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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Vitaly Kuznetsov" <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	"Wanpeng Li" <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	"Jim Mattson" <jmattson@google.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 06/16] x86/cpu: Clear VMX feature flag if VMX is not fully enabled
Date: Fri, 25 Oct 2019 18:38:58 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191025163858.GF6483@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191022000836.1907-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>

On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 05:08:36PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Now that the IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR is guaranteed to be configured and
> locked, clear the VMX capability flag if the IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR is
> not supported or if BIOS disabled VMX, i.e. locked IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL
> and did not set the appropriate VMX enable bit.
> 
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
> Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feature_control.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++---
>  1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feature_control.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feature_control.c
> index 57b928e64cf5..74c76159a046 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feature_control.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feature_control.c
> @@ -7,13 +7,19 @@
>  
>  void init_feature_control_msr(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>  {
> +	bool tboot = tboot_enabled();
>  	u64 msr;
>  
> -	if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, &msr))
> +	if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, &msr)) {
> +		if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX)) {
> +			pr_err_once("x86/cpu: VMX disabled, IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR unsupported\n");
				     ^^^^^^^^

pr_fmt

But, before that: do we really wanna know about this or there's nothing
the user can do? If she can reenable VMX in the BIOS, or otherwise do
something about it, maybe we should say that above... Otherwise, this
message is useless.

> +			clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX);
> +		}
>  		return;
> +	}
>  
>  	if (msr & FEATURE_CONTROL_LOCKED)
> -		return;
> +		goto update_caps;
>  
>  	/*
>  	 * Ignore whatever value BIOS left in the MSR to avoid enabling random
> @@ -23,8 +29,19 @@ void init_feature_control_msr(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>  
>  	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX)) {
>  		msr |= FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX;
> -		if (tboot_enabled())
> +		if (tboot)
>  			msr |= FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX;
>  	}
>  	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, msr);
> +
> +update_caps:
> +	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
> +		return;

If this test is just so we can save us the below code, I'd say remove it
for the sake of having less code in that function. The test is cheap and
not on a fast path so who cares if we clear an alrady cleared bit. But
maybe this evolves in the later patches...

> +
> +	if ((tboot && !(msr & FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX)) ||
> +	    (!tboot && !(msr & FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX))) {
> +		pr_err_once("x86/cpu: VMX disabled by BIOS (TXT %s)\n",
> +			    tboot ? "enabled" : "disabled");
> +		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX);
> +	}
>  }

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

  reply	other threads:[~2019-10-25 16:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-10-21 23:46 [PATCH v2 00/16] x86/cpu: Clean up handling of VMX features Sean Christopherson
2019-10-21 23:54 ` [PATCH v2 01/16] x86/intel: Initialize IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR at boot Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22  0:15   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-10-25 14:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-10-25 15:11     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-10-21 23:56 ` [PATCH v2 02/16] x86/mce: WARN once if IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR is left unlocked Sean Christopherson
2019-10-25 14:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-10-22  0:08 ` [PATCH v2 03/16] x86/centaur: Use common IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR initialization Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22  0:08 ` [PATCH v2 04/16] x86/zhaoxin: " Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22  0:08 ` [PATCH v2 05/16] KVM: VMX: Drop initialization of IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22 10:51   ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-10-22 15:16     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-11-14 18:34       ` Sean Christopherson
2019-11-15 10:10         ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-10-25 16:26   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-10-25 16:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2019-10-22  0:08 ` [PATCH v2 06/16] x86/cpu: Clear VMX feature flag if VMX is not fully enabled Sean Christopherson
2019-10-25 16:38   ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2019-11-14 18:32     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-11-15 10:05       ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-11-15 10:34         ` Borislav Petkov
2019-11-15 15:34           ` Sean Christopherson
2019-11-15 15:39             ` Borislav Petkov
2019-10-22  0:08 ` [PATCH v2 07/16] KVM: VMX: Use VMX feature flag to query BIOS enabling Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22  0:08 ` [PATCH v2 08/16] KVM: VMX: Check for full VMX support when verifying CPU compatibility Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22  0:08 ` [PATCH v2 09/16] x86/vmx: Introduce VMX_FEATURES_* Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22  0:08 ` [PATCH v2 10/16] x86/cpu: Detect VMX features on Intel, Centaur and Zhaoxin CPUs Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22  0:08 ` [PATCH v2 11/16] x86/cpu: Print VMX flags in /proc/cpuinfo using VMX_FEATURES_* Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22  0:08 ` [PATCH v2 12/16] x86/cpufeatures: Drop synthetic VMX feature flags Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22  0:08 ` [PATCH v2 13/16] KVM: VMX: Use VMX_FEATURE_* flags to define VMCS control bits Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22  0:09 ` [PATCH v2 14/16] x86/cpufeatures: Clean up synthetic virtualization flags Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22  0:12 ` [PATCH v2 15/16] perf/x86: Provide stubs of KVM helpers for non-Intel CPUs Sean Christopherson
2019-10-22  0:12 ` [PATCH v2 16/16] KVM: VMX: Allow KVM_INTEL when building for Centaur and/or Zhaoxin CPUs Sean Christopherson

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