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From: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
To: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
	mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com,
	luto@amacapital.net, trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 07/13] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub
Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 13:38:01 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200924173801.GA103726@rani.riverdale.lan> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1600959521-24158-8-git-send-email-ross.philipson@oracle.com>

On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 10:58:35AM -0400, Ross Philipson wrote:
> The Secure Launch (SL) stub provides the entry point for Intel TXT (and
> later AMD SKINIT) to vector to during the late launch. The symbol
> sl_stub_entry is that entry point and its offset into the kernel is
> conveyed to the launching code using the MLE (Measured Launch
> Environment) header in the structure named mle_header. The offset of the
> MLE header is set in the kernel_info. The routine sl_stub contains the
> very early late launch setup code responsible for setting up the basic
> environment to allow the normal kernel startup_32 code to proceed. It is
> also responsible for properly waking and handling the APs on Intel
> platforms. The routine sl_main which runs after entering 64b mode is
> responsible for measuring configuration and module information before
> it is used like the boot params, the kernel command line, the TXT heap,
> an external initramfs, etc.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>

Which version of the kernel is this based on?

> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
> index 97d37f0..42043bf 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
> @@ -279,6 +279,21 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(efi32_pe_stub_entry, SYM_L_LOCAL)
>  SYM_FUNC_END(efi32_stub_entry)
>  #endif
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH
> +SYM_FUNC_START(sl_stub_entry)
> +	/*
> +	 * On entry, %ebx has the entry abs offset to sl_stub_entry. To
> +	 * find the beginning of where we are loaded, sub off from the
> +	 * beginning.
> +	 */

This requirement should be added to the documentation. Is it necessary
or can this stub just figure out the address the same way as the other
32-bit entry points, using the scratch space in bootparams as a little
stack?

> +	leal	(startup_32 - sl_stub_entry)(%ebx), %ebx
> +
> +	/* More room to work in sl_stub in the text section */
> +	jmp	sl_stub
> +
> +SYM_FUNC_END(sl_stub_entry)
> +#endif
> +
>  	.code64
>  	.org 0x200
>  SYM_CODE_START(startup_64)
> @@ -537,6 +552,25 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(.Lrelocated)
>  	shrq	$3, %rcx
>  	rep	stosq
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH
> +	/*
> +	 * Have to do the final early sl stub work in 64b area.
> +	 *
> +	 * *********** NOTE ***********
> +	 *
> +	 * Several boot params get used before we get a chance to measure
> +	 * them in this call. This is a known issue and we currently don't
> +	 * have a solution. The scratch field doesn't matter and loadflags
> +	 * have KEEP_SEGMENTS set by the stub code. There is no obvious way
> +	 * to do anything about the use of kernel_alignment or init_size
> +	 * though these seem low risk.
> +	 */

There are various fields in bootparams that depend on where the
kernel/initrd and cmdline are loaded in memory. If the entire bootparams
page is getting measured, does that mean they all have to be at fixed
addresses on every boot?

Also KEEP_SEGMENTS support is gone from the kernel since v5.7, since it
was unused. startup_32 now always loads a GDT and then the segment
registers. I think this should be ok for you as the only thing the flag
used to do in the 64-bit kernel was to stop startup_32 from blindly
loading __BOOT_DS into the segment registers before it had setup its own
GDT.

For the 32-bit assembler code that's being added, tip/master now has
changes that prevent the compressed kernel from having any runtime
relocations.  You'll need to revise some of the code and the data
structures initial values to avoid creating relocations.

Thanks.

  reply	other threads:[~2020-09-24 17:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-09-24 14:58 [PATCH 00/13] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 01/13] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2020-09-25  2:08   ` Randy Dunlap
2020-09-25 14:59     ` Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 02/13] x86: Secure Launch main header file Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 03/13] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2020-09-29 17:26   ` Jason Andryuk
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 04/13] x86: Add early TPM TIS/CRB interface support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 05/13] x86: Add early TPM1.2/TPM2.0 " Ross Philipson
2020-09-25  5:43   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-29 23:47     ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-09-30  3:19       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-30  3:24         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-20  0:33     ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 06/13] x86: Add early general TPM " Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 07/13] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 17:38   ` Arvind Sankar [this message]
2020-09-25 14:56     ` Ross Philipson
2020-09-25 19:18       ` Arvind Sankar
2020-09-29 14:03         ` Ross Philipson
2020-09-29 14:53           ` Arvind Sankar
2020-10-15 18:26           ` Daniel Kiper
2020-10-16 20:51             ` Arvind Sankar
2020-10-19 14:38               ` Ross Philipson
2020-10-19 17:06                 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-10-19 19:00                   ` Ross Philipson
2020-10-19 14:51               ` Daniel Kiper
2020-10-19 17:18                 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-10-21 15:28                   ` Daniel Kiper
2020-10-21 16:18                     ` Arvind Sankar
2020-10-21 20:36                       ` Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 08/13] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 09/13] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 10/13] x86: Secure Launch adding event log securityfs Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 11/13] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 12/13] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 13/13] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2020-09-25  5:30 ` [PATCH 00/13] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-25 21:32   ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-09-27 23:59     ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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