From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To: "Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Cc: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
hpa@zytor.com, luto@amacapital.net,
trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/13] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2020 02:59:08 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200927235908.GC5283@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8329607a-704d-1da0-dc7b-4b97c2440afb@apertussolutions.com>
On Fri, Sep 25, 2020 at 05:32:50PM -0400, Daniel P. Smith wrote:
> The work for this is split across different teams with different
> resourcing levels resulting in one organization working Intel and
> another working AMD. This then raised the concern over submitting a
> single patch set developed by two groups pseudo-independently. In this
> situation the result would be patches being submitted from one
> organization that had no direct development or testing and therefore
> could not sign off on a subset of the patches being submitted.
Not sure if internal team structures qualify as a techical argument for
upstream code.
> > I'd be more motivated to review and test a full all encompassing x86
> > solution. It would increase the patch set size but would also give it
> > a better test coverage, which I think would be a huge plus in such a
> > complex patch set.
>
> We would not disagree with those sentiments but see the previous
> response about the conflict that exists.
At minimum, you have to make the case that the AMD support is easy to
tackle in to the framework of things you have later on.
/Jarkko
prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-09-27 23:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-09-24 14:58 [PATCH 00/13] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 01/13] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2020-09-25 2:08 ` Randy Dunlap
2020-09-25 14:59 ` Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 02/13] x86: Secure Launch main header file Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 03/13] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2020-09-29 17:26 ` Jason Andryuk
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 04/13] x86: Add early TPM TIS/CRB interface support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 05/13] x86: Add early TPM1.2/TPM2.0 " Ross Philipson
2020-09-25 5:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-29 23:47 ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-09-30 3:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-30 3:24 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-20 0:33 ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 06/13] x86: Add early general TPM " Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 07/13] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 17:38 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-09-25 14:56 ` Ross Philipson
2020-09-25 19:18 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-09-29 14:03 ` Ross Philipson
2020-09-29 14:53 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-10-15 18:26 ` Daniel Kiper
2020-10-16 20:51 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-10-19 14:38 ` Ross Philipson
2020-10-19 17:06 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-10-19 19:00 ` Ross Philipson
2020-10-19 14:51 ` Daniel Kiper
2020-10-19 17:18 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-10-21 15:28 ` Daniel Kiper
2020-10-21 16:18 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-10-21 20:36 ` Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 08/13] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 09/13] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 10/13] x86: Secure Launch adding event log securityfs Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 11/13] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 12/13] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 13/13] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2020-09-25 5:30 ` [PATCH 00/13] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-25 21:32 ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-09-27 23:59 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
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