[PATCH 0/5] vsyscall xonly mode

[PATCH 0/5] vsyscall xonly mode

[Andy Lutomirski]

Hi all-

This adds a new "xonly" mode for vsyscalls and makes it the default.
xonly is a bit more secure -- Kees knows about an exploit that relied on
read access to the vsyscall page.  It's also nicer from a paging
perspective, as it doesn't require user access to any of the kernel
address space as far as the CPU is concerned.  This would, for example,
allow a much simpler implementation of per-process vsyscall disabling.

Andy Lutomirski (5):
  x86/vsyscall: Remove the vsyscall=native documentation
  x86/vsyscall: Add a new vsyscall=xonly mode
  x86/vsyscall: Document odd #PF's error code for vsyscalls
  selftests/x86/vsyscall: Verify that vsyscall=none blocks execution
  x86/vsyscall: Change the default vsyscall mode to xonly

 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         | 11 ++-
 arch/x86/Kconfig                              | 32 ++++---
 arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c         | 19 ++++-
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c                           |  7 ++
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_vsyscall.c   | 83 +++++++++++++------
 5 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)

-- 
2.21.0

[PATCH 1/5] x86/vsyscall: Remove the vsyscall=native documentation

[Andy Lutomirski]

The vsyscall=native feature is gone -- remove the docs.

Fixes: 076ca272a14c ("x86/vsyscall/64: Drop "native" vsyscalls")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 ------
 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 43176340c73d..e1a3525d07f2 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -5086,12 +5086,6 @@
 			emulate     [default] Vsyscalls turn into traps and are
 			            emulated reasonably safely.
 
-			native      Vsyscalls are native syscall instructions.
-			            This is a little bit faster than trapping
-			            and makes a few dynamic recompilers work
-			            better than they would in emulation mode.
-			            It also makes exploits much easier to write.
-
 			none        Vsyscalls don't work at all.  This makes
 			            them quite hard to use for exploits but
 			            might break your system.
-- 
2.21.0

[PATCH 2/5] x86/vsyscall: Add a new vsyscall=xonly mode

[Andy Lutomirski]

With vsyscall emulation on, we still expose a readable vsyscall page
that contains syscall instructions that validly implement the
vsyscalls.  We need this because certain dynamic binary
instrumentation tools attempt to read the call targets of call
instructions in the instrumented code.  If the instrumented code
uses vsyscalls, then the vsyscal page needs to contain readable
code.

Unfortunately, leaving readable memory at a deterministic address
can be used to help various ASLR bypasses, so we gain some hardening
value if we disallow vsyscall reads.

Given how rarely the vsyscall page needs to be readable, add a
mechanism to make the vsyscall page be execute only.

Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---
 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         |  7 ++++-
 arch/x86/Kconfig                              | 30 +++++++++++++------
 arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c         | 19 +++++++++---
 3 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index e1a3525d07f2..d96a770e99f0 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -5084,7 +5084,12 @@
 			targets for exploits that can control RIP.
 
 			emulate     [default] Vsyscalls turn into traps and are
-			            emulated reasonably safely.
+			            emulated reasonably safely.  The vsyscall
+				    page is readable.
+
+			xonly       Vsyscalls turn into traps and are
+			            emulated reasonably safely.  The vsyscall
+				    page is not readable.
 
 			none        Vsyscalls don't work at all.  This makes
 			            them quite hard to use for exploits but
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 818b361094ed..054033cc4b1b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2288,23 +2288,35 @@ choice
 	  it can be used to assist security vulnerability exploitation.
 
 	  This setting can be changed at boot time via the kernel command
-	  line parameter vsyscall=[emulate|none].
+	  line parameter vsyscall=[emulate|xonly|none].
 
 	  On a system with recent enough glibc (2.14 or newer) and no
 	  static binaries, you can say None without a performance penalty
 	  to improve security.
 
-	  If unsure, select "Emulate".
+	  If unsure, select "Emulate execution only".
 
 	config LEGACY_VSYSCALL_EMULATE
-		bool "Emulate"
+		bool "Full emulation"
 		help
-		  The kernel traps and emulates calls into the fixed
-		  vsyscall address mapping. This makes the mapping
-		  non-executable, but it still contains known contents,
-		  which could be used in certain rare security vulnerability
-		  exploits. This configuration is recommended when userspace
-		  still uses the vsyscall area.
+		  The kernel traps and emulates calls into the fixed vsyscall
+		  address mapping. This makes the mapping non-executable, but
+		  it still contains readable known contents, which could be
+		  used in certain rare security vulnerability exploits. This
+		  configuration is recommended when legacy using userspace
+		  that still uses vsyscalls along with legacy binary
+		  instrumentation tools that require code to be readable.
+
+	config LEGACY_VSYSCALL_XONLY
+		bool "Emulate execution only"
+		help
+		  The kernel traps and emulates calls into the fixed vsyscall
+		  address mapping and does not allow reads.  This
+		  configuration is recommended when userspace might use the
+		  legacy vsyscall area but support for legacy binary
+		  instrumentation of legacy code is not needed.  It mitigates
+		  certain uses of the vsyscall area as an ASLR-bypassing
+		  buffer.
 
 	config LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE
 		bool "None"
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
index d9d81ad7a400..fd306ba4b4ad 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
@@ -42,9 +42,11 @@
 #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
 #include "vsyscall_trace.h"
 
-static enum { EMULATE, NONE } vsyscall_mode =
+static enum { EMULATE, XONLY, NONE } vsyscall_mode =
 #ifdef CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE
 	NONE;
+#elif defined(CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_XONLY)
+	XONLY;
 #else
 	EMULATE;
 #endif
@@ -54,6 +56,8 @@ static int __init vsyscall_setup(char *str)
 	if (str) {
 		if (!strcmp("emulate", str))
 			vsyscall_mode = EMULATE;
+		else if (!strcmp("xonly", str))
+			vsyscall_mode = XONLY;
 		else if (!strcmp("none", str))
 			vsyscall_mode = NONE;
 		else
@@ -284,13 +288,20 @@ static const char *gate_vma_name(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 static const struct vm_operations_struct gate_vma_ops = {
 	.name = gate_vma_name,
 };
-static struct vm_area_struct gate_vma = {
+static struct vm_area_struct rx_gate_vma = {
 	.vm_start	= VSYSCALL_ADDR,
 	.vm_end		= VSYSCALL_ADDR + PAGE_SIZE,
 	.vm_page_prot	= PAGE_READONLY_EXEC,
 	.vm_flags	= VM_READ | VM_EXEC,
 	.vm_ops		= &gate_vma_ops,
 };
+static struct vm_area_struct xo_gate_vma = {
+	.vm_start	= VSYSCALL_ADDR,
+	.vm_end		= VSYSCALL_ADDR + PAGE_SIZE,
+	.vm_page_prot	= PAGE_READONLY_EXEC,
+	.vm_flags	= VM_EXEC,
+	.vm_ops		= &gate_vma_ops,
+};
 
 struct vm_area_struct *get_gate_vma(struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
@@ -300,7 +311,7 @@ struct vm_area_struct *get_gate_vma(struct mm_struct *mm)
 #endif
 	if (vsyscall_mode == NONE)
 		return NULL;
-	return &gate_vma;
+	return vsyscall_mode == XONLY ? &xo_gate_vma : &rx_gate_vma;
 }
 
 int in_gate_area(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr)
@@ -357,7 +368,7 @@ void __init map_vsyscall(void)
 	extern char __vsyscall_page;
 	unsigned long physaddr_vsyscall = __pa_symbol(&__vsyscall_page);
 
-	if (vsyscall_mode != NONE) {
+	if (vsyscall_mode == EMULATE) {
 		__set_fixmap(VSYSCALL_PAGE, physaddr_vsyscall,
 			     PAGE_KERNEL_VVAR);
 		set_vsyscall_pgtable_user_bits(swapper_pg_dir);
-- 
2.21.0

Re: [PATCH 2/5] x86/vsyscall: Add a new vsyscall=xonly mode

[Kees Cook]

On Mon, Jun 10, 2019 at 01:25:28PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> With vsyscall emulation on, we still expose a readable vsyscall page
> that contains syscall instructions that validly implement the
> vsyscalls.  We need this because certain dynamic binary
> instrumentation tools attempt to read the call targets of call
> instructions in the instrumented code.  If the instrumented code
> uses vsyscalls, then the vsyscal page needs to contain readable
> code.
> 
> Unfortunately, leaving readable memory at a deterministic address
> can be used to help various ASLR bypasses, so we gain some hardening
> value if we disallow vsyscall reads.
> 
> Given how rarely the vsyscall page needs to be readable, add a
> mechanism to make the vsyscall page be execute only.

Should the commit log mention that the VVAR portion goes away under
xonly? (Since it's not executable.)

Otherwise, yay! Looks good to me and thanks for updating the selftests!

-Kees

> @@ -357,7 +368,7 @@ void __init map_vsyscall(void)
>  	extern char __vsyscall_page;
>  	unsigned long physaddr_vsyscall = __pa_symbol(&__vsyscall_page);
>  
> -	if (vsyscall_mode != NONE) {
> +	if (vsyscall_mode == EMULATE) {
>  		__set_fixmap(VSYSCALL_PAGE, physaddr_vsyscall,
>  			     PAGE_KERNEL_VVAR);
>  		set_vsyscall_pgtable_user_bits(swapper_pg_dir);
> -- 
> 2.21.0
> 

-- 
Kees Cook

Re: [PATCH 2/5] x86/vsyscall: Add a new vsyscall=xonly mode

[Andy Lutomirski]

On Mon, Jun 10, 2019 at 1:43 PM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jun 10, 2019 at 01:25:28PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > With vsyscall emulation on, we still expose a readable vsyscall page
> > that contains syscall instructions that validly implement the
> > vsyscalls.  We need this because certain dynamic binary
> > instrumentation tools attempt to read the call targets of call
> > instructions in the instrumented code.  If the instrumented code
> > uses vsyscalls, then the vsyscal page needs to contain readable
> > code.
> >
> > Unfortunately, leaving readable memory at a deterministic address
> > can be used to help various ASLR bypasses, so we gain some hardening
> > value if we disallow vsyscall reads.
> >
> > Given how rarely the vsyscall page needs to be readable, add a
> > mechanism to make the vsyscall page be execute only.
>
> Should the commit log mention that the VVAR portion goes away under
> xonly? (Since it's not executable.)

No, because vsyscall VVAR is long gone no matter what.  Even the old
vsyscall=native didn't have it.

[PATCH 3/5] x86/vsyscall: Document odd #PF's error code for vsyscalls

[Andy Lutomirski]

Even if vsyscall=none, we report uer page faults on the vsyscall
page as though the PROT bit in the error code was set.  Add a
comment explaining why this is probably okay and display the value
in the test case.

While we're at it, explain why our behavior is correct with respect
to PKRU.

If anyone really cares about more accurate emulation, we could
change the behavior.

Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c                         | 7 +++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_vsyscall.c | 9 ++++++++-
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index 46df4c6aae46..1b18819e8e11 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -710,6 +710,10 @@ static void set_signal_archinfo(unsigned long address,
 	 * To avoid leaking information about the kernel page
 	 * table layout, pretend that user-mode accesses to
 	 * kernel addresses are always protection faults.
+	 *
+	 * NB: This means that failed vsyscalls with vsyscall=none
+	 * will have the PROT bit.  This doesn't leak any
+	 * information and does not appear to cause any problems.
 	 */
 	if (address >= TASK_SIZE_MAX)
 		error_code |= X86_PF_PROT;
@@ -1376,6 +1380,9 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,
 	 *
 	 * The vsyscall page does not have a "real" VMA, so do this
 	 * emulation before we go searching for VMAs.
+	 *
+	 * PKRU never rejects instruction fetches, so we don't need
+	 * to consider the PF_PK bit.
 	 */
 	if ((hw_error_code & X86_PF_INSTR) && is_vsyscall_vaddr(address)) {
 		if (emulate_vsyscall(regs, address))
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_vsyscall.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_vsyscall.c
index 0b4f1cc2291c..4c9a8d76dba0 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_vsyscall.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_vsyscall.c
@@ -183,9 +183,13 @@ static inline long sys_getcpu(unsigned * cpu, unsigned * node,
 }
 
 static jmp_buf jmpbuf;
+static volatile unsigned long segv_err;
 
 static void sigsegv(int sig, siginfo_t *info, void *ctx_void)
 {
+	ucontext_t *ctx = (ucontext_t *)ctx_void;
+
+	segv_err =  ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_ERR];
 	siglongjmp(jmpbuf, 1);
 }
 
@@ -416,8 +420,11 @@ static int test_vsys_r(void)
 	} else if (!can_read && should_read_vsyscall) {
 		printf("[FAIL]\tWe don't have read access, but we should\n");
 		return 1;
+	} else if (can_read) {
+		printf("[OK]\tWe have read access\n");
 	} else {
-		printf("[OK]\tgot expected result\n");
+		printf("[OK]\tWe do not have read access: #PF(0x%lx)\n",
+		       segv_err);
 	}
 #endif
 
-- 
2.21.0

Re: [PATCH 3/5] x86/vsyscall: Document odd #PF's error code for vsyscalls

[Kees Cook]

On Mon, Jun 10, 2019 at 01:25:29PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>  tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_vsyscall.c | 9 ++++++++-

Did this hunk end up in the wrong patch? (It's not mentioned in the
commit log and the next patch has other selftest changes...)

-- 
Kees Cook

Re: [PATCH 3/5] x86/vsyscall: Document odd #PF's error code for vsyscalls

[Andy Lutomirski]

On Mon, Jun 10, 2019 at 1:40 PM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jun 10, 2019 at 01:25:29PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >  tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_vsyscall.c | 9 ++++++++-
>
> Did this hunk end up in the wrong patch? (It's not mentioned in the
> commit log and the next patch has other selftest changes...)
>

It was intentional -- you can run the improved selftest and observe
the oddity for yourself :)  I'll improve the changelog.

[PATCH 4/5] selftests/x86/vsyscall: Verify that vsyscall=none blocks execution

[Andy Lutomirski]

If vsyscall=none accidentally still allowed vsyscalls, the test
wouldn't fail.  Fix it.

Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_vsyscall.c | 74 ++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_vsyscall.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_vsyscall.c
index 4c9a8d76dba0..aa59583e9aa7 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_vsyscall.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_vsyscall.c
@@ -49,21 +49,21 @@ static void sethandler(int sig, void (*handler)(int, siginfo_t *, void *),
 }
 
 /* vsyscalls and vDSO */
-bool should_read_vsyscall = false;
+bool vsyscall_map_r = false, vsyscall_map_x = false;
 
 typedef long (*gtod_t)(struct timeval *tv, struct timezone *tz);
-gtod_t vgtod = (gtod_t)VSYS(0xffffffffff600000);
+const gtod_t vgtod = (gtod_t)VSYS(0xffffffffff600000);
 gtod_t vdso_gtod;
 
 typedef int (*vgettime_t)(clockid_t, struct timespec *);
 vgettime_t vdso_gettime;
 
 typedef long (*time_func_t)(time_t *t);
-time_func_t vtime = (time_func_t)VSYS(0xffffffffff600400);
+const time_func_t vtime = (time_func_t)VSYS(0xffffffffff600400);
 time_func_t vdso_time;
 
 typedef long (*getcpu_t)(unsigned *, unsigned *, void *);
-getcpu_t vgetcpu = (getcpu_t)VSYS(0xffffffffff600800);
+const getcpu_t vgetcpu = (getcpu_t)VSYS(0xffffffffff600800);
 getcpu_t vdso_getcpu;
 
 static void init_vdso(void)
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static int init_vsys(void)
 	maps = fopen("/proc/self/maps", "r");
 	if (!maps) {
 		printf("[WARN]\tCould not open /proc/self/maps -- assuming vsyscall is r-x\n");
-		should_read_vsyscall = true;
+		vsyscall_map_r = true;
 		return 0;
 	}
 
@@ -133,12 +133,8 @@ static int init_vsys(void)
 		}
 
 		printf("\tvsyscall permissions are %c-%c\n", r, x);
-		should_read_vsyscall = (r == 'r');
-		if (x != 'x') {
-			vgtod = NULL;
-			vtime = NULL;
-			vgetcpu = NULL;
-		}
+		vsyscall_map_r = (r == 'r');
+		vsyscall_map_x = (x == 'x');
 
 		found = true;
 		break;
@@ -148,10 +144,8 @@ static int init_vsys(void)
 
 	if (!found) {
 		printf("\tno vsyscall map in /proc/self/maps\n");
-		should_read_vsyscall = false;
-		vgtod = NULL;
-		vtime = NULL;
-		vgetcpu = NULL;
+		vsyscall_map_r = false;
+		vsyscall_map_x = false;
 	}
 
 	return nerrs;
@@ -242,7 +236,7 @@ static int test_gtod(void)
 		err(1, "syscall gettimeofday");
 	if (vdso_gtod)
 		ret_vdso = vdso_gtod(&tv_vdso, &tz_vdso);
-	if (vgtod)
+	if (vsyscall_map_x)
 		ret_vsys = vgtod(&tv_vsys, &tz_vsys);
 	if (sys_gtod(&tv_sys2, &tz_sys) != 0)
 		err(1, "syscall gettimeofday");
@@ -256,7 +250,7 @@ static int test_gtod(void)
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (vgtod) {
+	if (vsyscall_map_x) {
 		if (ret_vsys == 0) {
 			nerrs += check_gtod(&tv_sys1, &tv_sys2, &tz_sys, "vsyscall", &tv_vsys, &tz_vsys);
 		} else {
@@ -277,7 +271,7 @@ static int test_time(void) {
 	t_sys1 = sys_time(&t2_sys1);
 	if (vdso_time)
 		t_vdso = vdso_time(&t2_vdso);
-	if (vtime)
+	if (vsyscall_map_x)
 		t_vsys = vtime(&t2_vsys);
 	t_sys2 = sys_time(&t2_sys2);
 	if (t_sys1 < 0 || t_sys1 != t2_sys1 || t_sys2 < 0 || t_sys2 != t2_sys2) {
@@ -298,7 +292,7 @@ static int test_time(void) {
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (vtime) {
+	if (vsyscall_map_x) {
 		if (t_vsys < 0 || t_vsys != t2_vsys) {
 			printf("[FAIL]\tvsyscall failed (ret:%ld output:%ld)\n", t_vsys, t2_vsys);
 			nerrs++;
@@ -334,7 +328,7 @@ static int test_getcpu(int cpu)
 	ret_sys = sys_getcpu(&cpu_sys, &node_sys, 0);
 	if (vdso_getcpu)
 		ret_vdso = vdso_getcpu(&cpu_vdso, &node_vdso, 0);
-	if (vgetcpu)
+	if (vsyscall_map_x)
 		ret_vsys = vgetcpu(&cpu_vsys, &node_vsys, 0);
 
 	if (ret_sys == 0) {
@@ -373,7 +367,7 @@ static int test_getcpu(int cpu)
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (vgetcpu) {
+	if (vsyscall_map_x) {
 		if (ret_vsys) {
 			printf("[FAIL]\tvsyscall getcpu() failed\n");
 			nerrs++;
@@ -414,10 +408,10 @@ static int test_vsys_r(void)
 		can_read = false;
 	}
 
-	if (can_read && !should_read_vsyscall) {
+	if (can_read && !vsyscall_map_r) {
 		printf("[FAIL]\tWe have read access, but we shouldn't\n");
 		return 1;
-	} else if (!can_read && should_read_vsyscall) {
+	} else if (!can_read && vsyscall_map_r) {
 		printf("[FAIL]\tWe don't have read access, but we should\n");
 		return 1;
 	} else if (can_read) {
@@ -431,6 +425,37 @@ static int test_vsys_r(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int test_vsys_x(void)
+{
+	if (vsyscall_map_x) {
+		/* We already tested this adequately. */
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	printf("[RUN]\tMake sure that vsyscalls really page fault\n");
+
+	bool can_exec;
+	if (sigsetjmp(jmpbuf, 1) == 0) {
+		vgtod(NULL, NULL);
+		can_exec = true;
+	} else {
+		can_exec = false;
+	}
+
+	if (can_exec) {
+		printf("[FAIL]\tExecuting the vsyscall did not page fault\n");
+		return 1;
+	} else if (segv_err & (1 << 4)) { /* INSTR */
+		printf("[OK]\tExecuting the vsyscall page failed: #PF(0x%lx)\n",
+		       segv_err);
+	} else {
+		printf("[FAILT]\tExecution failed with the wrong error: #PF(0x%lx)\n",
+		       segv_err);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
 
 #ifdef __x86_64__
 #define X86_EFLAGS_TF (1UL << 8)
@@ -462,7 +487,7 @@ static int test_emulation(void)
 	time_t tmp;
 	bool is_native;
 
-	if (!vtime)
+	if (!vsyscall_map_x)
 		return 0;
 
 	printf("[RUN]\tchecking that vsyscalls are emulated\n");
@@ -504,6 +529,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 
 	sethandler(SIGSEGV, sigsegv, 0);
 	nerrs += test_vsys_r();
+	nerrs += test_vsys_x();
 
 #ifdef __x86_64__
 	nerrs += test_emulation();
-- 
2.21.0

[PATCH 5/5] x86/vsyscall: Change the default vsyscall mode to xonly

[Andy Lutomirski]

The use case for full emulation over xonly is very esoteric.  Let's
change the default to the safer xonly mode.

Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 054033cc4b1b..e56f33e6b045 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2280,7 +2280,7 @@ config COMPAT_VDSO
 choice
 	prompt "vsyscall table for legacy applications"
 	depends on X86_64
-	default LEGACY_VSYSCALL_EMULATE
+	default LEGACY_VSYSCALL_XONLY
 	help
 	  Legacy user code that does not know how to find the vDSO expects
 	  to be able to issue three syscalls by calling fixed addresses in
-- 
2.21.0

Re: [PATCH 5/5] x86/vsyscall: Change the default vsyscall mode to xonly

[Kees Cook]

On Mon, Jun 10, 2019 at 01:25:31PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> The use case for full emulation over xonly is very esoteric.  Let's
> change the default to the safer xonly mode.

Perhaps describe the esoteric cases here (and maybe in the Kconfig help
text)? That should a user determine if they actually need it. (What
would the failure under xonly look like for someone needing emulate?)

-Kees

> 
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
> Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> ---
>  arch/x86/Kconfig | 2 +-
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index 054033cc4b1b..e56f33e6b045 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -2280,7 +2280,7 @@ config COMPAT_VDSO
>  choice
>  	prompt "vsyscall table for legacy applications"
>  	depends on X86_64
> -	default LEGACY_VSYSCALL_EMULATE
> +	default LEGACY_VSYSCALL_XONLY
>  	help
>  	  Legacy user code that does not know how to find the vDSO expects
>  	  to be able to issue three syscalls by calling fixed addresses in
> -- 
> 2.21.0
> 

-- 
Kees Cook

Re: [PATCH 5/5] x86/vsyscall: Change the default vsyscall mode to xonly

[Andy Lutomirski]

On Mon, Jun 10, 2019 at 1:44 PM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jun 10, 2019 at 01:25:31PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > The use case for full emulation over xonly is very esoteric.  Let's
> > change the default to the safer xonly mode.
>
> Perhaps describe the esoteric cases here (and maybe in the Kconfig help
> text)? That should a user determine if they actually need it. (What
> would the failure under xonly look like for someone needing emulate?)

I added it to the Kconfig text.

Right now, the failure will just be a segfault.  I could add some
logic so that it would log "invalid read to vsyscall page -- fix your
userspace or boot with vsyscall=emulate".  Do you think that's
important?

--Andy

Re: [PATCH 5/5] x86/vsyscall: Change the default vsyscall mode to xonly

[Kees Cook]

On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 12:14:50PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 10, 2019 at 1:44 PM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Jun 10, 2019 at 01:25:31PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > > The use case for full emulation over xonly is very esoteric.  Let's
> > > change the default to the safer xonly mode.
> >
> > Perhaps describe the esoteric cases here (and maybe in the Kconfig help
> > text)? That should a user determine if they actually need it. (What
> > would the failure under xonly look like for someone needing emulate?)
> 
> I added it to the Kconfig text.
> 
> Right now, the failure will just be a segfault.  I could add some
> logic so that it would log "invalid read to vsyscall page -- fix your
> userspace or boot with vsyscall=emulate".  Do you think that's
> important?

I think it would be a friendly way to help anyone wondering why
something suddenly started segfaulting, yeah. Just a pr_warn_once() or
something (not a WARN() since it's "intentionally" reachable by
userspace).

-- 
Kees Cook