work(struct work_struct *work)
@@ -1749,9 +1735,6 @@ static ssize_t aio_poll(struct aio_kiocb
 
 	INIT_WORK(&req->work, aio_poll_complete_work);
 	req->events = demangle_poll(iocb->aio_buf) | EPOLLERR | EPOLLHUP;
-	req->file = fget(iocb->aio_fildes);
-	if (unlikely(!req->file))
-		return -EBADF;
 
 	req->head = NULL;
 	req->woken = false;
@@ -1794,10 +1777,8 @@ static ssize_t aio_poll(struct aio_kiocb
 	spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->ctx_lock);
 
 out:
-	if (unlikely(apt.error)) {
-		fput(req->file);
+	if (unlikely(apt.error))
 		return apt.error;
-	}
 
 	if (mask)
 		aio_poll_complete(aiocb, mask);
@@ -1835,6 +1816,11 @@ static int __io_submit_one(struct kioctx
 	if (unlikely(!req))
 		goto out_put_reqs_available;
 
+	req->ki_filp = fget(iocb->aio_fildes);
+	ret = -EBADF;
+	if (unlikely(!req->ki_filp))
+		goto out_put_req;
+
 	if (iocb->aio_flags & IOCB_FLAG_RESFD) {
 		/*
 		 * If the IOCB_FLAG_RESFD flag of aio_flags is set, get an
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -304,13 +304,19 @@ enum rw_hint {
 
 struct kiocb {
 	struct file		*ki_filp;
+
+	/* The 'ki_filp' pointer is shared in a union for aio */
+	randomized_struct_fields_start
+
 	loff_t			ki_pos;
 	void (*ki_complete)(struct kiocb *iocb, long ret, long ret2);
 	void			*private;
 	int			ki_flags;
 	u16			ki_hint;
 	u16			ki_ioprio; /* See linux/ioprio.h */
-} __randomize_layout;
+
+	randomized_struct_fields_end
+};
 
 static inline bool is_sync_kiocb(struct kiocb *kiocb)
 {

[PATCH 5.0 45/52] netfilter: ebtables: remove BUGPRINT messages

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>

commit d824548dae220820bdf69b2d1561b7c4b072783f upstream.

They are however frequently triggered by syzkaller, so remove them.

ebtables userspace should never trigger any of these, so there is little
value in making them pr_debug (or ratelimited).

Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c |  131 +++++++++++-----------------------------
 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-)

--- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
+++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
@@ -31,10 +31,6 @@
 /* needed for logical [in,out]-dev filtering */
 #include "../br_private.h"
 
-#define BUGPRINT(format, args...) printk("kernel msg: ebtables bug: please "\
-					 "report to author: "format, ## args)
-/* #define BUGPRINT(format, args...) */
-
 /* Each cpu has its own set of counters, so there is no need for write_lock in
  * the softirq
  * For reading or updating the counters, the user context needs to
@@ -466,8 +462,6 @@ static int ebt_verify_pointers(const str
 				/* we make userspace set this right,
 				 * so there is no misunderstanding
 				 */
-				BUGPRINT("EBT_ENTRY_OR_ENTRIES shouldn't be set "
-					 "in distinguisher\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 			if (i != NF_BR_NUMHOOKS)
@@ -485,18 +479,14 @@ static int ebt_verify_pointers(const str
 			offset += e->next_offset;
 		}
 	}
-	if (offset != limit) {
-		BUGPRINT("entries_size too small\n");
+	if (offset != limit)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	/* check if all valid hooks have a chain */
 	for (i = 0; i < NF_BR_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
 		if (!newinfo->hook_entry[i] &&
-		   (valid_hooks & (1 << i))) {
-			BUGPRINT("Valid hook without chain\n");
+		   (valid_hooks & (1 << i)))
 			return -EINVAL;
-		}
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -523,26 +513,20 @@ ebt_check_entry_size_and_hooks(const str
 		/* this checks if the previous chain has as many entries
 		 * as it said it has
 		 */
-		if (*n != *cnt) {
-			BUGPRINT("nentries does not equal the nr of entries "
-				 "in the chain\n");
+		if (*n != *cnt)
 			return -EINVAL;
-		}
+
 		if (((struct ebt_entries *)e)->policy != EBT_DROP &&
 		   ((struct ebt_entries *)e)->policy != EBT_ACCEPT) {
 			/* only RETURN from udc */
 			if (i != NF_BR_NUMHOOKS ||
-			   ((struct ebt_entries *)e)->policy != EBT_RETURN) {
-				BUGPRINT("bad policy\n");
+			   ((struct ebt_entries *)e)->policy != EBT_RETURN)
 				return -EINVAL;
-			}
 		}
 		if (i == NF_BR_NUMHOOKS) /* it's a user defined chain */
 			(*udc_cnt)++;
-		if (((struct ebt_entries *)e)->counter_offset != *totalcnt) {
-			BUGPRINT("counter_offset != totalcnt");
+		if (((struct ebt_entries *)e)->counter_offset != *totalcnt)
 			return -EINVAL;
-		}
 		*n = ((struct ebt_entries *)e)->nentries;
 		*cnt = 0;
 		return 0;
@@ -550,15 +534,13 @@ ebt_check_entry_size_and_hooks(const str
 	/* a plain old entry, heh */
 	if (sizeof(struct ebt_entry) > e->watchers_offset ||
 	   e->watchers_offset > e->target_offset ||
-	   e->target_offset >= e->next_offset) {
-		BUGPRINT("entry offsets not in right order\n");
+	   e->target_offset >= e->next_offset)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+
 	/* this is not checked anywhere else */
-	if (e->next_offset - e->target_offset < sizeof(struct ebt_entry_target)) {
-		BUGPRINT("target size too small\n");
+	if (e->next_offset - e->target_offset < sizeof(struct ebt_entry_target))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+
 	(*cnt)++;
 	(*totalcnt)++;
 	return 0;
@@ -678,18 +660,15 @@ ebt_check_entry(struct ebt_entry *e, str
 	if (e->bitmask == 0)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (e->bitmask & ~EBT_F_MASK) {
-		BUGPRINT("Unknown flag for bitmask\n");
+	if (e->bitmask & ~EBT_F_MASK)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-	if (e->invflags & ~EBT_INV_MASK) {
-		BUGPRINT("Unknown flag for inv bitmask\n");
+
+	if (e->invflags & ~EBT_INV_MASK)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-	if ((e->bitmask & EBT_NOPROTO) && (e->bitmask & EBT_802_3)) {
-		BUGPRINT("NOPROTO & 802_3 not allowed\n");
+
+	if ((e->bitmask & EBT_NOPROTO) && (e->bitmask & EBT_802_3))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+
 	/* what hook do we belong to? */
 	for (i = 0; i < NF_BR_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
 		if (!newinfo->hook_entry[i])
@@ -748,13 +727,11 @@ ebt_check_entry(struct ebt_entry *e, str
 	t->u.target = target;
 	if (t->u.target == &ebt_standard_target) {
 		if (gap < sizeof(struct ebt_standard_target)) {
-			BUGPRINT("Standard target size too big\n");
 			ret = -EFAULT;
 			goto cleanup_watchers;
 		}
 		if (((struct ebt_standard_target *)t)->verdict <
 		   -NUM_STANDARD_TARGETS) {
-			BUGPRINT("Invalid standard target\n");
 			ret = -EFAULT;
 			goto cleanup_watchers;
 		}
@@ -813,10 +790,9 @@ static int check_chainloops(const struct
 		if (strcmp(t->u.name, EBT_STANDARD_TARGET))
 			goto letscontinue;
 		if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct ebt_standard_target) >
-		   e->next_offset) {
-			BUGPRINT("Standard target size too big\n");
+		   e->next_offset)
 			return -1;
-		}
+
 		verdict = ((struct ebt_standard_target *)t)->verdict;
 		if (verdict >= 0) { /* jump to another chain */
 			struct ebt_entries *hlp2 =
@@ -825,14 +801,12 @@ static int check_chainloops(const struct
 				if (hlp2 == cl_s[i].cs.chaininfo)
 					break;
 			/* bad destination or loop */
-			if (i == udc_cnt) {
-				BUGPRINT("bad destination\n");
+			if (i == udc_cnt)
 				return -1;
-			}
-			if (cl_s[i].cs.n) {
-				BUGPRINT("loop\n");
+
+			if (cl_s[i].cs.n)
 				return -1;
-			}
+
 			if (cl_s[i].hookmask & (1 << hooknr))
 				goto letscontinue;
 			/* this can't be 0, so the loop test is correct */
@@ -865,24 +839,21 @@ static int translate_table(struct net *n
 	i = 0;
 	while (i < NF_BR_NUMHOOKS && !newinfo->hook_entry[i])
 		i++;
-	if (i == NF_BR_NUMHOOKS) {
-		BUGPRINT("No valid hooks specified\n");
+	if (i == NF_BR_NUMHOOKS)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-	if (newinfo->hook_entry[i] != (struct ebt_entries *)newinfo->entries) {
-		BUGPRINT("Chains don't start at beginning\n");
+
+	if (newinfo->hook_entry[i] != (struct ebt_entries *)newinfo->entries)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+
 	/* make sure chains are ordered after each other in same order
 	 * as their corresponding hooks
 	 */
 	for (j = i + 1; j < NF_BR_NUMHOOKS; j++) {
 		if (!newinfo->hook_entry[j])
 			continue;
-		if (newinfo->hook_entry[j] <= newinfo->hook_entry[i]) {
-			BUGPRINT("Hook order must be followed\n");
+		if (newinfo->hook_entry[j] <= newinfo->hook_entry[i])
 			return -EINVAL;
-		}
+
 		i = j;
 	}
 
@@ -900,15 +871,11 @@ static int translate_table(struct net *n
 	if (ret != 0)
 		return ret;
 
-	if (i != j) {
-		BUGPRINT("nentries does not equal the nr of entries in the "
-			 "(last) chain\n");
+	if (i != j)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-	if (k != newinfo->nentries) {
-		BUGPRINT("Total nentries is wrong\n");
+
+	if (k != newinfo->nentries)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	/* get the location of the udc, put them in an array
 	 * while we're at it, allocate the chainstack
@@ -942,7 +909,6 @@ static int translate_table(struct net *n
 		   ebt_get_udc_positions, newinfo, &i, cl_s);
 		/* sanity check */
 		if (i != udc_cnt) {
-			BUGPRINT("i != udc_cnt\n");
 			vfree(cl_s);
 			return -EFAULT;
 		}
@@ -1042,7 +1008,6 @@ static int do_replace_finish(struct net
 		goto free_unlock;
 
 	if (repl->num_counters && repl->num_counters != t->private->nentries) {
-		BUGPRINT("Wrong nr. of counters requested\n");
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto free_unlock;
 	}
@@ -1118,15 +1083,12 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, c
 	if (copy_from_user(&tmp, user, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	if (len != sizeof(tmp) + tmp.entries_size) {
-		BUGPRINT("Wrong len argument\n");
+	if (len != sizeof(tmp) + tmp.entries_size)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
-	if (tmp.entries_size == 0) {
-		BUGPRINT("Entries_size never zero\n");
+	if (tmp.entries_size == 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+
 	/* overflow check */
 	if (tmp.nentries >= ((INT_MAX - sizeof(struct ebt_table_info)) /
 			NR_CPUS - SMP_CACHE_BYTES) / sizeof(struct ebt_counter))
@@ -1153,7 +1115,6 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, c
 	}
 	if (copy_from_user(
 	   newinfo->entries, tmp.entries, tmp.entries_size) != 0) {
-		BUGPRINT("Couldn't copy entries from userspace\n");
 		ret = -EFAULT;
 		goto free_entries;
 	}
@@ -1194,10 +1155,8 @@ int ebt_register_table(struct net *net,
 
 	if (input_table == NULL || (repl = input_table->table) == NULL ||
 	    repl->entries == NULL || repl->entries_size == 0 ||
-	    repl->counters != NULL || input_table->private != NULL) {
-		BUGPRINT("Bad table data for ebt_register_table!!!\n");
+	    repl->counters != NULL || input_table->private != NULL)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	/* Don't add one table to multiple lists. */
 	table = kmemdup(input_table, sizeof(struct ebt_table), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1235,13 +1194,10 @@ int ebt_register_table(struct net *net,
 				((char *)repl->hook_entry[i] - repl->entries);
 	}
 	ret = translate_table(net, repl->name, newinfo);
-	if (ret != 0) {
-		BUGPRINT("Translate_table failed\n");
+	if (ret != 0)
 		goto free_chainstack;
-	}
 
 	if (table->check && table->check(newinfo, table->valid_hooks)) {
-		BUGPRINT("The table doesn't like its own initial data, lol\n");
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto free_chainstack;
 	}
@@ -1252,7 +1208,6 @@ int ebt_register_table(struct net *net,
 	list_for_each_entry(t, &net->xt.tables[NFPROTO_BRIDGE], list) {
 		if (strcmp(t->name, table->name) == 0) {
 			ret = -EEXIST;
-			BUGPRINT("Table name already exists\n");
 			goto free_unlock;
 		}
 	}
@@ -1320,7 +1275,6 @@ static int do_update_counters(struct net
 		goto free_tmp;
 
 	if (num_counters != t->private->nentries) {
-		BUGPRINT("Wrong nr of counters\n");
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto unlock_mutex;
 	}
@@ -1447,10 +1401,8 @@ static int copy_counters_to_user(struct
 	if (num_counters == 0)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (num_counters != nentries) {
-		BUGPRINT("Num_counters wrong\n");
+	if (num_counters != nentries)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	counterstmp = vmalloc(array_size(nentries, sizeof(*counterstmp)));
 	if (!counterstmp)
@@ -1496,15 +1448,11 @@ static int copy_everything_to_user(struc
 	   (tmp.num_counters ? nentries * sizeof(struct ebt_counter) : 0))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (tmp.nentries != nentries) {
-		BUGPRINT("Nentries wrong\n");
+	if (tmp.nentries != nentries)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
-	if (tmp.entries_size != entries_size) {
-		BUGPRINT("Wrong size\n");
+	if (tmp.entries_size != entries_size)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	ret = copy_counters_to_user(t, oldcounters, tmp.counters,
 					tmp.num_counters, nentries);
@@ -1576,7 +1524,6 @@ static int do_ebt_get_ctl(struct sock *s
 		}
 		mutex_unlock(&ebt_mutex);
 		if (copy_to_user(user, &tmp, *len) != 0) {
-			BUGPRINT("c2u Didn't work\n");
 			ret = -EFAULT;
 			break;
 		}

[PATCH 5.0 46/52] loop: access lo_backing_file only when the loop device is Lo_bound

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com>

commit f7c8a4120eedf24c36090b7542b179ff7a649219 upstream.

Commit 758a58d0bc67 ("loop: set GENHD_FL_NO_PART_SCAN after
blkdev_reread_part()") separates "lo->lo_backing_file = NULL" and
"lo->lo_state = Lo_unbound" into different critical regions protected by
loop_ctl_mutex.

However, there is below race that the NULL lo->lo_backing_file would be
accessed when the backend of a loop is another loop device, e.g., loop0's
backend is a file, while loop1's backend is loop0.

loop0's backend is file            loop1's backend is loop0

__loop_clr_fd()
  mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
  lo->lo_backing_file = NULL; --> set to NULL
  mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
                                   loop_set_fd()
                                     mutex_lock_killable(&loop_ctl_mutex);
                                     loop_validate_file()
                                       f = l->lo_backing_file; --> NULL
                                         access if loop0 is not Lo_unbound
  mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
  lo->lo_state = Lo_unbound;
  mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);

lo->lo_backing_file should be accessed only when the loop device is
Lo_bound.

In fact, the problem has been introduced already in commit 7ccd0791d985
("loop: Push loop_ctl_mutex down into loop_clr_fd()") after which
loop_validate_file() could see devices in Lo_rundown state with which it
did not count. It was harmless at that point but still.

Fixes: 7ccd0791d985 ("loop: Push loop_ctl_mutex down into loop_clr_fd()")
Reported-by: syzbot+9bdc1adc1c55e7fe765b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/block/loop.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/block/loop.c
+++ b/drivers/block/loop.c
@@ -656,7 +656,7 @@ static int loop_validate_file(struct fil
 			return -EBADF;
 
 		l = f->f_mapping->host->i_bdev->bd_disk->private_data;
-		if (l->lo_state == Lo_unbound) {
+		if (l->lo_state != Lo_bound) {
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 		f = l->lo_backing_file;

[PATCH 5.0 47/52] x86/unwind: Handle NULL pointer calls better in frame unwinder

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>

commit f4f34e1b82eb4219d8eaa1c7e2e17ca219a6a2b5 upstream.

When the frame unwinder is invoked for an oops caused by a call to NULL, it
currently skips the parent function because BP still points to the parent's
stack frame; the (nonexistent) current function only has the first half of
a stack frame, and BP doesn't point to it yet.

Add a special case for IP==0 that calculates a fake BP from SP, then uses
the real BP for the next frame.

Note that this handles first_frame specially: Return information about the
parent function as long as the saved IP is >=first_frame, even if the fake
BP points below it.

With an artificially-added NULL call in prctl_set_seccomp(), before this
patch, the trace is:

Call Trace:
 ? prctl_set_seccomp+0x3a/0x50
 __x64_sys_prctl+0x457/0x6f0
 ? __ia32_sys_prctl+0x750/0x750
 do_syscall_64+0x72/0x160
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

After this patch, the trace is:

Call Trace:
 prctl_set_seccomp+0x3a/0x50
 __x64_sys_prctl+0x457/0x6f0
 ? __ia32_sys_prctl+0x750/0x750
 do_syscall_64+0x72/0x160
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: syzbot <syzbot+ca95b2b7aef9e7cbd6ab@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Michal Marek <michal.lkml@markovi.net>
Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190301031201.7416-1-jannh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h  |    6 ++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/unwind_frame.c |   25 ++++++++++++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h
@@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ struct unwind_state {
 #elif defined(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER)
 	bool got_irq;
 	unsigned long *bp, *orig_sp, ip;
+	/*
+	 * If non-NULL: The current frame is incomplete and doesn't contain a
+	 * valid BP. When looking for the next frame, use this instead of the
+	 * non-existent saved BP.
+	 */
+	unsigned long *next_bp;
 	struct pt_regs *regs;
 #else
 	unsigned long *sp;
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_frame.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_frame.c
@@ -320,10 +320,14 @@ bool unwind_next_frame(struct unwind_sta
 	}
 
 	/* Get the next frame pointer: */
-	if (state->regs)
+	if (state->next_bp) {
+		next_bp = state->next_bp;
+		state->next_bp = NULL;
+	} else if (state->regs) {
 		next_bp = (unsigned long *)state->regs->bp;
-	else
+	} else {
 		next_bp = (unsigned long *)READ_ONCE_TASK_STACK(state->task, *state->bp);
+	}
 
 	/* Move to the next frame if it's safe: */
 	if (!update_stack_state(state, next_bp))
@@ -398,6 +402,21 @@ void __unwind_start(struct unwind_state
 
 	bp = get_frame_pointer(task, regs);
 
+	/*
+	 * If we crash with IP==0, the last successfully executed instruction
+	 * was probably an indirect function call with a NULL function pointer.
+	 * That means that SP points into the middle of an incomplete frame:
+	 * *SP is a return pointer, and *(SP-sizeof(unsigned long)) is where we
+	 * would have written a frame pointer if we hadn't crashed.
+	 * Pretend that the frame is complete and that BP points to it, but save
+	 * the real BP so that we can use it when looking for the next frame.
+	 */
+	if (regs && regs->ip == 0 &&
+	    (unsigned long *)kernel_stack_pointer(regs) >= first_frame) {
+		state->next_bp = bp;
+		bp = ((unsigned long *)kernel_stack_pointer(regs)) - 1;
+	}
+
 	/* Initialize stack info and make sure the frame data is accessible: */
 	get_stack_info(bp, state->task, &state->stack_info,
 		       &state->stack_mask);
@@ -410,7 +429,7 @@ void __unwind_start(struct unwind_state
 	 */
 	while (!unwind_done(state) &&
 	       (!on_stack(&state->stack_info, first_frame, sizeof(long)) ||
-			state->bp < first_frame))
+			(state->next_bp == NULL && state->bp < first_frame)))
 		unwind_next_frame(state);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__unwind_start);

[PATCH 5.0 48/52] x86/unwind: Add hardcoded ORC entry for NULL

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>

commit ac5ceccce5501e43d217c596e4ee859f2a3fef79 upstream.

When the ORC unwinder is invoked for an oops caused by IP==0,
it currently has no idea what to do because there is no debug information
for the stack frame of NULL.

But if RIP is NULL, it is very likely that the last successfully executed
instruction was an indirect CALL/JMP, and it is possible to unwind out in
the same way as for the first instruction of a normal function. Hardcode
a corresponding ORC entry.

With an artificially-added NULL call in prctl_set_seccomp(), before this
patch, the trace is:

Call Trace:
 ? __x64_sys_prctl+0x402/0x680
 ? __ia32_sys_prctl+0x6e0/0x6e0
 ? __do_page_fault+0x457/0x620
 ? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x160
 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

After this patch, the trace looks like this:

Call Trace:
 __x64_sys_prctl+0x402/0x680
 ? __ia32_sys_prctl+0x6e0/0x6e0
 ? __do_page_fault+0x457/0x620
 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x160
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

prctl_set_seccomp() still doesn't show up in the trace because for some
reason, tail call optimization is only disabled in builds that use the
frame pointer unwinder.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: syzbot <syzbot+ca95b2b7aef9e7cbd6ab@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Michal Marek <michal.lkml@markovi.net>
Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190301031201.7416-2-jannh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c |   17 +++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
@@ -113,6 +113,20 @@ static struct orc_entry *orc_ftrace_find
 }
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * If we crash with IP==0, the last successfully executed instruction
+ * was probably an indirect function call with a NULL function pointer,
+ * and we don't have unwind information for NULL.
+ * This hardcoded ORC entry for IP==0 allows us to unwind from a NULL function
+ * pointer into its parent and then continue normally from there.
+ */
+static struct orc_entry null_orc_entry = {
+	.sp_offset = sizeof(long),
+	.sp_reg = ORC_REG_SP,
+	.bp_reg = ORC_REG_UNDEFINED,
+	.type = ORC_TYPE_CALL
+};
+
 static struct orc_entry *orc_find(unsigned long ip)
 {
 	static struct orc_entry *orc;
@@ -120,6 +134,9 @@ static struct orc_entry *orc_find(unsign
 	if (!orc_init)
 		return NULL;
 
+	if (ip == 0)
+		return &null_orc_entry;
+
 	/* For non-init vmlinux addresses, use the fast lookup table: */
 	if (ip >= LOOKUP_START_IP && ip < LOOKUP_STOP_IP) {
 		unsigned int idx, start, stop;

[PATCH 5.0 49/52] locking/lockdep: Add debug_locks check in __lock_downgrade()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>

commit 71492580571467fb7177aade19c18ce7486267f5 upstream.

Tetsuo Handa had reported he saw an incorrect "downgrading a read lock"
warning right after a previous lockdep warning. It is likely that the
previous warning turned off lock debugging causing the lockdep to have
inconsistency states leading to the lock downgrade warning.

Fix that by add a check for debug_locks at the beginning of
__lock_downgrade().

Debugged-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Reported-by: syzbot+53383ae265fb161ef488@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1547093005-26085-1-git-send-email-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 kernel/locking/lockdep.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/kernel/locking/lockdep.c
+++ b/kernel/locking/lockdep.c
@@ -3535,6 +3535,9 @@ static int __lock_downgrade(struct lockd
 	unsigned int depth;
 	int i;
 
+	if (unlikely(!debug_locks))
+		return 0;
+
 	depth = curr->lockdep_depth;
 	/*
 	 * This function is about (re)setting the class of a held lock,

[PATCH 5.0 50/52] mm, mempolicy: fix uninit memory access

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>

commit 2e25644e8da4ed3a27e7b8315aaae74660be72dc upstream.

Syzbot with KMSAN reports (excerpt):

==================================================================
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in mpol_rebind_policy mm/mempolicy.c:353 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in mpol_rebind_mm+0x249/0x370 mm/mempolicy.c:384
CPU: 1 PID: 17420 Comm: syz-executor4 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc7+ #15
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
  dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
  kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:613
  __msan_warning+0x82/0xf0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:295
  mpol_rebind_policy mm/mempolicy.c:353 [inline]
  mpol_rebind_mm+0x249/0x370 mm/mempolicy.c:384
  update_tasks_nodemask+0x608/0xca0 kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:1120
  update_nodemasks_hier kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:1185 [inline]
  update_nodemask kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:1253 [inline]
  cpuset_write_resmask+0x2a98/0x34b0 kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:1728

...

Uninit was created at:
  kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:204 [inline]
  kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x92/0x150 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:158
  kmsan_kmalloc+0xa6/0x130 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:176
  kmem_cache_alloc+0x572/0xb90 mm/slub.c:2777
  mpol_new mm/mempolicy.c:276 [inline]
  do_mbind mm/mempolicy.c:1180 [inline]
  kernel_mbind+0x8a7/0x31a0 mm/mempolicy.c:1347
  __do_sys_mbind mm/mempolicy.c:1354 [inline]

As it's difficult to report where exactly the uninit value resides in
the mempolicy object, we have to guess a bit.  mm/mempolicy.c:353
contains this part of mpol_rebind_policy():

        if (!mpol_store_user_nodemask(pol) &&
            nodes_equal(pol->w.cpuset_mems_allowed, *newmask))

"mpol_store_user_nodemask(pol)" is testing pol->flags, which I couldn't
ever see being uninitialized after leaving mpol_new().  So I'll guess
it's actually about accessing pol->w.cpuset_mems_allowed on line 354,
but still part of statement starting on line 353.

For w.cpuset_mems_allowed to be not initialized, and the nodes_equal()
reachable for a mempolicy where mpol_set_nodemask() is called in
do_mbind(), it seems the only possibility is a MPOL_PREFERRED policy
with empty set of nodes, i.e.  MPOL_LOCAL equivalent, with MPOL_F_LOCAL
flag.  Let's exclude such policies from the nodes_equal() check.  Note
the uninit access should be benign anyway, as rebinding this kind of
policy is always a no-op.  Therefore no actual need for stable
inclusion.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a71997c3-e8ae-a787-d5ce-3db05768b27c@suse.cz
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/73da3e9c-cc84-509e-17d9-0c434bb9967d@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reported-by: syzbot+b19c2dc2c990ea657a71@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Yisheng Xie <xieyisheng1@huawei.com>
Cc: zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 mm/mempolicy.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/mm/mempolicy.c
+++ b/mm/mempolicy.c
@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ static void mpol_rebind_policy(struct me
 {
 	if (!pol)
 		return;
-	if (!mpol_store_user_nodemask(pol) &&
+	if (!mpol_store_user_nodemask(pol) && !(pol->flags & MPOL_F_LOCAL) &&
 	    nodes_equal(pol->w.cpuset_mems_allowed, *newmask))
 		return;
 

[PATCH 5.0 51/52] ALSA: hda - Record the current power state before suspend/resume calls

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

commit 98081ca62cbac31fb0f7efaf90b2e7384ce22257 upstream.

Currently we deal with single codec and suspend codec callbacks for
all S3, S4 and runtime PM handling.  But it turned out that we want
distinguish the call patterns sometimes, e.g. for applying some init
sequence only at probing and restoring from hibernate.

This patch slightly modifies the common PM callbacks for HD-audio
codec and stores the currently processed PM event in power_state of
the codec's device.power field, which is currently unused.  The codec
callback can take a look at this event value and judges which purpose
it's being called.

Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 sound/pci/hda/hda_codec.c |   43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/sound/pci/hda/hda_codec.c
+++ b/sound/pci/hda/hda_codec.c
@@ -2917,6 +2917,7 @@ static void hda_call_codec_resume(struct
 		hda_jackpoll_work(&codec->jackpoll_work.work);
 	else
 		snd_hda_jack_report_sync(codec);
+	codec->core.dev.power.power_state = PMSG_ON;
 	snd_hdac_leave_pm(&codec->core);
 }
 
@@ -2950,10 +2951,48 @@ static int hda_codec_runtime_resume(stru
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_PM */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP
+static int hda_codec_pm_suspend(struct device *dev)
+{
+	dev->power.power_state = PMSG_SUSPEND;
+	return pm_runtime_force_suspend(dev);
+}
+
+static int hda_codec_pm_resume(struct device *dev)
+{
+	dev->power.power_state = PMSG_RESUME;
+	return pm_runtime_force_resume(dev);
+}
+
+static int hda_codec_pm_freeze(struct device *dev)
+{
+	dev->power.power_state = PMSG_FREEZE;
+	return pm_runtime_force_suspend(dev);
+}
+
+static int hda_codec_pm_thaw(struct device *dev)
+{
+	dev->power.power_state = PMSG_THAW;
+	return pm_runtime_force_resume(dev);
+}
+
+static int hda_codec_pm_restore(struct device *dev)
+{
+	dev->power.power_state = PMSG_RESTORE;
+	return pm_runtime_force_resume(dev);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_PM_SLEEP */
+
 /* referred in hda_bind.c */
 const struct dev_pm_ops hda_codec_driver_pm = {
-	SET_SYSTEM_SLEEP_PM_OPS(pm_runtime_force_suspend,
-				pm_runtime_force_resume)
+#ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP
+	.suspend = hda_codec_pm_suspend,
+	.resume = hda_codec_pm_resume,
+	.freeze = hda_codec_pm_freeze,
+	.thaw = hda_codec_pm_thaw,
+	.poweroff = hda_codec_pm_suspend,
+	.restore = hda_codec_pm_restore,
+#endif /* CONFIG_PM_SLEEP */
 	SET_RUNTIME_PM_OPS(hda_codec_runtime_suspend, hda_codec_runtime_resume,
 			   NULL)
 };

[PATCH 5.0 52/52] ALSA: hda - Enforces runtime_resume after S3 and S4 for each codec

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.0-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hui Wang <hui.wang@canonical.com>

commit b5a236c175b0d984552a5f7c9d35141024c2b261 upstream.

Recently we found the audio jack detection stop working after suspend
on many machines with Realtek codec. Sometimes the audio selection
dialogue didn't show up after users plugged headhphone/headset into
the headset jack, sometimes after uses plugged headphone/headset, then
click the sound icon on the upper-right corner of gnome-desktop, it
also showed the speaker rather than the headphone.

The root cause is that before suspend, the codec already call the
runtime_suspend since this codec is not used by any apps, then in
resume, it will not call runtime_resume for this codec. But for some
realtek codec (so far, alc236, alc255 and alc891) with the specific
BIOS, if it doesn't run runtime_resume after suspend, all codec
functions including jack detection stop working anymore.

This problem existed for a long time, but it was not exposed, that is
because when problem happens, if users play sound or open
sound-setting to check audio device, this will trigger calling to
runtime_resume (via snd_hda_power_up), then the codec starts working
again before users notice this problem.

Since we don't know how many codec and BIOS combinations have this
problem, to fix it, let the driver call runtime_resume for all codecs
in pm_resume, maybe for some codecs, this is not needed, but it is
harmless. After a codec is runtime resumed, if it is not used by any
apps, it will be runtime suspended soon and furthermore we don't run
suspend frequently, this change will not add much power consumption.

Fixes: cc72da7d4d06 ("ALSA: hda - Use standard runtime PM for codec power-save control")
Signed-off-by: Hui Wang <hui.wang@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 sound/pci/hda/hda_codec.c |   20 +++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/sound/pci/hda/hda_codec.c
+++ b/sound/pci/hda/hda_codec.c
@@ -2952,6 +2952,20 @@ static int hda_codec_runtime_resume(stru
 #endif /* CONFIG_PM */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP
+static int hda_codec_force_resume(struct device *dev)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	/* The get/put pair below enforces the runtime resume even if the
+	 * device hasn't been used at suspend time.  This trick is needed to
+	 * update the jack state change during the sleep.
+	 */
+	pm_runtime_get_noresume(dev);
+	ret = pm_runtime_force_resume(dev);
+	pm_runtime_put(dev);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static int hda_codec_pm_suspend(struct device *dev)
 {
 	dev->power.power_state = PMSG_SUSPEND;
@@ -2961,7 +2975,7 @@ static int hda_codec_pm_suspend(struct d
 static int hda_codec_pm_resume(struct device *dev)
 {
 	dev->power.power_state = PMSG_RESUME;
-	return pm_runtime_force_resume(dev);
+	return hda_codec_force_resume(dev);
 }
 
 static int hda_codec_pm_freeze(struct device *dev)
@@ -2973,13 +2987,13 @@ static int hda_codec_pm_freeze(struct de
 static int hda_codec_pm_thaw(struct device *dev)
 {
 	dev->power.power_state = PMSG_THAW;
-	return pm_runtime_force_resume(dev);
+	return hda_codec_force_resume(dev);
 }
 
 static int hda_codec_pm_restore(struct device *dev)
 {
 	dev->power.power_state = PMSG_RESTORE;
-	return pm_runtime_force_resume(dev);
+	return hda_codec_force_resume(dev);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_PM_SLEEP */
 

Re: [PATCH 5.0 00/52] 5.0.5-stable review

[Jon Hunter]

On 26/03/2019 06:29, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.0.5 release.
> There are 52 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Thu Mar 28 04:26:38 UTC 2019.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.0.5-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> 	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.0.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h

All tests are passing for Tegra ...

Test results for stable-v5.0:
    11 builds:	11 pass, 0 fail
    22 boots:	22 pass, 0 fail
    28 tests:	28 pass, 0 fail

Linux version:	5.0.5-rc1-gebcb1bb
Boards tested:	tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra186-p2771-0000,
                tegra194-p2972-0000, tegra20-ventana,
                tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra30-cardhu-a04

Cheers
Jon

-- 
nvpublic

Re: [PATCH 5.0 00/52] 5.0.5-stable review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 03:20:22PM +0000, Jon Hunter wrote:
> 
> On 26/03/2019 06:29, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.0.5 release.
> > There are 52 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > let me know.
> > 
> > Responses should be made by Thu Mar 28 04:26:38 UTC 2019.
> > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> > 
> > The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> > 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.0.5-rc1.gz
> > or in the git tree and branch at:
> > 	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.0.y
> > and the diffstat can be found below.
> > 
> > thanks,
> > 
> > greg k-h
> 
> All tests are passing for Tegra ...
> 
> Test results for stable-v5.0:
>     11 builds:	11 pass, 0 fail
>     22 boots:	22 pass, 0 fail
>     28 tests:	28 pass, 0 fail
> 
> Linux version:	5.0.5-rc1-gebcb1bb
> Boards tested:	tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra186-p2771-0000,
>                 tegra194-p2972-0000, tegra20-ventana,
>                 tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra30-cardhu-a04
> 

Wonderful, thanks for testing all of these and letting me know.

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH 5.0 00/52] 5.0.5-stable review

[Guenter Roeck]

On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 03:29:47PM +0900, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.0.5 release.
> There are 52 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Thu Mar 28 04:26:38 UTC 2019.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 

Build results:
	total: 159 pass: 159 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 345 pass: 345 fail: 0

Guenter

Re: [PATCH 5.0 00/52] 5.0.5-stable review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 10:50:11AM -0700, Guenter Roeck wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 03:29:47PM +0900, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.0.5 release.
> > There are 52 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > let me know.
> > 
> > Responses should be made by Thu Mar 28 04:26:38 UTC 2019.
> > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> > 
> 
> Build results:
> 	total: 159 pass: 159 fail: 0
> Qemu test results:
> 	total: 345 pass: 345 fail: 0

Great, thanks for testing all of these and letting me know.

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH 5.0 00/52] 5.0.5-stable review

[shuah]

On 3/26/19 12:29 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.0.5 release.
> There are 52 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Thu Mar 28 04:26:38 UTC 2019.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.0.5-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> 	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.0.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h
> 

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

thanks,
-- Shuah

Re: [PATCH 5.0 00/52] 5.0.5-stable review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 05:18:04PM -0600, shuah wrote:
> On 3/26/19 12:29 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.0.5 release.
> > There are 52 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > let me know.
> > 
> > Responses should be made by Thu Mar 28 04:26:38 UTC 2019.
> > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> > 
> > The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> > 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.0.5-rc1.gz
> > or in the git tree and branch at:
> > 	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.0.y
> > and the diffstat can be found below.
> > 
> > thanks,
> > 
> > greg k-h
> > 
> 
> Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

Thanks for testing all of these and letting me know.

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH 5.0 00/52] 5.0.5-stable review

[Naresh Kamboju]

On Tue, 26 Mar 2019 at 12:09, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.0.5 release.
> There are 52 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Thu Mar 28 04:26:38 UTC 2019.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
>         https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.0.5-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
>         git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.0.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------

kernel: 5.0.5-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-5.0.y
git commit: ebcb1bb407e721935a9b63a86b17bacb9a1bbe84
git describe: v5.0.4-53-gebcb1bb407e7
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-5.0-oe/build/v5.0.4-53-gebcb1bb407e7


No regressions (compared to build v5.0.4)

No fixes (compared to build v5.0.4)

Ran 23108 total tests in the following environments and test suites.

Environments
--------------
- dragonboard-410c
- hi6220-hikey
- i386
- juno-r2
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- x15
- x86

Test Suites
-----------
* boot
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* kselftest
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-timers-tests
* perf
* spectre-meltdown-checker-test
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none

-- 
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org

Re: [PATCH 5.0 00/52] 5.0.5-stable review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at 09:36:06AM +0530, Naresh Kamboju wrote:
> On Tue, 26 Mar 2019 at 12:09, Greg Kroah-Hartman
> <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >
> > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.0.5 release.
> > There are 52 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > let me know.
> >
> > Responses should be made by Thu Mar 28 04:26:38 UTC 2019.
> > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> >
> > The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> >         https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.0.5-rc1.gz
> > or in the git tree and branch at:
> >         git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.0.y
> > and the diffstat can be found below.
> >
> > thanks,
> >
> > greg k-h
> >
> 
> Results from Linaro’s test farm.
> No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

Thank you for testing all of these and letting me know.

greg k-h