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From: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
To: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	madvenka@linux.microsoft.com, jthierry@redhat.com,
	catalin.marinas@arm.com, will@kernel.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	live-patching@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/4] arm64: Implement stack trace reliability checks
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2021 18:36:17 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210412173617.GE5379@sirena.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210409213741.kqmwyajoppuqrkge@treble>

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On Fri, Apr 09, 2021 at 04:37:41PM -0500, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 09, 2021 at 01:09:09PM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:

> > Further, I believe all the special cases are assembly functions, and
> > most of those are already in special sections to begin with. I reckon
> > it'd be simpler and more robust to reject unwinding based on the
> > section. If we need to unwind across specific functions in those
> > sections, we could opt-in with some metadata. So e.g. we could reject
> > all functions in ".entry.text", special casing the EL0 entry functions
> > if necessary.

> Couldn't this also end up being somewhat fragile?  Saying "certain
> sections are deemed unreliable" isn't necessarily obvious to somebody
> who doesn't already know about it, and it could be overlooked or
> forgotten over time.  And there's no way to enforce it stays that way.

Anything in this area is going to have some opportunity for fragility
and missed assumptions somewhere.  I do find the idea of using the
SYM_CODE annotations that we already have and use for other purposes to
flag code that we don't expect to be suitable for reliable unwinding
appealing from that point of view.  It's pretty clear at the points
where they're used that they're needed, even with a pretty surface level
review, and the bit actually pushing things into a section is going to
be in a single place where the macro is defined.  That seems relatively
robust as these things go, it seems no worse than our reliance on
SYM_FUNC to create BTI annotations.  Missing those causes oopses when we
try to branch to the function.

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-04-12 17:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <705993ccb34a611c75cdae0a8cb1b40f9b218ebd>
2021-04-05 20:43 ` [RFC PATCH v2 0/4] arm64: Implement stack trace reliability checks madvenka
2021-04-05 20:43   ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/4] arm64: Implement infrastructure for " madvenka
2021-04-08 15:15     ` Mark Brown
2021-04-08 17:17     ` Mark Brown
2021-04-08 19:30       ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2021-04-08 23:30         ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2021-04-09 11:57           ` Mark Brown
2021-04-05 20:43   ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/4] arm64: Mark a stack trace unreliable if an EL1 exception frame is detected madvenka
2021-04-05 20:43   ` [RFC PATCH v2 3/4] arm64: Detect FTRACE cases that make the stack trace unreliable madvenka
2021-04-08 16:58     ` Mark Brown
2021-04-08 19:23       ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2021-04-09 11:31         ` Mark Brown
2021-04-09 14:02           ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2021-04-09 12:27     ` Mark Rutland
2021-04-09 17:23       ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2021-04-05 20:43   ` [RFC PATCH v2 4/4] arm64: Mark stack trace as unreliable if kretprobed functions are present madvenka
2021-04-09 12:09   ` [RFC PATCH v2 0/4] arm64: Implement stack trace reliability checks Mark Rutland
2021-04-09 17:16     ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2021-04-09 21:37     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2021-04-09 22:05       ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2021-04-09 22:32         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2021-04-09 22:53           ` Josh Poimboeuf
2021-04-11 17:54             ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2021-04-12 16:59           ` Mark Brown
2021-04-13 22:53             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2021-04-14 12:24               ` Mark Brown
2021-04-12 17:36       ` Mark Brown [this message]
2021-04-12 19:55         ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2021-04-13 11:02           ` Mark Brown
2021-04-14 10:23             ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2021-04-14 12:35               ` Mark Brown
2021-04-16 14:43               ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2021-04-16 15:36                 ` Mark Brown

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