From: "Michal Koutný" <mkoutny@suse.com>
To: gorcunov@gmail.com
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, arunks@codeaurora.org, brgl@bgdev.pl,
geert+renesas@glider.be, ldufour@linux.ibm.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
mguzik@redhat.com, mhocko@kernel.org, mkoutny@suse.com,
rppt@linux.ibm.com, vbabka@suse.cz, ktkhai@virtuozzo.com
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] prctl_set_mm: Refactor checks from validate_prctl_map
Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 10:18:43 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190430081844.22597-3-mkoutny@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190430081844.22597-1-mkoutny@suse.com>
Despite comment of validate_prctl_map claims there are no capability
checks, it is not completely true since commit 4d28df6152aa ("prctl:
Allow local CAP_SYS_ADMIN changing exe_file"). Extract the check out of
the function and make the function perform purely arithmetic checks.
This patch should not change any behavior, it is mere refactoring for
following patch.
CC: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
CC: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
---
kernel/sys.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 12df0e5434b8..e1acb444d7b0 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -1882,10 +1882,12 @@ static int prctl_set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned int fd)
}
/*
+ * Check arithmetic relations of passed addresses.
+ *
* WARNING: we don't require any capability here so be very careful
* in what is allowed for modification from userspace.
*/
-static int validate_prctl_map(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map)
+static int validate_prctl_map_addr(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map)
{
unsigned long mmap_max_addr = TASK_SIZE;
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
@@ -1949,24 +1951,6 @@ static int validate_prctl_map(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map)
prctl_map->start_data))
goto out;
- /*
- * Someone is trying to cheat the auxv vector.
- */
- if (prctl_map->auxv_size) {
- if (!prctl_map->auxv || prctl_map->auxv_size > sizeof(mm->saved_auxv))
- goto out;
- }
-
- /*
- * Finally, make sure the caller has the rights to
- * change /proc/pid/exe link: only local sys admin should
- * be allowed to.
- */
- if (prctl_map->exe_fd != (u32)-1) {
- if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- goto out;
- }
-
error = 0;
out:
return error;
@@ -1993,11 +1977,17 @@ static int prctl_set_mm_map(int opt, const void __user *addr, unsigned long data
if (copy_from_user(&prctl_map, addr, sizeof(prctl_map)))
return -EFAULT;
- error = validate_prctl_map(&prctl_map);
+ error = validate_prctl_map_addr(&prctl_map);
if (error)
return error;
if (prctl_map.auxv_size) {
+ /*
+ * Someone is trying to cheat the auxv vector.
+ */
+ if (!prctl_map.auxv || prctl_map.auxv_size > sizeof(mm->saved_auxv))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
memset(user_auxv, 0, sizeof(user_auxv));
if (copy_from_user(user_auxv,
(const void __user *)prctl_map.auxv,
@@ -2010,6 +2000,14 @@ static int prctl_set_mm_map(int opt, const void __user *addr, unsigned long data
}
if (prctl_map.exe_fd != (u32)-1) {
+ /*
+ * Make sure the caller has the rights to
+ * change /proc/pid/exe link: only local sys admin should
+ * be allowed to.
+ */
+ if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
error = prctl_set_mm_exe_file(mm, prctl_map.exe_fd);
if (error)
return error;
@@ -2097,7 +2095,7 @@ static int prctl_set_mm(int opt, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
- struct prctl_mm_map prctl_map;
+ struct prctl_mm_map prctl_map = { .auxv = NULL, .auxv_size = 0, .exe_fd = -1 };
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
int error;
@@ -2139,9 +2137,6 @@ static int prctl_set_mm(int opt, unsigned long addr,
prctl_map.arg_end = mm->arg_end;
prctl_map.env_start = mm->env_start;
prctl_map.env_end = mm->env_end;
- prctl_map.auxv = NULL;
- prctl_map.auxv_size = 0;
- prctl_map.exe_fd = -1;
switch (opt) {
case PR_SET_MM_START_CODE:
@@ -2181,7 +2176,7 @@ static int prctl_set_mm(int opt, unsigned long addr,
goto out;
}
- error = validate_prctl_map(&prctl_map);
+ error = validate_prctl_map_addr(&prctl_map);
if (error)
goto out;
--
2.16.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-04-30 8:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-04-17 12:03 [PATCH] mm: get_cmdline use arg_lock instead of mmap_sem Michal Koutný
2019-04-17 13:41 ` Michal Hocko
2019-04-17 14:41 ` Michal Koutný
2019-04-17 14:55 ` Michal Hocko
2019-04-18 13:50 ` [PATCH] prctl_set_mm: downgrade mmap_sem to read lock Michal Koutný
2019-04-18 14:09 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2019-04-18 14:15 ` Michal Hocko
2019-04-18 14:27 ` Laurent Dufour
2019-04-18 18:23 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2019-04-30 8:18 ` [PATCH 0/3] Reduce mmap_sem usage for args manipulation Michal Koutný
2019-04-30 8:18 ` [PATCH 1/3] mm: get_cmdline use arg_lock instead of mmap_sem Michal Koutný
2019-04-30 9:09 ` Kirill Tkhai
2019-04-30 9:38 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2019-04-30 9:53 ` Kirill Tkhai
2019-04-30 10:45 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2019-04-30 10:56 ` Michal Koutný
2019-04-30 13:24 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2019-04-30 8:18 ` Michal Koutný [this message]
2019-04-30 9:27 ` [PATCH 2/3] prctl_set_mm: Refactor checks from validate_prctl_map Kirill Tkhai
2019-04-30 8:18 ` [PATCH 3/3] prctl_set_mm: downgrade mmap_sem to read lock Michal Koutný
2019-04-30 8:55 ` Kirill Tkhai
2019-04-30 9:08 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2019-04-30 9:11 ` Kirill Tkhai
2019-05-02 12:52 ` [PATCH v3 0/2] Reduce mmap_sem usage for args manipulation Michal Koutný
2019-05-02 12:52 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] prctl_set_mm: Refactor checks from validate_prctl_map Michal Koutný
2019-05-02 20:57 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2019-05-02 12:52 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] prctl_set_mm: downgrade mmap_sem to read lock Michal Koutný
2019-05-02 20:57 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2019-05-06 9:28 ` Kirill Tkhai
2019-05-07 17:42 ` Michal Hocko
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