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From: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <>
To: Josh Triplett <>
Cc: "Darrick J. Wong" <>,
	Linus Torvalds <>,
	Andreas Dilger <>,
	Jan Kara <>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <>,
Subject: Re: ext4 regression in v5.9-rc2 from e7bfb5c9bb3d on ro fs with overlapped bitmaps
Date: Wed, 7 Oct 2020 22:10:17 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201007201424.GB15049@localhost>

On Wed, Oct 07, 2020 at 01:14:24PM -0700, Josh Triplett wrote:
> That sounds like a conversation that would have been a lot more
> interesting and enjoyable if it hadn't started with "can we shoot it in
> the head", and continued with the notion that anything other than
> e2fsprogs making something to be mounted by mount(2) and handled by
> fs/ext4 is being "inflicted", and if the goal didn't still seem to be
> "how do we make it go away so that only e2fsprogs and the kernel ever
> touch ext4". I started this thread because I'd written some userspace
> code, a new version of the kernel made that userspace code stop working,
> so I wanted to report that the moment I'd discovered that, along with a
> potential way to address it with as little disrupton to ext4 as
> possible.

What is really getting my dander up is your attempt to claim that the
on-disk file system format is like the userspace/kernel interface,
where if we break any file system that file system that was
"previously accepted by an older kernel", this is a bug that must be
reverted or otherwise fixed to allow file systems that had previously
worked, to continue to work.  And this is true even if the file system
is ***invalid***.

And the problem with this is that there have been any number of
commits where file systems which were previously invalid, but which
could be caused to trigger a syzbot whine, which was fixed by
tightening up the validity tests in the kernel.  In some cases, I had
to also had to fix up e2fsck to detect the invalid file system which
was generated by the file system fuzzer.  Yes, it's unfortunate that
we didn't have these checks earlier, but a file system has a huge
amount of state.

The principle you've articulated would make it impossible for me to
fix these bugs, unless I can prove that the failure to check a
particular invalid file system corruption could lead to a security
vulnerability.  (Would it be OK for me to make the kernel more strict
and reject an invalid file system if it triggers a WARN_ON, so I get
the syzbot complaint, but it doesn't actually cause a security issue?)

So this conversation would have been a lot more pleasant for *me* if
you hadn't tried to elevate your request to a general principle, where
if someone is deliberately generating an invalid file system, I'm not
allowed to make the kernel more strict to detect said invalidity and
to reject the invalid / corrupted / fuzzed file system.

And note that sometimes the security problem happens when there are
multiple file system corruptions that are chained together.  So
enabling block validity *can* sometimes prevent the fuzzed file system
from proceeding further.  Granted, this is less likely in the case of
a read-only file system, but it really worries me when there are
proprietary programs (maybe your library isn't proprietary, but I note
you haven't send me a link to your git repo, but instead have offered
sending sample file systems) which insist on generating their own file
systems, which might or might not be valid, and then expecting them to
receive first class support as part of an iron-bound contract where
I'm not even allowed to add stronger sanity checks which might reject
said invalid file system in the future.

> The short version is that I needed a library to rapidly turn
> dynamically-obtained data into a set of disk blocks to be served
> on-the-fly as a software-defined disk, and then mounted on the other
> side of that interface by the Linux kernel. Turns out that's *many
> orders of magnitude* faster than any kind of network filesystem like
> NFS. It's slightly similar to a vvfat for ext4. The less blocks it can
> generate and account for and cache, the faster it can run, and
> microseconds matter.

So are you actually trying to dedup data blocks, or are you just
trying to avoid needing to track the block allocation bitmaps?  And
are you just writing a single file, or multiple files?  Do you know
what the maximum size of the file or files will be?  Do you need a
complex directory structure, or just a single root directory?  Can the
file system be sparse?

So for example, you can do something like this, which puts all of the
metadata at beginning of the file system, and then you could write to
contiguous data blocks.  Add the following in mke2fs.conf:

    hugefile = {
        features = extent,huge_file,bigalloc,flex_bg,uninit_bg,dir_nlink,extra_isize,^resize_inode,sparse_super2
        cluster_size = 32768
        hash_alg = half_md4
        reserved_ratio = 0.0
        num_backup_sb = 0
        packed_meta_blocks = 1
        make_hugefiles = 1
        inode_ratio = 4194304
        hugefiles_dir = /storage
        hugefiles_name = huge-file
        hugefiles_digits = 0
        hugefiles_size = 0
        hugefiles_align = 256M
        hugefiles_align_disk = true
        num_hugefiles = 1
        zero_hugefiles = false
	inode_size = 128

   hugefiles = {
        features = extent,huge_file,flex_bg,uninit_bg,dir_nlink,extra_isize,^resize_inode,sparse_super2
        hash_alg = half_md4
        reserved_ratio = 0.0
        num_backup_sb = 0
        packed_meta_blocks = 1
        make_hugefiles = 1
        inode_ratio = 4194304
        hugefiles_dir = /storage
        hugefiles_name = chunk-
        hugefiles_digits = 5
        hugefiles_size = 4G
        hugefiles_align = 256M
        hugefiles_align_disk = true
        zero_hugefiles = false
        flex_bg_size = 262144
	inode_size = 128

... and then run "mke2fs -T hugefile /tmp/image 1T" or "mke2fs -T
hugefiles /tmp/image 1T", and see what you get.  In the case of
hugefile, you'll see a single file which covers the entire storage
device.  Because we are using bigalloc with a large cluster size, this
minimizes the number of bitmap blocks.

With hugefiles, it will create a set of 4G files to fill the size of
the disk, again, aligned to 256 MiB zones at the beginning of the
disk.  In both cases, the file or files are aligned to 256 MiB
relative to beginning of the disk, which can be handy if you are
creating the file system, on, say, a 14T SMR disk.  And this is a
niche use case if there ever was one!  :-)

So if you had come to the ext4 list with a set of requirements, it
could have been that we could have come up with something which uses
the existing file system features, or come up with something which
would have been more specific --- and more importantly, we'd know what
the semantics were of various on-disk file system formats that people
are depending upon.

> If at some point I'm looking to make ext4 support more than it already
> does (e.g. a way to omit bitmaps entirely, or a way to express
> contiguous files with smaller extent maps, or other enhancements for
> read-only filesystems),

See above for a way to significantly reduce the number of bitmaps.
Adding a way to omit bitmaps entirely would require an INCOMPAT flag,
so it might not be worth it.

The way to express contiguous files with smaller extent files would be
to extend the kernel to allow file systems with block_size > page_size
read-only.  This would allow you to create a file system with a block
size of 64k, which will reduce the size of the extent maps by a factor
of 16, and it wouldn't be all that hard to teach ext4 to support these
file systems.  (The reason why it would be hard for us to support file
systems with block sizes > page size is dealing with page cache when
writing files while allocating blocks, especially when doing random
writes into a sparse file.  Read-only would be much easier to

So please, talk to us, and *tell* us what it is you're trying to do
before you try to do it.  Don't rely on some implementation detail
where we're not being sufficiently strict in checking for an invalid
file system, especially without telling us in advance and then trying
to hold us to the lack of checking forever because it's "breaking
things that used to work".


					- Ted

  reply	other threads:[~2020-10-08  2:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-10-04 23:17 Linux 5.9-rc8 Linus Torvalds
2020-10-05  8:14 ` ext4 regression in v5.9-rc2 from e7bfb5c9bb3d on ro fs with overlapped bitmaps Josh Triplett
2020-10-05  9:46   ` Jan Kara
2020-10-05 10:16     ` Josh Triplett
2020-10-05 16:19       ` Jan Kara
2020-10-05 16:20   ` Jan Kara
2020-10-05 17:36   ` Darrick J. Wong
2020-10-06  0:04     ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2020-10-06  0:32     ` Josh Triplett
2020-10-06  2:51       ` Darrick J. Wong
2020-10-06  3:18         ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2020-10-06  5:03           ` Josh Triplett
2020-10-06  6:03             ` Josh Triplett
2020-10-06 13:35             ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2020-10-07  8:03               ` Josh Triplett
2020-10-07 14:32                 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2020-10-07 20:14                   ` Josh Triplett
2020-10-08  2:10                     ` Theodore Y. Ts'o [this message]
2020-10-08 17:54                       ` Darrick J. Wong
2020-10-08 22:38                         ` Josh Triplett
2020-10-09  2:54                           ` Darrick J. Wong
2020-10-09 19:08                             ` Josh Triplett
2020-10-08 22:22                       ` Josh Triplett
2020-10-09 14:37                         ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2020-10-09 20:30                           ` Josh Triplett
2021-01-10 18:41                           ` Malicious fs images was " Pavel Machek
2021-01-11 18:51                             ` Darrick J. Wong
2021-01-11 19:39                               ` Eric Biggers
2021-01-12 21:43                             ` Theodore Ts'o
2021-01-12 22:28                               ` Pavel Machek
2021-01-13  5:09                                 ` Theodore Ts'o
2020-10-08  2:57                     ` Andreas Dilger
2020-10-08 19:12                       ` Josh Triplett
2020-10-08 19:25                         ` Andreas Dilger
2020-10-08 22:28                           ` Josh Triplett

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