From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
To: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH] x86/ftrace: Have ftrace trampolines turn read-only at the end of system boot up
Date: Thu, 30 Apr 2020 23:47:33 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200501044733.eqf6hc6erucsd43x@treble> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200430202147.4dc6e2de@oasis.local.home>
On Thu, Apr 30, 2020 at 08:21:47PM -0400, Steven Rostedt wrote:
> The cause is the "ftrace=function" would register the function tracer
> and create a trampoline, and it will set it as executable and
> read-only. Then the "trace_options=func_stack_trace" would then update
> the same trampoline to include the stack tracer version of the function
> tracer. But since the trampoline already exists, it updates it with
> text_poke_bp(). The problem is that text_poke_bp() called while
> system_state == SYSTEM_BOOTING, it will simply do a memcpy() and not
> the page mapping, as it would think that the text is still read-write.
> But in this case it is not, and we take a fault and crash.
>
> Instead, lets keep the ftrace trampolines read-write during boot up,
> and then when the kernel executable text is set to read-only, the
> ftrace trampolines get set to read-only as well.
Would it be easier to just call a new __text_poke_bp() which skips the
SYSTEM_BOOTING check, since you know the trampoline will always be
read-only?
Like:
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h
index 67315fa3956a..710106256916 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ extern void *text_poke(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len);
extern void text_poke_sync(void);
extern void *text_poke_kgdb(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len);
extern int poke_int3_handler(struct pt_regs *regs);
+extern void __text_poke_bp(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len, const void *emulate);
extern void text_poke_bp(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len, const void *emulate);
extern void text_poke_queue(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len, const void *emulate);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
index 7867dfb3963e..9cc983cc9291 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -1265,6 +1265,14 @@ void __ref text_poke_queue(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len, const voi
text_poke_loc_init(tp, addr, opcode, len, emulate);
}
+void __ref __text_poke_bp(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len, const void *emulate)
+{
+ struct text_poke_loc tp;
+
+ text_poke_loc_init(&tp, addr, opcode, len, emulate);
+ text_poke_bp_batch(&tp, 1);
+}
+
/**
* text_poke_bp() -- update instructions on live kernel on SMP
* @addr: address to patch
@@ -1278,13 +1286,10 @@ void __ref text_poke_queue(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len, const voi
*/
void __ref text_poke_bp(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len, const void *emulate)
{
- struct text_poke_loc tp;
-
if (unlikely(system_state == SYSTEM_BOOTING)) {
text_poke_early(addr, opcode, len);
return;
}
- text_poke_loc_init(&tp, addr, opcode, len, emulate);
- text_poke_bp_batch(&tp, 1);
+ __text_poke_bp(addr, opcode, len, emulate);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
index 867c126ddabe..c36f51f01f6e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ void arch_ftrace_update_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *ops)
mutex_lock(&text_mutex);
/* Do a safe modify in case the trampoline is executing */
new = ftrace_call_replace(ip, (unsigned long)func);
- text_poke_bp((void *)ip, new, MCOUNT_INSN_SIZE, NULL);
+ __text_poke_bp((void *)ip, new, MCOUNT_INSN_SIZE, NULL);
mutex_unlock(&text_mutex);
}
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-05-01 4:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-05-01 0:21 [RFC][PATCH] x86/ftrace: Have ftrace trampolines turn read-only at the end of system boot up Steven Rostedt
2020-05-01 4:47 ` Josh Poimboeuf [this message]
2020-05-01 5:17 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2020-05-01 13:24 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-05-01 15:13 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2020-05-01 16:19 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-05-01 17:29 ` Peter Zijlstra
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