* general protection fault in proc_kill_sb
@ 2020-06-10 10:56 syzbot
2020-06-10 11:23 ` Tetsuo Handa
2020-06-10 13:04 ` [PATCH] proc: s_fs_info may be NULL when proc_kill_sb is called Alexey Gladkov
0 siblings, 2 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: syzbot @ 2020-06-10 10:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: adobriyan, ebiederm, gladkov.alexey, keescook, linux-fsdevel,
linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs, viro
Hello,
syzbot found the following crash on:
HEAD commit: 7ae77150 Merge tag 'powerpc-5.8-1' of git://git.kernel.org..
git tree: upstream
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=16e12212100000
kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=d195fe572fb15312
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4abac52934a48af5ff19
compiler: gcc (GCC) 9.0.0 20181231 (experimental)
Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this crash yet.
IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+4abac52934a48af5ff19@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
RBP: 000000000078bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000005
R13: 0000000000000751 R14: 00000000004ca3ea R15: 00007f8970ff76d4
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
CPU: 0 PID: 6840 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.7.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:proc_kill_sb+0x4d/0x110 fs/proc/root.c:267
Code: c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 ad 00 00 00 49 8b ac 24 68 06 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8d 7d 08 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 a1 00 00 00 4c 8b 6d 08 4d 85 ed 74 0d e8 cb 51
RSP: 0018:ffffc90007b67d48 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffc9000d6d1000
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff81e37c9d RDI: 0000000000000008
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: ffffffff8c347a2f R11: fffffbfff1868f45 R12: ffff888059e1a000
R13: 00000000fffffff4 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888059e1a068
FS: 00007f8970ff7700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000000073c138 CR3: 00000000588dc000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
deactivate_locked_super+0x8c/0xf0 fs/super.c:335
vfs_get_super+0x258/0x2d0 fs/super.c:1212
vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x2f0 fs/super.c:1547
do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2874 [inline]
do_mount+0x1306/0x1b40 fs/namespace.c:3199
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3409 [inline]
__se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3386 [inline]
__x64_sys_mount+0x18f/0x230 fs/namespace.c:3386
do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3
RIP: 0033:0x45ca69
Code: 0d b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 db b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f8970ff6c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004f62c0 RCX: 000000000045ca69
RDX: 00000000200000c0 RSI: 0000000020000200 RDI: 0000000020000340
RBP: 000000000078bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000005
R13: 0000000000000751 R14: 00000000004ca3ea R15: 00007f8970ff76d4
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 7f26d357bd21d77e ]---
RIP: 0010:proc_kill_sb+0x4d/0x110 fs/proc/root.c:267
Code: c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 ad 00 00 00 49 8b ac 24 68 06 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8d 7d 08 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 a1 00 00 00 4c 8b 6d 08 4d 85 ed 74 0d e8 cb 51
RSP: 0018:ffffc90007b67d48 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffc9000d6d1000
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff81e37c9d RDI: 0000000000000008
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: ffffffff8c347a2f R11: fffffbfff1868f45 R12: ffff888059e1a000
R13: 00000000fffffff4 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888059e1a068
FS: 00007f8970ff7700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f19326ab000 CR3: 00000000588dc000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
---
This bug is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com.
syzbot will keep track of this bug report. See:
https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: general protection fault in proc_kill_sb
2020-06-10 10:56 general protection fault in proc_kill_sb syzbot
@ 2020-06-10 11:23 ` Tetsuo Handa
2020-06-10 11:44 ` Alexey Gladkov
2020-06-10 13:04 ` [PATCH] proc: s_fs_info may be NULL when proc_kill_sb is called Alexey Gladkov
1 sibling, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread
From: Tetsuo Handa @ 2020-06-10 11:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: viro
Cc: syzbot, adobriyan, ebiederm, gladkov.alexey, keescook,
linux-fsdevel, linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs
On 2020/06/10 19:56, syzbot wrote:
> Hello,
>
> syzbot found the following crash on:
>
> HEAD commit: 7ae77150 Merge tag 'powerpc-5.8-1' of git://git.kernel.org..
> git tree: upstream
> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=16e12212100000
> kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=d195fe572fb15312
> dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4abac52934a48af5ff19
> compiler: gcc (GCC) 9.0.0 20181231 (experimental)
>
> Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this crash yet.
The report says proc_sb_info(sb) == NULL at proc_kill_sb() which was called via
fs->kill_sb(s) from deactivate_locked_super(). The console log says that memory
allocation for proc_sb_info(sb) failed due to memory allocation fault injection.
[ 1492.052802][ T6840] FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure.
[ 1492.052802][ T6840] name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 0
[ 1492.077153][ T6840] CPU: 0 PID: 6840 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.7.0-syzkaller #0
[ 1492.085449][ T6840] Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
[ 1492.095511][ T6840] Call Trace:
[ 1492.098811][ T6840] dump_stack+0x188/0x20d
[ 1492.103157][ T6840] should_fail.cold+0x5/0xa
[ 1492.107686][ T6840] ? fault_create_debugfs_attr+0x140/0x140
[ 1492.107721][ T6840] ? idr_replace+0xee/0x160
[ 1492.127210][ T6840] should_failslab+0x5/0xf
[ 1492.131638][ T6840] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x2d0/0x7d0
[ 1492.137020][ T6840] ? up_write+0x148/0x470
[ 1492.141367][ T6840] proc_fill_super+0x79/0x5c0
[ 1492.146052][ T6840] ? proc_parse_param+0x8a0/0x8a0
[ 1492.151092][ T6840] vfs_get_super+0x12e/0x2d0
[ 1492.155694][ T6840] vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x2f0
[ 1492.160126][ T6840] do_mount+0x1306/0x1b40
[ 1492.164467][ T6840] ? copy_mount_string+0x40/0x40
[ 1492.169411][ T6840] ? __might_fault+0x190/0x1d0
[ 1492.174188][ T6840] ? _copy_from_user+0x13c/0x1a0
[ 1492.179138][ T6840] ? memdup_user+0x7c/0xd0
[ 1492.183575][ T6840] __x64_sys_mount+0x18f/0x230
[ 1492.188351][ T6840] do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x7d0
[ 1492.192861][ T6840] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3
[ 1492.198759][ T6840] RIP: 0033:0x45ca69
That is, proc_kill_sb() was assuming "s->s_fs_info = fs_info;" is always
called from proc_fill_super() which is called via fill_super(sb, fc); from
vfs_get_super().
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: general protection fault in proc_kill_sb
2020-06-10 11:23 ` Tetsuo Handa
@ 2020-06-10 11:44 ` Alexey Gladkov
0 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Alexey Gladkov @ 2020-06-10 11:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tetsuo Handa
Cc: viro, syzbot, adobriyan, ebiederm, keescook, linux-fsdevel,
linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs
On Wed, Jun 10, 2020 at 08:23:33PM +0900, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> On 2020/06/10 19:56, syzbot wrote:
> > Hello,
> >
> > syzbot found the following crash on:
> >
> > HEAD commit: 7ae77150 Merge tag 'powerpc-5.8-1' of git://git.kernel.org..
> > git tree: upstream
> > console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=16e12212100000
> > kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=d195fe572fb15312
> > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4abac52934a48af5ff19
> > compiler: gcc (GCC) 9.0.0 20181231 (experimental)
> >
> > Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this crash yet.
>
> The report says proc_sb_info(sb) == NULL at proc_kill_sb() which was called via
> fs->kill_sb(s) from deactivate_locked_super(). The console log says that memory
> allocation for proc_sb_info(sb) failed due to memory allocation fault injection.
>
> [ 1492.052802][ T6840] FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure.
> [ 1492.052802][ T6840] name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 0
> [ 1492.077153][ T6840] CPU: 0 PID: 6840 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.7.0-syzkaller #0
> [ 1492.085449][ T6840] Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
> [ 1492.095511][ T6840] Call Trace:
> [ 1492.098811][ T6840] dump_stack+0x188/0x20d
> [ 1492.103157][ T6840] should_fail.cold+0x5/0xa
> [ 1492.107686][ T6840] ? fault_create_debugfs_attr+0x140/0x140
> [ 1492.107721][ T6840] ? idr_replace+0xee/0x160
> [ 1492.127210][ T6840] should_failslab+0x5/0xf
> [ 1492.131638][ T6840] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x2d0/0x7d0
> [ 1492.137020][ T6840] ? up_write+0x148/0x470
> [ 1492.141367][ T6840] proc_fill_super+0x79/0x5c0
> [ 1492.146052][ T6840] ? proc_parse_param+0x8a0/0x8a0
> [ 1492.151092][ T6840] vfs_get_super+0x12e/0x2d0
> [ 1492.155694][ T6840] vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x2f0
> [ 1492.160126][ T6840] do_mount+0x1306/0x1b40
> [ 1492.164467][ T6840] ? copy_mount_string+0x40/0x40
> [ 1492.169411][ T6840] ? __might_fault+0x190/0x1d0
> [ 1492.174188][ T6840] ? _copy_from_user+0x13c/0x1a0
> [ 1492.179138][ T6840] ? memdup_user+0x7c/0xd0
> [ 1492.183575][ T6840] __x64_sys_mount+0x18f/0x230
> [ 1492.188351][ T6840] do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x7d0
> [ 1492.192861][ T6840] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3
> [ 1492.198759][ T6840] RIP: 0033:0x45ca69
>
> That is, proc_kill_sb() was assuming "s->s_fs_info = fs_info;" is always
> called from proc_fill_super() which is called via fill_super(sb, fc); from
> vfs_get_super().
Yes. If fill_super() fails before filling up fs_info,
deactivate_locked_super() will be called and sb->s_fs_info may be NULL.
--
Rgrds, legion
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* [PATCH] proc: s_fs_info may be NULL when proc_kill_sb is called
2020-06-10 10:56 general protection fault in proc_kill_sb syzbot
2020-06-10 11:23 ` Tetsuo Handa
@ 2020-06-10 13:04 ` Alexey Gladkov
2020-06-10 17:12 ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-06-10 18:35 ` [PATCH v2] " Alexey Gladkov
1 sibling, 2 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Alexey Gladkov @ 2020-06-10 13:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ebiederm
Cc: syzbot, adobriyan, keescook, linux-fsdevel, linux-kernel,
syzkaller-bugs, viro
syzbot found that proc_fill_super() fails before filling up sb->s_fs_info,
deactivate_locked_super() will be called and sb->s_fs_info will be NULL.
The proc_kill_sb() does not expect fs_info to be NULL which is wrong.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/0000000000002d7ca605a7b8b1c5@google.com
Reported-by: syzbot+4abac52934a48af5ff19@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: fa10fed30f25 ("proc: allow to mount many instances of proc in one pid namespace")
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>
---
fs/proc/root.c | 15 +++++++++------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c
index ffebed1999e5..a715eb9f196a 100644
--- a/fs/proc/root.c
+++ b/fs/proc/root.c
@@ -264,15 +264,18 @@ static void proc_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(sb);
- if (fs_info->proc_self)
- dput(fs_info->proc_self);
+ if (fs_info) {
+ if (fs_info->proc_self)
+ dput(fs_info->proc_self);
- if (fs_info->proc_thread_self)
- dput(fs_info->proc_thread_self);
+ if (fs_info->proc_thread_self)
+ dput(fs_info->proc_thread_self);
+
+ put_pid_ns(fs_info->pid_ns);
+ kfree(fs_info);
+ }
kill_anon_super(sb);
- put_pid_ns(fs_info->pid_ns);
- kfree(fs_info);
}
static struct file_system_type proc_fs_type = {
--
2.25.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] proc: s_fs_info may be NULL when proc_kill_sb is called
2020-06-10 13:04 ` [PATCH] proc: s_fs_info may be NULL when proc_kill_sb is called Alexey Gladkov
@ 2020-06-10 17:12 ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-06-10 17:41 ` Al Viro
2020-06-10 18:35 ` [PATCH v2] " Alexey Gladkov
1 sibling, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread
From: Eric W. Biederman @ 2020-06-10 17:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexey Gladkov
Cc: syzbot, adobriyan, keescook, linux-fsdevel, linux-kernel,
syzkaller-bugs, viro
Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com> writes:
> syzbot found that proc_fill_super() fails before filling up sb->s_fs_info,
> deactivate_locked_super() will be called and sb->s_fs_info will be NULL.
> The proc_kill_sb() does not expect fs_info to be NULL which is wrong.
For the case where s_fs_info is never allocated this looks correct.
That is because generic_shutdown_super has a special for !sb->s_root.
However for the existing cases I can't convince myself that it is safe
to change the order we free the pid namespace and free fs_info.
There is a lot of code that can run while generic_shutdown_super is
running and purging all of the inodes. We have crazy things like
proc_flush_pid that might care, as well proc_evict_inode.
I haven't found anything that actually references fs_info or actually
depends on the pid namespace living longer than the proc inode but it
would be really easy to miss something.
Can you send a v2 version does not change the order things are freed in
for the case where we do allocate fs_info. That will make it trivially
safe to apply.
Otherwise this looks like a very good patch.
Thank you,
Eric
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/0000000000002d7ca605a7b8b1c5@google.com
> Reported-by: syzbot+4abac52934a48af5ff19@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Fixes: fa10fed30f25 ("proc: allow to mount many instances of proc in one pid namespace")
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>
> ---
> fs/proc/root.c | 15 +++++++++------
> 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c
> index ffebed1999e5..a715eb9f196a 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/root.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/root.c
> @@ -264,15 +264,18 @@ static void proc_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
> {
> struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(sb);
>
> - if (fs_info->proc_self)
> - dput(fs_info->proc_self);
> + if (fs_info) {
> + if (fs_info->proc_self)
> + dput(fs_info->proc_self);
>
> - if (fs_info->proc_thread_self)
> - dput(fs_info->proc_thread_self);
> + if (fs_info->proc_thread_self)
> + dput(fs_info->proc_thread_self);
> +
> + put_pid_ns(fs_info->pid_ns);
> + kfree(fs_info);
> + }
>
> kill_anon_super(sb);
> - put_pid_ns(fs_info->pid_ns);
> - kfree(fs_info);
> }
>
> static struct file_system_type proc_fs_type = {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] proc: s_fs_info may be NULL when proc_kill_sb is called
2020-06-10 17:12 ` Eric W. Biederman
@ 2020-06-10 17:41 ` Al Viro
0 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Al Viro @ 2020-06-10 17:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eric W. Biederman
Cc: Alexey Gladkov, syzbot, adobriyan, keescook, linux-fsdevel,
linux-kernel, syzkaller-bugs
On Wed, Jun 10, 2020 at 12:12:54PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> > {
> > struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(sb);
> >
> > - if (fs_info->proc_self)
> > - dput(fs_info->proc_self);
> > + if (fs_info) {
> > + if (fs_info->proc_self)
> > + dput(fs_info->proc_self);
> >
> > - if (fs_info->proc_thread_self)
> > - dput(fs_info->proc_thread_self);
> > + if (fs_info->proc_thread_self)
> > + dput(fs_info->proc_thread_self);
> > +
> > + put_pid_ns(fs_info->pid_ns);
> > + kfree(fs_info);
While we are at it, dput(NULL) is an explicit no-op.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v2] proc: s_fs_info may be NULL when proc_kill_sb is called
2020-06-10 13:04 ` [PATCH] proc: s_fs_info may be NULL when proc_kill_sb is called Alexey Gladkov
2020-06-10 17:12 ` Eric W. Biederman
@ 2020-06-10 18:35 ` Alexey Gladkov
2020-06-10 20:17 ` Eric W. Biederman
1 sibling, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread
From: Alexey Gladkov @ 2020-06-10 18:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ebiederm
Cc: syzbot, adobriyan, keescook, linux-fsdevel, linux-kernel,
syzkaller-bugs, viro
syzbot found that proc_fill_super() fails before filling up sb->s_fs_info,
deactivate_locked_super() will be called and sb->s_fs_info will be NULL.
The proc_kill_sb() does not expect fs_info to be NULL which is wrong.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/0000000000002d7ca605a7b8b1c5@google.com
Reported-by: syzbot+4abac52934a48af5ff19@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: fa10fed30f25 ("proc: allow to mount many instances of proc in one pid namespace")
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>
---
fs/proc/root.c | 10 ++++++----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c
index ffebed1999e5..5e444d4f9717 100644
--- a/fs/proc/root.c
+++ b/fs/proc/root.c
@@ -264,11 +264,13 @@ static void proc_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(sb);
- if (fs_info->proc_self)
- dput(fs_info->proc_self);
+ if (!fs_info) {
+ kill_anon_super(sb);
+ return;
+ }
- if (fs_info->proc_thread_self)
- dput(fs_info->proc_thread_self);
+ dput(fs_info->proc_self);
+ dput(fs_info->proc_thread_self);
kill_anon_super(sb);
put_pid_ns(fs_info->pid_ns);
--
2.25.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2] proc: s_fs_info may be NULL when proc_kill_sb is called
2020-06-10 18:35 ` [PATCH v2] " Alexey Gladkov
@ 2020-06-10 20:17 ` Eric W. Biederman
0 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Eric W. Biederman @ 2020-06-10 20:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexey Gladkov
Cc: syzbot, adobriyan, keescook, linux-fsdevel, linux-kernel,
syzkaller-bugs, viro
Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com> writes:
> syzbot found that proc_fill_super() fails before filling up sb->s_fs_info,
> deactivate_locked_super() will be called and sb->s_fs_info will be NULL.
> The proc_kill_sb() does not expect fs_info to be NULL which is wrong.
>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/0000000000002d7ca605a7b8b1c5@google.com
> Reported-by: syzbot+4abac52934a48af5ff19@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Fixes: fa10fed30f25 ("proc: allow to mount many instances of proc in one pid namespace")
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>
applied
Eric
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2020-06-10 20:21 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2020-06-10 10:56 general protection fault in proc_kill_sb syzbot
2020-06-10 11:23 ` Tetsuo Handa
2020-06-10 11:44 ` Alexey Gladkov
2020-06-10 13:04 ` [PATCH] proc: s_fs_info may be NULL when proc_kill_sb is called Alexey Gladkov
2020-06-10 17:12 ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-06-10 17:41 ` Al Viro
2020-06-10 18:35 ` [PATCH v2] " Alexey Gladkov
2020-06-10 20:17 ` Eric W. Biederman
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