From: John Wood <john.wood@gmx.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
John Wood <john.wood@gmx.com>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>,
Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>,
Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>, Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 4/6] security/fbfam: Add a new sysctl to control the crashing rate threshold
Date: Sun, 13 Sep 2020 16:33:09 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200913143309.GA2873@ubuntu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202009101612.18BAD0241D@keescook>
Hi, more inline.
On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 04:14:38PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > diff --git a/include/fbfam/fbfam.h b/include/fbfam/fbfam.h
> > index b5b7d1127a52..2cfe51d2b0d5 100644
> > --- a/include/fbfam/fbfam.h
> > +++ b/include/fbfam/fbfam.h
> > @@ -3,8 +3,12 @@
> > #define _FBFAM_H_
> >
> > #include <linux/sched.h>
> > +#include <linux/sysctl.h>
> >
> > #ifdef CONFIG_FBFAM
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
> > +extern struct ctl_table fbfam_sysctls[];
> > +#endif
>
> Instead of doing the extern and adding to sysctl.c, this can all be done
> directly (dynamically) from the fbfam.c file instead.
Like Yama do in the yama_init_sysctl() function? As a reference code.
> > int fbfam_fork(struct task_struct *child);
> > int fbfam_execve(void);
> > int fbfam_exit(void);
> > diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
> > index 09e70ee2332e..c3b4d737bef3 100644
> > --- a/kernel/sysctl.c
> > +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
> > @@ -77,6 +77,8 @@
> > #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> > #include <asm/processor.h>
> >
> > +#include <fbfam/fbfam.h>
> > +
> > #ifdef CONFIG_X86
> > #include <asm/nmi.h>
> > #include <asm/stacktrace.h>
> > @@ -2660,6 +2662,13 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
> > .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
> > .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
> > },
> > +#endif
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_FBFAM
> > + {
> > + .procname = "fbfam",
> > + .mode = 0555,
> > + .child = fbfam_sysctls,
> > + },
> > #endif
> > { }
> > };
> > diff --git a/security/fbfam/Makefile b/security/fbfam/Makefile
> > index f4b9f0b19c44..b8d5751ecea4 100644
> > --- a/security/fbfam/Makefile
> > +++ b/security/fbfam/Makefile
> > @@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
> > # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> > obj-$(CONFIG_FBFAM) += fbfam.o
> > +obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o
> > diff --git a/security/fbfam/fbfam.c b/security/fbfam/fbfam.c
> > index 0387f95f6408..9be4639b72eb 100644
> > --- a/security/fbfam/fbfam.c
> > +++ b/security/fbfam/fbfam.c
> > @@ -7,6 +7,17 @@
> > #include <linux/refcount.h>
> > #include <linux/slab.h>
> >
> > +/**
> > + * sysctl_crashing_rate_threshold - Crashing rate threshold.
> > + *
> > + * The rate's units are in milliseconds per fault.
> > + *
> > + * A fork brute force attack will be detected if the application's crashing rate
> > + * falls under this threshold. So, the higher this value, the faster an attack
> > + * will be detected.
> > + */
> > +unsigned long sysctl_crashing_rate_threshold = 30000;
>
> I would move the sysctls here, instead. (Also, the above should be
> const.)
If the above variable is const how the sysctl interface can modify it?
I think it would be better to declare it as __read_mostly instead. What
do you think?
unsigned long sysctl_crashing_rate_threshold __read_mostly = 30000;
> > +
> > /**
> > * struct fbfam_stats - Fork brute force attack mitigation statistics.
> > * @refc: Reference counter.
> > diff --git a/security/fbfam/sysctl.c b/security/fbfam/sysctl.c
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..430323ad8e9f
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/security/fbfam/sysctl.c
> > @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
> > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> > +#include <linux/sysctl.h>
> > +
> > +extern unsigned long sysctl_crashing_rate_threshold;
> > +static unsigned long ulong_one = 1;
> > +static unsigned long ulong_max = ULONG_MAX;
> > +
> > +struct ctl_table fbfam_sysctls[] = {
> > + {
> > + .procname = "crashing_rate_threshold",
> > + .data = &sysctl_crashing_rate_threshold,
> > + .maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_crashing_rate_threshold),
> > + .mode = 0644,
> > + .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
> > + .extra1 = &ulong_one,
> > + .extra2 = &ulong_max,
> > + },
> > + { }
> > +};
>
> I wouldn't bother splitting this into a separate file. (Just leave it in
> fbfam.c)
>
> --
> Kees Cook
Thanks,
John Wood
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-09-13 14:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-09-10 20:21 [RESEND][RFC PATCH 0/6] Fork brute force attack mitigation (fbfam) Kees Cook
2020-09-10 20:21 ` [RFC PATCH 1/6] security/fbfam: Add a Kconfig to enable the fbfam feature Kees Cook
2020-09-10 21:21 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-17 17:32 ` John Wood
2020-09-10 23:18 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-17 18:40 ` John Wood
2020-09-17 22:05 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-18 14:50 ` John Wood
2020-09-10 20:21 ` [RFC PATCH 2/6] security/fbfam: Add the api to manage statistics Kees Cook
2020-09-10 23:23 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-10 20:21 ` [RFC PATCH 3/6] security/fbfam: Use " Kees Cook
2020-09-10 20:27 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-10 23:33 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-29 23:47 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-09-29 23:49 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-10-03 9:52 ` John Wood
2020-09-10 20:21 ` [RFC PATCH 4/6] security/fbfam: Add a new sysctl to control the crashing rate threshold Kees Cook
2020-09-10 23:14 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-13 14:33 ` John Wood [this message]
2020-09-10 20:21 ` [RFC PATCH 5/6] security/fbfam: Detect a fork brute force attack Kees Cook
2020-09-10 21:10 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-13 17:54 ` John Wood
2020-09-14 19:42 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-15 18:44 ` John Wood
2020-09-10 23:49 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-11 0:01 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-13 16:56 ` John Wood
2020-09-14 19:39 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-15 17:36 ` John Wood
2020-09-10 20:21 ` [RFC PATCH 6/6] security/fbfam: Mitigate " Kees Cook
2020-09-10 20:55 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-10 23:56 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-11 0:20 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-18 16:02 ` John Wood
2020-09-18 21:35 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-19 8:01 ` John Wood
2020-09-10 20:39 ` [RESEND][RFC PATCH 0/6] Fork brute force attack mitigation (fbfam) Jann Horn
2020-09-10 23:58 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-11 14:48 ` John Wood
2020-09-12 7:55 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-12 12:24 ` John Wood
2020-09-12 0:03 ` James Morris
2020-09-12 7:56 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-12 9:36 ` John Wood
2020-09-12 14:47 ` Mel Gorman
2020-09-12 20:48 ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2020-09-13 7:24 ` John Wood
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