* [PATCH v3] KEYS: trusted: allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a TPM
@ 2019-03-26 12:11 Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-03-27 17:15 ` Dan Williams
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2019-03-26 12:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: linux-security-module, Jarkko Sakkinen, James Morris,
James Bottomley, Mimi Zohar, David Howells, Serge E. Hallyn,
open list:KEYS-TRUSTED, open list
Allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a TPM. This commit adds checks to the
key type callbacks and exported functions to fail when a TPM is not
available.
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Reported-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Tested-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Fixes: 240730437deb ("KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure...")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
v3:
- remove unnecessary check for chip in init_trusted()
v2:
- Remove checks from the key type callbacks because the key type will
not be registered.
- Cc to James Morris because hopefully we can land this 5.1.0.
security/keys/trusted.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index ecec672d3a77..efdbf17f3915 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -135,6 +135,9 @@ int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
int ret;
va_list argp;
+ if (!chip)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
@@ -196,6 +199,9 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
va_list argp;
int ret;
+ if (!chip)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
bufsize = LOAD32(buffer, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
tag = LOAD16(buffer, 0);
ordinal = command;
@@ -363,6 +369,9 @@ int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
{
int rc;
+ if (!chip)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
rc = tpm_send(chip, cmd, buflen);
dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
@@ -429,6 +438,9 @@ int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce)
{
int ret;
+ if (!chip)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
INIT_BUF(tb);
store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
store32(tb, TPM_OIAP_SIZE);
@@ -1245,9 +1257,13 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void)
{
int ret;
+ /* encrypted_keys.ko depends on successful load of this module even if
+ * TPM is not used.
+ */
chip = tpm_default_chip();
if (!chip)
- return -ENOENT;
+ return 0;
+
ret = init_digests();
if (ret < 0)
goto err_put;
@@ -1269,10 +1285,12 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void)
static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void)
{
- put_device(&chip->dev);
- kfree(digests);
- trusted_shash_release();
- unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+ if (chip) {
+ put_device(&chip->dev);
+ kfree(digests);
+ trusted_shash_release();
+ unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+ }
}
late_initcall(init_trusted);
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3] KEYS: trusted: allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a TPM
2019-03-26 12:11 [PATCH v3] KEYS: trusted: allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a TPM Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2019-03-27 17:15 ` Dan Williams
2019-03-28 12:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Dan Williams @ 2019-03-27 17:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jarkko Sakkinen
Cc: linux-integrity, linux-security-module, James Morris,
James Bottomley, Mimi Zohar, David Howells, Serge E. Hallyn,
open list:KEYS-TRUSTED, open list
On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 5:13 AM Jarkko Sakkinen
<jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>
> Allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a TPM. This commit adds checks to the
> key type callbacks and exported functions to fail when a TPM is not
> available.
>
> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
> Reported-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> Tested-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> Fixes: 240730437deb ("KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure...")
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> v3:
> - remove unnecessary check for chip in init_trusted()
v3 also tests ok here.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3] KEYS: trusted: allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a TPM
2019-03-27 17:15 ` Dan Williams
@ 2019-03-28 12:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2019-03-28 12:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Dan Williams
Cc: linux-integrity, linux-security-module, James Morris,
James Bottomley, Mimi Zohar, David Howells, Serge E. Hallyn,
open list:KEYS-TRUSTED, open list
On Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at 10:15:50AM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 5:13 AM Jarkko Sakkinen
> <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> >
> > Allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a TPM. This commit adds checks to the
> > key type callbacks and exported functions to fail when a TPM is not
> > available.
> >
> > Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
> > Reported-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> > Tested-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> > Fixes: 240730437deb ("KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure...")
> > Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
> > ---
> > v3:
> > - remove unnecessary check for chip in init_trusted()
>
> v3 also tests ok here.
Thank you.
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
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