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From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
To: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Cc: jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V36 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2019 22:23:54 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190724222354.7cbd6c6e@oasis.local.home> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190718194415.108476-28-matthewgarrett@google.com>

On Thu, 18 Jul 2019 12:44:13 -0700
Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> wrote:

> @@ -387,6 +412,7 @@ struct dentry *tracefs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode,
>  				   struct dentry *parent, void *data,
>  				   const struct file_operations *fops)
>  {
> +	struct file_operations *proxy_fops;
>  	struct dentry *dentry;
>  	struct inode *inode;
>  
> @@ -402,8 +428,18 @@ struct dentry *tracefs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode,
>  	if (unlikely(!inode))
>  		return failed_creating(dentry);
>  
> +	proxy_fops = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_operations), GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!proxy_fops)

I believe we need "iput(inode);" here. Or move the allocation before
the inode allocation and free it on inode failure.

-- Steve

> +		return failed_creating(dentry);
> +
> +	if (!fops)
> +		fops = &tracefs_file_operations;
> +
> +	dentry->d_fsdata = (void *)fops;
> +	memcpy(proxy_fops, fops, sizeof(*proxy_fops));
> +	proxy_fops->open = default_open_file;
>  	inode->i_mode = mode;
> -	inode->i_fop = fops ? fops : &tracefs_file_operations;
> +	inode->i_fop = proxy_fops;
>  	inode->i_private = data;
>  	d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
>  	fsnotify_create(dentry->d_parent->d_inode, dentry);

  reply	other threads:[~2019-07-25  2:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-07-18 19:43 [PATCH V36 00/29] security: Add kernel lockdown functionality Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 01/29] security: Support early LSMs Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 20:02   ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 02/29] security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 20:03   ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 03/29] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 04/29] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 05/29] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 06/29] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 07/29] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 08/29] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 10/29] hibernate: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 12/29] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:43 ` [PATCH V36 13/29] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 17/29] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 18/29] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 19/29] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) Matthew Garrett
2019-07-29 21:47   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 20/29] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 21:06   ` Kees Cook
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 21/29] Lock down /proc/kcore Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 22/29] Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 21:06   ` Kees Cook
2019-07-29 21:47   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 24/29] Lock down perf when " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 25/29] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 26/29] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-25  2:23   ` Steven Rostedt [this message]
2019-07-30 18:47     ` [PATCH] " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-31  1:48       ` Steven Rostedt
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 28/29] efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load " Matthew Garrett
2019-07-18 19:44 ` [PATCH V36 29/29] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages Matthew Garrett

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