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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Cc: jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
	Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
	linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH V34 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down
Date: Sat, 22 Jun 2019 16:55:31 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <201906221655.3076CBD3@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190622000358.19895-12-matthewgarrett@google.com>

On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 05:03:40PM -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
> 
> Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in
> order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code,
> allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing.
> Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for
> sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices.
> 
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-Kees

> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
> Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
> cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
> ---
>  drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c      | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>  drivers/pci/proc.c           | 14 ++++++++++++--
>  drivers/pci/syscall.c        |  4 +++-
>  include/linux/security.h     |  1 +
>  security/lockdown/lockdown.c |  1 +
>  5 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
> index 25794c27c7a4..e1011efb5a31 100644
> --- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
> +++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
> @@ -903,6 +903,11 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
>  	unsigned int size = count;
>  	loff_t init_off = off;
>  	u8 *data = (u8 *) buf;
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS);
> +	if (ret)
> +		return ret;
>  
>  	if (off > dev->cfg_size)
>  		return 0;
> @@ -1165,6 +1170,11 @@ static int pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr,
>  	int bar = (unsigned long)attr->private;
>  	enum pci_mmap_state mmap_type;
>  	struct resource *res = &pdev->resource[bar];
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS);
> +	if (ret)
> +		return ret;
>  
>  	if (res->flags & IORESOURCE_MEM && iomem_is_exclusive(res->start))
>  		return -EINVAL;
> @@ -1241,6 +1251,12 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
>  				     struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf,
>  				     loff_t off, size_t count)
>  {
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS);
> +	if (ret)
> +		return ret;
> +
>  	return pci_resource_io(filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true);
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c
> index 6fa1627ce08d..a72258d70407 100644
> --- a/drivers/pci/proc.c
> +++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c
> @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
>  #include <linux/seq_file.h>
>  #include <linux/capability.h>
>  #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
>  #include <asm/byteorder.h>
>  #include "pci.h"
>  
> @@ -115,7 +116,11 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
>  	struct pci_dev *dev = PDE_DATA(ino);
>  	int pos = *ppos;
>  	int size = dev->cfg_size;
> -	int cnt;
> +	int cnt, ret;
> +
> +	ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS);
> +	if (ret)
> +		return ret;
>  
>  	if (pos >= size)
>  		return 0;
> @@ -196,6 +201,10 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
>  #endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */
>  	int ret = 0;
>  
> +	ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS);
> +	if (ret)
> +		return ret;
> +
>  	switch (cmd) {
>  	case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER:
>  		ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus);
> @@ -237,7 +246,8 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
>  	struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data;
>  	int i, ret, write_combine = 0, res_bit = IORESOURCE_MEM;
>  
> -	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
> +	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ||
> +	    security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS))
>  		return -EPERM;
>  
>  	if (fpriv->mmap_state == pci_mmap_io) {
> diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
> index d96626c614f5..31e39558d49d 100644
> --- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c
> +++ b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
> @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
>  
>  #include <linux/errno.h>
>  #include <linux/pci.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
>  #include <linux/syscalls.h>
>  #include <linux/uaccess.h>
>  #include "pci.h"
> @@ -90,7 +91,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned long, dfn,
>  	u32 dword;
>  	int err = 0;
>  
> -	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> +	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
> +	    security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS))
>  		return -EPERM;
>  
>  	dev = pci_get_domain_bus_and_slot(0, bus, dfn);
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index a051f21a1144..1b849f10dec6 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
>  	LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM,
>  	LOCKDOWN_KEXEC,
>  	LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION,
> +	LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS,
>  	LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
>  	LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX,
>  };
> diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> index ce5b3da9bd09..e2ee8a16b94c 100644
> --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
>  	[LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port",
>  	[LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images",
>  	[LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation",
> +	[LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access",
>  	[LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
>  	[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
>  };
> -- 
> 2.22.0.410.gd8fdbe21b5-goog
> 

-- 
Kees Cook

  reply	other threads:[~2019-06-22 23:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 80+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-06-22  0:03 [PATCH V34 00/29] Lockdown as an LSM Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22  0:03 ` [PATCH V34 01/29] security: Support early LSMs Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:36   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22  0:03 ` [PATCH V34 02/29] security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:37   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22  0:03 ` [PATCH V34 03/29] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:37   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22  0:03 ` [PATCH V34 04/29] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:48   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22  0:03 ` [PATCH V34 05/29] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:52   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22  0:03 ` [PATCH V34 06/29] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:52   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22  0:03 ` [PATCH V34 07/29] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:53   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22  0:03 ` [PATCH V34 08/29] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Matthew Garrett
2019-06-24  2:01   ` Dave Young
2019-06-25  2:35     ` Dave Young
2019-06-22  0:03 ` [PATCH V34 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:54   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27  4:59   ` James Morris
2019-06-27 15:28     ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-27 18:14       ` James Morris
2019-06-27 23:17         ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22  0:03 ` [PATCH V34 10/29] hibernate: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 17:52   ` Pavel Machek
2019-06-24 13:21     ` Jiri Kosina
2019-07-10 15:26       ` Joey Lee
2019-07-11  4:11       ` joeyli
2019-06-22 23:55   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22  0:03 ` [PATCH V34 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:55   ` Kees Cook [this message]
2019-06-22  0:03 ` [PATCH V34 12/29] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:58   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22  0:03 ` [PATCH V34 13/29] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22  0:03 ` [PATCH V34 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:59   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22  0:03 ` [PATCH V34 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:59   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22  0:03 ` [PATCH V34 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23  0:00   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22  0:03 ` [PATCH V34 17/29] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23  0:00   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22  0:03 ` [PATCH V34 18/29] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23  0:01   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22  0:03 ` [PATCH V34 19/29] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23  0:04   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27  1:49   ` Daniel Axtens
2019-06-27 15:30     ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22  0:03 ` [PATCH V34 20/29] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23  0:04   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-23 11:08   ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-06-22  0:03 ` [PATCH V34 21/29] Lock down /proc/kcore Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23  0:05   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22  0:03 ` [PATCH V34 22/29] Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23  0:09   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-23  1:57   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-06-22  0:03 ` [PATCH V34 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23  0:09   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 15:15   ` Daniel Borkmann
2019-06-24 19:54     ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-24 20:08       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-24 20:15         ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-24 20:59         ` Daniel Borkmann
2019-06-24 21:30           ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22  0:03 ` [PATCH V34 24/29] Lock down perf when " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23  0:12   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22  0:03 ` [PATCH V34 25/29] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22  0:03 ` [PATCH V34 26/29] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22  0:03 ` [PATCH V34 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22  0:03 ` [PATCH V34 28/29] efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load " Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23  0:14   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-25 15:00   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-06-22  0:03 ` [PATCH V34 29/29] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages Matthew Garrett
2019-06-23  0:25   ` Kees Cook
2019-06-24 23:01 ` [PATCH V34 00/29] Lockdown as an LSM James Morris
2019-06-24 23:47   ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-24 23:56   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-25  6:04     ` James Morris
2019-06-25  8:16   ` John Johansen

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