* [PATCH 4.4 01/20] kvm: mmu: Dont read PDPTEs when paging is not enabled
2019-11-15 6:20 [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2019-11-15 6:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 02/20] MIPS: BCM63XX: fix switch core reset on BCM6368 Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (22 subsequent siblings)
23 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2019-11-15 6:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Junaid Shahid, Paolo Bonzini,
Sean Christopherson, Sasha Levin
From: Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com>
[ Upstream commit d35b34a9a70edae7ef923f100e51b8b5ae9fe899 ]
kvm should not attempt to read guest PDPTEs when CR0.PG = 0 and
CR4.PAE = 1.
Signed-off-by: Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ static bool pdptrs_changed(struct kvm_vc
gfn_t gfn;
int r;
- if (is_long_mode(vcpu) || !is_pae(vcpu))
+ if (is_long_mode(vcpu) || !is_pae(vcpu) || !is_paging(vcpu))
return false;
if (!test_bit(VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR,
@@ -7168,7 +7168,7 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs(struct
kvm_update_cpuid(vcpu);
idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
- if (!is_long_mode(vcpu) && is_pae(vcpu)) {
+ if (!is_long_mode(vcpu) && is_pae(vcpu) && is_paging(vcpu)) {
load_pdptrs(vcpu, vcpu->arch.walk_mmu, kvm_read_cr3(vcpu));
mmu_reset_needed = 1;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 02/20] MIPS: BCM63XX: fix switch core reset on BCM6368
2019-11-15 6:20 [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 01/20] kvm: mmu: Dont read PDPTEs when paging is not enabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2019-11-15 6:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 03/20] powerpc/Makefile: Use cflags-y/aflags-y for setting endian options Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (21 subsequent siblings)
23 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2019-11-15 6:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jonas Gorski, Paul Burton,
linux-mips, Ralf Baechle, James Hogan, Florian Fainelli,
Amit Pundir
From: Jonas Gorski <jonas.gorski@gmail.com>
commit 8a38dacf87180738d42b058334c951eba15d2d47 upstream.
The Ethernet Switch core mask was set to 0, causing the switch core to
be not reset on BCM6368 on boot. Provide the proper mask so the switch
core gets reset to a known good state.
Fixes: 799faa626c71 ("MIPS: BCM63XX: add core reset helper")
Signed-off-by: Jonas Gorski <jonas.gorski@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org>
Cc: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/mips/bcm63xx/reset.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/mips/bcm63xx/reset.c
+++ b/arch/mips/bcm63xx/reset.c
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@
#define BCM6368_RESET_DSL 0
#define BCM6368_RESET_SAR SOFTRESET_6368_SAR_MASK
#define BCM6368_RESET_EPHY SOFTRESET_6368_EPHY_MASK
-#define BCM6368_RESET_ENETSW 0
+#define BCM6368_RESET_ENETSW SOFTRESET_6368_ENETSW_MASK
#define BCM6368_RESET_PCM SOFTRESET_6368_PCM_MASK
#define BCM6368_RESET_MPI SOFTRESET_6368_MPI_MASK
#define BCM6368_RESET_PCIE 0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 03/20] powerpc/Makefile: Use cflags-y/aflags-y for setting endian options
2019-11-15 6:20 [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 01/20] kvm: mmu: Dont read PDPTEs when paging is not enabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 02/20] MIPS: BCM63XX: fix switch core reset on BCM6368 Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2019-11-15 6:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 04/20] powerpc: Fix compiling a BE kernel with a powerpc64le toolchain Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (20 subsequent siblings)
23 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2019-11-15 6:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Michael Ellerman, Andrew Donnellan
From: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
commit 164af597ce945751e2dcd53d0a86e84203a6d117 upstream.
When we introduced the little endian support, we added the endian flags
to CC directly using override. I don't know the history of why we did
that, I suspect no one does.
Although this mostly works, it has one bug, which is that CROSS32CC
doesn't get -mbig-endian. That means when the compiler is little endian
by default and the user is building big endian, vdso32 is incorrectly
compiled as little endian and the kernel fails to build.
Instead we can add the endian flags to cflags-y/aflags-y, and then
append those to KBUILD_CFLAGS/KBUILD_AFLAGS.
This has the advantage of being 1) less ugly, 2) the documented way of
adding flags in the arch Makefile and 3) it fixes building vdso32 with a
LE toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/powerpc/Makefile | 22 ++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/powerpc/Makefile
+++ b/arch/powerpc/Makefile
@@ -66,29 +66,28 @@ endif
UTS_MACHINE := $(OLDARCH)
ifeq ($(CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN),y)
-override CC += -mlittle-endian
-ifneq ($(cc-name),clang)
-override CC += -mno-strict-align
-endif
-override AS += -mlittle-endian
override LD += -EL
-override CROSS32CC += -mlittle-endian
override CROSS32AS += -mlittle-endian
LDEMULATION := lppc
GNUTARGET := powerpcle
MULTIPLEWORD := -mno-multiple
KBUILD_CFLAGS_MODULE += $(call cc-option,-mno-save-toc-indirect)
else
-ifeq ($(call cc-option-yn,-mbig-endian),y)
-override CC += -mbig-endian
-override AS += -mbig-endian
-endif
override LD += -EB
LDEMULATION := ppc
GNUTARGET := powerpc
MULTIPLEWORD := -mmultiple
endif
+cflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN) += $(call cc-option,-mbig-endian)
+cflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN) += -mlittle-endian
+ifneq ($(cc-name),clang)
+ cflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN) += -mno-strict-align
+endif
+
+aflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN) += $(call cc-option,-mbig-endian)
+aflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN) += -mlittle-endian
+
ifeq ($(HAS_BIARCH),y)
override AS += -a$(CONFIG_WORD_SIZE)
override LD += -m elf$(CONFIG_WORD_SIZE)$(LDEMULATION)
@@ -212,6 +211,9 @@ cpu-as-$(CONFIG_E200) += -Wa,-me200
KBUILD_AFLAGS += $(cpu-as-y)
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(cpu-as-y)
+KBUILD_AFLAGS += $(aflags-y)
+KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(cflags-y)
+
head-y := arch/powerpc/kernel/head_$(CONFIG_WORD_SIZE).o
head-$(CONFIG_8xx) := arch/powerpc/kernel/head_8xx.o
head-$(CONFIG_40x) := arch/powerpc/kernel/head_40x.o
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 04/20] powerpc: Fix compiling a BE kernel with a powerpc64le toolchain
2019-11-15 6:20 [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 03/20] powerpc/Makefile: Use cflags-y/aflags-y for setting endian options Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2019-11-15 6:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 05/20] powerpc/boot: Request no dynamic linker for boot wrapper Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (19 subsequent siblings)
23 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2019-11-15 6:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Nicholas Piggin, Naveen N. Rao,
Michael Ellerman, Andrew Donnellan
From: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
commit 4dc831aa88132f835cefe876aa0206977c4d7710 upstream.
GCC can compile with either endian, but the default ABI version is set
based on the default endianness of the toolchain. Alan Modra says:
you need both -mbig and -mabi=elfv1 to make a powerpc64le gcc
generate powerpc64 code
The opposite is true for powerpc64 when generating -mlittle it
requires -mabi=elfv2 to generate v2 ABI, which we were already doing.
This change adds ABI annotations together with endianness for all cases,
LE and BE. This fixes the case of building a BE kernel with a toolchain
that is LE by default.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/powerpc/Makefile | 11 ++++++++++-
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/powerpc/Makefile
+++ b/arch/powerpc/Makefile
@@ -79,8 +79,15 @@ GNUTARGET := powerpc
MULTIPLEWORD := -mmultiple
endif
-cflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN) += $(call cc-option,-mbig-endian)
+ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
+cflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN) += $(call cc-option,-mabi=elfv1)
+cflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN) += $(call cc-option,-mcall-aixdesc)
+aflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN) += $(call cc-option,-mabi=elfv1)
+aflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN) += -mabi=elfv2
+endif
+
cflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN) += -mlittle-endian
+cflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN) += $(call cc-option,-mbig-endian)
ifneq ($(cc-name),clang)
cflags-$(CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN) += -mno-strict-align
endif
@@ -120,7 +127,9 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN),y)
CFLAGS-$(CONFIG_PPC64) += $(call cc-option,-mabi=elfv2,$(call cc-option,-mcall-aixdesc))
AFLAGS-$(CONFIG_PPC64) += $(call cc-option,-mabi=elfv2)
else
+CFLAGS-$(CONFIG_PPC64) += $(call cc-option,-mabi=elfv1)
CFLAGS-$(CONFIG_PPC64) += $(call cc-option,-mcall-aixdesc)
+AFLAGS-$(CONFIG_PPC64) += $(call cc-option,-mabi=elfv1)
endif
CFLAGS-$(CONFIG_PPC64) += $(call cc-option,-mcmodel=medium,$(call cc-option,-mminimal-toc))
CFLAGS-$(CONFIG_PPC64) += $(call cc-option,-mno-pointers-to-nested-functions)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 05/20] powerpc/boot: Request no dynamic linker for boot wrapper
2019-11-15 6:20 [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 04/20] powerpc: Fix compiling a BE kernel with a powerpc64le toolchain Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2019-11-15 6:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 06/20] KVM: Introduce kvm_get_arch_capabilities() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (18 subsequent siblings)
23 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2019-11-15 6:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Anton Blanchard, Nicholas Piggin,
Michael Ellerman, Andrew Donnellan
From: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
commit ff45000fcb56b5b0f1a14a865d3541746d838a0a upstream.
The boot wrapper performs its own relocations and does not require
PT_INTERP segment. However currently we don't tell the linker that.
Prior to binutils 2.28 that works OK. But since binutils commit
1a9ccd70f9a7 ("Fix the linker so that it will not silently generate ELF
binaries with invalid program headers. Fix readelf to report such
invalid binaries.") binutils tries to create a program header segment
due to PT_INTERP, and the link fails because there is no space for it:
ld: arch/powerpc/boot/zImage.pseries: Not enough room for program headers, try linking with -N
ld: final link failed: Bad value
So tell the linker not to do that, by passing --no-dynamic-linker.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
[mpe: Drop dependency on ld-version.sh and massage change log]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
[ajd: backport to v4.4 (resolve conflict with a comment line)]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/powerpc/boot/wrapper | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/powerpc/boot/wrapper
+++ b/arch/powerpc/boot/wrapper
@@ -161,6 +161,28 @@ case "$elfformat" in
elf32-powerpc) format=elf32ppc ;;
esac
+ld_version()
+{
+ # Poached from scripts/ld-version.sh, but we don't want to call that because
+ # this script (wrapper) is distributed separately from the kernel source.
+ # Extract linker version number from stdin and turn into single number.
+ awk '{
+ gsub(".*\\)", "");
+ gsub(".*version ", "");
+ gsub("-.*", "");
+ split($1,a, ".");
+ print a[1]*100000000 + a[2]*1000000 + a[3]*10000;
+ exit
+ }'
+}
+
+# Do not include PT_INTERP segment when linking pie. Non-pie linking
+# just ignores this option.
+LD_VERSION=$(${CROSS}ld --version | ld_version)
+LD_NO_DL_MIN_VERSION=$(echo 2.26 | ld_version)
+if [ "$LD_VERSION" -ge "$LD_NO_DL_MIN_VERSION" ] ; then
+ nodl="--no-dynamic-linker"
+fi
platformo=$object/"$platform".o
lds=$object/zImage.lds
@@ -412,7 +434,7 @@ if [ "$platform" != "miboot" ]; then
if [ -n "$link_address" ] ; then
text_start="-Ttext $link_address"
fi
- ${CROSS}ld -m $format -T $lds $text_start $pie -o "$ofile" \
+ ${CROSS}ld -m $format -T $lds $text_start $pie $nodl -o "$ofile" \
$platformo $tmp $object/wrapper.a
rm $tmp
fi
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 06/20] KVM: Introduce kvm_get_arch_capabilities()
2019-11-15 6:20 [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 05/20] powerpc/boot: Request no dynamic linker for boot wrapper Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2019-11-15 6:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 07/20] KVM: x86: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES on AMD hosts Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (17 subsequent siblings)
23 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2019-11-15 6:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Ben Hutchings
From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Extracted from commit 5b76a3cff011 "KVM: VMX: Tell the nested
hypervisor to skip L1D flush on vmentry". We will need this to let a
nested hypervisor know that we have applied the mitigation for TAA.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 3 +--
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 10 ++++++++++
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1226,6 +1226,7 @@ void kvm_vcpu_reload_apic_access_page(st
void kvm_arch_mmu_notifier_invalidate_page(struct kvm *kvm,
unsigned long address);
+u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void);
void kvm_define_shared_msr(unsigned index, u32 msr);
int kvm_set_shared_msr(unsigned index, u64 val, u64 mask);
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -5079,8 +5079,7 @@ static int vmx_vcpu_setup(struct vcpu_vm
++vmx->nmsrs;
}
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
- rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, vmx->arch_capabilities);
+ vmx->arch_capabilities = kvm_get_arch_capabilities();
vm_exit_controls_init(vmx, vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl);
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -995,6 +995,16 @@ static u32 emulated_msrs[] = {
static unsigned num_emulated_msrs;
+u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
+{
+ u64 data;
+
+ rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, &data);
+
+ return data;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_get_arch_capabilities);
+
static bool __kvm_valid_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
{
if (efer & EFER_FFXSR) {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 07/20] KVM: x86: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES on AMD hosts
2019-11-15 6:20 [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 06/20] KVM: Introduce kvm_get_arch_capabilities() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2019-11-15 6:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 08/20] kvm: x86: IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES is always supported Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (16 subsequent siblings)
23 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2019-11-15 6:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Xiaoyao Li, Jim Mattson,
Sean Christopherson, Paolo Bonzini, Ben Hutchings
From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
commit 0cf9135b773bf32fba9dd8e6699c1b331ee4b749 upstream.
The CPUID flag ARCH_CAPABILITIES is unconditioinally exposed to host
userspace for all x86 hosts, i.e. KVM advertises ARCH_CAPABILITIES
regardless of hardware support under the pretense that KVM fully
emulates MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES. Unfortunately, only VMX hosts
handle accesses to MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (despite KVM_GET_MSRS
also reporting MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES for all hosts).
Move the MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES handling to common x86 code so
that it's emulated on AMD hosts.
Fixes: 1eaafe91a0df4 ("kvm: x86: IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES is always supported")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 14 --------------
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 12 ++++++++++++
3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -408,6 +408,7 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
u64 smbase;
bool tpr_access_reporting;
u64 ia32_xss;
+ u64 arch_capabilities;
/*
* Paging state of the vcpu
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -546,7 +546,6 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
u64 msr_guest_kernel_gs_base;
#endif
- u64 arch_capabilities;
u64 spec_ctrl;
u32 vm_entry_controls_shadow;
@@ -2866,12 +2865,6 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *
msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->spec_ctrl;
break;
- case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
- if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
- !guest_cpuid_has_arch_capabilities(vcpu))
- return 1;
- msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->arch_capabilities;
- break;
case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
msr_info->data = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS);
break;
@@ -3028,11 +3021,6 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *
vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD,
MSR_TYPE_W);
break;
- case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
- if (!msr_info->host_initiated)
- return 1;
- vmx->arch_capabilities = data;
- break;
case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
if (!kvm_mtrr_valid(vcpu, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, data))
@@ -5079,8 +5067,6 @@ static int vmx_vcpu_setup(struct vcpu_vm
++vmx->nmsrs;
}
- vmx->arch_capabilities = kvm_get_arch_capabilities();
-
vm_exit_controls_init(vmx, vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl);
/* 22.2.1, 20.8.1 */
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -2080,6 +2080,11 @@ int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *
case MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2:
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
+ if (!msr_info->host_initiated)
+ return 1;
+ vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities = data;
+ break;
case MSR_EFER:
return set_efer(vcpu, msr_info);
case MSR_K7_HWCR:
@@ -2354,6 +2359,12 @@ int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *
case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
msr_info->data = 0x100000000ULL;
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
+ if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+ !guest_cpuid_has_arch_capabilities(vcpu))
+ return 1;
+ msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities;
+ break;
case MSR_MTRRcap:
case 0x200 ... 0x2ff:
return kvm_mtrr_get_msr(vcpu, msr_info->index, &msr_info->data);
@@ -7402,6 +7413,7 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_setup(struct kvm_vcpu
{
int r;
+ vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities = kvm_get_arch_capabilities();
kvm_vcpu_mtrr_init(vcpu);
r = vcpu_load(vcpu);
if (r)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 08/20] kvm: x86: IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES is always supported
2019-11-15 6:20 [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 07/20] KVM: x86: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES on AMD hosts Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2019-11-15 6:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 09/20] KVM: x86: use Intel speculation bugs and features as derived in generic x86 code Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (15 subsequent siblings)
23 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2019-11-15 6:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jim Mattson, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk,
Radim Krčmář,
Ben Hutchings
From: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
commit 1eaafe91a0df4157521b6417b3dd8430bf5f52f0 upstream.
If there is a possibility that a VM may migrate to a Skylake host,
then the hypervisor should report IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.RSBA[bit 2]
as being set (future work, of course). This implies that
CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EDX.ARCH_CAPABILITIES[bit 29] should be
set. Therefore, kvm should report this CPUID bit as being supported
whether or not the host supports it. Userspace is still free to clear
the bit if it chooses.
For more information on RSBA, see Intel's white paper, "Retpoline: A
Branch Target Injection Mitigation" (Document Number 337131-001),
currently available at https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199511.
Since the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR is emulated in kvm, there is no
dependency on hardware support for this feature.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Fixes: 28c1c9fabf48 ("KVM/VMX: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -447,6 +447,11 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct
entry->ebx |= F(TSC_ADJUST);
entry->edx &= kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features;
cpuid_mask(&entry->edx, CPUID_7_EDX);
+ /*
+ * We emulate ARCH_CAPABILITIES in software even
+ * if the host doesn't support it.
+ */
+ entry->edx |= F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
} else {
entry->ebx = 0;
entry->edx = 0;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 09/20] KVM: x86: use Intel speculation bugs and features as derived in generic x86 code
2019-11-15 6:20 [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 08/20] kvm: x86: IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES is always supported Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2019-11-15 6:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 10/20] x86/msr: Add the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (14 subsequent siblings)
23 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2019-11-15 6:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jim Mattson, Paolo Bonzini,
Thomas Gleixner, Ben Hutchings
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
commit 0c54914d0c52a15db9954a76ce80fee32cf318f4 upstream.
Similar to AMD bits, set the Intel bits from the vendor-independent
feature and bug flags, because KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID does not care
about the vendor and they should be set on AMD processors as well.
Suggested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 7 +++++++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 8 ++++++++
2 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -447,6 +447,13 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct
entry->ebx |= F(TSC_ADJUST);
entry->edx &= kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features;
cpuid_mask(&entry->edx, CPUID_7_EDX);
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
+ entry->edx |= F(SPEC_CTRL);
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
+ entry->edx |= F(INTEL_STIBP);
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD))
+ entry->edx |= F(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD);
/*
* We emulate ARCH_CAPABILITIES in software even
* if the host doesn't support it.
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1001,8 +1001,16 @@ u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, &data);
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
+ data |= ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO;
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS))
+ data |= ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO;
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
+ data |= ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO;
+
return data;
}
+
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_get_arch_capabilities);
static bool __kvm_valid_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 10/20] x86/msr: Add the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR
2019-11-15 6:20 [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 09/20] KVM: x86: use Intel speculation bugs and features as derived in generic x86 code Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2019-11-15 6:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 11/20] x86/cpu: Add a helper function x86_read_arch_cap_msr() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (13 subsequent siblings)
23 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2019-11-15 6:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Pawan Gupta, Borislav Petkov,
Thomas Gleixner, Neelima Krishnan, Mark Gross, Tony Luck,
Josh Poimboeuf, Ben Hutchings
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
commit c2955f270a84762343000f103e0640d29c7a96f3 upstream.
Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) may be used on certain
processors as part of a speculative side channel attack. A microcode
update for existing processors that are vulnerable to this attack will
add a new MSR - IA32_TSX_CTRL to allow the system administrator the
option to disable TSX as one of the possible mitigations.
The CPUs which get this new MSR after a microcode upgrade are the ones
which do not set MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO (bit 5) because those
CPUs have CPUID.MD_CLEAR, i.e., the VERW implementation which clears all
CPU buffers takes care of the TAA case as well.
[ Note that future processors that are not vulnerable will also
support the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR. ]
Add defines for the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR and its bits.
TSX has two sub-features:
1. Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM) is an explicitly-used feature
where new instructions begin and end TSX transactions.
2. Hardware Lock Elision (HLE) is implicitly used when certain kinds of
"old" style locks are used by software.
Bit 7 of the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES indicates the presence of the
IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR.
There are two control bits in IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR:
Bit 0: When set, it disables the Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM)
sub-feature of TSX (will force all transactions to abort on the
XBEGIN instruction).
Bit 1: When set, it disables the enumeration of the RTM and HLE feature
(i.e. it will make CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4} and
CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit11} read as 0).
The other TSX sub-feature, Hardware Lock Elision (HLE), is
unconditionally disabled by the new microcode but still enumerated
as present by CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4}, unless disabled by
IA32_TSX_CTRL_MSR[1] - TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -71,10 +71,15 @@
* Microarchitectural Data
* Sampling (MDS) vulnerabilities.
*/
+#define ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR BIT(7) /* MSR for TSX control is available. */
#define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL 0x00000119
#define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3 0x0000011e
+#define MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL 0x00000122
+#define TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE BIT(0) /* Disable RTM feature */
+#define TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR BIT(1) /* Disable TSX enumeration */
+
#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS 0x00000174
#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP 0x00000175
#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP 0x00000176
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 11/20] x86/cpu: Add a helper function x86_read_arch_cap_msr()
2019-11-15 6:20 [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 10/20] x86/msr: Add the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2019-11-15 6:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 12/20] x86/cpu: Add a "tsx=" cmdline option with TSX disabled by default Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (12 subsequent siblings)
23 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2019-11-15 6:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Pawan Gupta, Borislav Petkov,
Thomas Gleixner, Neelima Krishnan, Mark Gross, Tony Luck,
Josh Poimboeuf, Ben Hutchings
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
commit 286836a70433fb64131d2590f4bf512097c255e1 upstream.
Add a helper function to read the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 15 +++++++++++----
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h | 2 ++
2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -918,19 +918,26 @@ static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned
return m && !!(m->driver_data & which);
}
-static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void)
{
u64 ia32_cap = 0;
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
+
+ return ia32_cap;
+}
+
+static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+
if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION))
return;
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
- if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
- rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
-
if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
@@ -49,4 +49,6 @@ extern void cpu_detect_cache_sizes(struc
extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void);
+extern u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void);
+
#endif /* ARCH_X86_CPU_H */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 12/20] x86/cpu: Add a "tsx=" cmdline option with TSX disabled by default
2019-11-15 6:20 [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 11/20] x86/cpu: Add a helper function x86_read_arch_cap_msr() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2019-11-15 6:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 13/20] x86/speculation/taa: Add mitigation for TSX Async Abort Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (11 subsequent siblings)
23 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2019-11-15 6:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Pawan Gupta, Borislav Petkov,
Thomas Gleixner, Josh Poimboeuf, Ben Hutchings
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
commit 95c5824f75f3ba4c9e8e5a4b1a623c95390ac266 upstream.
Add a kernel cmdline parameter "tsx" to control the Transactional
Synchronization Extensions (TSX) feature. On CPUs that support TSX
control, use "tsx=on|off" to enable or disable TSX. Not specifying this
option is equivalent to "tsx=off". This is because on certain processors
TSX may be used as a part of a speculative side channel attack.
Carve out the TSX controlling functionality into a separate compilation
unit because TSX is a CPU feature while the TSX async abort control
machinery will go to cpu/bugs.c.
[ bp: - Massage, shorten and clear the arg buffer.
- Clarifications of the tsx= possible options - Josh.
- Expand on TSX_CTRL availability - Pawan. ]
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
- Drop __ro_after_init attribute
- Adjust filenames, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 26 +++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile | 2
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 2
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h | 16 ++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 5 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c | 125 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
6 files changed, 175 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -4052,6 +4052,32 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
platforms where RDTSC is slow and this accounting
can add overhead.
+ tsx= [X86] Control Transactional Synchronization
+ Extensions (TSX) feature in Intel processors that
+ support TSX control.
+
+ This parameter controls the TSX feature. The options are:
+
+ on - Enable TSX on the system. Although there are
+ mitigations for all known security vulnerabilities,
+ TSX has been known to be an accelerator for
+ several previous speculation-related CVEs, and
+ so there may be unknown security risks associated
+ with leaving it enabled.
+
+ off - Disable TSX on the system. (Note that this
+ option takes effect only on newer CPUs which are
+ not vulnerable to MDS, i.e., have
+ MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO=1 and which get
+ the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR through a microcode
+ update. This new MSR allows for the reliable
+ deactivation of the TSX functionality.)
+
+ Not specifying this option is equivalent to tsx=off.
+
+ See Documentation/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
+ for more details.
+
turbografx.map[2|3]= [HW,JOY]
TurboGraFX parallel port interface
Format:
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ obj-y += bugs.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES) += capflags.o powerflags.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL) += intel.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL) += intel.o tsx.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_AMD) += amd.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_CYRIX_32) += cyrix.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_CENTAUR) += centaur.o
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1294,6 +1294,8 @@ void __init identify_boot_cpu(void)
enable_sep_cpu();
#endif
cpu_detect_tlb(&boot_cpu_data);
+
+ tsx_init();
}
void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
@@ -44,6 +44,22 @@ struct _tlb_table {
extern const struct cpu_dev *const __x86_cpu_dev_start[],
*const __x86_cpu_dev_end[];
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL
+enum tsx_ctrl_states {
+ TSX_CTRL_ENABLE,
+ TSX_CTRL_DISABLE,
+ TSX_CTRL_NOT_SUPPORTED,
+};
+
+extern enum tsx_ctrl_states tsx_ctrl_state;
+
+extern void __init tsx_init(void);
+extern void tsx_enable(void);
+extern void tsx_disable(void);
+#else
+static inline void tsx_init(void) { }
+#endif /* CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL */
+
extern void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
extern void cpu_detect_cache_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -582,6 +582,11 @@ static void init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x8
detect_vmx_virtcap(c);
init_intel_energy_perf(c);
+
+ if (tsx_ctrl_state == TSX_CTRL_ENABLE)
+ tsx_enable();
+ if (tsx_ctrl_state == TSX_CTRL_DISABLE)
+ tsx_disable();
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Intel Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) control.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 Intel Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+
+#include <asm/cmdline.h>
+
+#include "cpu.h"
+
+enum tsx_ctrl_states tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+
+void tsx_disable(void)
+{
+ u64 tsx;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, tsx);
+
+ /* Force all transactions to immediately abort */
+ tsx |= TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure TSX support is not enumerated in CPUID.
+ * This is visible to userspace and will ensure they
+ * do not waste resources trying TSX transactions that
+ * will always abort.
+ */
+ tsx |= TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR;
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, tsx);
+}
+
+void tsx_enable(void)
+{
+ u64 tsx;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, tsx);
+
+ /* Enable the RTM feature in the cpu */
+ tsx &= ~TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure TSX support is enumerated in CPUID.
+ * This is visible to userspace and will ensure they
+ * can enumerate and use the TSX feature.
+ */
+ tsx &= ~TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR;
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, tsx);
+}
+
+static bool __init tsx_ctrl_is_supported(void)
+{
+ u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+
+ /*
+ * TSX is controlled via MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL. However, support for this
+ * MSR is enumerated by ARCH_CAP_TSX_MSR bit in MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.
+ *
+ * TSX control (aka MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL) is only available after a
+ * microcode update on CPUs that have their MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
+ * bit MDS_NO=1. CPUs with MDS_NO=0 are not planned to get
+ * MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL support even after a microcode update. Thus,
+ * tsx= cmdline requests will do nothing on CPUs without
+ * MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL support.
+ */
+ return !!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR);
+}
+
+void __init tsx_init(void)
+{
+ char arg[4] = {};
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!tsx_ctrl_is_supported())
+ return;
+
+ ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "tsx", arg, sizeof(arg));
+ if (ret >= 0) {
+ if (!strcmp(arg, "on")) {
+ tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_ENABLE;
+ } else if (!strcmp(arg, "off")) {
+ tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
+ } else {
+ tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
+ pr_err("tsx: invalid option, defaulting to off\n");
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* tsx= not provided, defaulting to off */
+ tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
+ }
+
+ if (tsx_ctrl_state == TSX_CTRL_DISABLE) {
+ tsx_disable();
+
+ /*
+ * tsx_disable() will change the state of the
+ * RTM CPUID bit. Clear it here since it is now
+ * expected to be not set.
+ */
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RTM);
+ } else if (tsx_ctrl_state == TSX_CTRL_ENABLE) {
+
+ /*
+ * HW defaults TSX to be enabled at bootup.
+ * We may still need the TSX enable support
+ * during init for special cases like
+ * kexec after TSX is disabled.
+ */
+ tsx_enable();
+
+ /*
+ * tsx_enable() will change the state of the
+ * RTM CPUID bit. Force it here since it is now
+ * expected to be set.
+ */
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RTM);
+ }
+}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 13/20] x86/speculation/taa: Add mitigation for TSX Async Abort
2019-11-15 6:20 [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 12/20] x86/cpu: Add a "tsx=" cmdline option with TSX disabled by default Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2019-11-15 6:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 14/20] x86/speculation/taa: Add sysfs reporting " Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (10 subsequent siblings)
23 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2019-11-15 6:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Pawan Gupta, Borislav Petkov,
Thomas Gleixner, Josh Poimboeuf, Ben Hutchings
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
commit 1b42f017415b46c317e71d41c34ec088417a1883 upstream.
TSX Async Abort (TAA) is a side channel vulnerability to the internal
buffers in some Intel processors similar to Microachitectural Data
Sampling (MDS). In this case, certain loads may speculatively pass
invalid data to dependent operations when an asynchronous abort
condition is pending in a TSX transaction.
This includes loads with no fault or assist condition. Such loads may
speculatively expose stale data from the uarch data structures as in
MDS. Scope of exposure is within the same-thread and cross-thread. This
issue affects all current processors that support TSX, but do not have
ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO (bit 8) set in MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.
On CPUs which have their IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR bit MDS_NO=0,
CPUID.MD_CLEAR=1 and the MDS mitigation is clearing the CPU buffers
using VERW or L1D_FLUSH, there is no additional mitigation needed for
TAA. On affected CPUs with MDS_NO=1 this issue can be mitigated by
disabling the Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) feature.
A new MSR IA32_TSX_CTRL in future and current processors after a
microcode update can be used to control the TSX feature. There are two
bits in that MSR:
* TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE disables the TSX sub-feature Restricted
Transactional Memory (RTM).
* TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR clears the RTM enumeration in CPUID. The other
TSX sub-feature, Hardware Lock Elision (HLE), is unconditionally
disabled with updated microcode but still enumerated as present by
CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4}.
The second mitigation approach is similar to MDS which is clearing the
affected CPU buffers on return to user space and when entering a guest.
Relevant microcode update is required for the mitigation to work. More
details on this approach can be found here:
https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html
The TSX feature can be controlled by the "tsx" command line parameter.
If it is force-enabled then "Clear CPU buffers" (MDS mitigation) is
deployed. The effective mitigation state can be read from sysfs.
[ bp:
- massage + comments cleanup
- s/TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLE/TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED/g - Josh.
- remove partial TAA mitigation in update_mds_branch_idle() - Josh.
- s/tsx_async_abort_cmdline/tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline/g
]
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
- Add #include "cpu.h" in bugs.c
- Drop __ro_after_init attribute
- Drop "nosmt" support
- Adjust context, indentation]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 4 +
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 4 -
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 7 ++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 15 +++++
6 files changed, 132 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -340,5 +340,6 @@
#define X86_BUG_MDS X86_BUG(19) /* CPU is affected by Microarchitectural data sampling */
#define X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY X86_BUG(20) /* CPU is only affected by the MSDBS variant of BUG_MDS */
#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS X86_BUG(21) /* CPU is affected by speculation through SWAPGS */
+#define X86_BUG_TAA X86_BUG(22) /* CPU is affected by TSX Async Abort(TAA) */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -72,6 +72,10 @@
* Sampling (MDS) vulnerabilities.
*/
#define ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR BIT(7) /* MSR for TSX control is available. */
+#define ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO BIT(8) /*
+ * Not susceptible to
+ * TSX Async Abort (TAA) vulnerabilities.
+ */
#define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL 0x00000119
#define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3 0x0000011e
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear)
#include <asm/segment.h>
/**
- * mds_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
+ * mds_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability
*
* This uses the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW instruction in
* combination with microcode which triggers a CPU buffer flush when the
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ static inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers
}
/**
- * mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
+ * mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability
*
* Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
*/
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -852,4 +852,11 @@ enum mds_mitigations {
MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV,
};
+enum taa_mitigations {
+ TAA_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+ TAA_MITIGATION_VERW,
+ TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED,
+};
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_H */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -30,11 +30,14 @@
#include <asm/intel-family.h>
#include <asm/e820.h>
+#include "cpu.h"
+
static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
@@ -94,6 +97,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
ssb_select_mitigation();
l1tf_select_mitigation();
mds_select_mitigation();
+ taa_select_mitigation();
arch_smt_update();
@@ -247,6 +251,93 @@ static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str)
early_param("mds", mds_cmdline);
#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "TAA: " fmt
+
+/* Default mitigation for TAA-affected CPUs */
+static enum taa_mitigations taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+
+static const char * const taa_strings[] = {
+ [TAA_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
+ [TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
+ [TAA_MITIGATION_VERW] = "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers",
+ [TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED] = "Mitigation: TSX disabled",
+};
+
+static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ u64 ia32_cap;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) {
+ taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* TSX previously disabled by tsx=off */
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) {
+ taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+ taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* TAA mitigation is turned off on the cmdline (tsx_async_abort=off) */
+ if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
+ taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ else
+ taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+
+ /*
+ * VERW doesn't clear the CPU buffers when MD_CLEAR=1 and MDS_NO=1.
+ * A microcode update fixes this behavior to clear CPU buffers. It also
+ * adds support for MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL which is enumerated by the
+ * ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR bit.
+ *
+ * On MDS_NO=1 CPUs if ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR is not set, microcode
+ * update is required.
+ */
+ ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+ if ( (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
+ taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+
+ /*
+ * TSX is enabled, select alternate mitigation for TAA which is
+ * the same as MDS. Enable MDS static branch to clear CPU buffers.
+ *
+ * For guests that can't determine whether the correct microcode is
+ * present on host, enable the mitigation for UCODE_NEEDED as well.
+ */
+ static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+
+out:
+ pr_info("%s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!str)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!strcmp(str, "off")) {
+ taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ } else if (!strcmp(str, "full")) {
+ taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("tsx_async_abort", tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V1 : " fmt
enum spectre_v1_mitigation {
@@ -758,6 +849,7 @@ static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
}
#define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more details.\n"
+#define TAA_MSG_SMT "TAA CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html for more details.\n"
void arch_smt_update(void)
{
@@ -790,6 +882,17 @@ void arch_smt_update(void)
break;
}
+ switch (taa_mitigation) {
+ case TAA_MITIGATION_VERW:
+ case TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
+ if (sched_smt_active())
+ pr_warn_once(TAA_MSG_SMT);
+ break;
+ case TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED:
+ case TAA_MITIGATION_OFF:
+ break;
+ }
+
mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
}
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -954,6 +954,21 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS);
+ /*
+ * When the CPU is not mitigated for TAA (TAA_NO=0) set TAA bug when:
+ * - TSX is supported or
+ * - TSX_CTRL is present
+ *
+ * TSX_CTRL check is needed for cases when TSX could be disabled before
+ * the kernel boot e.g. kexec.
+ * TSX_CTRL check alone is not sufficient for cases when the microcode
+ * update is not present or running as guest that don't get TSX_CTRL.
+ */
+ if (!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO) &&
+ (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RTM) ||
+ (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
+
if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
return;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 14/20] x86/speculation/taa: Add sysfs reporting for TSX Async Abort
2019-11-15 6:20 [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (12 preceding siblings ...)
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 13/20] x86/speculation/taa: Add mitigation for TSX Async Abort Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2019-11-15 6:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 15/20] kvm/x86: Export MDS_NO=0 to guests when TSX is enabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (9 subsequent siblings)
23 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2019-11-15 6:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Pawan Gupta, Borislav Petkov,
Thomas Gleixner, Neelima Krishnan, Mark Gross, Tony Luck,
Josh Poimboeuf, Ben Hutchings
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
commit 6608b45ac5ecb56f9e171252229c39580cc85f0f upstream.
Add the sysfs reporting file for TSX Async Abort. It exposes the
vulnerability and the mitigation state similar to the existing files for
the other hardware vulnerabilities.
Sysfs file path is:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/base/cpu.c | 9 +++++++++
include/linux/cpu.h | 3 +++
3 files changed, 35 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1300,6 +1300,21 @@ static ssize_t mds_show_state(char *buf)
sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
}
+static ssize_t tsx_async_abort_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ if ((taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED) ||
+ (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF))
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT Host state unknown\n",
+ taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
+ }
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation],
+ sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
+}
+
static char *stibp_state(void)
{
if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
@@ -1365,6 +1380,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct de
case X86_BUG_MDS:
return mds_show_state(buf);
+ case X86_BUG_TAA:
+ return tsx_async_abort_show_state(buf);
+
default:
break;
}
@@ -1401,4 +1419,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_mds(struct device *dev,
{
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MDS);
}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_tsx_async_abort(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_TAA);
+}
#endif
--- a/drivers/base/cpu.c
+++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c
@@ -536,12 +536,20 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_mds(struct devic
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
}
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_tsx_async_abort(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spec_store_bypass, 0444, cpu_show_spec_store_bypass, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(l1tf, 0444, cpu_show_l1tf, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(mds, 0444, cpu_show_mds, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(tsx_async_abort, 0444, cpu_show_tsx_async_abort, NULL);
static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
@@ -550,6 +558,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulner
&dev_attr_spec_store_bypass.attr,
&dev_attr_l1tf.attr,
&dev_attr_mds.attr,
+ &dev_attr_tsx_async_abort.attr,
NULL
};
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -52,6 +52,9 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_l1tf(struct devi
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
extern ssize_t cpu_show_mds(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_tsx_async_abort(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf);
extern __printf(4, 5)
struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 15/20] kvm/x86: Export MDS_NO=0 to guests when TSX is enabled
2019-11-15 6:20 [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (13 preceding siblings ...)
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 14/20] x86/speculation/taa: Add sysfs reporting " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2019-11-15 6:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 16/20] x86/tsx: Add "auto" option to the tsx= cmdline parameter Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (8 subsequent siblings)
23 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2019-11-15 6:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Pawan Gupta, Borislav Petkov,
Thomas Gleixner, Neelima Krishnan, Tony Luck, Josh Poimboeuf,
Ben Hutchings
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
commit e1d38b63acd843cfdd4222bf19a26700fd5c699e upstream.
Export the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR bit MDS_NO=0 to guests on TSX
Async Abort(TAA) affected hosts that have TSX enabled and updated
microcode. This is required so that the guests don't complain,
"Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode"
when the host has the updated microcode to clear CPU buffers.
Microcode update also adds support for MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL which is
enumerated by the ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL bit in IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.
Guests can't do this check themselves when the ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL bit is
not exported to the guests.
In this case export MDS_NO=0 to the guests. When guests have
CPUID.MD_CLEAR=1, they deploy MDS mitigation which also mitigates TAA.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1008,6 +1008,25 @@ u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
data |= ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO;
+ /*
+ * On TAA affected systems, export MDS_NO=0 when:
+ * - TSX is enabled on the host, i.e. X86_FEATURE_RTM=1.
+ * - Updated microcode is present. This is detected by
+ * the presence of ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR and ensures
+ * that VERW clears CPU buffers.
+ *
+ * When MDS_NO=0 is exported, guests deploy clear CPU buffer
+ * mitigation and don't complain:
+ *
+ * "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode"
+ *
+ * If TSX is disabled on the system, guests are also mitigated against
+ * TAA and clear CPU buffer mitigation is not required for guests.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) &&
+ (data & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
+ data &= ~ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO;
+
return data;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 16/20] x86/tsx: Add "auto" option to the tsx= cmdline parameter
2019-11-15 6:20 [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (14 preceding siblings ...)
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 15/20] kvm/x86: Export MDS_NO=0 to guests when TSX is enabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2019-11-15 6:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 17/20] x86/speculation/taa: Add documentation for TSX Async Abort Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (7 subsequent siblings)
23 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2019-11-15 6:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Pawan Gupta, Borislav Petkov,
Thomas Gleixner, Tony Luck, Josh Poimboeuf, Ben Hutchings
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
commit 7531a3596e3272d1f6841e0d601a614555dc6b65 upstream.
Platforms which are not affected by X86_BUG_TAA may want the TSX feature
enabled. Add "auto" option to the TSX cmdline parameter. When tsx=auto
disable TSX when X86_BUG_TAA is present, otherwise enable TSX.
More details on X86_BUG_TAA can be found here:
https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html
[ bp: Extend the arg buffer to accommodate "auto\0". ]
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 3 +++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c | 7 ++++++-
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -4073,6 +4073,9 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
update. This new MSR allows for the reliable
deactivation of the TSX functionality.)
+ auto - Disable TSX if X86_BUG_TAA is present,
+ otherwise enable TSX on the system.
+
Not specifying this option is equivalent to tsx=off.
See Documentation/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static bool __init tsx_ctrl_is_supported
void __init tsx_init(void)
{
- char arg[4] = {};
+ char arg[5] = {};
int ret;
if (!tsx_ctrl_is_supported())
@@ -87,6 +87,11 @@ void __init tsx_init(void)
tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_ENABLE;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "off")) {
tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
+ } else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto")) {
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA))
+ tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
+ else
+ tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_ENABLE;
} else {
tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
pr_err("tsx: invalid option, defaulting to off\n");
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 17/20] x86/speculation/taa: Add documentation for TSX Async Abort
2019-11-15 6:20 [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (15 preceding siblings ...)
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 16/20] x86/tsx: Add "auto" option to the tsx= cmdline parameter Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2019-11-15 6:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 18/20] x86/tsx: Add config options to set tsx=on|off|auto Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (6 subsequent siblings)
23 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2019-11-15 6:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Pawan Gupta, Antonio Gomez Iglesias,
Borislav Petkov, Thomas Gleixner, Mark Gross, Tony Luck,
Josh Poimboeuf, Ben Hutchings
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
commit a7a248c593e4fd7a67c50b5f5318fe42a0db335e upstream.
Add the documenation for TSX Async Abort. Include the description of
the issue, how to check the mitigation state, control the mitigation,
guidance for system administrators.
[ bp: Add proper SPDX tags, touch ups by Josh and me. ]
Co-developed-by: Antonio Gomez Iglesias <antonio.gomez.iglesias@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Antonio Gomez Iglesias <antonio.gomez.iglesias@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
- Drop changes to ReST index files
- Drop "nosmt" documentation
- Adjust filenames, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 1
Documentation/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst | 268 +++++++++++++++++++++
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 33 ++
Documentation/x86/tsx_async_abort.rst | 117 +++++++++
4 files changed, 419 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Documentation/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/tsx_async_abort.rst
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
@@ -279,6 +279,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabi
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
+ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
Date: January 2018
Contact: Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Description: Information about CPU vulnerabilities
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+TAA - TSX Asynchronous Abort
+======================================
+
+TAA is a hardware vulnerability that allows unprivileged speculative access to
+data which is available in various CPU internal buffers by using asynchronous
+aborts within an Intel TSX transactional region.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+This vulnerability only affects Intel processors that support Intel
+Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) when the TAA_NO bit (bit 8)
+is 0 in the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. On processors where the MDS_NO bit
+(bit 5) is 0 in the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR, the existing MDS mitigations
+also mitigate against TAA.
+
+Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the TAA
+vulnerability file in sysfs. See :ref:`tsx_async_abort_sys_info`.
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entry is related to this TAA issue:
+
+ ============== ===== ===================================================
+ CVE-2019-11135 TAA TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA) condition on some
+ microprocessors utilizing speculative execution may
+ allow an authenticated user to potentially enable
+ information disclosure via a side channel with
+ local access.
+ ============== ===== ===================================================
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+When performing store, load or L1 refill operations, processors write
+data into temporary microarchitectural structures (buffers). The data in
+those buffers can be forwarded to load operations as an optimization.
+
+Intel TSX is an extension to the x86 instruction set architecture that adds
+hardware transactional memory support to improve performance of multi-threaded
+software. TSX lets the processor expose and exploit concurrency hidden in an
+application due to dynamically avoiding unnecessary synchronization.
+
+TSX supports atomic memory transactions that are either committed (success) or
+aborted. During an abort, operations that happened within the transactional region
+are rolled back. An asynchronous abort takes place, among other options, when a
+different thread accesses a cache line that is also used within the transactional
+region when that access might lead to a data race.
+
+Immediately after an uncompleted asynchronous abort, certain speculatively
+executed loads may read data from those internal buffers and pass it to dependent
+operations. This can be then used to infer the value via a cache side channel
+attack.
+
+Because the buffers are potentially shared between Hyper-Threads cross
+Hyper-Thread attacks are possible.
+
+The victim of a malicious actor does not need to make use of TSX. Only the
+attacker needs to begin a TSX transaction and raise an asynchronous abort
+which in turn potenitally leaks data stored in the buffers.
+
+More detailed technical information is available in the TAA specific x86
+architecture section: :ref:`Documentation/x86/tsx_async_abort.rst <tsx_async_abort>`.
+
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+Attacks against the TAA vulnerability can be implemented from unprivileged
+applications running on hosts or guests.
+
+As for MDS, the attacker has no control over the memory addresses that can
+be leaked. Only the victim is responsible for bringing data to the CPU. As
+a result, the malicious actor has to sample as much data as possible and
+then postprocess it to try to infer any useful information from it.
+
+A potential attacker only has read access to the data. Also, there is no direct
+privilege escalation by using this technique.
+
+
+.. _tsx_async_abort_sys_info:
+
+TAA system information
+-----------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current TAA status
+of mitigated systems. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+.. list-table::
+
+ * - 'Vulnerable'
+ - The CPU is affected by this vulnerability and the microcode and kernel mitigation are not applied.
+ * - 'Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode'
+ - The system tries to clear the buffers but the microcode might not support the operation.
+ * - 'Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers'
+ - The microcode has been updated to clear the buffers. TSX is still enabled.
+ * - 'Mitigation: TSX disabled'
+ - TSX is disabled.
+ * - 'Not affected'
+ - The CPU is not affected by this issue.
+
+.. _ucode_needed:
+
+Best effort mitigation mode
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+If the processor is vulnerable, but the availability of the microcode-based
+mitigation mechanism is not advertised via CPUID the kernel selects a best
+effort mitigation mode. This mode invokes the mitigation instructions
+without a guarantee that they clear the CPU buffers.
+
+This is done to address virtualization scenarios where the host has the
+microcode update applied, but the hypervisor is not yet updated to expose the
+CPUID to the guest. If the host has updated microcode the protection takes
+effect; otherwise a few CPU cycles are wasted pointlessly.
+
+The state in the tsx_async_abort sysfs file reflects this situation
+accordingly.
+
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+--------------------
+
+The kernel detects the affected CPUs and the presence of the microcode which is
+required. If a CPU is affected and the microcode is available, then the kernel
+enables the mitigation by default.
+
+
+The mitigation can be controlled at boot time via a kernel command line option.
+See :ref:`taa_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+.. _virt_mechanism:
+
+Virtualization mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+Affected systems where the host has TAA microcode and TAA is mitigated by
+having disabled TSX previously, are not vulnerable regardless of the status
+of the VMs.
+
+In all other cases, if the host either does not have the TAA microcode or
+the kernel is not mitigated, the system might be vulnerable.
+
+
+.. _taa_mitigation_control_command_line:
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+The kernel command line allows to control the TAA mitigations at boot time with
+the option "tsx_async_abort=". The valid arguments for this option are:
+
+ ============ =============================================================
+ off This option disables the TAA mitigation on affected platforms.
+ If the system has TSX enabled (see next parameter) and the CPU
+ is affected, the system is vulnerable.
+
+ full TAA mitigation is enabled. If TSX is enabled, on an affected
+ system it will clear CPU buffers on ring transitions. On
+ systems which are MDS-affected and deploy MDS mitigation,
+ TAA is also mitigated. Specifying this option on those
+ systems will have no effect.
+ ============ =============================================================
+
+Not specifying this option is equivalent to "tsx_async_abort=full".
+
+The kernel command line also allows to control the TSX feature using the
+parameter "tsx=" on CPUs which support TSX control. MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL is used
+to control the TSX feature and the enumeration of the TSX feature bits (RTM
+and HLE) in CPUID.
+
+The valid options are:
+
+ ============ =============================================================
+ off Disables TSX on the system.
+
+ Note that this option takes effect only on newer CPUs which are
+ not vulnerable to MDS, i.e., have MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO=1
+ and which get the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR through a microcode
+ update. This new MSR allows for the reliable deactivation of
+ the TSX functionality.
+
+ on Enables TSX.
+
+ Although there are mitigations for all known security
+ vulnerabilities, TSX has been known to be an accelerator for
+ several previous speculation-related CVEs, and so there may be
+ unknown security risks associated with leaving it enabled.
+
+ auto Disables TSX if X86_BUG_TAA is present, otherwise enables TSX
+ on the system.
+ ============ =============================================================
+
+Not specifying this option is equivalent to "tsx=off".
+
+The following combinations of the "tsx_async_abort" and "tsx" are possible. For
+affected platforms tsx=auto is equivalent to tsx=off and the result will be:
+
+ ========= ========================== =========================================
+ tsx=on tsx_async_abort=full The system will use VERW to clear CPU
+ buffers. Cross-thread attacks are still
+ possible on SMT machines.
+ tsx=on tsx_async_abort=off The system is vulnerable.
+ tsx=off tsx_async_abort=full TSX might be disabled if microcode
+ provides a TSX control MSR. If so,
+ system is not vulnerable.
+ tsx=off tsx_async_abort=off ditto
+ ========= ========================== =========================================
+
+
+For unaffected platforms "tsx=on" and "tsx_async_abort=full" does not clear CPU
+buffers. For platforms without TSX control (MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO=0)
+"tsx" command line argument has no effect.
+
+For the affected platforms below table indicates the mitigation status for the
+combinations of CPUID bit MD_CLEAR and IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR bits MDS_NO
+and TSX_CTRL_MSR.
+
+ ======= ========= ============= ========================================
+ MDS_NO MD_CLEAR TSX_CTRL_MSR Status
+ ======= ========= ============= ========================================
+ 0 0 0 Vulnerable (needs microcode)
+ 0 1 0 MDS and TAA mitigated via VERW
+ 1 1 0 MDS fixed, TAA vulnerable if TSX enabled
+ because MD_CLEAR has no meaning and
+ VERW is not guaranteed to clear buffers
+ 1 X 1 MDS fixed, TAA can be mitigated by
+ VERW or TSX_CTRL_MSR
+ ======= ========= ============= ========================================
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. Trusted userspace and guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+If all user space applications are from a trusted source and do not execute
+untrusted code which is supplied externally, then the mitigation can be
+disabled. The same applies to virtualized environments with trusted guests.
+
+
+2. Untrusted userspace and guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+If there are untrusted applications or guests on the system, enabling TSX
+might allow a malicious actor to leak data from the host or from other
+processes running on the same physical core.
+
+If the microcode is available and the TSX is disabled on the host, attacks
+are prevented in a virtualized environment as well, even if the VMs do not
+explicitly enable the mitigation.
+
+
+.. _taa_default_mitigations:
+
+Default mitigations
+-------------------
+
+The kernel's default action for vulnerable processors is:
+
+ - Deploy TSX disable mitigation (tsx_async_abort=full tsx=off).
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2189,6 +2189,7 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86]
mds=off [X86]
+ tsx_async_abort=off [X86]
auto (default)
Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
@@ -4081,6 +4082,38 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
See Documentation/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
for more details.
+ tsx_async_abort= [X86,INTEL] Control mitigation for the TSX Async
+ Abort (TAA) vulnerability.
+
+ Similar to Micro-architectural Data Sampling (MDS)
+ certain CPUs that support Transactional
+ Synchronization Extensions (TSX) are vulnerable to an
+ exploit against CPU internal buffers which can forward
+ information to a disclosure gadget under certain
+ conditions.
+
+ In vulnerable processors, the speculatively forwarded
+ data can be used in a cache side channel attack, to
+ access data to which the attacker does not have direct
+ access.
+
+ This parameter controls the TAA mitigation. The
+ options are:
+
+ full - Enable TAA mitigation on vulnerable CPUs
+ if TSX is enabled.
+
+ off - Unconditionally disable TAA mitigation
+
+ Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+ tsx_async_abort=full. On CPUs which are MDS affected
+ and deploy MDS mitigation, TAA mitigation is not
+ required and doesn't provide any additional
+ mitigation.
+
+ For details see:
+ Documentation/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
+
turbografx.map[2|3]= [HW,JOY]
TurboGraFX parallel port interface
Format:
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/x86/tsx_async_abort.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+TSX Async Abort (TAA) mitigation
+================================
+
+.. _tsx_async_abort:
+
+Overview
+--------
+
+TSX Async Abort (TAA) is a side channel attack on internal buffers in some
+Intel processors similar to Microachitectural Data Sampling (MDS). In this
+case certain loads may speculatively pass invalid data to dependent operations
+when an asynchronous abort condition is pending in a Transactional
+Synchronization Extensions (TSX) transaction. This includes loads with no
+fault or assist condition. Such loads may speculatively expose stale data from
+the same uarch data structures as in MDS, with same scope of exposure i.e.
+same-thread and cross-thread. This issue affects all current processors that
+support TSX.
+
+Mitigation strategy
+-------------------
+
+a) TSX disable - one of the mitigations is to disable TSX. A new MSR
+IA32_TSX_CTRL will be available in future and current processors after
+microcode update which can be used to disable TSX. In addition, it
+controls the enumeration of the TSX feature bits (RTM and HLE) in CPUID.
+
+b) Clear CPU buffers - similar to MDS, clearing the CPU buffers mitigates this
+vulnerability. More details on this approach can be found in
+:ref:`Documentation/hw-vuln/mds.rst <mds>`.
+
+Kernel internal mitigation modes
+--------------------------------
+
+ ============= ============================================================
+ off Mitigation is disabled. Either the CPU is not affected or
+ tsx_async_abort=off is supplied on the kernel command line.
+
+ tsx disabled Mitigation is enabled. TSX feature is disabled by default at
+ bootup on processors that support TSX control.
+
+ verw Mitigation is enabled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is
+ advertised in CPUID.
+
+ ucode needed Mitigation is enabled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is not
+ advertised in CPUID. That is mainly for virtualization
+ scenarios where the host has the updated microcode but the
+ hypervisor does not expose MD_CLEAR in CPUID. It's a best
+ effort approach without guarantee.
+ ============= ============================================================
+
+If the CPU is affected and the "tsx_async_abort" kernel command line parameter is
+not provided then the kernel selects an appropriate mitigation depending on the
+status of RTM and MD_CLEAR CPUID bits.
+
+Below tables indicate the impact of tsx=on|off|auto cmdline options on state of
+TAA mitigation, VERW behavior and TSX feature for various combinations of
+MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits.
+
+1. "tsx=off"
+
+========= ========= ============ ============ ============== =================== ======================
+MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits Result with cmdline tsx=off
+---------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+TAA_NO MDS_NO TSX_CTRL_MSR TSX state VERW can clear TAA mitigation TAA mitigation
+ after bootup CPU buffers tsx_async_abort=off tsx_async_abort=full
+========= ========= ============ ============ ============== =================== ======================
+ 0 0 0 HW default Yes Same as MDS Same as MDS
+ 0 0 1 Invalid case Invalid case Invalid case Invalid case
+ 0 1 0 HW default No Need ucode update Need ucode update
+ 0 1 1 Disabled Yes TSX disabled TSX disabled
+ 1 X 1 Disabled X None needed None needed
+========= ========= ============ ============ ============== =================== ======================
+
+2. "tsx=on"
+
+========= ========= ============ ============ ============== =================== ======================
+MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits Result with cmdline tsx=on
+---------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+TAA_NO MDS_NO TSX_CTRL_MSR TSX state VERW can clear TAA mitigation TAA mitigation
+ after bootup CPU buffers tsx_async_abort=off tsx_async_abort=full
+========= ========= ============ ============ ============== =================== ======================
+ 0 0 0 HW default Yes Same as MDS Same as MDS
+ 0 0 1 Invalid case Invalid case Invalid case Invalid case
+ 0 1 0 HW default No Need ucode update Need ucode update
+ 0 1 1 Enabled Yes None Same as MDS
+ 1 X 1 Enabled X None needed None needed
+========= ========= ============ ============ ============== =================== ======================
+
+3. "tsx=auto"
+
+========= ========= ============ ============ ============== =================== ======================
+MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits Result with cmdline tsx=auto
+---------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+TAA_NO MDS_NO TSX_CTRL_MSR TSX state VERW can clear TAA mitigation TAA mitigation
+ after bootup CPU buffers tsx_async_abort=off tsx_async_abort=full
+========= ========= ============ ============ ============== =================== ======================
+ 0 0 0 HW default Yes Same as MDS Same as MDS
+ 0 0 1 Invalid case Invalid case Invalid case Invalid case
+ 0 1 0 HW default No Need ucode update Need ucode update
+ 0 1 1 Disabled Yes TSX disabled TSX disabled
+ 1 X 1 Enabled X None needed None needed
+========= ========= ============ ============ ============== =================== ======================
+
+In the tables, TSX_CTRL_MSR is a new bit in MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES that
+indicates whether MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL is supported.
+
+There are two control bits in IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR:
+
+ Bit 0: When set it disables the Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM)
+ sub-feature of TSX (will force all transactions to abort on the
+ XBEGIN instruction).
+
+ Bit 1: When set it disables the enumeration of the RTM and HLE feature
+ (i.e. it will make CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4} and
+ CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit11} read as 0).
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 18/20] x86/tsx: Add config options to set tsx=on|off|auto
2019-11-15 6:20 [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (16 preceding siblings ...)
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 17/20] x86/speculation/taa: Add documentation for TSX Async Abort Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2019-11-15 6:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 19/20] x86/speculation/taa: Fix printing of TAA_MSG_SMT on IBRS_ALL CPUs Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (5 subsequent siblings)
23 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2019-11-15 6:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Borislav Petkov, Michal Hocko,
Pawan Gupta, Borislav Petkov, Thomas Gleixner, Josh Poimboeuf,
Ben Hutchings
From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
commit db616173d787395787ecc93eef075fa975227b10 upstream.
There is a general consensus that TSX usage is not largely spread while
the history shows there is a non trivial space for side channel attacks
possible. Therefore the tsx is disabled by default even on platforms
that might have a safe implementation of TSX according to the current
knowledge. This is a fair trade off to make.
There are, however, workloads that really do benefit from using TSX and
updating to a newer kernel with TSX disabled might introduce a
noticeable regressions. This would be especially a problem for Linux
distributions which will provide TAA mitigations.
Introduce config options X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF, X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_ON
and X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO to control the TSX feature. The config
setting can be overridden by the tsx cmdline options.
[ bp: Text cleanups from Josh. ]
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4: adjust doc filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++------
2 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1695,6 +1695,51 @@ config X86_INTEL_MPX
If unsure, say N.
+choice
+ prompt "TSX enable mode"
+ depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+ default X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF
+ help
+ Intel's TSX (Transactional Synchronization Extensions) feature
+ allows to optimize locking protocols through lock elision which
+ can lead to a noticeable performance boost.
+
+ On the other hand it has been shown that TSX can be exploited
+ to form side channel attacks (e.g. TAA) and chances are there
+ will be more of those attacks discovered in the future.
+
+ Therefore TSX is not enabled by default (aka tsx=off). An admin
+ might override this decision by tsx=on the command line parameter.
+ Even with TSX enabled, the kernel will attempt to enable the best
+ possible TAA mitigation setting depending on the microcode available
+ for the particular machine.
+
+ This option allows to set the default tsx mode between tsx=on, =off
+ and =auto. See Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt for more
+ details.
+
+ Say off if not sure, auto if TSX is in use but it should be used on safe
+ platforms or on if TSX is in use and the security aspect of tsx is not
+ relevant.
+
+config X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF
+ bool "off"
+ help
+ TSX is disabled if possible - equals to tsx=off command line parameter.
+
+config X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_ON
+ bool "on"
+ help
+ TSX is always enabled on TSX capable HW - equals the tsx=on command
+ line parameter.
+
+config X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO
+ bool "auto"
+ help
+ TSX is enabled on TSX capable HW that is believed to be safe against
+ side channel attacks- equals the tsx=auto command line parameter.
+endchoice
+
config EFI
bool "EFI runtime service support"
depends on ACPI
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c
@@ -73,6 +73,14 @@ static bool __init tsx_ctrl_is_supported
return !!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR);
}
+static enum tsx_ctrl_states x86_get_tsx_auto_mode(void)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA))
+ return TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
+
+ return TSX_CTRL_ENABLE;
+}
+
void __init tsx_init(void)
{
char arg[5] = {};
@@ -88,17 +96,19 @@ void __init tsx_init(void)
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "off")) {
tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto")) {
- if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA))
- tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
- else
- tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_ENABLE;
+ tsx_ctrl_state = x86_get_tsx_auto_mode();
} else {
tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
pr_err("tsx: invalid option, defaulting to off\n");
}
} else {
- /* tsx= not provided, defaulting to off */
- tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
+ /* tsx= not provided */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO))
+ tsx_ctrl_state = x86_get_tsx_auto_mode();
+ else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF))
+ tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
+ else
+ tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_ENABLE;
}
if (tsx_ctrl_state == TSX_CTRL_DISABLE) {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 19/20] x86/speculation/taa: Fix printing of TAA_MSG_SMT on IBRS_ALL CPUs
2019-11-15 6:20 [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (17 preceding siblings ...)
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 18/20] x86/tsx: Add config options to set tsx=on|off|auto Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2019-11-15 6:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 20/20] x86/bugs: Add ITLB_MULTIHIT bug infrastructure Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (4 subsequent siblings)
23 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2019-11-15 6:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Josh Poimboeuf, Thomas Gleixner,
Tyler Hicks, Borislav Petkov, Ben Hutchings
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
commit 012206a822a8b6ac09125bfaa210a95b9eb8f1c1 upstream.
For new IBRS_ALL CPUs, the Enhanced IBRS check at the beginning of
cpu_bugs_smt_update() causes the function to return early, unintentionally
skipping the MDS and TAA logic.
This is not a problem for MDS, because there appears to be no overlap
between IBRS_ALL and MDS-affected CPUs. So the MDS mitigation would be
disabled and nothing would need to be done in this function anyway.
But for TAA, the TAA_MSG_SMT string will never get printed on Cascade
Lake and newer.
The check is superfluous anyway: when 'spectre_v2_enabled' is
SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED, 'spectre_v2_user' is always
SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE, and so the 'spectre_v2_user' switch statement
handles it appropriately by doing nothing. So just remove the check.
Fixes: 1b42f017415b ("x86/speculation/taa: Add mitigation for TSX Async Abort")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 4 ----
1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -853,10 +853,6 @@ static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
void arch_smt_update(void)
{
- /* Enhanced IBRS implies STIBP. No update required. */
- if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
- return;
-
mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
switch (spectre_v2_user) {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 20/20] x86/bugs: Add ITLB_MULTIHIT bug infrastructure
2019-11-15 6:20 [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (18 preceding siblings ...)
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 19/20] x86/speculation/taa: Fix printing of TAA_MSG_SMT on IBRS_ALL CPUs Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2019-11-15 6:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-15 12:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review kernelci.org bot
` (3 subsequent siblings)
23 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2019-11-15 6:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Vineela Tummalapalli, Pawan Gupta,
Paolo Bonzini, Thomas Gleixner, Ben Hutchings
From: Vineela Tummalapalli <vineela.tummalapalli@intel.com>
commit db4d30fbb71b47e4ecb11c4efa5d8aad4b03dfae upstream.
Some processors may incur a machine check error possibly resulting in an
unrecoverable CPU lockup when an instruction fetch encounters a TLB
multi-hit in the instruction TLB. This can occur when the page size is
changed along with either the physical address or cache type. The relevant
erratum can be found here:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=205195
There are other processors affected for which the erratum does not fully
disclose the impact.
This issue affects both bare-metal x86 page tables and EPT.
It can be mitigated by either eliminating the use of large pages or by
using careful TLB invalidations when changing the page size in the page
tables.
Just like Spectre, Meltdown, L1TF and MDS, a new bit has been allocated in
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (PSCHANGE_MC_NO) and will be set on CPUs which
are mitigated against this issue.
Signed-off-by: Vineela Tummalapalli <vineela.tummalapalli@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
- No support for X86_VENDOR_HYGON, ATOM_AIRMONT_NP
- Adjust context, indentation]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 1
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 7 ++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 13 ++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 61 +++++++++++----------
drivers/base/cpu.c | 8 ++
include/linux/cpu.h | 2
7 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabi
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
+ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
Date: January 2018
Contact: Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Description: Information about CPU vulnerabilities
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -341,5 +341,6 @@
#define X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY X86_BUG(20) /* CPU is only affected by the MSDBS variant of BUG_MDS */
#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS X86_BUG(21) /* CPU is affected by speculation through SWAPGS */
#define X86_BUG_TAA X86_BUG(22) /* CPU is affected by TSX Async Abort(TAA) */
+#define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -71,6 +71,13 @@
* Microarchitectural Data
* Sampling (MDS) vulnerabilities.
*/
+#define ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO BIT(6) /*
+ * The processor is not susceptible to a
+ * machine check error due to modifying the
+ * code page size along with either the
+ * physical address or cache type
+ * without TLB invalidation.
+ */
#define ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR BIT(7) /* MSR for TSX control is available. */
#define ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO BIT(8) /*
* Not susceptible to
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1277,6 +1277,11 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigatio
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
+static ssize_t itlb_multihit_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ return sprintf(buf, "Processor vulnerable\n");
+}
+
static ssize_t mds_show_state(char *buf)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_HYPERVISOR_GUEST
@@ -1379,6 +1384,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct de
case X86_BUG_TAA:
return tsx_async_abort_show_state(buf);
+ case X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT:
+ return itlb_multihit_show_state(buf);
+
default:
break;
}
@@ -1420,4 +1428,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_tsx_async_abort(struct
{
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_TAA);
}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
+}
#endif
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -847,13 +847,14 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(s
#endif
}
-#define NO_SPECULATION BIT(0)
-#define NO_MELTDOWN BIT(1)
-#define NO_SSB BIT(2)
-#define NO_L1TF BIT(3)
-#define NO_MDS BIT(4)
-#define MSBDS_ONLY BIT(5)
-#define NO_SWAPGS BIT(6)
+#define NO_SPECULATION BIT(0)
+#define NO_MELTDOWN BIT(1)
+#define NO_SSB BIT(2)
+#define NO_L1TF BIT(3)
+#define NO_MDS BIT(4)
+#define MSBDS_ONLY BIT(5)
+#define NO_SWAPGS BIT(6)
+#define NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT BIT(7)
#define VULNWL(_vendor, _family, _model, _whitelist) \
{ X86_VENDOR_##_vendor, _family, _model, X86_FEATURE_ANY, _whitelist }
@@ -871,26 +872,26 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
VULNWL(NSC, 5, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECULATION),
/* Intel Family 6 */
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL, NO_SPECULATION),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET, NO_SPECULATION),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_MID, NO_SPECULATION),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL, NO_SPECULATION),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL_MID, NO_SPECULATION),
-
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_X, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
- VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
- VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_MID, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL_MID, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_X, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
VULNWL_INTEL(CORE_YONAH, NO_SSB),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID, NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID, NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_X, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_X, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
/*
* Technically, swapgs isn't serializing on AMD (despite it previously
@@ -901,13 +902,13 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
*/
/* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */
- VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
- VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
- VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
- VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
/* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */
- VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
+ VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
{}
};
@@ -932,6 +933,10 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
{
u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+ /* Set ITLB_MULTIHIT bug if cpu is not in the whitelist and not mitigated */
+ if (!cpu_matches(NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
+
if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION))
return;
--- a/drivers/base/cpu.c
+++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c
@@ -543,6 +543,12 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_tsx_async_abort(
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
}
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
@@ -550,6 +556,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(spec_store_bypass, 04
static DEVICE_ATTR(l1tf, 0444, cpu_show_l1tf, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(mds, 0444, cpu_show_mds, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(tsx_async_abort, 0444, cpu_show_tsx_async_abort, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(itlb_multihit, 0444, cpu_show_itlb_multihit, NULL);
static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
@@ -559,6 +566,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulner
&dev_attr_l1tf.attr,
&dev_attr_mds.attr,
&dev_attr_tsx_async_abort.attr,
+ &dev_attr_itlb_multihit.attr,
NULL
};
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_mds(struct devic
extern ssize_t cpu_show_tsx_async_abort(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
extern __printf(4, 5)
struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review
2019-11-15 6:20 [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (19 preceding siblings ...)
2019-11-15 6:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 20/20] x86/bugs: Add ITLB_MULTIHIT bug infrastructure Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2019-11-15 12:20 ` kernelci.org bot
2019-11-15 13:50 ` Jon Hunter
` (2 subsequent siblings)
23 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: kernelci.org bot @ 2019-11-15 12:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah, patches,
ben.hutchings, lkft-triage, stable
stable-rc/linux-4.4.y boot: 80 boots: 1 failed, 75 passed with 3 offline, 1 conflict (v4.4.201-21-gb0074e36d782)
Full Boot Summary: https://kernelci.org/boot/all/job/stable-rc/branch/linux-4.4.y/kernel/v4.4.201-21-gb0074e36d782/
Full Build Summary: https://kernelci.org/build/stable-rc/branch/linux-4.4.y/kernel/v4.4.201-21-gb0074e36d782/
Tree: stable-rc
Branch: linux-4.4.y
Git Describe: v4.4.201-21-gb0074e36d782
Git Commit: b0074e36d782e84e6a2e08910103642762949d2b
Git URL: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
Tested: 41 unique boards, 17 SoC families, 13 builds out of 190
Boot Regressions Detected:
arm:
exynos_defconfig:
gcc-8:
exynos5422-odroidxu3:
lab-collabora: new failure (last pass: v4.4.201)
Boot Failure Detected:
arm:
exynos_defconfig:
gcc-8:
exynos5422-odroidxu3: 1 failed lab
Offline Platforms:
arm:
sunxi_defconfig:
gcc-8
sun7i-a20-bananapi: 1 offline lab
multi_v7_defconfig:
gcc-8
bcm4708-smartrg-sr400ac: 1 offline lab
sun7i-a20-bananapi: 1 offline lab
Conflicting Boot Failure Detected: (These likely are not failures as other labs are reporting PASS. Needs review.)
i386:
i386_defconfig:
qemu_i386:
lab-baylibre: FAIL (gcc-8)
lab-collabora: PASS (gcc-8)
---
For more info write to <info@kernelci.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review
2019-11-15 6:20 [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (20 preceding siblings ...)
2019-11-15 12:20 ` [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review kernelci.org bot
@ 2019-11-15 13:50 ` Jon Hunter
2019-11-15 13:55 ` Guenter Roeck
2019-11-15 15:53 ` Naresh Kamboju
23 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Jon Hunter @ 2019-11-15 13:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-kernel
Cc: torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah, patches, ben.hutchings,
lkft-triage, stable, linux-tegra
On 15/11/2019 06:20, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.202 release.
> There are 20 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sun, 17 Nov 2019 06:18:31 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.4.202-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.4.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
All tests are passing for Tegra ...
Test results for stable-v4.4:
6 builds: 6 pass, 0 fail
12 boots: 12 pass, 0 fail
19 tests: 19 pass, 0 fail
Linux version: 4.4.202-rc1-gb0074e36d782
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra20-ventana,
tegra30-cardhu-a04
Cheers
Jon
--
nvpublic
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review
2019-11-15 6:20 [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (21 preceding siblings ...)
2019-11-15 13:50 ` Jon Hunter
@ 2019-11-15 13:55 ` Guenter Roeck
2019-11-15 15:53 ` Naresh Kamboju
23 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Guenter Roeck @ 2019-11-15 13:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-kernel
Cc: torvalds, akpm, shuah, patches, ben.hutchings, lkft-triage, stable
On 11/14/19 10:20 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.202 release.
> There are 20 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sun, 17 Nov 2019 06:18:31 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
Build results:
total: 170 pass: 170 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
total: 324 pass: 324 fail: 0
Guenter
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review
2019-11-15 6:20 [PATCH 4.4 00/20] 4.4.202-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (22 preceding siblings ...)
2019-11-15 13:55 ` Guenter Roeck
@ 2019-11-15 15:53 ` Naresh Kamboju
23 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Naresh Kamboju @ 2019-11-15 15:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Cc: open list, Shuah Khan, patches, lkft-triage, Ben Hutchings,
linux- stable, Andrew Morton, Linus Torvalds, Guenter Roeck
On Fri, 15 Nov 2019 at 11:52, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.202 release.
> There are 20 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sun, 17 Nov 2019 06:18:31 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.4.202-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.4.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.
Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------
kernel: 4.4.202-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.4.y
git commit: b0074e36d782e84e6a2e08910103642762949d2b
git describe: v4.4.201-21-gb0074e36d782
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.4-oe/build/v4.4.201-21-gb0074e36d782
No regressions (compared to build v4.4.201)
No fixes (compared to build v4.4.201)
Ran 18051 total tests in the following environments and test suites.
Environments
--------------
- i386
- juno-r2 - arm64
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- x15 - arm
- x86_64
Test Suites
-----------
* build
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* network-basic-tests
* perf
* prep-tmp-disk
* spectre-meltdown-checker-test
* kselftest
* kvm-unit-tests
* v4l2-compliance
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native
* ssuite
Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------
kernel: 4.4.202-rc1
git repo: https://git.linaro.org/lkft/arm64-stable-rc.git
git branch: 4.4.202-rc1-hikey-20191115-607
git commit: 493901fc04b1127d80037f3fb43e916a4eec9f10
git describe: 4.4.202-rc1-hikey-20191115-607
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linaro-hikey-stable-rc-4.4-oe/build/4.4.202-rc1-hikey-20191115-607
No regressions (compared to build 4.4.201-rc2-hikey-20191112-605)
No fixes (compared to build 4.4.201-rc2-hikey-20191112-605)
Ran 1538 total tests in the following environments and test suites.
Environments
--------------
- hi6220-hikey - arm64
Test Suites
-----------
* build
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* perf
* spectre-meltdown-checker-test
* v4l2-compliance
--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread