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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>,
	Peter Oberparleiter <oberpar@linux.ibm.com>,
	Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	kbuild-all@lists.01.org,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: lib/crypto/chacha.c:65:1: warning: the frame size of 1604 bytes is larger than 1024 bytes
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2020 11:42:07 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202008271138.0FA7400@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=wgXW=YLxGN0QVpp-1w5GDd2pf1W-FqY15poKzoVfik2qA@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Aug 27, 2020 at 10:55:32AM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 27, 2020 at 10:34 AM Linus Torvalds
> <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> >
> > How are you guys testing? I have UBSAN and GCOV on, and don't see
> > crazy frames on either i386 or x86-64.
> 
> Oh, never mind. I also have COMPILE_TEST on, so it ends up disabling
> GCOV_PROFILE_ALL and UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL.
> 
> And yeah, this seems to be a gcc bug. It generates a ton of stack
> slots for temporaries. It's -fsanitize=object-size that seems to do
> it.
> 
> And "-fstack-reuse=all" doesn't seem to make any difference.
> 
> So I think
> 
>  (a) our stack size check is good to catch this
> 
>  (b) gcc and -fsanitize=object-size is basically an unusable combination
> 
> and it's not a bug in the kernel.

Do you mean you checked both gcc and clang and it was only a problem with gcc?
(If so, I can tweak the "depends" below...)

This should let us avoid it, I'm currently testing:

diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.ubsan b/lib/Kconfig.ubsan
index 774315de555a..24091315c251 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.ubsan
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.ubsan
@@ -47,6 +47,19 @@ config UBSAN_BOUNDS
 	  to the {str,mem}*cpy() family of functions (that is addressed
 	  by CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE).
 
+config UBSAN_OBJECT_SIZE
+	bool "Check for accesses beyond known object sizes"
+	default UBSAN
+	depends on !COMPILE_TEST
+	help
+	  This option enables detection of cases where accesses may
+	  happen beyond the end of an object's size, which happens in
+	  places like invalid downcasts, or calling function pointers
+	  through invalid pointers.
+
+	  This uses much more stack space, and isn't recommended for
+	  cases were stack utilization depth is a concern.
+
 config UBSAN_MISC
 	bool "Enable all other Undefined Behavior sanity checks"
 	default UBSAN
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.ubsan b/scripts/Makefile.ubsan
index 27348029b2b8..3ff67e9b17fd 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.ubsan
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.ubsan
@@ -7,12 +7,15 @@ ifdef CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS
       CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=bounds)
 endif
 
+ifdef CONFIG_UBSAN_OBJECT_SIZE
+      CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=object-size)
+endif
+
 ifdef CONFIG_UBSAN_MISC
       CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=shift)
       CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=integer-divide-by-zero)
       CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=unreachable)
       CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=signed-integer-overflow)
-      CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=object-size)
       CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=bool)
       CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=enum)
 endif

-- 
Kees Cook

  reply	other threads:[~2020-08-27 18:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-08-27  3:52 lib/crypto/chacha.c:65:1: warning: the frame size of 1604 bytes is larger than 1024 bytes kernel test robot
2020-08-27  8:05 ` Herbert Xu
2020-08-27  8:10   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-08-27  8:24     ` Herbert Xu
2020-08-27 17:34       ` Linus Torvalds
2020-08-27 17:55         ` Linus Torvalds
2020-08-27 18:42           ` Kees Cook [this message]
2020-08-27 19:02             ` Linus Torvalds
2020-08-27 19:32               ` Kees Cook
2020-08-27 19:11           ` Arnd Bergmann
2020-08-27 19:34             ` Kees Cook
2020-08-27 20:08             ` Linus Torvalds
2020-08-27  8:33     ` Arnd Bergmann
2020-08-27  8:42       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-08-27  9:19         ` Arnd Bergmann
2020-08-27 10:41           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-08-27 11:51             ` Herbert Xu
2020-08-27 16:25               ` Arnd Bergmann
2020-09-19 17:27 kernel test robot
2020-10-18 19:13 kernel test robot
2020-10-19 15:47 ` Joe Perches
2020-10-20  8:00   ` David Laight
2020-10-20 10:13     ` Joe Perches

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