From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
To: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 0/2] Avoid blocking in selinux inode callbacks on RCU walk
Date: Tue, 19 Nov 2019 18:40:55 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191119184057.14961-1-will@kernel.org> (raw)
Hi all,
While debugging a KASAN report in the selinux access vector cache hash
table, I noticed that it looks like we may block in the inode_follow_link()
and inode_permission() callbacks, even when called from the VFS layer as
part of an RCU-protected path walk.
These two patches attempt to fix that, but since I found this by
inspection and I'm not familiar with this code, I'm sending as an RFC in
case I missed something that means this cannot happen.
Comments very welcome,
Will
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
--->8
Will Deacon (2):
selinux: Don't call avc_compute_av() from RCU path walk
selinux: Propagate RCU walk status from 'security_inode_follow_link()'
security/selinux/avc.c | 21 +++++++++++++--------
security/selinux/hooks.c | 5 +++--
security/selinux/include/avc.h | 12 ++++++++----
3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--
2.24.0.432.g9d3f5f5b63-goog
next reply other threads:[~2019-11-19 18:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-11-19 18:40 Will Deacon [this message]
2019-11-19 18:40 ` [RFC PATCH 1/2] selinux: Don't call avc_compute_av() from RCU path walk Will Deacon
2019-11-19 18:59 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-11-20 13:12 ` Will Deacon
2019-11-20 15:28 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-11-20 19:07 ` Paul E. McKenney
2019-11-20 19:13 ` Will Deacon
2019-11-19 18:40 ` [RFC PATCH 2/2] selinux: Propagate RCU walk status from 'security_inode_follow_link()' Will Deacon
2019-11-19 18:46 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-11-20 13:13 ` Will Deacon
2019-11-20 13:31 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-11-29 7:36 ` [selinux] 5149a783b9: WARNING:at_security/selinux/avc.c:#avc_has_perm_flags kernel test robot
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