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* [PATCH 1/2] seq_buf: fix overflow in seq_buf_putmem_hex()
@ 2021-06-26  3:21 Yun Zhou
  2021-06-26  3:21 ` [PATCH 2/2] seq_buf: Make trace_seq_putmem_hex() support data longer than 8 Yun Zhou
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Yun Zhou @ 2021-06-26  3:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: rostedt; +Cc: linux-kernel, kernel-hardening, ying.xue, zhiquan.li

There's two variables being increased in that loop (i and j), and i
follows the raw data, and j follows what is being written into the buffer.
We should compare 'i' to MAX_MEMHEX_BYTES or compare 'j' to HEX_CHARS.
Otherwise, if 'j' goes bigger than HEX_CHARS, it will overflow the
destination buffer.

This bug exists in the original code (commit 5e3ca0ec76fce 'ftrace:
introduce the "hex" output method'). Although its original design did
not support more than 8 bytes, the only check on length seems to have
mistaken the comparison object, 'len' should compare to 'HEX_CHARS/2'.
    BUG_ON(len >= HEX_CHARS);

Signed-off-by: Yun Zhou <yun.zhou@windriver.com>
---
 lib/seq_buf.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/lib/seq_buf.c b/lib/seq_buf.c
index 6aabb609dd87..223fbc3bb958 100644
--- a/lib/seq_buf.c
+++ b/lib/seq_buf.c
@@ -228,8 +228,10 @@ int seq_buf_putmem_hex(struct seq_buf *s, const void *mem,
 
 	WARN_ON(s->size == 0);
 
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(MAX_MEMHEX_BYTES * 2 >= HEX_CHARS);
+
 	while (len) {
-		start_len = min(len, HEX_CHARS - 1);
+		start_len = min(len, MAX_MEMHEX_BYTES);
 #ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
 		for (i = 0, j = 0; i < start_len; i++) {
 #else
-- 
2.26.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 1/2] seq_buf: fix overflow when length is bigger than 8
@ 2021-06-25 15:53 Yun Zhou
  2021-06-25 15:53 ` [PATCH 2/2] seq_buf: Make trace_seq_putmem_hex() support data longer " Yun Zhou
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Yun Zhou @ 2021-06-25 15:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: rostedt; +Cc: linux-kernel, kernel-hardening, ying.xue, zhiquan.li

There's two variables being increased in that loop (i and j), and i
follows the raw data, and j follows what is being written into the buffer.
We should compare 'i' to MAX_MEMHEX_BYTES or compare 'j' to HEX_CHARS.
Otherwise, if 'j' goes bigger than HEX_CHARS, it will overflow the
destination buffer.

This bug was introduced by commit 6d2289f3faa71dcc ("tracing: Make
trace_seq_putmem_hex() more robust")

Signed-off-by: Yun Zhou <yun.zhou@windriver.com>
---
 lib/seq_buf.c | 29 +++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/seq_buf.c b/lib/seq_buf.c
index 6aabb609dd87..aa2f666e584e 100644
--- a/lib/seq_buf.c
+++ b/lib/seq_buf.c
@@ -210,7 +210,8 @@ int seq_buf_putmem(struct seq_buf *s, const void *mem, unsigned int len)
  * seq_buf_putmem_hex - write raw memory into the buffer in ASCII hex
  * @s: seq_buf descriptor
  * @mem: The raw memory to write its hex ASCII representation of
- * @len: The length of the raw memory to copy (in bytes)
+ * @len: The length of the raw memory to copy (in bytes).
+ *       It can be not larger than 8.
  *
  * This is similar to seq_buf_putmem() except instead of just copying the
  * raw memory into the buffer it writes its ASCII representation of it
@@ -228,27 +229,19 @@ int seq_buf_putmem_hex(struct seq_buf *s, const void *mem,
 
 	WARN_ON(s->size == 0);
 
-	while (len) {
-		start_len = min(len, HEX_CHARS - 1);
+	start_len = min(len, MAX_MEMHEX_BYTES);
 #ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
-		for (i = 0, j = 0; i < start_len; i++) {
+	for (i = 0, j = 0; i < start_len; i++) {
 #else
-		for (i = start_len-1, j = 0; i >= 0; i--) {
+	for (i = start_len-1, j = 0; i >= 0; i--) {
 #endif
-			hex[j++] = hex_asc_hi(data[i]);
-			hex[j++] = hex_asc_lo(data[i]);
-		}
-		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(j == 0 || j/2 > len))
-			break;
-
-		/* j increments twice per loop */
-		len -= j / 2;
-		hex[j++] = ' ';
-
-		seq_buf_putmem(s, hex, j);
-		if (seq_buf_has_overflowed(s))
-			return -1;
+		hex[j++] = hex_asc_hi(data[i]);
+		hex[j++] = hex_asc_lo(data[i]);
 	}
+
+	seq_buf_putmem(s, hex, j);
+	if (seq_buf_has_overflowed(s))
+		return -1;
 	return 0;
 }
 
-- 
2.26.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

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Thread overview: 3+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
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2021-06-26  3:21 [PATCH 1/2] seq_buf: fix overflow in seq_buf_putmem_hex() Yun Zhou
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2021-06-25 15:53 [PATCH 1/2] seq_buf: fix overflow when length is bigger " Yun Zhou
2021-06-25 15:53 ` [PATCH 2/2] seq_buf: Make trace_seq_putmem_hex() support data longer " Yun Zhou

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