From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
To: "Thomas Hellström (VMware)" <thomas_os@shipmail.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, pv-drivers@vmware.com,
linux-graphics-maintainer@vmware.com, x86@kernel.org,
"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Christoph Hellwig" <hch@infradead.org>,
"Christian König" <christian.koenig@amd.com>,
"Marek Szyprowski" <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>,
"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/2] Fix SEV user-space mapping of unencrypted coherent memory
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2019 06:39:49 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190918133949.GA20296@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190917130115.51748-1-thomas_os@shipmail.org>
This looks sensibe to me. x86 folks let me know if you guys want
to pick this up or if I should take it.
On Tue, Sep 17, 2019 at 03:01:13PM +0200, Thomas Hellström (VMware) wrote:
> As far as I can tell there are no current users of dma_mmap_coherent() with
> SEV or SME encryption which means that there is no need to CC stable.
Note that the usbfs access really should use it, as the current version
is completely broken on non-coherent architectures. That already
triggered on x86 dma_mmap_coherent fix. So I'd actually like to see
a stable backport to avoid hitting surprises.
prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-09-18 13:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-09-17 13:01 [PATCH v3 0/2] Fix SEV user-space mapping of unencrypted coherent memory Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-17 13:01 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] x86: Don't let pgprot_modify() change the page encryption bit Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-18 17:57 ` Dave Hansen
2019-10-01 5:54 ` Thomas Hellstrom
2019-10-01 16:07 ` Dave Hansen
2019-09-17 13:01 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] dma-mapping: Fix dma_pgprot() for unencrypted coherent pages Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-18 13:39 ` Christoph Hellwig [this message]
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