From: mark gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
To: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] doc: x86/speculation: length of underlines
Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2020 08:53:31 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200616155331.GA28297@mtg-dev.jf.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200615203645.11545-1-xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
+1
reviewed-by: Mark Gross<mgross@linux.intel.com>
Thanks!
--mark
On Mon, Jun 15, 2020 at 10:36:45PM +0200, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote:
> The lengths of underlines must match the titles to avoid build warnings.
>
> Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
> ---
> .../hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst | 6 +++---
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
> index 47b1b3afac99..3b1ce68d2456 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
> @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ to the core through the special register mechanism that is susceptible
> to MDS attacks.
>
> Affected processors
> ---------------------
> +-------------------
> Core models (desktop, mobile, Xeon-E3) that implement RDRAND and/or RDSEED may
> be affected.
>
> @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ executed on another core or sibling thread using MDS techniques.
>
>
> Mitigation mechanism
> --------------------
> +--------------------
> Intel will release microcode updates that modify the RDRAND, RDSEED, and
> EGETKEY instructions to overwrite secret special register data in the shared
> staging buffer before the secret data can be accessed by another logical
> @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ with the option "srbds=". The option for this is:
> ============= =============================================================
>
> SRBDS System Information
> ------------------------
> +------------------------
> The Linux kernel provides vulnerability status information through sysfs. For
> SRBDS this can be accessed by the following sysfs file:
> /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
> --
> 2.27.0
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-06-16 15:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-06-15 20:36 [PATCH 1/1] doc: x86/speculation: length of underlines Heinrich Schuchardt
2020-06-16 15:53 ` mark gross [this message]
2020-06-19 19:18 ` Jonathan Corbet
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