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* Re: [PATCH 2/2] macsec: Netlink support of XPN cipher suites (IEEE 802.1AEbw)
  2020-03-05 22:01 ` [PATCH 2/2] macsec: Netlink support of XPN cipher suites (IEEE 802.1AEbw) Era Mayflower
@ 2020-03-05 14:02   ` Michal Kubecek
       [not found]     ` <CAMdQvKv9tSoSBfyOyhtctQ9D7aU2WUmuMUsoLn_WZ8whD=3AzA@mail.gmail.com>
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Michal Kubecek @ 2020-03-05 14:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: netdev; +Cc: Era Mayflower, davem, linux-kernel

On Thu, Mar 05, 2020 at 10:01:08PM +0000, Era Mayflower wrote:
> Netlink support of extended packet number cipher suites,
> allows adding and updating XPN macsec interfaces.
> 
> Added support in:
>     * Creating interfaces with GCM-AES-XPN-128 and GCM-AES-XPN-256.
>     * Setting and getting packet numbers with 64bit of SAs.
>     * Settings and getting ssci of SCs.
>     * Settings and getting salt of SecYs.
> 
> Depends on: macsec: Support XPN frame handling - IEEE 802.1AEbw.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Era Mayflower <mayflowerera@gmail.com>
> ---
[...]
> diff --git a/include/net/macsec.h b/include/net/macsec.h
> index a0b1d0b5c..3c7914ff1 100644
> --- a/include/net/macsec.h
> +++ b/include/net/macsec.h
> @@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
>  #include <uapi/linux/if_link.h>
>  #include <uapi/linux/if_macsec.h>
>  
> +#define MACSEC_DEFAULT_PN_LEN 4
> +#define MACSEC_XPN_PN_LEN 8
> +
>  #define MACSEC_SALT_LEN 12
>  
>  typedef u64 __bitwise sci_t;
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/if_link.h b/include/uapi/linux/if_link.h
> index 024af2d1d..ee424d915 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/if_link.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/if_link.h
> @@ -462,6 +462,8 @@ enum {
>  	IFLA_MACSEC_SCB,
>  	IFLA_MACSEC_REPLAY_PROTECT,
>  	IFLA_MACSEC_VALIDATION,
> +	IFLA_MACSEC_SSCI,
> +	IFLA_MACSEC_SALT,
>  	IFLA_MACSEC_PAD,
>  	__IFLA_MACSEC_MAX,
>  };

Doesn't this break backword compatibility? You change the value of
IFLA_MACSEC_PAD; even if it's only used as padding, if an old client
uses it, new kernel will interpret it as IFLA_MACSEC_SSCI (an the same
holds for new client with old kernel).

> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h b/include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h
> index 1d63c43c3..c8fab9673 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h
> @@ -25,6 +25,8 @@
>  /* cipher IDs as per IEEE802.1AEbn-2011 */
>  #define MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_128 0x0080C20001000001ULL
>  #define MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_256 0x0080C20001000002ULL
> +#define MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_128 0x0080C20001000003ULL
> +#define MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_256 0x0080C20001000004ULL
>  
>  /* deprecated cipher ID for GCM-AES-128 */
>  #define MACSEC_DEFAULT_CIPHER_ID     0x0080020001000001ULL
> @@ -66,6 +68,8 @@ enum macsec_secy_attrs {
>  	MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_INC_SCI,
>  	MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_ES,
>  	MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_SCB,
> +	MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_SSCI,
> +	MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_SALT,
>  	MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_PAD,
>  	__MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_END,
>  	NUM_MACSEC_SECY_ATTR = __MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_END,
> @@ -78,6 +82,7 @@ enum macsec_rxsc_attrs {
>  	MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_ACTIVE,  /* config/dump, u8 0..1 */
>  	MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_SA_LIST, /* dump, nested */
>  	MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_STATS,   /* dump, nested, macsec_rxsc_stats_attr */
> +	MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_SSCI,    /* config/dump, u32 */
>  	MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_PAD,
>  	__MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_END,
>  	NUM_MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR = __MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_END,

The same problem with these two.

I'm also a bit unsure about the change of type and length of
MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN but I would have to get more familiar with the code to
see if it is really a problem.

Michal

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 2/2] macsec: Netlink support of XPN cipher suites (IEEE 802.1AEbw)
  2020-03-05 23:53       ` Era Mayflower
@ 2020-03-05 17:24         ` Michal Kubecek
  2020-03-06  2:59           ` Era Mayflower
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Michal Kubecek @ 2020-03-05 17:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Era Mayflower; +Cc: netdev, davem, linux-kernel

On Thu, Mar 05, 2020 at 11:53:29PM +0000, Era Mayflower wrote:
> Do you think that inserting those new enum values after *_PAD would be
> a good solution?

Yes, new attribute identifiers should always be added as last so that
you don't change existing values.

Michal

> On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 11:51 PM Era Mayflower <mayflowerera@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > Do you think that inserting those new enum values after *_PAD would be a good solution?
> >
> > On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 2:02 PM Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> wrote:
> >>
> >> On Thu, Mar 05, 2020 at 10:01:08PM +0000, Era Mayflower wrote:
> >> > Netlink support of extended packet number cipher suites,
> >> > allows adding and updating XPN macsec interfaces.
> >> >
> >> > Added support in:
> >> >     * Creating interfaces with GCM-AES-XPN-128 and GCM-AES-XPN-256.
> >> >     * Setting and getting packet numbers with 64bit of SAs.
> >> >     * Settings and getting ssci of SCs.
> >> >     * Settings and getting salt of SecYs.
> >> >
> >> > Depends on: macsec: Support XPN frame handling - IEEE 802.1AEbw.
> >> >
> >> > Signed-off-by: Era Mayflower <mayflowerera@gmail.com>
> >> > ---
> >> [...]
> >> > diff --git a/include/net/macsec.h b/include/net/macsec.h
> >> > index a0b1d0b5c..3c7914ff1 100644
> >> > --- a/include/net/macsec.h
> >> > +++ b/include/net/macsec.h
> >> > @@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
> >> >  #include <uapi/linux/if_link.h>
> >> >  #include <uapi/linux/if_macsec.h>
> >> >
> >> > +#define MACSEC_DEFAULT_PN_LEN 4
> >> > +#define MACSEC_XPN_PN_LEN 8
> >> > +
> >> >  #define MACSEC_SALT_LEN 12
> >> >
> >> >  typedef u64 __bitwise sci_t;
> >> > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/if_link.h b/include/uapi/linux/if_link.h
> >> > index 024af2d1d..ee424d915 100644
> >> > --- a/include/uapi/linux/if_link.h
> >> > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/if_link.h
> >> > @@ -462,6 +462,8 @@ enum {
> >> >       IFLA_MACSEC_SCB,
> >> >       IFLA_MACSEC_REPLAY_PROTECT,
> >> >       IFLA_MACSEC_VALIDATION,
> >> > +     IFLA_MACSEC_SSCI,
> >> > +     IFLA_MACSEC_SALT,
> >> >       IFLA_MACSEC_PAD,
> >> >       __IFLA_MACSEC_MAX,
> >> >  };
> >>
> >> Doesn't this break backword compatibility? You change the value of
> >> IFLA_MACSEC_PAD; even if it's only used as padding, if an old client
> >> uses it, new kernel will interpret it as IFLA_MACSEC_SSCI (an the same
> >> holds for new client with old kernel).
> >>
> >> > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h b/include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h
> >> > index 1d63c43c3..c8fab9673 100644
> >> > --- a/include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h
> >> > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h
> >> > @@ -25,6 +25,8 @@
> >> >  /* cipher IDs as per IEEE802.1AEbn-2011 */
> >> >  #define MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_128 0x0080C20001000001ULL
> >> >  #define MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_256 0x0080C20001000002ULL
> >> > +#define MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_128 0x0080C20001000003ULL
> >> > +#define MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_256 0x0080C20001000004ULL
> >> >
> >> >  /* deprecated cipher ID for GCM-AES-128 */
> >> >  #define MACSEC_DEFAULT_CIPHER_ID     0x0080020001000001ULL
> >> > @@ -66,6 +68,8 @@ enum macsec_secy_attrs {
> >> >       MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_INC_SCI,
> >> >       MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_ES,
> >> >       MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_SCB,
> >> > +     MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_SSCI,
> >> > +     MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_SALT,
> >> >       MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_PAD,
> >> >       __MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_END,
> >> >       NUM_MACSEC_SECY_ATTR = __MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_END,
> >> > @@ -78,6 +82,7 @@ enum macsec_rxsc_attrs {
> >> >       MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_ACTIVE,  /* config/dump, u8 0..1 */
> >> >       MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_SA_LIST, /* dump, nested */
> >> >       MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_STATS,   /* dump, nested, macsec_rxsc_stats_attr */
> >> > +     MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_SSCI,    /* config/dump, u32 */
> >> >       MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_PAD,
> >> >       __MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_END,
> >> >       NUM_MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR = __MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_END,
> >>
> >> The same problem with these two.
> >>
> >> I'm also a bit unsure about the change of type and length of
> >> MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN but I would have to get more familiar with the code to
> >> see if it is really a problem.
> >>
> >> Michal

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 1/2] macsec: Support XPN frame handling - IEEE 802.1AEbw
@ 2020-03-05 22:01 Era Mayflower
  2020-03-05 22:01 ` [PATCH 2/2] macsec: Netlink support of XPN cipher suites (IEEE 802.1AEbw) Era Mayflower
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Era Mayflower @ 2020-03-05 22:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: davem; +Cc: netdev, linux-kernel, Era Mayflower

Support extended packet number cipher suites (802.1AEbw) frames handling.
This does not include the needed netlink patches.

    * Added xpn boolean field to `struct macsec_secy`.
    * Added ssci to `struct macsec_secy` (belongs to the txsc).
    * Added salt to `struct macsec_secy` (belongs to the txsc).
    * Added ssci to `struct macsec_rx_sc`.
    * Created pn_t type to allow easy access to lower and upper halves.
    * Created salt_t type to allow easy access to the "ssci" and "pn" halves.
    * Created `macsec_fill_iv_xpn` function to allow IV creating in XPN mode.
    * Added support in PN recovery and preliminary replay check in XPN mode.

Signed-off-by: Era Mayflower <mayflowerera@gmail.com>
---
 drivers/net/macsec.c | 117 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 include/net/macsec.h |  44 +++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/macsec.c b/drivers/net/macsec.c
index 45bfd99f1..5bfd0f92f 100644
--- a/drivers/net/macsec.c
+++ b/drivers/net/macsec.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <net/gro_cells.h>
 #include <net/macsec.h>
 #include <linux/phy.h>
+#include <linux/byteorder/generic.h>
 
 #include <uapi/linux/if_macsec.h>
 
@@ -68,6 +69,16 @@ struct macsec_eth_header {
 	     sc;					\
 	     sc = rtnl_dereference(sc->next))
 
+#define pn_same_half(pn1, pn2) (!(((pn1) >> 31) ^ ((pn2) >> 31)))
+
+struct gcm_iv_xpn {
+	union {
+		u8 short_secure_channel_id[4];
+		ssci_t ssci;
+	};
+	__be64 pn;
+} __packed;
+
 struct gcm_iv {
 	union {
 		u8 secure_channel_id[8];
@@ -411,6 +422,15 @@ static bool macsec_validate_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 icv_len)
 #define MACSEC_NEEDED_HEADROOM (macsec_extra_len(true))
 #define MACSEC_NEEDED_TAILROOM MACSEC_STD_ICV_LEN
 
+static void macsec_fill_iv_xpn(unsigned char *iv, ssci_t ssci, u64 pn,
+				salt_t salt)
+{
+	struct gcm_iv_xpn *gcm_iv = (struct gcm_iv_xpn *)iv;
+
+	gcm_iv->ssci = ssci ^ salt.ssci;
+	gcm_iv->pn = cpu_to_be64(pn) ^ salt.pn;
+}
+
 static void macsec_fill_iv(unsigned char *iv, sci_t sci, u32 pn)
 {
 	struct gcm_iv *gcm_iv = (struct gcm_iv *)iv;
@@ -441,14 +461,18 @@ void macsec_pn_wrapped(struct macsec_secy *secy, struct macsec_tx_sa *tx_sa)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(macsec_pn_wrapped);
 
-static u32 tx_sa_update_pn(struct macsec_tx_sa *tx_sa, struct macsec_secy *secy)
+static pn_t tx_sa_update_pn(struct macsec_tx_sa *tx_sa, struct macsec_secy *secy)
 {
-	u32 pn;
+	pn_t pn;
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&tx_sa->lock);
-	pn = tx_sa->next_pn;
 
-	tx_sa->next_pn++;
+	pn = tx_sa->next_pn_halves;
+	if (secy->xpn)
+		tx_sa->next_pn++;
+	else
+		tx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower++;
+
 	if (tx_sa->next_pn == 0)
 		__macsec_pn_wrapped(secy, tx_sa);
 	spin_unlock_bh(&tx_sa->lock);
@@ -563,7 +587,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_encrypt(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	struct macsec_tx_sa *tx_sa;
 	struct macsec_dev *macsec = macsec_priv(dev);
 	bool sci_present;
-	u32 pn;
+	pn_t pn;
 
 	secy = &macsec->secy;
 	tx_sc = &secy->tx_sc;
@@ -605,12 +629,12 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_encrypt(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	memmove(hh, eth, 2 * ETH_ALEN);
 
 	pn = tx_sa_update_pn(tx_sa, secy);
-	if (pn == 0) {
+	if (pn.full64 == 0) {
 		macsec_txsa_put(tx_sa);
 		kfree_skb(skb);
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOLINK);
 	}
-	macsec_fill_sectag(hh, secy, pn, sci_present);
+	macsec_fill_sectag(hh, secy, pn.lower, sci_present);
 	macsec_set_shortlen(hh, unprotected_len - 2 * ETH_ALEN);
 
 	skb_put(skb, secy->icv_len);
@@ -641,7 +665,10 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_encrypt(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 	}
 
-	macsec_fill_iv(iv, secy->sci, pn);
+	if (secy->xpn)
+		macsec_fill_iv_xpn(iv, secy->ssci, pn.full64, secy->salt);
+	else
+		macsec_fill_iv(iv, secy->sci, pn.lower);
 
 	sg_init_table(sg, ret);
 	ret = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len);
@@ -693,13 +720,14 @@ static bool macsec_post_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, struct macsec_secy *secy, u
 	u32 lowest_pn = 0;
 
 	spin_lock(&rx_sa->lock);
-	if (rx_sa->next_pn >= secy->replay_window)
-		lowest_pn = rx_sa->next_pn - secy->replay_window;
+	if (rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower >= secy->replay_window)
+		lowest_pn = rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower - secy->replay_window;
 
 	/* Now perform replay protection check again
 	 * (see IEEE 802.1AE-2006 figure 10-5)
 	 */
-	if (secy->replay_protect && pn < lowest_pn) {
+	if (secy->replay_protect && pn < lowest_pn &&
+		(!secy->xpn || pn_same_half(pn, lowest_pn))) {
 		spin_unlock(&rx_sa->lock);
 		u64_stats_update_begin(&rxsc_stats->syncp);
 		rxsc_stats->stats.InPktsLate++;
@@ -748,8 +776,14 @@ static bool macsec_post_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, struct macsec_secy *secy, u
 		}
 		u64_stats_update_end(&rxsc_stats->syncp);
 
-		if (pn >= rx_sa->next_pn)
-			rx_sa->next_pn = pn + 1;
+		// Instead of "pn >=" - to support pn overflow in xpn
+		if (pn + 1 > rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower) {
+			rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower = pn + 1;
+		} else if (secy->xpn && !pn_same_half(pn, rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower)) {
+			rx_sa->next_pn_halves.upper++;
+			rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower = pn + 1;
+		}
+
 		spin_unlock(&rx_sa->lock);
 	}
 
@@ -836,6 +870,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	unsigned char *iv;
 	struct aead_request *req;
 	struct macsec_eth_header *hdr;
+	u32 hdr_pn;
 	u16 icv_len = secy->icv_len;
 
 	macsec_skb_cb(skb)->valid = false;
@@ -855,7 +890,20 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	}
 
 	hdr = (struct macsec_eth_header *)skb->data;
-	macsec_fill_iv(iv, sci, ntohl(hdr->packet_number));
+	hdr_pn = ntohl(hdr->packet_number);
+
+	if (secy->xpn) {
+		pn_t recovered_pn = rx_sa->next_pn_halves;
+
+		recovered_pn.lower = hdr_pn;
+		if (hdr_pn < rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower &&
+			!pn_same_half(hdr_pn, rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower))
+			recovered_pn.upper++;
+
+		macsec_fill_iv_xpn(iv, rx_sa->sc->ssci, recovered_pn.full64, secy->salt);
+	} else {
+		macsec_fill_iv(iv, sci, hdr_pn);
+	}
 
 	sg_init_table(sg, ret);
 	ret = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len);
@@ -996,7 +1044,7 @@ static rx_handler_result_t macsec_handle_frame(struct sk_buff **pskb)
 	struct macsec_rxh_data *rxd;
 	struct macsec_dev *macsec;
 	sci_t sci;
-	u32 pn;
+	u32 hdr_pn;
 	bool cbit;
 	struct pcpu_rx_sc_stats *rxsc_stats;
 	struct pcpu_secy_stats *secy_stats;
@@ -1099,13 +1147,16 @@ static rx_handler_result_t macsec_handle_frame(struct sk_buff **pskb)
 	}
 
 	/* First, PN check to avoid decrypting obviously wrong packets */
-	pn = ntohl(hdr->packet_number);
+	hdr_pn = ntohl(hdr->packet_number);
 	if (secy->replay_protect) {
 		bool late;
 
 		spin_lock(&rx_sa->lock);
-		late = rx_sa->next_pn >= secy->replay_window &&
-		       pn < (rx_sa->next_pn - secy->replay_window);
+		late = rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower >= secy->replay_window &&
+		       hdr_pn < (rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower - secy->replay_window);
+
+		if (secy->xpn)
+			late = late && pn_same_half(rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower, hdr_pn);
 		spin_unlock(&rx_sa->lock);
 
 		if (late) {
@@ -1134,7 +1185,7 @@ static rx_handler_result_t macsec_handle_frame(struct sk_buff **pskb)
 		return RX_HANDLER_CONSUMED;
 	}
 
-	if (!macsec_post_decrypt(skb, secy, pn))
+	if (!macsec_post_decrypt(skb, secy, hdr_pn))
 		goto drop;
 
 deliver:
@@ -1661,7 +1712,7 @@ static int macsec_add_rxsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 
 	if (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) {
 		spin_lock_bh(&rx_sa->lock);
-		rx_sa->next_pn = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
+		rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
 		spin_unlock_bh(&rx_sa->lock);
 	}
 
@@ -1868,7 +1919,7 @@ static int macsec_add_txsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	}
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&tx_sa->lock);
-	tx_sa->next_pn = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
+	tx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
 	spin_unlock_bh(&tx_sa->lock);
 
 	if (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_ACTIVE])
@@ -2132,9 +2183,11 @@ static int macsec_upd_txsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	u8 assoc_num;
 	struct nlattr *tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_MAX + 1];
 	bool was_operational, was_active;
-	u32 prev_pn = 0;
+	pn_t prev_pn;
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	prev_pn.full64 = 0;
+
 	if (!attrs[MACSEC_ATTR_IFINDEX])
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -2154,8 +2207,8 @@ static int macsec_upd_txsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 
 	if (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) {
 		spin_lock_bh(&tx_sa->lock);
-		prev_pn = tx_sa->next_pn;
-		tx_sa->next_pn = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
+		prev_pn = tx_sa->next_pn_halves;
+		tx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
 		spin_unlock_bh(&tx_sa->lock);
 	}
 
@@ -2193,7 +2246,7 @@ static int macsec_upd_txsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 cleanup:
 	if (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) {
 		spin_lock_bh(&tx_sa->lock);
-		tx_sa->next_pn = prev_pn;
+		tx_sa->next_pn_halves = prev_pn;
 		spin_unlock_bh(&tx_sa->lock);
 	}
 	tx_sa->active = was_active;
@@ -2213,9 +2266,11 @@ static int macsec_upd_rxsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	struct nlattr *tb_rxsc[MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_MAX + 1];
 	struct nlattr *tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_MAX + 1];
 	bool was_active;
-	u32 prev_pn = 0;
+	pn_t prev_pn;
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	prev_pn.full64 = 0;
+
 	if (!attrs[MACSEC_ATTR_IFINDEX])
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -2238,8 +2293,8 @@ static int macsec_upd_rxsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 
 	if (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) {
 		spin_lock_bh(&rx_sa->lock);
-		prev_pn = rx_sa->next_pn;
-		rx_sa->next_pn = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
+		prev_pn = rx_sa->next_pn_halves;
+		rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
 		spin_unlock_bh(&rx_sa->lock);
 	}
 
@@ -2272,7 +2327,7 @@ static int macsec_upd_rxsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 cleanup:
 	if (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) {
 		spin_lock_bh(&rx_sa->lock);
-		rx_sa->next_pn = prev_pn;
+		rx_sa->next_pn_halves = prev_pn;
 		spin_unlock_bh(&rx_sa->lock);
 	}
 	rx_sa->active = was_active;
@@ -2791,7 +2846,7 @@ dump_secy(struct macsec_secy *secy, struct net_device *dev,
 		}
 
 		if (nla_put_u8(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_AN, i) ||
-		    nla_put_u32(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN, tx_sa->next_pn) ||
+		    nla_put_u32(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN, tx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower) ||
 		    nla_put(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEYID, MACSEC_KEYID_LEN, tx_sa->key.id) ||
 		    nla_put_u8(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_ACTIVE, tx_sa->active)) {
 			nla_nest_cancel(skb, txsa_nest);
@@ -2895,7 +2950,7 @@ dump_secy(struct macsec_secy *secy, struct net_device *dev,
 			nla_nest_end(skb, attr);
 
 			if (nla_put_u8(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_AN, i) ||
-			    nla_put_u32(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN, rx_sa->next_pn) ||
+			    nla_put_u32(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN, rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower) ||
 			    nla_put(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEYID, MACSEC_KEYID_LEN, rx_sa->key.id) ||
 			    nla_put_u8(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_ACTIVE, rx_sa->active)) {
 				nla_nest_cancel(skb, rxsa_nest);
diff --git a/include/net/macsec.h b/include/net/macsec.h
index 92e43db8b..a0b1d0b5c 100644
--- a/include/net/macsec.h
+++ b/include/net/macsec.h
@@ -11,7 +11,10 @@
 #include <uapi/linux/if_link.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/if_macsec.h>
 
+#define MACSEC_SALT_LEN 12
+
 typedef u64 __bitwise sci_t;
+typedef u32 __bitwise ssci_t;
 
 #define MACSEC_NUM_AN 4 /* 2 bits for the association number */
 
@@ -58,6 +61,29 @@ struct macsec_tx_sc_stats {
 	__u64 OutOctetsEncrypted;
 };
 
+typedef union salt {
+	struct {
+		u32 ssci;
+		u64 pn;
+	} __packed;
+	u8 bytes[MACSEC_SALT_LEN];
+} __packed salt_t;
+
+typedef union pn {
+	struct {
+#if defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN_BITFIELD)
+		u32 lower;
+		u32 upper;
+#elif defined(__BIG_ENDIAN_BITFIELD)
+		u32 upper;
+		u32 lower;
+#else
+#error	"Please fix <asm/byteorder.h>"
+#endif
+	};
+	u64 full64;
+} pn_t;
+
 /**
  * struct macsec_rx_sa - receive secure association
  * @active:
@@ -69,7 +95,10 @@ struct macsec_tx_sc_stats {
 struct macsec_rx_sa {
 	struct macsec_key key;
 	spinlock_t lock;
-	u32 next_pn;
+	union {
+		pn_t next_pn_halves;
+		u64 next_pn;
+	};
 	refcount_t refcnt;
 	bool active;
 	struct macsec_rx_sa_stats __percpu *stats;
@@ -90,6 +119,7 @@ struct pcpu_tx_sc_stats {
 /**
  * struct macsec_rx_sc - receive secure channel
  * @sci: secure channel identifier for this SC
+ * @ssci: short secure channel identifier for this SC
  * @active: channel is active
  * @sa: array of secure associations
  * @stats: per-SC stats
@@ -97,6 +127,7 @@ struct pcpu_tx_sc_stats {
 struct macsec_rx_sc {
 	struct macsec_rx_sc __rcu *next;
 	sci_t sci;
+	ssci_t ssci;
 	bool active;
 	struct macsec_rx_sa __rcu *sa[MACSEC_NUM_AN];
 	struct pcpu_rx_sc_stats __percpu *stats;
@@ -115,7 +146,10 @@ struct macsec_rx_sc {
 struct macsec_tx_sa {
 	struct macsec_key key;
 	spinlock_t lock;
-	u32 next_pn;
+	union {
+		pn_t next_pn_halves;
+		u64 next_pn;
+	};
 	refcount_t refcnt;
 	bool active;
 	struct macsec_tx_sa_stats __percpu *stats;
@@ -148,10 +182,13 @@ struct macsec_tx_sc {
  * struct macsec_secy - MACsec Security Entity
  * @netdev: netdevice for this SecY
  * @n_rx_sc: number of receive secure channels configured on this SecY
+ * @salt: salt used to generate IV in XPN cipher suites
  * @sci: secure channel identifier used for tx
+ * @ssci: short secure channel identifier used for tx
  * @key_len: length of keys used by the cipher suite
  * @icv_len: length of ICV used by the cipher suite
  * @validate_frames: validation mode
+ * @xpn: enable XPN for this SecY
  * @operational: MAC_Operational flag
  * @protect_frames: enable protection for this SecY
  * @replay_protect: enable packet number checks on receive
@@ -162,10 +199,13 @@ struct macsec_tx_sc {
 struct macsec_secy {
 	struct net_device *netdev;
 	unsigned int n_rx_sc;
+	salt_t salt;
 	sci_t sci;
+	ssci_t ssci;
 	u16 key_len;
 	u16 icv_len;
 	enum macsec_validation_type validate_frames;
+	bool xpn;
 	bool operational;
 	bool protect_frames;
 	bool replay_protect;
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 2/2] macsec: Netlink support of XPN cipher suites (IEEE 802.1AEbw)
  2020-03-05 22:01 [PATCH 1/2] macsec: Support XPN frame handling - IEEE 802.1AEbw Era Mayflower
@ 2020-03-05 22:01 ` Era Mayflower
  2020-03-05 14:02   ` Michal Kubecek
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Era Mayflower @ 2020-03-05 22:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: davem; +Cc: netdev, linux-kernel, Era Mayflower

Netlink support of extended packet number cipher suites,
allows adding and updating XPN macsec interfaces.

Added support in:
    * Creating interfaces with GCM-AES-XPN-128 and GCM-AES-XPN-256.
    * Setting and getting packet numbers with 64bit of SAs.
    * Settings and getting ssci of SCs.
    * Settings and getting salt of SecYs.

Depends on: macsec: Support XPN frame handling - IEEE 802.1AEbw.

Signed-off-by: Era Mayflower <mayflowerera@gmail.com>
---
 drivers/net/macsec.c           | 181 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 include/net/macsec.h           |   3 +
 include/uapi/linux/if_link.h   |   2 +
 include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h |   5 +
 4 files changed, 175 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/macsec.c b/drivers/net/macsec.c
index 5bfd0f92f..aff28ee89 100644
--- a/drivers/net/macsec.c
+++ b/drivers/net/macsec.c
@@ -240,11 +240,13 @@ static struct macsec_cb *macsec_skb_cb(struct sk_buff *skb)
 #define MACSEC_PORT_ES (htons(0x0001))
 #define MACSEC_PORT_SCB (0x0000)
 #define MACSEC_UNDEF_SCI ((__force sci_t)0xffffffffffffffffULL)
+#define MACSEC_UNDEF_SSCI ((__force ssci_t)0xffffffff)
 
 #define MACSEC_GCM_AES_128_SAK_LEN 16
 #define MACSEC_GCM_AES_256_SAK_LEN 32
 
 #define DEFAULT_SAK_LEN MACSEC_GCM_AES_128_SAK_LEN
+#define DEFAULT_XPN false
 #define DEFAULT_SEND_SCI true
 #define DEFAULT_ENCRYPT false
 #define DEFAULT_ENCODING_SA 0
@@ -1351,7 +1353,8 @@ static struct macsec_rx_sc *del_rx_sc(struct macsec_secy *secy, sci_t sci)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-static struct macsec_rx_sc *create_rx_sc(struct net_device *dev, sci_t sci)
+static struct macsec_rx_sc *create_rx_sc(struct net_device *dev, sci_t sci,
+				ssci_t ssci)
 {
 	struct macsec_rx_sc *rx_sc;
 	struct macsec_dev *macsec;
@@ -1375,6 +1378,7 @@ static struct macsec_rx_sc *create_rx_sc(struct net_device *dev, sci_t sci)
 	}
 
 	rx_sc->sci = sci;
+	rx_sc->ssci = ssci;
 	rx_sc->active = true;
 	refcount_set(&rx_sc->refcnt, 1);
 
@@ -1444,6 +1448,16 @@ static int nla_put_sci(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, sci_t value,
 	return nla_put_u64_64bit(skb, attrtype, (__force u64)value, padattr);
 }
 
+static ssci_t nla_get_ssci(const struct nlattr *nla)
+{
+	return (__force ssci_t)nla_get_u32(nla);
+}
+
+static int nla_put_ssci(struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype, ssci_t value)
+{
+	return nla_put_u32(skb, attrtype, (__force u64)value);
+}
+
 static struct macsec_tx_sa *get_txsa_from_nl(struct net *net,
 					     struct nlattr **attrs,
 					     struct nlattr **tb_sa,
@@ -1553,13 +1567,14 @@ static const struct nla_policy macsec_genl_policy[NUM_MACSEC_ATTR] = {
 
 static const struct nla_policy macsec_genl_rxsc_policy[NUM_MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR] = {
 	[MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_SCI] = { .type = NLA_U64 },
+	[MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_SSCI] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
 	[MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_ACTIVE] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
 };
 
 static const struct nla_policy macsec_genl_sa_policy[NUM_MACSEC_SA_ATTR] = {
 	[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_AN] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
 	[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_ACTIVE] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
-	[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
+	[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN] = { .type = NLA_MIN_LEN, .len = 4 },
 	[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEYID] = { .type = NLA_BINARY,
 				   .len = MACSEC_KEYID_LEN, },
 	[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEY] = { .type = NLA_BINARY,
@@ -1636,7 +1651,7 @@ static bool validate_add_rxsa(struct nlattr **attrs)
 	if (nla_get_u8(attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_AN]) >= MACSEC_NUM_AN)
 		return false;
 
-	if (attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN] && nla_get_u32(attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) == 0)
+	if (attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN] && *(u64 *)nla_data(attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) == 0)
 		return false;
 
 	if (attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_ACTIVE]) {
@@ -1658,6 +1673,7 @@ static int macsec_add_rxsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	struct macsec_rx_sc *rx_sc;
 	struct macsec_rx_sa *rx_sa;
 	unsigned char assoc_num;
+	int pn_len;
 	struct nlattr *tb_rxsc[MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_MAX + 1];
 	struct nlattr *tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_MAX + 1];
 	int err;
@@ -1690,6 +1706,14 @@ static int macsec_add_rxsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	pn_len = secy->xpn ? MACSEC_XPN_PN_LEN : MACSEC_DEFAULT_PN_LEN;
+	if (nla_len(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) != pn_len) {
+		pr_notice("macsec: nl: add_rxsa: bad pn length: %d != %d\n",
+			  nla_len(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]), pn_len);
+		rtnl_unlock();
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	rx_sa = rtnl_dereference(rx_sc->sa[assoc_num]);
 	if (rx_sa) {
 		rtnl_unlock();
@@ -1712,7 +1736,7 @@ static int macsec_add_rxsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 
 	if (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) {
 		spin_lock_bh(&rx_sa->lock);
-		rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
+		rx_sa->next_pn = nla_get_u64(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
 		spin_unlock_bh(&rx_sa->lock);
 	}
 
@@ -1772,6 +1796,7 @@ static int macsec_add_rxsc(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 {
 	struct net_device *dev;
 	sci_t sci = MACSEC_UNDEF_SCI;
+	ssci_t ssci = MACSEC_UNDEF_SSCI;
 	struct nlattr **attrs = info->attrs;
 	struct macsec_rx_sc *rx_sc;
 	struct nlattr *tb_rxsc[MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_MAX + 1];
@@ -1796,7 +1821,10 @@ static int macsec_add_rxsc(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 
 	sci = nla_get_sci(tb_rxsc[MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_SCI]);
 
-	rx_sc = create_rx_sc(dev, sci);
+	if (macsec_priv(dev)->secy.xpn)
+		ssci = nla_get_ssci(tb_rxsc[MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_SSCI]);
+
+	rx_sc = create_rx_sc(dev, sci, ssci);
 	if (IS_ERR(rx_sc)) {
 		rtnl_unlock();
 		return PTR_ERR(rx_sc);
@@ -1866,6 +1894,7 @@ static int macsec_add_txsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	struct macsec_tx_sc *tx_sc;
 	struct macsec_tx_sa *tx_sa;
 	unsigned char assoc_num;
+	int pn_len;
 	struct nlattr *tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_MAX + 1];
 	bool was_operational;
 	int err;
@@ -1898,6 +1927,14 @@ static int macsec_add_txsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	pn_len = secy->xpn ? MACSEC_XPN_PN_LEN : MACSEC_DEFAULT_PN_LEN;
+	if (nla_len(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) != pn_len) {
+		pr_notice("macsec: nl: add_txsa: bad pn length: %d != %d\n",
+			  nla_len(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]), pn_len);
+		rtnl_unlock();
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	tx_sa = rtnl_dereference(tx_sc->sa[assoc_num]);
 	if (tx_sa) {
 		rtnl_unlock();
@@ -1919,7 +1956,7 @@ static int macsec_add_txsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	}
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&tx_sa->lock);
-	tx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
+	tx_sa->next_pn = nla_get_u64(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
 	spin_unlock_bh(&tx_sa->lock);
 
 	if (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_ACTIVE])
@@ -2206,9 +2243,19 @@ static int macsec_upd_txsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	}
 
 	if (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) {
+		int pn_len;
+
+		pn_len = secy->xpn ? MACSEC_XPN_PN_LEN : MACSEC_DEFAULT_PN_LEN;
+		if (nla_len(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) != pn_len) {
+			pr_notice("macsec: nl: upd_txsa: bad pn length: %d != %d\n",
+				nla_len(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]), pn_len);
+			rtnl_unlock();
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
 		spin_lock_bh(&tx_sa->lock);
 		prev_pn = tx_sa->next_pn_halves;
-		tx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
+		tx_sa->next_pn = nla_get_u64(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
 		spin_unlock_bh(&tx_sa->lock);
 	}
 
@@ -2292,9 +2339,19 @@ static int macsec_upd_rxsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	}
 
 	if (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) {
+		int pn_len;
+
+		pn_len = secy->xpn ? MACSEC_XPN_PN_LEN : MACSEC_DEFAULT_PN_LEN;
+		if (nla_len(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) != pn_len) {
+			pr_notice("macsec: nl: upd_rxsa: bad pn length: %d != %d\n",
+				nla_len(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]), pn_len);
+			rtnl_unlock();
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
 		spin_lock_bh(&rx_sa->lock);
 		prev_pn = rx_sa->next_pn_halves;
-		rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
+		rx_sa->next_pn = nla_get_u64(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
 		spin_unlock_bh(&rx_sa->lock);
 	}
 
@@ -2355,6 +2412,9 @@ static int macsec_upd_rxsc(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	if (!validate_add_rxsc(tb_rxsc))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (attrs[MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_SSCI])
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	rtnl_lock();
 	rx_sc = get_rxsc_from_nl(genl_info_net(info), attrs, tb_rxsc, &dev, &secy);
 	if (IS_ERR(rx_sc)) {
@@ -2741,10 +2801,10 @@ static int nla_put_secy(struct macsec_secy *secy, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	switch (secy->key_len) {
 	case MACSEC_GCM_AES_128_SAK_LEN:
-		csid = MACSEC_DEFAULT_CIPHER_ID;
+		csid = secy->xpn ? MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_128 : MACSEC_DEFAULT_CIPHER_ID;
 		break;
 	case MACSEC_GCM_AES_256_SAK_LEN:
-		csid = MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_256;
+		csid = secy->xpn ? MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_256 : MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_256;
 		break;
 	default:
 		goto cancel;
@@ -2771,6 +2831,14 @@ static int nla_put_secy(struct macsec_secy *secy, struct sk_buff *skb)
 			goto cancel;
 	}
 
+	if (secy->xpn) {
+		if (nla_put_ssci(skb, MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_SSCI, secy->ssci) ||
+			nla_put(skb, MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_SALT, MACSEC_SALT_LEN,
+					secy->salt.bytes) ||
+			0)
+			goto cancel;
+	}
+
 	nla_nest_end(skb, secy_nest);
 	return 0;
 
@@ -2835,6 +2903,8 @@ dump_secy(struct macsec_secy *secy, struct net_device *dev,
 	for (i = 0, j = 1; i < MACSEC_NUM_AN; i++) {
 		struct macsec_tx_sa *tx_sa = rtnl_dereference(tx_sc->sa[i]);
 		struct nlattr *txsa_nest;
+		u64 pn;
+		int pn_len;
 
 		if (!tx_sa)
 			continue;
@@ -2845,8 +2915,16 @@ dump_secy(struct macsec_secy *secy, struct net_device *dev,
 			goto nla_put_failure;
 		}
 
+		if (secy->xpn) {
+			pn = tx_sa->next_pn;
+			pn_len = MACSEC_XPN_PN_LEN;
+		} else {
+			pn = tx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower;
+			pn_len = MACSEC_DEFAULT_PN_LEN;
+		}
+
 		if (nla_put_u8(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_AN, i) ||
-		    nla_put_u32(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN, tx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower) ||
+		    nla_put(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN, pn_len, &pn) ||
 		    nla_put(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEYID, MACSEC_KEYID_LEN, tx_sa->key.id) ||
 		    nla_put_u8(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_ACTIVE, tx_sa->active)) {
 			nla_nest_cancel(skb, txsa_nest);
@@ -2895,6 +2973,14 @@ dump_secy(struct macsec_secy *secy, struct net_device *dev,
 			goto nla_put_failure;
 		}
 
+		if (secy->xpn) {
+			if (nla_put_ssci(skb, MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_SSCI, rx_sc->ssci)) {
+				nla_nest_cancel(skb, rxsc_nest);
+				nla_nest_cancel(skb, rxsc_list);
+				goto nla_put_failure;
+			}
+		}
+
 		attr = nla_nest_start_noflag(skb, MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_STATS);
 		if (!attr) {
 			nla_nest_cancel(skb, rxsc_nest);
@@ -2920,6 +3006,8 @@ dump_secy(struct macsec_secy *secy, struct net_device *dev,
 		for (i = 0, k = 1; i < MACSEC_NUM_AN; i++) {
 			struct macsec_rx_sa *rx_sa = rtnl_dereference(rx_sc->sa[i]);
 			struct nlattr *rxsa_nest;
+			u64 pn;
+			int pn_len;
 
 			if (!rx_sa)
 				continue;
@@ -2949,8 +3037,16 @@ dump_secy(struct macsec_secy *secy, struct net_device *dev,
 			}
 			nla_nest_end(skb, attr);
 
+			if (secy->xpn) {
+				pn = rx_sa->next_pn;
+				pn_len = MACSEC_XPN_PN_LEN;
+			} else {
+				pn = rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower;
+				pn_len = MACSEC_DEFAULT_PN_LEN;
+			}
+
 			if (nla_put_u8(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_AN, i) ||
-			    nla_put_u32(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN, rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower) ||
+			    nla_put(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN, pn_len, &pn) ||
 			    nla_put(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEYID, MACSEC_KEYID_LEN, rx_sa->key.id) ||
 			    nla_put_u8(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_ACTIVE, rx_sa->active)) {
 				nla_nest_cancel(skb, rxsa_nest);
@@ -3408,6 +3504,9 @@ static const struct nla_policy macsec_rtnl_policy[IFLA_MACSEC_MAX + 1] = {
 	[IFLA_MACSEC_SCB] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
 	[IFLA_MACSEC_REPLAY_PROTECT] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
 	[IFLA_MACSEC_VALIDATION] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
+	[IFLA_MACSEC_SSCI] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
+	[IFLA_MACSEC_SALT] = { .type = NLA_BINARY,
+					.len = MACSEC_SALT_LEN }
 };
 
 static void macsec_free_netdev(struct net_device *dev)
@@ -3480,15 +3579,32 @@ static int macsec_changelink_common(struct net_device *dev,
 		case MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_128:
 		case MACSEC_DEFAULT_CIPHER_ID:
 			secy->key_len = MACSEC_GCM_AES_128_SAK_LEN;
+			secy->xpn = false;
 			break;
 		case MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_256:
 			secy->key_len = MACSEC_GCM_AES_256_SAK_LEN;
+			secy->xpn = false;
+			break;
+		case MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_128:
+			secy->key_len = MACSEC_GCM_AES_128_SAK_LEN;
+			secy->xpn = true;
+			break;
+		case MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_256:
+			secy->key_len = MACSEC_GCM_AES_256_SAK_LEN;
+			secy->xpn = true;
 			break;
 		default:
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 	}
 
+	if (secy->xpn) {
+		if (data[IFLA_MACSEC_SSCI])
+			secy->ssci = nla_get_ssci(data[IFLA_MACSEC_SSCI]);
+		if (data[IFLA_MACSEC_SALT])
+			memcpy(&secy->salt, nla_data(data[IFLA_MACSEC_SALT]), MACSEC_SALT_LEN);
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -3507,7 +3623,9 @@ static int macsec_changelink(struct net_device *dev, struct nlattr *tb[],
 	if (data[IFLA_MACSEC_CIPHER_SUITE] ||
 	    data[IFLA_MACSEC_ICV_LEN] ||
 	    data[IFLA_MACSEC_SCI] ||
-	    data[IFLA_MACSEC_PORT])
+	    data[IFLA_MACSEC_PORT] ||
+		data[IFLA_MACSEC_SSCI] ||
+		data[IFLA_MACSEC_SALT])
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* Keep a copy of unmodified secy and tx_sc, in case the offload
@@ -3677,8 +3795,12 @@ static int macsec_add_dev(struct net_device *dev, sci_t sci, u8 icv_len)
 	secy->validate_frames = MACSEC_VALIDATE_DEFAULT;
 	secy->protect_frames = true;
 	secy->replay_protect = false;
+	secy->xpn = DEFAULT_XPN;
+	secy->salt.ssci = 0;
+	secy->salt.pn = 0;
 
 	secy->sci = sci;
+	secy->ssci = MACSEC_UNDEF_SSCI;
 	secy->tx_sc.active = true;
 	secy->tx_sc.encoding_sa = DEFAULT_ENCODING_SA;
 	secy->tx_sc.encrypt = DEFAULT_ENCRYPT;
@@ -3752,6 +3874,12 @@ static int macsec_newlink(struct net *net, struct net_device *dev,
 		err = macsec_changelink_common(dev, data);
 		if (err)
 			goto del_dev;
+
+		if (macsec->secy.xpn &&
+			(!data[IFLA_MACSEC_SSCI] || !data[IFLA_MACSEC_SALT])) {
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			goto del_dev;
+		}
 	}
 
 	err = register_macsec_dev(real_dev, dev);
@@ -3806,6 +3934,8 @@ static int macsec_validate_attr(struct nlattr *tb[], struct nlattr *data[],
 	switch (csid) {
 	case MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_128:
 	case MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_256:
+	case MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_128:
+	case MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_256:
 	case MACSEC_DEFAULT_CIPHER_ID:
 		if (icv_len < MACSEC_MIN_ICV_LEN ||
 		    icv_len > MACSEC_STD_ICV_LEN)
@@ -3853,8 +3983,18 @@ static struct net *macsec_get_link_net(const struct net_device *dev)
 	return dev_net(macsec_priv(dev)->real_dev);
 }
 
-static size_t macsec_get_size(const struct net_device *dev)
+static size_t macsec_get_size(const struct net_device *dev) // TODO: ?
 {
+	size_t ssci_size = 0;
+	size_t salt_size = 0;
+
+	struct macsec_secy *secy = &macsec_priv(dev)->secy;
+
+	if (secy->xpn) {
+		ssci_size = nla_total_size(sizeof(ssci_t)); /* IFLA_MACSEC_SSCI */
+		salt_size = nla_total_size(MACSEC_SALT_LEN); /* IFLA_MACSEC_SALT */
+	}
+
 	return  nla_total_size_64bit(8) + /* IFLA_MACSEC_SCI */
 		nla_total_size(1) + /* IFLA_MACSEC_ICV_LEN */
 		nla_total_size_64bit(8) + /* IFLA_MACSEC_CIPHER_SUITE */
@@ -3867,6 +4007,8 @@ static size_t macsec_get_size(const struct net_device *dev)
 		nla_total_size(1) + /* IFLA_MACSEC_SCB */
 		nla_total_size(1) + /* IFLA_MACSEC_REPLAY_PROTECT */
 		nla_total_size(1) + /* IFLA_MACSEC_VALIDATION */
+		ssci_size + /* IFLA_MACSEC_SSCI */
+		salt_size + /* IFLA_MACSEC_SALT */
 		0;
 }
 
@@ -3879,10 +4021,10 @@ static int macsec_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb,
 
 	switch (secy->key_len) {
 	case MACSEC_GCM_AES_128_SAK_LEN:
-		csid = MACSEC_DEFAULT_CIPHER_ID;
+		csid = secy->xpn ? MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_128 : MACSEC_DEFAULT_CIPHER_ID;
 		break;
 	case MACSEC_GCM_AES_256_SAK_LEN:
-		csid = MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_256;
+		csid = secy->xpn ? MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_256 : MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_256;
 		break;
 	default:
 		goto nla_put_failure;
@@ -3909,6 +4051,13 @@ static int macsec_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb,
 			goto nla_put_failure;
 	}
 
+	if (secy->xpn) {
+		if (nla_put_ssci(skb, IFLA_MACSEC_SSCI, secy->ssci) ||
+			nla_put(skb, IFLA_MACSEC_SALT, MACSEC_SALT_LEN, secy->salt.bytes) ||
+			0)
+			goto nla_put_failure;
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 
 nla_put_failure:
diff --git a/include/net/macsec.h b/include/net/macsec.h
index a0b1d0b5c..3c7914ff1 100644
--- a/include/net/macsec.h
+++ b/include/net/macsec.h
@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
 #include <uapi/linux/if_link.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/if_macsec.h>
 
+#define MACSEC_DEFAULT_PN_LEN 4
+#define MACSEC_XPN_PN_LEN 8
+
 #define MACSEC_SALT_LEN 12
 
 typedef u64 __bitwise sci_t;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/if_link.h b/include/uapi/linux/if_link.h
index 024af2d1d..ee424d915 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/if_link.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/if_link.h
@@ -462,6 +462,8 @@ enum {
 	IFLA_MACSEC_SCB,
 	IFLA_MACSEC_REPLAY_PROTECT,
 	IFLA_MACSEC_VALIDATION,
+	IFLA_MACSEC_SSCI,
+	IFLA_MACSEC_SALT,
 	IFLA_MACSEC_PAD,
 	__IFLA_MACSEC_MAX,
 };
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h b/include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h
index 1d63c43c3..c8fab9673 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@
 /* cipher IDs as per IEEE802.1AEbn-2011 */
 #define MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_128 0x0080C20001000001ULL
 #define MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_256 0x0080C20001000002ULL
+#define MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_128 0x0080C20001000003ULL
+#define MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_256 0x0080C20001000004ULL
 
 /* deprecated cipher ID for GCM-AES-128 */
 #define MACSEC_DEFAULT_CIPHER_ID     0x0080020001000001ULL
@@ -66,6 +68,8 @@ enum macsec_secy_attrs {
 	MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_INC_SCI,
 	MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_ES,
 	MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_SCB,
+	MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_SSCI,
+	MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_SALT,
 	MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_PAD,
 	__MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_END,
 	NUM_MACSEC_SECY_ATTR = __MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_END,
@@ -78,6 +82,7 @@ enum macsec_rxsc_attrs {
 	MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_ACTIVE,  /* config/dump, u8 0..1 */
 	MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_SA_LIST, /* dump, nested */
 	MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_STATS,   /* dump, nested, macsec_rxsc_stats_attr */
+	MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_SSCI,    /* config/dump, u32 */
 	MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_PAD,
 	__MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_END,
 	NUM_MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR = __MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_END,
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 2/2] macsec: Netlink support of XPN cipher suites (IEEE 802.1AEbw)
       [not found]     ` <CAMdQvKv9tSoSBfyOyhtctQ9D7aU2WUmuMUsoLn_WZ8whD=3AzA@mail.gmail.com>
@ 2020-03-05 23:53       ` Era Mayflower
  2020-03-05 17:24         ` Michal Kubecek
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Era Mayflower @ 2020-03-05 23:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Michal Kubecek; +Cc: netdev, davem, linux-kernel

Do you think that inserting those new enum values after *_PAD would be
a good solution?


On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 11:51 PM Era Mayflower <mayflowerera@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Do you think that inserting those new enum values after *_PAD would be a good solution?
>
> On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 2:02 PM Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Mar 05, 2020 at 10:01:08PM +0000, Era Mayflower wrote:
>> > Netlink support of extended packet number cipher suites,
>> > allows adding and updating XPN macsec interfaces.
>> >
>> > Added support in:
>> >     * Creating interfaces with GCM-AES-XPN-128 and GCM-AES-XPN-256.
>> >     * Setting and getting packet numbers with 64bit of SAs.
>> >     * Settings and getting ssci of SCs.
>> >     * Settings and getting salt of SecYs.
>> >
>> > Depends on: macsec: Support XPN frame handling - IEEE 802.1AEbw.
>> >
>> > Signed-off-by: Era Mayflower <mayflowerera@gmail.com>
>> > ---
>> [...]
>> > diff --git a/include/net/macsec.h b/include/net/macsec.h
>> > index a0b1d0b5c..3c7914ff1 100644
>> > --- a/include/net/macsec.h
>> > +++ b/include/net/macsec.h
>> > @@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
>> >  #include <uapi/linux/if_link.h>
>> >  #include <uapi/linux/if_macsec.h>
>> >
>> > +#define MACSEC_DEFAULT_PN_LEN 4
>> > +#define MACSEC_XPN_PN_LEN 8
>> > +
>> >  #define MACSEC_SALT_LEN 12
>> >
>> >  typedef u64 __bitwise sci_t;
>> > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/if_link.h b/include/uapi/linux/if_link.h
>> > index 024af2d1d..ee424d915 100644
>> > --- a/include/uapi/linux/if_link.h
>> > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/if_link.h
>> > @@ -462,6 +462,8 @@ enum {
>> >       IFLA_MACSEC_SCB,
>> >       IFLA_MACSEC_REPLAY_PROTECT,
>> >       IFLA_MACSEC_VALIDATION,
>> > +     IFLA_MACSEC_SSCI,
>> > +     IFLA_MACSEC_SALT,
>> >       IFLA_MACSEC_PAD,
>> >       __IFLA_MACSEC_MAX,
>> >  };
>>
>> Doesn't this break backword compatibility? You change the value of
>> IFLA_MACSEC_PAD; even if it's only used as padding, if an old client
>> uses it, new kernel will interpret it as IFLA_MACSEC_SSCI (an the same
>> holds for new client with old kernel).
>>
>> > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h b/include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h
>> > index 1d63c43c3..c8fab9673 100644
>> > --- a/include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h
>> > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h
>> > @@ -25,6 +25,8 @@
>> >  /* cipher IDs as per IEEE802.1AEbn-2011 */
>> >  #define MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_128 0x0080C20001000001ULL
>> >  #define MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_256 0x0080C20001000002ULL
>> > +#define MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_128 0x0080C20001000003ULL
>> > +#define MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_256 0x0080C20001000004ULL
>> >
>> >  /* deprecated cipher ID for GCM-AES-128 */
>> >  #define MACSEC_DEFAULT_CIPHER_ID     0x0080020001000001ULL
>> > @@ -66,6 +68,8 @@ enum macsec_secy_attrs {
>> >       MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_INC_SCI,
>> >       MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_ES,
>> >       MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_SCB,
>> > +     MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_SSCI,
>> > +     MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_SALT,
>> >       MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_PAD,
>> >       __MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_END,
>> >       NUM_MACSEC_SECY_ATTR = __MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_END,
>> > @@ -78,6 +82,7 @@ enum macsec_rxsc_attrs {
>> >       MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_ACTIVE,  /* config/dump, u8 0..1 */
>> >       MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_SA_LIST, /* dump, nested */
>> >       MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_STATS,   /* dump, nested, macsec_rxsc_stats_attr */
>> > +     MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_SSCI,    /* config/dump, u32 */
>> >       MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_PAD,
>> >       __MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_END,
>> >       NUM_MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR = __MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_END,
>>
>> The same problem with these two.
>>
>> I'm also a bit unsure about the change of type and length of
>> MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN but I would have to get more familiar with the code to
>> see if it is really a problem.
>>
>> Michal

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 2/2] macsec: Netlink support of XPN cipher suites (IEEE 802.1AEbw)
  2020-03-05 17:24         ` Michal Kubecek
@ 2020-03-06  2:59           ` Era Mayflower
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Era Mayflower @ 2020-03-06  2:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Michal Kubecek; +Cc: netdev, davem, linux-kernel

On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 5:24 PM Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> wrote:
> Yes, new attribute identifiers should always be added as last so that
> you don't change existing values.

Created a new patch: macsec: Backward compatibility bugfix of consts values

On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 5:24 PM Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Mar 05, 2020 at 11:53:29PM +0000, Era Mayflower wrote:
> > Do you think that inserting those new enum values after *_PAD would be
> > a good solution?
>
> Yes, new attribute identifiers should always be added as last so that
> you don't change existing values.
>
> Michal
>
> > On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 11:51 PM Era Mayflower <mayflowerera@gmail.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > Do you think that inserting those new enum values after *_PAD would be a good solution?
> > >
> > > On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 2:02 PM Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> wrote:
> > >>
> > >> On Thu, Mar 05, 2020 at 10:01:08PM +0000, Era Mayflower wrote:
> > >> > Netlink support of extended packet number cipher suites,
> > >> > allows adding and updating XPN macsec interfaces.
> > >> >
> > >> > Added support in:
> > >> >     * Creating interfaces with GCM-AES-XPN-128 and GCM-AES-XPN-256.
> > >> >     * Setting and getting packet numbers with 64bit of SAs.
> > >> >     * Settings and getting ssci of SCs.
> > >> >     * Settings and getting salt of SecYs.
> > >> >
> > >> > Depends on: macsec: Support XPN frame handling - IEEE 802.1AEbw.
> > >> >
> > >> > Signed-off-by: Era Mayflower <mayflowerera@gmail.com>
> > >> > ---
> > >> [...]
> > >> > diff --git a/include/net/macsec.h b/include/net/macsec.h
> > >> > index a0b1d0b5c..3c7914ff1 100644
> > >> > --- a/include/net/macsec.h
> > >> > +++ b/include/net/macsec.h
> > >> > @@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
> > >> >  #include <uapi/linux/if_link.h>
> > >> >  #include <uapi/linux/if_macsec.h>
> > >> >
> > >> > +#define MACSEC_DEFAULT_PN_LEN 4
> > >> > +#define MACSEC_XPN_PN_LEN 8
> > >> > +
> > >> >  #define MACSEC_SALT_LEN 12
> > >> >
> > >> >  typedef u64 __bitwise sci_t;
> > >> > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/if_link.h b/include/uapi/linux/if_link.h
> > >> > index 024af2d1d..ee424d915 100644
> > >> > --- a/include/uapi/linux/if_link.h
> > >> > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/if_link.h
> > >> > @@ -462,6 +462,8 @@ enum {
> > >> >       IFLA_MACSEC_SCB,
> > >> >       IFLA_MACSEC_REPLAY_PROTECT,
> > >> >       IFLA_MACSEC_VALIDATION,
> > >> > +     IFLA_MACSEC_SSCI,
> > >> > +     IFLA_MACSEC_SALT,
> > >> >       IFLA_MACSEC_PAD,
> > >> >       __IFLA_MACSEC_MAX,
> > >> >  };
> > >>
> > >> Doesn't this break backword compatibility? You change the value of
> > >> IFLA_MACSEC_PAD; even if it's only used as padding, if an old client
> > >> uses it, new kernel will interpret it as IFLA_MACSEC_SSCI (an the same
> > >> holds for new client with old kernel).
> > >>
> > >> > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h b/include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h
> > >> > index 1d63c43c3..c8fab9673 100644
> > >> > --- a/include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h
> > >> > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/if_macsec.h
> > >> > @@ -25,6 +25,8 @@
> > >> >  /* cipher IDs as per IEEE802.1AEbn-2011 */
> > >> >  #define MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_128 0x0080C20001000001ULL
> > >> >  #define MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_256 0x0080C20001000002ULL
> > >> > +#define MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_128 0x0080C20001000003ULL
> > >> > +#define MACSEC_CIPHER_ID_GCM_AES_XPN_256 0x0080C20001000004ULL
> > >> >
> > >> >  /* deprecated cipher ID for GCM-AES-128 */
> > >> >  #define MACSEC_DEFAULT_CIPHER_ID     0x0080020001000001ULL
> > >> > @@ -66,6 +68,8 @@ enum macsec_secy_attrs {
> > >> >       MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_INC_SCI,
> > >> >       MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_ES,
> > >> >       MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_SCB,
> > >> > +     MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_SSCI,
> > >> > +     MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_SALT,
> > >> >       MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_PAD,
> > >> >       __MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_END,
> > >> >       NUM_MACSEC_SECY_ATTR = __MACSEC_SECY_ATTR_END,
> > >> > @@ -78,6 +82,7 @@ enum macsec_rxsc_attrs {
> > >> >       MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_ACTIVE,  /* config/dump, u8 0..1 */
> > >> >       MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_SA_LIST, /* dump, nested */
> > >> >       MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_STATS,   /* dump, nested, macsec_rxsc_stats_attr */
> > >> > +     MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_SSCI,    /* config/dump, u32 */
> > >> >       MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_PAD,
> > >> >       __MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_END,
> > >> >       NUM_MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR = __MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_END,
> > >>
> > >> The same problem with these two.
> > >>
> > >> I'm also a bit unsure about the change of type and length of
> > >> MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN but I would have to get more familiar with the code to
> > >> see if it is really a problem.
> > >>
> > >> Michal

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2020-03-05 17:59 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2020-03-05 22:01 [PATCH 1/2] macsec: Support XPN frame handling - IEEE 802.1AEbw Era Mayflower
2020-03-05 22:01 ` [PATCH 2/2] macsec: Netlink support of XPN cipher suites (IEEE 802.1AEbw) Era Mayflower
2020-03-05 14:02   ` Michal Kubecek
     [not found]     ` <CAMdQvKv9tSoSBfyOyhtctQ9D7aU2WUmuMUsoLn_WZ8whD=3AzA@mail.gmail.com>
2020-03-05 23:53       ` Era Mayflower
2020-03-05 17:24         ` Michal Kubecek
2020-03-06  2:59           ` Era Mayflower

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