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From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	Android Kernel Team <kernel-team@android.com>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
	Luc Van Oostenryck <luc.vanoostenryck@gmail.com>,
	Peter Oberparleiter <oberpar@linux.ibm.com>,
	Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>,
	Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
	Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 05/12] arm64: csum: Disable KASAN for do_csum()
Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2020 21:10:07 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200415201007.GA22393@willie-the-truck> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200415194305.GB21804@willie-the-truck>

On Wed, Apr 15, 2020 at 08:43:05PM +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 15, 2020 at 08:42:16PM +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> > On Wed, Apr 15, 2020 at 7:28 PM Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote:
> > > On Wed, Apr 15, 2020 at 05:52:11PM +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
> > > > do_csum() over-reads the source buffer and therefore abuses
> > > > READ_ONCE_NOCHECK() to avoid tripping up KASAN. In preparation for
> > > > READ_ONCE_NOCHECK() becoming a macro, and therefore losing its
> > > > '__no_sanitize_address' annotation, just annotate do_csum() explicitly
> > > > and fall back to normal loads.
> > >
> > > I'm confused by this. The whole point of READ_ONCE_NOCHECK() is that it
> > > isn't checked by KASAN, so if that semantic is removed it has no reason
> > > to exist.
> > >
> > > Changing that will break the unwind/stacktrace code across multiple
> > > architectures. IIRC they use READ_ONCE_NOCHECK() for two reasons:
> > >
> > > 1. Races with concurrent modification, as might happen when a thread's
> > >    stack is corrupted. Allowing the unwinder to bail out after a sanity
> > >    check means the resulting report is more useful than a KASAN splat in
> > >    the unwinder. I made the arm64 unwinder robust to this case.
> > >
> > > 2. I believe that the frame record itself /might/ be poisoned by KASAN,
> > >    since it's not meant to be an accessible object at the C langauge
> > >    level. I could be wrong about this, and would have to check.
> > 
> > I thought the main reason was deadlocks when a READ_ONCE()
> > is called inside of code that is part of the KASAN handling. If
> > READ_ONCE() ends up recursively calling itself, the kernel
> > tends to crash once it overflows its stack.
> 
> That was also my understanding.
> 
> > > I would like to keep the unwinding robust in the first case, even if the
> > > second case doesn't apply, and I'd prefer to not mark the entirety of
> > > the unwinding code as unchecked as that's sufficiently large an subtle
> > > that it could have nasty bugs.
> > >
> > > Is there any way we keep something like READ_ONCE_NOCHECK() around even
> > > if we have to give it reduced functionality relative to READ_ONCE()?
> > >
> > > I'm not enirely sure why READ_ONCE_NOCHECK() had to go, so if there's a
> > > particular pain point I'm happy to take a look.
> > 
> > As I understood, only this particular instance was removed, not all of
> > them.
> 
> Right, but the problem is that whether the NOCHECK version gets checked
> or not now depends on the caller, since it's all just a macro. If we want
> to fix this, then we could force the nocheck variant to return unsigned
> long, which simplifies things a lot (completely untested):
> 
> 
> #define READ_ONCE(x)							\
> ({									\
> 	compiletime_assert_rwonce_type(x);				\
> 	__READ_ONCE_SCALAR(x);						\
> })
> 
> unsigned long __no_sanitise_address
> kasan_nocheck_read_once_ul(const volatile void *p)
> {
> 	return READ_ONCE(*p);
> }
> 
> /* Please don't use this */
> #define READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(x)	kasan_nocheck_read_once_ul(&x)
> 

Urgh, scratch that. Trying to instantiate READ_ONCE() in compiler.h
causes a circular header-file dependency between linux/compiler.h
and asm-generic/barrier.h thanks to smp_read_barrier_depends().

Time to dust off that patch I had splitting up compiler.h.

Will

  reply	other threads:[~2020-04-15 20:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-04-15 16:52 [PATCH v3 00/12] Rework READ_ONCE() to improve codegen Will Deacon
2020-04-15 16:52 ` [PATCH v3 01/12] compiler/gcc: Emit build-time warning for GCC prior to version 4.8 Will Deacon
2020-04-15 17:20   ` Masahiro Yamada
2020-04-15 16:52 ` [PATCH v3 02/12] netfilter: Avoid assigning 'const' pointer to non-const pointer Will Deacon
2020-04-15 16:52 ` [PATCH v3 03/12] net: tls: " Will Deacon
2020-04-15 16:52 ` [PATCH v3 04/12] fault_inject: Don't rely on "return value" from WRITE_ONCE() Will Deacon
2020-04-15 16:52 ` [PATCH v3 05/12] arm64: csum: Disable KASAN for do_csum() Will Deacon
2020-04-15 17:28   ` Mark Rutland
2020-04-15 18:42     ` Arnd Bergmann
2020-04-15 19:43       ` Will Deacon
2020-04-15 20:10         ` Will Deacon [this message]
2020-04-15 19:26     ` Will Deacon
2020-04-16  9:31       ` Mark Rutland
2020-04-16 11:53         ` Will Deacon
2020-04-16 12:11           ` Mark Rutland
2020-04-15 19:26   ` Robin Murphy
2020-04-15 16:52 ` [PATCH v3 06/12] READ_ONCE: Simplify implementations of {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() Will Deacon
2020-04-15 16:52 ` [PATCH v3 07/12] READ_ONCE: Enforce atomicity for {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() memory accesses Will Deacon
2020-04-15 16:52 ` [PATCH v3 08/12] READ_ONCE: Drop pointer qualifiers when reading from scalar types Will Deacon
2020-04-15 16:52 ` [PATCH v3 09/12] locking/barriers: Use '__unqual_scalar_typeof' for load-acquire macros Will Deacon
2020-04-15 16:52 ` [PATCH v3 10/12] arm64: barrier: Use '__unqual_scalar_typeof' for acquire/release macros Will Deacon
2020-04-15 16:52 ` [PATCH v3 11/12] compiler/gcc: Raise minimum GCC version for kernel builds to 4.8 Will Deacon
2020-04-15 18:37   ` Arnd Bergmann
2020-04-15 16:52 ` [PATCH v3 12/12] gcov: Remove old GCC 3.4 support Will Deacon
2020-04-16 12:30 ` [PATCH v3 00/12] Rework READ_ONCE() to improve codegen Christian Borntraeger
2020-04-16 12:48   ` Will Deacon

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